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JOHN WILLIAMS WHITE, LEWIS R. PACKARD, AND THOMAS D. SEYMOUR.

PLATO

APOLOGY OF SOCRATES

AND

CRITO

EDITED
ON THE BASIS OF CRON'S EDITION
BY
LOUIS DYER
Assistant Professor in Harvard University.

BOSTON:
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HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
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The endowment of philosophical thought with a beautiful form of its own was the last literary triumph of Greece. Guided by a wonderful law of growth, the Greeks, before dealing with philosophy, had already displayed in the elaboration of various kinds of literature their singular susceptibility to beauty. Epic and lyric composition first ran their full course and then the drama succeeded them. Indeed not poetry only but also history and oratory preceded philosophy, for when the drama was perfect they were nearly so. Philosophy, meanwhile, still lacked an outward form for the expression of what she was bound to say. This lack involves more than a question of clothing: the body itself of Greek thought was as yet but imperfectly developed. Since thought (ratio) is the soul of which the body is utterance (oratio), we cannot wonder at finding a single Greek word (λόγος) for both, nor can we fail to see that the soul of philosophy was not full-grown until it had fashioned for itself a body in which to stand forth free and independent.

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Yet a far less material notion of this permanent something underlying all change was undoubtedly arrived at by the Pythagoreans. Born at Samos, Pythagoras emigrated to Croton, where about 530 B.C. he founded the half religious and half political society which bore his name. These Pythagoreans believed that number was the essence of things, the permanent and real part of the world, or, to give their second way of putting the doctrine, that the elements of numbers are the elements of things. This doctrine admits of application not only to the physical world, but also to


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The Pythagoreans approached a comparatively spiritual conception of nature, but the Eleatics went further in the same direction. Xenophanes of Colophon, the reputed originator of this new doctrine, was probably a contemporary of Pythagoras. Looking upon the world as a whole, he maintained that the All is the One, and that the One is God. This utterance implies a deep-seated moral conviction that God is perfection. Parmenides, who was born about 515 B.C., at Elea, a Phocaean colony in Italy, first devel-

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oped the doctrines of Xenophanes, saying that what has not Being but is many does not exist. He maintained the Oneness of all that is, calling it Being, pure and simple. Following Xenophanes, Parmenides set forth his doctrine in a long didactic poem in epic verse. Zeno supported this theory by indirect demonstration, pointing out the contradictions in which we are involved by maintaining the opposite view, that what is many has Being or exists. Finally, Melissus of Samos, well known as a Samian general in the revolt of that island from Athens, about 440 B.C., accepted the views of Parmenides, and, unlike Zeno, argued directly that Being is eternal, infinite, one and unchangeable.

The physical first cause of Pythagoreanism suggests the possibility of a systematic theory of right and wrong, that is of Ethics. The Eleatic first cause gives promise of a coming system of philosophic reasoning, of Dialectic. For all this we must not call Zeno the originator of Dialectic. Any inclination to do so ought to disappear after a consideration of his method in controversial reasoning and proof. He argues, not to win truth from the heart of his facts, but to defend a ready-made doctrine and to thrust it upon those whose attention he gains. At its best this is rhetoric, at its worst it is sophistry.

Conflicting authorities leave us uncertain whether it was before or after the completer statement of the Eleatic doctrines by Parmenides, that Heraclitus of Ephesus flatly contradicted the saying forty. This is not history, but it gives a chronological clue.

1 Assert that the many things seen in the world really exist, and you must admit that they are at the same time limited and limitless. For if these things are real there must be a definite sum of them, not more and not less. Hence they are limited. But they are also limitless; because, taking their definite sum and subdividing it as often as we please, we still can go on with the subdivision indefinitely and without limit.

2 If there is no Being, why do we talk of anything as being? If there is Being, either it always existed or it came into existence at some time. If it came into existence it must have grown out of something of which we could have said it is or it is not. Out of that which is not nothing can grow, therefore Being can only have grown out of Being.


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of his older contemporary Xenophanes that the One admits neither motion nor change. Heraclitus is said to have flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad, 500 B.C. The elaborate superstructure of his teaching rested upon the following statement: "Everything is moving like a stream, and nothing stands still; all things are forever coming into existence and ceaselessly flowing away. The world was from the beginning, and always will be, ever-living fire, kindling by fixed degrees and by fixed degrees dying down. Everything has its price in terms of Fire, and Fire pays for the world as gold buys goods and goods are sold for gold." The phraseology here used abundantly shows that Heraclitus, in speaking of fire as he does, is not following the older Ionic philosophers by taking his turn at describing anew a permanent substratum in their sense. Under the veil of his oracular words the meaning is given as it were in a parable. Ever-living Fire stands for the restless impulse which underlies the process of becoming or transformation. This process he also calls the upward and the downward way, meaning the constant shifting of things growing up and dying down. This he thought was the common life in all Nature. Such was the picture which he drew of the world. In the same vein Heraclitus said, "The father of all things is war," meaning by war the united play of opposites or things contradictory. "Concord," he said, "is the daughter of strife."

By making his system account for the world of sensible things Heraclitus undoubtedly improves upon the Eleatics. And this, too, in spite of his substantial agreement with them in certain leading conclusions. In the first place, both schools agree in rejecting all sensible impressions as wholly untrustworthy; reaching this conclusion, however, from points of view diametrically opposed. This agreement is most obvious in their respective accounts of particular (sensible) things. Heraclitus's stream of ceaseless transformation or Becoming allows to no single thing an instant of real and permanent existence, and thus practically relegates all things that we see in the world to a state of non-existence. Parmenides regards the sensible world as non-existent, opposing to it pure existence one and indivisible. But the Eleatics provide no means
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for connecting pure Being on the one hand with Not-being on the other, and, unlike Heraclitus, they cleave the world in twain and find no way of uniting the two parts. In the second place, Parmenides teaches that outside of the thought of the One there is no true thinking but only deceptive ‘opining,’ while Heraclitus urges that the ‘universal’ which pervades all things (τὸ ἕνὸν = τὸ κοινὸν) alone has understanding. This understanding the ‘individual’ shares only in proportion to the degree of its submission to and submersion in the ‘universal.’ Here is substantial agreement, but here again Heraclitus takes a wider view than Parmenides, and accordingly makes a fuller provision for the facts.

7 Though Heraclitus did not follow the example of Xenophanes and Parmenides, but wrote his work in prose, he expressed himself most obscurely. It was on this account that the ancients themselves nicknamed him ὁ σκοτεινός, the man of darkness. We hear that Socrates, when asked by Euripides for his opinion of Heraclitus’s book, gave this answer: “All that I could fathom was excellent; what I could not fathom is no doubt the same, only we had better send to Delos for a man to do the diving.” Aristotle says that Heraclitus is obscure because it is impossible to decide how his words are to be combined, and of the parts of his book that are preserved not a few justify this statement. For instance, a passage that has been much discussed ἐν τῷ σοφῷ μοιῶν λέγεται οὐκ ἔθλαι καὶ ἔθλαι Ζηνὸς σῶμα gives rise to two questions, neither of which can be satisfactorily answered. Shall we put a comma before or after καὶ ἔθλαι? How are the various words in the sentence to be construed?

8 Empedocles of Agrigentum stated his doctrines in a didactic poem after the manner of Xenophanes and Parmenides. He chose the epic form, and his work was the model after which Lucretius wrote his De rerum natura. Empedocles flourished in the eighty-fourth Olympiad, near the middle of the fifth century B.C. This date is confirmed by the report that he visited the newly founded

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1 Schleiermacher has collected and explained the fragments that are preserved (Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft, I. 3, Berlin, 1808; or, Werke zur Philosophie, II. 1). See the attempted restoration of the original sequence of the fragments, Heracliti Ephesii reliquiae, ed. I. Bywater, London, 1877.
colonies of Thurii. His system is closely connected with the Eleatic
as well as with the Heraclitan scheme of things, and also shows
traces of Pythagorean influence. Starting from the first principle,
that Not-being can no more come to be than Being can decay and
cease to be, he concludes that what men call growth and decay are
respectively cases of the combination and of the disintegration of
primal elements. His four elements are the familiar ones, to each
of which his imaginative genius gives a mythological name. Fire,
described as flaming Aether, he names Zeus; Air, Hera; Earth,
Aidonens; Water, Nestis. These four elements were at the be-
ginning inseparably united within the eternal Globe (Σφαῖρα),
which in all its parts was of like consistency. But outside of this
globe ruled Strife (Νέκρος), who finally invaded it, causing com-
plete disintegration. The resisting impulse of Love (Φιλία) reacted
from within and brought about a partial reintegration. This reac-
tion and reintegration gave rise to the frame of the world (Κόσμος)
with all the particular things which it comprises. In his detailed
account of sensible perception, feeling, and intellectual apprehen-
sion of the good and the bad, Empedocles applies his fundamental
principle with an unsteady hand, and is often involved in contradic-
tions. His religious theories are set forth in a separate work called
Καθαρμός.

Neither the date nor the place of the birth of Leucippus can 9
be determined, but we know that he founded the school of the
Atomists. Democritus of Abdera, born in the eightieth Olympiad,
about 460 B.C., was certainly his younger contemporary, and
probably his disciple. Upon Democritus devolved the task of de-
veloping this new system of thought.1 The Atomists were unwilling
to say either with Heraclitus (1) Being is a process of constant
change, or with Parmenides (2) Being immovable and unchangeable
exists apart from all particular things, but like Empedocles they
said (3) A number of original elements exists. Instead, however,
of four elements, they supposed an unlimited number of atoms
(αἱ ὄρομοι, sc. ὄστρα ἢ ιδέαι). These indivisible Atoms were in-

1 For the interesting fragments of
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ments," Berol. 1843. Also his work
referred to above, p. 4, note 3.
WARDLY ALIKE IN ESSENCE, AND SO SMALL AS TO BE INDISTINGUISHABLE; THEY DIFFERED IN SHAPE, ARRANGEMENT, AND POSITION. THEIR COMBINATION MEANS GROWTH; THEIR SEPARATION MEANS DECAY AND DESTRUCTION; THE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR SITUATION AND ARRANGEMENT IS AT THE BOTTOM OF SUCH VARIETY AND CHANGE AS WE SEE IN THE WORLD. BUT WHY, WE MAY ASK, SHOULD THESE ATOMS COMBINE OR SEPARATE? BECAUSE, SAYS THE ATOMIST, NECESSITY FORCES THEM TO MOVE. THIS NECESSARY MOTION COMES, NOT FROM ANY SOURCE OR CAUSE BEYOND AND ABOVE THEM, BUT IS DERIVED PARTLY FROM AN ORIGINAL ROTARY MOTION, A TWIST WHICH THEY TAKE AT THE START, AND PARTLY FROM THEIR CONSTANT COLLISION ONE WITH ANOTHER AND THE CONSEQUENT REACTION. BUT TO MOVE AT ALL THEY NEED ROOM TO MOVE IN. THIS ROOM IS A VACUUM WHICH OFFERS NO RESISTANCE; IT IS FREE AND EMPTY SPACE OR VOID, WHILE THE ATOMS ARE SPACE COMPACTED AND FILLED FULL, OR FULNESS. REALITY CONSISTS SOLELY OF THESE ATOMS, AND HENCE THEY ARE BEING, WHILE THE VOID IS NOT-BEING. AND YET NOT-BEING IN THIS SENSE HAS A RELATIVE EXISTENCE. THEREFORE THE ATOMISTS DID NOT HESITATE TO SAY: BEING NO MORE IS THAN NOT-BEING. BY ATOMS NOT THE PHYSICAL WORLD OF THE SENSES ONLY, BUT ALSO THE SOUL, IS EXPLAINED.

THE BODY IS THE CABIN, συγγενός, OF THE SOUL, AND ON THIS BASIS AN ATTEMPT IS MADE TO EXPLAIN MENTAL ACTIVITY AND THE LIFE OF THE SOUL. HERE THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE ATOMIC EXPLANATION OF THE WORLD SHOW THEMSELVES. STILL, AGAINST THE ATOMISTS THE POINT IS NOT WELL TAKEN THAT, BY NECESSITY, AN ATOMIST MUST MEAN CHANCE OR WHAT IS ARBITRARY, AND ALL PRAISE IS DUE TO THE DETERMINED LOGIC WITH WHICH THEY APPLY THEIR PRINCIPLE CONSISTENTLY TO EVERY DETAIL. DEMOCRITUS IS CREDITED WITH A NUMBER OF ADMIRABLE MORAL MAXIMS; THEY EXPRESS, HOWEVER, THE PLAIN COMMON-SENSE OF A MAN WHO MEANS TO MAKE THE MOST OF LIFE, RATHER THAN A MATURER PHILOSOPHY OF CONDUCT.

10 ANAXAGORAS OF CLAZOMENAE WAS BORN IN THE SEVENTIETH OLYMPIAD, ABOUT 500 B.C., AND THUS HIS BIRTH PRECEDED THAT OF EMPEDOCLES AND DEMOCRITUS; BUT HE MUST BE COUNTED AS BELONGING TO A MATUREER PHASE OF THOUGHT.1 WHEN ANAXAGORAS SAID: "ORDER IS INTRODUCED

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1 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 3: Ἀναξαγόρας . . . τῇ μὲν ἡλείᾳ πρῶτος δὲν τοῦτον (Ἐμπεδοκλέους), τοῖς δὲ ἔργοις ὁστε-ρος, ἀπελεύθερος ἐλαῖα φησι τὰς ἀρχὰς. OF his book Περὶ φύσεως a number of fragments are preserved. Schaubach has
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into the All by mind," there was no further use either for the half-mythological forces of Empedocles, or for the blind necessity of the Atomists. And yet, there was much upon which all the three schools would have agreed; Democritus and Empedocles would have welcomed Anaxagoras's dictum, "The Greeks are wrong in believing that there is such a thing as growing to be out of nothing or perishing away into nothing; nothing grows to be and nothing perishes, but all things are the mingling together and the falling apart of elements that really exist. So, therefore, to grow into being is properly to-be-compounded, and to perish is to-fall-apart." These elements that really exist Anaxagoras did not define as Empedocles defined his elements or as the Atomists defined their atoms. He often calls his elements seeds, στέρματα, and they have certain determinate qualities which make them the seeds of this, that, or the other particular kind of thing, e.g. gold, wood, bone. Flesh, blood, and bone are respectively combinations of parts, each one of which parts has the peculiar properties of the whole of which it is one part, and the whole has the properties of each of its parts. In speaking of such a whole, as well as of its parts, Aristotle used the word ὀμοιομερή (ὁμοιος, like, and μέρος, part); therefore, the whole theory has often been called homoiomeric. In the beginning, the sum of things infinitesimally small and infinite in number, no one of which could be perceived on account of its smallness, lay in a mass together. Finally mind intervened, separating like from unlike and introducing order. The most delicate and purest of essences, mind enters into combination with nothing else; it understands all things for and by itself, and over all it rules supreme. In such unmistakable terms as these did Anaxagoras set forth the idea of an all-wise and all-powerful essence completely distinct from matter. The words which he chose are no doubt inadequate because borrowed from the domain of the senses, but their import is clear. The fact that he reached this conception of mind gives to Anaxagoras a conspicuous place in the history of Greek philosophy, and yet he hardly knew the

published them: Anaxagorae Clazomenii fragmenta collecta et illustrata, Lips. 1827. Mullach has also put them into his book. See on Apology, p. 20 d.
full bearing of his discovery. Mind, he says, when in the begin-
ning all things lay in a motionless mass, gave them their first im-
pulse and lent the motion which brought order into all. In other
respects Anaxagoras's explanation of nature is materialistic, the
same in kind with those of his predecessors and contemporaries.
This is what Plato and Aristotle say, and it is of this that they
both complain. In order that the conception of mind reached by
Anaxagoras might be made fruitful, there was need that it be com-
pletely worked out, and for this the foundations of philosophy had
to be laid anew. For this necessary work of reconstruction no
more favorable place could have been found than Athens. Indeed,
it was at Athens, and in the society of its most noteworthy men,
especially of Pericles and Euripides, that Anaxagoras himself lived.
He was, however, finally accused of atheism and exiled by the
enemies of his great friend Pericles. Leaving Athens, he retired
to Lampscus, and there ended his days.

11 After numerous attempts to account for the world of sensible
things on a physical basis, the very school of thinkers who sought
to explain matter by matter began to feel the need of some first
cause which should lie outside of matter and above it. Hencefor-
ward the one thing indispensable for the full recognition of such a
first cause was a vigorous impulse which, arousing and uplifting
the moral energy of national thought, should re-shape Philosophy
by the help of this new conception. This required impulse was
found in the practical demand, now for the first time made upon
philosophers, that they abandon the retirement in which, with little
or no reference to what was going on about them, they had up to
this time carried on their speculations.¹ Now the time had come
when the world demanded a new departure in education, and now
was the opportunity for Philosophy to try her strength. At first
this trial seemed to lead rather to destruction than to reconstruc-
tion; the wear and tear of practice threatened completely to
swallow up all theory. Various tendencies, indeed, the obvious

¹ They show no little impatience
and disdain of every-day men like
ourselves. It matters little to them
whether we keep pace with their dis-
cussions or fall behind,— every man
of them steadily goes on his chosen
results not a few of them of doctrines previously taught, accomplished nothing but their own destruction. But this very destruction served to point a moral, since it showed that the engrossing aim of sound philosophy must not be to adorn its devotees with irresponsible cleverness and to train their faculties in that kind of intellectual dexterity whose chief reward is success. For it became evident that a moral ideal was required which, in the teaching of the Sophists, was absent. This lack of a freshly grasped and high moral standard, coupled with the effort to turn their disciples into dextrous performers on the stage of life, characterized many different teachers at this time. These teachers were the Sophists, and their teaching is usually called not Sophistry but Sophistic.¹ This term is accordingly applied to the teaching of men who, in the details of their theories, often had little or nothing in common. Men who appeared as public professors of wisdom called themselves Sophists, and were so called by the public. They gathered about them old and young, and, for a stated fee, gave lectures to hearers fresh from the heat of a keen and active political strife in such branches of knowledge as were likely to interest men so pre-occupied. In short, the practical needs of political life led them to annex the widening territory of rhetoric to the traditional domain of philosophy. They devoted much energy to the art of vigorous speech-writing and of finished speech-making. These were the outward graces which a Sophist used in order to make his teachings and lectures attractive. Rhetoric and Sophistic were sister arts, inseparable from the outset, and for every man who was anxious to find the best market for his proficiency in

¹ Grote, in his History of Greece (ch. 67), is certainly right in rejecting this designation, if it must mean that the teachings and principles of all Sophists were the same or that all of them taught in the same way. The word Sophistic may, however, be said to imply such similarity in methods of teaching and in doctrine as would (1) fairly distinguish the Sophists from Socrates, and (2) lead us to class the Sophists together. Three negative statements apply to all the Sophists which do not apply to Socrates: *first* the Sophists did not teach free of charge, *second* they did not in any strict sense lay foundations for the future development of philosophy, *third* they did not cast their lot either with their own or with any adopted country.
these arts, Athens, at that time the centre of all the intellectual activity of the day, was a natural place of abode.

Among the representatives of the new turn which thought had taken, Protagoras and Gorgias are especially prominent. Accordingly, more than all the rest, these two have earned a place in the history of philosophy. Protagoras of Abdera was the first who claimed as his distinguishing title the name of Sophist. When he was born and when he died cannot be satisfactorily determined. At all events, he was a contemporary of Socrates, though considerably his elder. Protagoras, during his long life of seventy years more or less, made repeated and protracted visits to Athens. He was, however, forced to discontinue them on account of a vote of the Athenian assembly condemning him as an atheist. His philosophical theory was based upon the dictum of Heraclitus that all things are constantly in a state of flux. But, in applying this principle to human thought and human action, he reached conclusions which were not infrequently opposed to those of the great Ephesian. In place of Heraclitus's ἀλόγος, he maintained that Man is the measure of all things; of things that are that they are, of things that are not that they are not. By man he understood man as this or that.

1 See Plato's Protagoras, p. 317 a, b.
2 His birth is variously placed between 490 and 480 B.C. (in 487, 485, or 481), and his death between 420 and 408 B.C.
3 Plato’s Protagoras, p. 317 c: οὐδενὸς ὤν ὁ πάντων ἐν ἡμῶν καθ’ ἑλικίαν πατὴρ ἦν, there is not a man of you all whose father I might not be so far as years go.
4 The original words as given by Diog. Laert. (ix. 51) are: “πάντων χρημάτων μέτρων ἄνθρωπος, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἐστι, τῶν δὲ οὐκ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν.” This is sometimes so interpreted as to mean simply that nothing can be measured, i.e. known, unless there is some one to measure or know. This might then mean that the right measure of all things would be taken only by the right man; by an ideally perfect man endowed with ideally perfect knowledge. In saying that Protagoras did not mean this ideal man Cron agrees with the following account, translated (freely) from Plato's Theaetetus, p. 161 c: “In other respects I am charmed with the doctrine of Protagoras that what seems to each man is, but I can never swallow his beginning. Why did he not commence by saying the measure of all things was a hog or a dog-faced baboon or some still worse monster, and that so far as wisdom went he himself was no whit wiser than a tadpole? If each man is his own best judge and all that he decides upon is right and true, how then is Protagoras wise enough to teach the rest of us, and to charge us roundly for it?”
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individual. This amounted to cutting away all footing for knowledge, after reducing knowledge to the sensation or sensible perception of a given individual.

Gorgias of Leontini\(^1\) in Sicily appeared at Athens in 427 B.C., on an embassy from his native town.\(^2\) His mission was successful, and his brilliant oratory won such golden opinions that large numbers crowded to listen to his show speeches and paid him handsomely for his trouble. Later he revisited Athens and travelled to various places in Greece (Xen. Anab. ii. 6. 16 ff.), always with the same success. It is said that he was a hundred years old when he died.\(^3\) His philosophical views and method of reasoning were based upon the Eleatic system, and are summed up in the following words from his book (περὶ φύσεως ἡ περὶ τοῦ μου ἔντος, Nature, or that which is not): "Nothing is; if anything is, it cannot be known; if anything can be known, it cannot be communicated." But the chief concern of Gorgias was the teaching of rhetoric; here he sought to win fame. Still, his instruction seems to have been confined to practical hints in regard to details and he objected to being called a Sophist.

Among the other distinguished Sophists, Hippias of Elis and Prodicus of Ceos were especially famous. Hippias was chiefly noted for his extensive knowledge of genealogy and of mathematical astronomy,\(^4\) but he also plumed himself upon his miscellaneous accomplishments in various practical directions. Prodicus is best known for his nice discriminations between words of similar meaning, and for his moral lectures. Xenophon (Mem. ii. 1. 21) has preserved one of these, the very clever story of the Choice of Hercules.

The bustling activity of these and of other Sophists who had no fixed abiding-place, produced no marked effect upon philosophy beyond making clear the insufficiency of all previous speculation. After a hundred years and more, Greek thought had reached the conclusion that to talk of real truth was idle, and that all kno-

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\(^1\) This same name is applied to the inhabitants. Ptolemaeus is alone in calling the town Λεόντιον.

\(^2\) Diodorus xii. 53. Thuc. iii. 86 does not mention him by name.

\(^3\) The dates given for his birth vary from 496 B.C. (Foss) to 483 B.C. (Frei); for his death, from 384 B.C. to 375 B.C.

\(^4\) See on Apol., p. 18 b.
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edge depends solely upon sensible perception and sensation. So, therefore, knowledge could at most change worse sensations into better ones,—more profitable and pleasanter ones.

16 This doctrine virtually involved the destruction of all philosophy. Therefore Socrates, who won the day against it, is rightly called the deliverer and the new founder of philosophy.

17 Socrates, the son of a sculptor Sophroniscus, was born at Athens, and as a boy followed his father's occupation. Soon, however, he abandoned sculpture and devoted himself to the profession to which he thought God called him; this was a continuous warfare carried on against the conceit of sham knowledge in all its forms. Wherever and whenever he met it he was bound to expose sham knowledge as real ignorance. As for himself, he claimed no knowledge beyond the capital fact that he knew nothing. By this, however, he did not mean that real knowledge was as the Sophists maintained impossible. For though Socrates said that God alone was really wise, his meaning was that the whole duty of man was comprised in the struggle toward that real knowledge which alone gives the power to do right. And just here Socrates declared that all virtues, ἀρετή, were essentially forms of knowledge, and were based upon the understanding of some class of things. This involved the final identification of virtue in general with understanding. If virtue is understanding, it follows that no one does wrong knowingly; men sin only in so far as they are in ignorance of what is right. A man who knows the right, who has real knowledge, will do the right, for then that knowledge will be stronger within him than any desire. Naturally the standard of this genuine knowledge is not arbitrary, nor is it borrowed from anything outside of the soul. Socrates based all knowledge upon necessary obedience to the commandment inscribed upon the temple at

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1 The ordinary date given for his birth is Ol. 77, 3 or 4 = 470/69 b.c.: probably Ol. 77, 2 or 1 = 472/1 b.c. is nearer the truth. Cf. infra note on § 30, and Apol., p. 17 d.
2 Cf. Apol., p. 29 d ff., particularly the explanation of συ γνωστική.
3 It cannot be denied that even in Socrates' conception of ἄρετῆ, the old notion so manifest in Homer (cf. Doederlein, Hom. Gloss., p. 536) of 'skill' or cleverness was still very strong. The German word 'Tugend' and its corresponding idea are similarly connected with 'Tauglichkeit' and 'Tüchtigkeit.'
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Delphi, Τνωθι σεαυτόν. Xenophon (Mem. iv. 2) gives an account of Socrates's explanation of this.\(^1\)

Two questions arise concerning Socrates's idea of knowledge as the foundation of righteousness. (1) What constitutes this knowledge? (2) What is the field in which it works? Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle vie with one another in declaring that Socrates would always ask about everything under discussion: *What is the general idea of which this, that, or the other is a particular instance? τι ἐκαστὸν ἐστὶν τῶν δεινῶν.* Let every man first answer this question, and then he is a fit guide for his friends; otherwise it is a case of 'the blind leading the blind.' Hence, when Socrates found a man who claimed the possession of knowledge, his test question was, Can you define the thing which you say you know? And he usually found his man incapable of giving the required definition, and accordingly showed up the boasted knowledge as ignorance.

In applying this test, and in taking the steps by which he led up to and determined the definition required, consisted the peculiar method of Socrates. He always began with everyday facts, and then proceeded by the method of question and answer, either (1) to the definition and general idea required, or (2) to the irresistible conclusion that some definition in vogue which he had taken up was wrong. The steps taken in going from a given class of particulars to their universal, which is the general idea including them all, are called ἐπαγωγή, induction. Hence, Aristotle ascribes to Socrates the discovery of the epagogic or inductive method (τοὺς ἐπαγωγικοὺς λόγους), and of the definition of universals (τὸ ὀρθοτομοῦν καθόλου, — hence ὅποι = definitio).

By the *dialectic* (διαλεκτική) of Socrates is meant simply his 19 acuteness in so guiding a series of questions and answers that something was finally done toward determining a general conception and reaching some measure of truth. This process required a living issue raised between a man skilled in questioning and some one willing to answer him. But, soon after the day of Socrates,

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\(^1\) We may summarize the philosophical situation as follows: Protagoras said: Man is the measure; Socrates met this by asking: What is man? Gorgias said: We cannot have real knowledge; Socrates met this by saying: Before we give up knowledge let us seriously try to know ourselves.
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'dialectic' became a philosophical term applied particularly to the more developed and many-sided method of Plato; indeed, it finally became identified with Plato's logic or theory of ideas. Quite apart from Socrates's dialectic is the controversial art of certain Sophists (ἀντιλογική), for, whereas this controversial art only sought perpetual controversy, the essential peculiarity of the dialectic of Socrates was that it aimed at the understanding of truth.

20 The discussions of Socrates were almost always ethical. Nearly all questions which up to his day had engrossed philosophers he summarily excluded from the field of his investigation. He asked: What is virtue? what is holiness? what is justice? what is courage? And his answer, in every case, was understanding,—the understanding of what is good in reference now to one and now to another class of facts. Courage, for instance, is the understanding of what is good in relation to things terrible and dangerous; and he has courage whose conduct is right in cases of terror and danger. Yet Socrates recognized that the original bent with which the individual is born here disclosed itself; since he saw that, just as one man's body is born stronger than his neighbor's, so one man's soul was born more courageous than his neighbor's. Yet he maintained that every man, be the qualities born in him what they might, could advance in excellence (πρὸς δηρέν) by learning and practice.

21 Such is Socrates's doctrine in its outlines, as Xenophon, Plato, and Aristotle have represented it in their writings. Socrates himself, as is well known, was the author of no books. We have, therefore, no direct statement of his views at first hand. The most important authority for his teachings is Xenophon, especially his four books of "Memoirs of Socrates" (ἀπομνημονεύματα, commentarii, Memorabilia). In this work the writer undertakes to defend the memory of his friend and master against the accusations and slanders of all enemies. With this in view, he sets forth all that he can remember of the conversations of Socrates. All must be ready to allow that Xenophon, who was nothing if not a man of action, failed to understand Socrates's position in

1 It has been claimed that the Memorabilia are referred to by Horace (A. P. v. 310), as Socraticae chartae. The poet's allusion, however, is probably more vague.
the history of Greek philosophy; he could not adequately appreciate him as a philosopher. But of the man his portrait is invaluable, in spite of this or perhaps on account of this. Writing from a popular point of view, he corrects Plato's ideal representation of the master Socrates, and helps us to the facts about Socrates as he lived and taught. Further, in the judicious remarks scattered here and there through Aristotle's writings, we have always a most welcome supplement, and often a most wholesome corrective; by drawing from all these sources we are enabled to bring our ideal Socrates within the limits of historical fact.

An account of Socrates's theory gives no adequate knowledge of his historical significance. A necessary aid must be sought in some description of his personality, of Socrates during life and Socrates facing death.¹

It has already been said that Socrates thought his life consecrated to the service of a higher power and his every act the fulfilment of a task laid on him by God. This it was that forbade his following any of the pursuits which engross the majority of men. He was poor,² but his poverty was not so complete as his frugality. The fulfilment of God's command imposed upon him abstention from politics, except in cases where to abstain would be to neglect the plain duties of a citizen. He served as a hoplite in three campaigns,³ and showed in battle that he was no mere talker about courage. This same temper, this untiried obedience to duty, unswerving in the way of right and law, he displayed as one of the senators⁴ and prytanes on the occasion of the memorable popular assembly which illegally condemned the generals victorious at Arginusae. Here he faced the arbitrary caprice of the people with the same strength of mind which made him

¹ When Xenophon is used as our authority, it should be remembered that the subtler qualities of such a man as Socrates were likely, either to escape so unimaginative a mind, or, if felt, to be represented inadequately by a writer comparatively destitute of dramatic power. These are just the qualities which distinguish Socrates from all other teachers, and these are given by Plato alone. Cf. ‘Socrates,’ a translation of the Apology, Crito, and parts of the Phaedo. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York.
² Apology, p. 23 c and note; also Xen. Mem. I. vi.
³ Apology, p. 28 c and note; also Laches, pp. 181 a b, 188 e, and Symposium, pp. 219 e–221 c.
⁴ Apology, p. 32 b with note
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afterwards\(^1\) prefer death to a cowardly and unrighteous submission to the thirty tyrants.

24 Critias, like Alcibiades, was for a time a disciple of Socrates chiefly for the reason that he expected in that capacity to learn certain useful accomplishments. Later, as the leading spirit among the Thirty, this same Critias undertook to make the habitual occupation of Socrates uncomfortable for him. The conversation between the two is preserved by Xenophon (Mem. i. 2. 31 ff.). The passage is characteristic of both speakers, and should certainly be read by all, for it familiarizes us with the plan of active operations to which Socrates devoted all of his life and energy.

25 Xenophon tells us that Critias, and with him Charicles who was also an influential member of the Thirty, had been irritated by Socrates’s freedom of speech. They pointedly reminded him of the terms of a law which they had promulgated to meet his particular case, and threateningly bade him obey its behests: λόγων τέχνην μὴ διδάσκειν, no one shall teach the art of words. It is no matter for surprise that this law should have been aimed at Socrates, for two reasons: first, because of the tendency to classify Socrates as one of the Sophists. Indeed, he seems to have been looked upon simply as the most popular and effective of Sophists, and hence he became for the comic poets the representative Sophist.\(^2\) The second reason is, that the words λόγων τέχνη, taken in their widest sense, do apply to Socrates’s characteristic way of question and answer, as well as to rhetoric; and yet there were really many outer and palpable marks which distinguished Socrates and his teaching from the Sophists and their art. A Sophist charged for his instruction, and hence would usually teach in some place of private resort; Socrates, since he was the servant

\(^1\) Apology, p. 32 c d with note.

\(^2\) In the Clouds, first put on the stage in B.C. 423, Aristophanes brings Socrates before his audience in that capacity. An added piquancy was given by Socrates’s peculiar personal appearance, which fell so very far short of the Hellenic ideal of beauty. Indeed Socrates himself frequently compares himself with the statues of Silenus (Xenophon, Symposium, ch. 5; Plato, Symposium, ch. 33). How then could we expect the comic poets to abstain from caricaturing one so easy to caricature? Anybody could recognize a mask which was meant for Socrates.
of God, would take no man's pay. Hence, he naturally preferred the most public places, such as the market, the gymnasion, a public porch, or some workshop. Being no respecter of persons he was ready to discuss with every man, and eager to share the search for truth with any new comer. The genuineness of this desire for cooperation was undoubted, for he declared himself unable alone to get at any knowledge. To exemplify this his homely description of his art as intellectual/midwifery (μακάμις) and his comparison of it with the profession of his mother, the midwife Phaenarete, may be mentioned.\(^1\) This idea made him protest against being called any man's teacher, indeed he stoutly denied that he had any pupils. As substitutes for these names of teacher and pupil, Xenophon and Plato use words which all of them describe the pursuit of truth on equal and friendly terms.

The chief delight of Socrates was to gather about him young men of good parts who were eager for knowledge. This led him to frequent places where they habitually assembled, such as the palaestra or the gymnasion. No doubt the Thirty bore this in mind when they bade him not to consort with any one under thirty years of age. But Socrates was ready to talk with men of all ages and all stations, no matter where he found them. He was often seen conversing eagerly with workmen, and this led him to draw freely upon their familiar surroundings and occupations for topics and for illustrations. And hence we hear the frequent complaint that he was continually harping upon cobbbling, cobblers, carpenters, smiths, and the like. He was considered a bore who repeated the same thing about the same subject ad nauseam; whereas, the Sophists were at infinite pains never to use the same phraseology twice in discussing the same thing. Of course this implied that their attention was riveted upon the way of putting things: they dazzled their hearers and drew from them tumultuous applause, little caring if the enthusiasm lasted but for a moment. But the whole energy of Socrates was absorbed by the central purpose of rousing a right understanding and of implanting a firm and fruitful conviction. That the knowledge itself which Socrates strove for was far other

\(^1\) Cf. Alcibiades I., p. 431 ff; Theaetet., p. 149 a.
than that which the Sophists so glibly taught, is best shown by a contrast between one characteristic attribute of his discourse and theirs. The Sophists made a great flourish of trumpets (παλτοψία); they began with a perfectly rounded self-complacency. Socrates began by protesting that he was sure of one thing only,—his own ignorance. Wisdom, he declared, is of God; and this, said he, was the meaning intended by the oracle at Delphi by the words: No man is wiser than Socrates. This self-knowledge is nothing more than a purified form of the genuinely Greek idea of temperance, σωφροσύνη. It is based upon the immemorial belief that the gods are jealous and refuse to tolerate men who put themselves upon a pedestal.\(^1\) The concept of self-knowledge with which the Sophists were puffed up, Socrates undoubtedly considered a case in point. Against this concept he waged war with his incomparable irony,\(^2\) before which all their wisdom became as nothing. He made it plain to them, and to whomsoever it might concern, that all their general notions were confused and worthless. A tempered form of his irony is seen in his treatment of young and enthusiastic votaries of learning. First of all, he helps them to an understanding of their ignorance, but yet he leaves in their souls such a sting as stirs them to an earnest struggle for real insight. Indeed, we have seen that the humility of Socrates's self-measurement was by no means incompatible with a fixed determination to win the truth which leads to righteousness. Socrates said, in short: Let no man call himself a σωφρονής, owner of wisdom, but let every man be a φιλόσοφος, lover of wisdom.

There is, indeed, no uncertain ring in the religious tone of Socrates's philosophy. By his conversations\(^3\) he strove to rouse in others the religious sense, and at the same time he exhibited in his own life a heartfelt piety, rooted in the purest gratitude for the goodness of God, and manifested in the most scrupulous conformity to all the outward rites and observances of public worship. Even the popular practice of consulting oracles and interpreting omens, he did not, according to Xenophon,\(^4\) reject. He merely sought to confine it

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\(^1\) Hdt. I. 32.
\(^2\) Cf. Apology, p. 37 ε; Republic, p. 337 a: ἐκεῖνη ἢ ἐρωτεία ἐρωτεία ζω-νοδρομοῦσιν.
\(^3\) See Xen. Mem. i. 4 and iv. 3.
\(^4\) Cf. particularly Mem. I. i. 2 sqq., especially 6-8; see also Anabasis iii. 1. 5-7.
to difficulties for dealing with which God had given to man neither the knowledge nor the capacity. In all these cases, Socrates himself was singularly favored in that he possessed a gift sent of God, — a heavenly voice of warning. Whenever this voice spoke within him he knew that what he was about to do would result in harm and that therefore he must abstain from it; when the voice was silent he was the stronger in his purpose and strengthened others in theirs.¹ Socrates most certainly did not conceive of this voice as an emanation from a special and independent divinity, but as a revelation of the love and the wisdom of God. Such a revelation, he thought,² might well come to any man, though perhaps not in the same way. Still Socrates may have been uncommonly sensitive to this influence, and more conscientious than most men in doing what it prompted. Be this as it may, what we know about the matter serves to prove that his trust in God was exceptional; indeed this is nowhere made clearer than in cases where Socrates did not hear the voice, and yet, without its warning to direct him, was deaf to the clamors of selfish fears which greatly disturb other men, — cases where he did what he knew was right without petty anxiety as to the end.

Intimately connected with this remarkable strength of moral 28 character is the absolute control in which his body was held by his mind. The capital manifestation of this is to be found in the accounts which have been preserved of his ‘staying power’ while he was engaged in following up a train of thought. The best instance of this Plato gives in the following story of Socrates at the siege of Potidaea.³ Early one day a subject of thought occurred to Socrates while he was walking, and he stopped; for twenty-four hours he stood stock-still, because he could not come to any conclusion until

¹ Cf. Apol., pp. 31cd, 40ab; Xen. Mem. i. 2, 1–5. In the Appendix to his edition of the Memorabilia, Breitenbach enters into this whole question. See also Sussemih in Bursian’s Jahresbericht i. 6, p. 546, and Zeller II., pp. 69–83 of the third edition. Çf. Riddell’s Apology, Appendix A, and Cardinal Manning’s The Daemon of Socrates, Longmans and Green, 1872.

² Schleiermacher proves this in his note on Apology, p. 27b, by showing that Plato and Xenophon alike use δαυδόνων as an adjective. Çf. on Apol., p. 31d.

³ Symposium, p. 220cd; see also, on the credibility of the story, Zeller II., p. 69.
the next morning. In other respects as well his endurance was remarkable: he was hardened to every privation. Winter and summer alike he went barefoot, and always wore clothes of the same texture and thickness. This, in fact, made the rigours of a winter in Thrace tell upon him far less than upon his comrades in arms. Apart from his soldiering, hardly anything could induce Socrates to leave Athens, as he is made to say himself in the Crito. As for temperance and frugality, we have seen that he was remarkable for both.

The outline given above may be regarded as an historically trustworthy account of the character of Socrates. And now we need not hesitate no longer in agreeing with the enthusiastic estimate of Socrates given at the end of the Memorabilia. But all this certainly leaves us but ill-prepared for the manner of the great man’s ‘taking off.’ Prosecuted in his declining years, on a most serious charge, he was, after a legal trial, sentenced to death. And all this happened, not during any oligarchical or democratic reign of terror, but at the very time when everybody was admiring the moderate spirit of the newly-restored Athenian democracy. It was shortly after the archonship of Euclides and the deposition of the thirty tyrants by Thrasybulus. As far as history has determined them, the facts about this trial are as follows:—

In the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, while Laches was archon, and when Socrates had already passed the limit of three-score years and ten, Meletus, seconded by Anytus and Lyco, came forward with his accusation. In Plato’s Euthyphro Meletus is described as an insignificant youth, and in the Apology he is treated with a measure of contempt. Some identify him with the poet Meletus, others say he was the poet’s son, though ‘a chip of the old block,’ since the words (Apol. 23 e) ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν

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1 Sympos., p. 220 a b.
2 Crito, ch. XIV. with note on p. 53 a.
3 Apol., p. 17 d and supra, p. 14, note 1. Ol. 96, 1 = 400/399 B.C.
4 Aristoph. Frogs, v. 1302.
5 K. F. Hermann, in his Disputatio de Socratis accusatoribus, maintains that there were four different persons named Meletus, (1) the accuser of Socrates, (2) the poet referred to in the Frogs, (3) the Meletus of Apol., p. 32 c d, who obeyed the thirty, and arrested the unoffending Leon of Salamis, (4) the Meletus of Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 36. Frohberger argues against this in the Philol. Anzeiger II. 7
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ἐχθρόμενος imply that he was poetically inclined. He led the prosecution, the other two being technically his συνήγοροι. It is plain, however, that the substantial man of the three was Anytus, since it was the influence of Anytus which chiefly secured the verdict.¹ Anytus, who had inherited a handsome property and had filled the highest offices in the commonwealth, was at this particular time one of the most popular men in public life. He had worked with all his might to help Thrasybulus expel the Thirty and to restore the democracy. Not only did he condemn Socrates as being one of the Sophists against all of whom his bitterness was uncompromising, but in addition he owed him an especial grudge. For Socrates, it appears, had made certain indiscreet and irritating comments upon his private affairs.² Lyco is absolutely unknown beyond what is said in the Apology (22 e). There he is represented as a professional speech-maker, and it is reasonable to infer that as such he contributed far more than Meletus toward the success of the prosecution.

The indictment was submitted by Meletus to the ἀρχων βασιλεὺς, 31 whose jurisdiction covered all cases involving religion. Its formal terms were:³ Socrates is guilty of not believing in the gods believed in by the state, and also of introducing other new divinities. Moreover, he is further guilty of corrupting the young. The penalty proposed is death. This was an indictment for an offence against the state⁴; accordingly it was technically a γραφή (public suit), and, as further qualified by the specific charges, a γραφή ἀρετείας (a public suit on the count of impiety).

As to the negative clause of the first count (οὗτς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει 32 θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων), it certainly is difficult to see any fact to justify such an accusation, inasmuch as Socrates expressly recognized the law of the land (νόμος πόλεως) as the final arbiter in all that concerned the worship of the gods; and, indeed, himself scrupulously

¹ Apol., p. 36 a.
² Xen. Apol. 29, σση. Probably there is some reference to Anytus’s unjust hatred of Socrates in Xen. Cyrop. iii. 1. 38 sqq.
³ Ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης οὗτς μὲν ἡ πόλις νομίζει θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἐτερα δὲ καὶ νά βαμβώνα εἰσαγομένους (or εἰσαφέρων with Xen. Mem. i. 1. 1). Ἀδικεῖ δὲ καὶ τοὺς νέους διαφθείρονα.
⁴ See infra, § 67, and Apol., p. 19 b.
⁵ Apol., p. 26 d.
observed all its requirements. The terms of the second (affirmative) clause (Ἐτερὰ δὲ καὶ κανὰ δαιμόνια εἰσηγούμενος) apparently refer to the much mooted δαιμόνιον,—the mysterious communication from God to Socrates. In the light of what has been set forth above, we are forced to conclude that this allegation was pure slander, and it looks like wilful slander.

33 /It is, however, probable that the first count was introduced as a foil to the second, and was primarily intended as a means for giving a legal foothold to the suit. For among all known provisions of Athenian law there is not one under which Socrates could have been prosecuted on the second count (ἄλλες δὲ καὶ τῶν νικῶν διαφθείρον). This view is confirmed by the difficulty which even the thirty tyrants had in interfering officially with Socrates’s dealings with young men. They had to pass a special law for the purpose, and that law was doubtless abolished when the democracy was restored/ At all events it is certain that in the accuser’s mind the second count was the most important. We have only to remember the prejudices of Anytus, and to recall the fact that he was still smarting under Socrates’s sharp criticism of the way in which he educated his son. We can understand his indignation, though we do not share it. Now Anytus was a citizen in excellent standing, and naturally felt sure of success against such heresies in any appeal to the law. What, then, is easier to understand than his eagerness to take advantage of any pretext that offered itself against Socrates? He was eager to save his country by redressing his own grievance. Nor is it difficult to see why many of the judges should have been inclined to sympathize with him. They were enthusiastic for the democracy, and looked with disfavour upon any man like Socrates who had so often and so sharply criticized institutions dear to the democrat’s heart. Still, it is more than questionable whether such criticisms were amenable to the law of a commonwealth whose shibboleth was free speech (παρηγορία). A connection, on Socrates’s part, with overt or covert attempts at revolution cannot be thought of; any suggestion of the kind falls by its own weight, for it is pure and unadulterated slander. But still it was urged that Alcibiades and Critias, notorious scourgis of the body politic, were for some time
the companions of Socrates. And, though Xenophon has abundantly shown the injustice of remembering this against Socrates, the judges could not forget it. The memory of these men's crimes was still so fresh that every one was inclined to mistrust the man to whose teaching many attributed the misdeeds which had so lately made life unbearable. This teaching they were therefore determined to stop, and nothing could better have served their purpose than the first count of the indictment, an accusation of atheism, for at Athens it had often gone hard in the courts with those who had to meet this charge.

This whole accusation was from the first met calmly and collectedly by Socrates, and he showed the same temper at the bar of the court. There is a story, told twice by Xenophon, which brings this unruffled spirit vividly before us, and Plato's Theaetetus does the same more subtly. Plato represents that intricate and abstruse philosophical discussion, carried on by Socrates with phenomenal fair-mindedness and consummate ease, as taking place immediately before the great teacher was compelled by the summons of Meletus to appear for preliminary examination before the magistrate (ἀρχηγὸς βασιλεύς). It was a sense of duty only which forced Socrates to appear, both at this time and afterwards, at the trial. It was his duty, he thought, to appear in his own case and to make his own plea, though he made it without real hope or serious

1 "Hermogenes, the son of Hipponicus," a friend of Socrates, "noticed that Socrates, though he conversed freely on things in general, avoided any allusion to the impending suit. 'My dear Socrates,' said he, 'surely you ought to be attending to your brief.' 'Why, do I not seem to you,' answered Socrates, 'to have passed my life with my brief constantly in view?' 'What do you mean by that?' asked Hermogenes. 'I mean that I have shunned evil all my life, that, I think, is the most honorable way in which a man can bestow attention upon his own defence.'" Xen. Apol., § 3 sqq. Cf. Mem. iv. 8. 4 sqq., where the story is almost verbally repeated.

2 Theaet., p. 210 c d.

3 Cicero (De oratore I. 54) is our chief authority for the following tale about Socrates's defence. The celebrated orator Lysias, out of the fulness of his friendship for Socrates, wrote him a speech for his defence. Socrates declined it when offered, because he thought it would be undignified for him to use it, and in spite of the fact that it was a marvel of pleading. The story is probably founded on the fact that upwards of six years after Socrates's execution Lysias wrote a rhetorical exercise (declamatio) on the theme of Socrates's defence, as an answer to
desire of escaping the death-penalty proposed by his accuser. His defence was made without previous preparation, and there breathed in it such noble pride and such uncompromising independence that its effect must rather have irritated than conciliated his judges. In the court-room as on the battle-field Socrates was always the same fearless champion of his own and his country’s honour. Where other men consulted their own safety, God required Socrates to be faithful and to obey orders.

And so it came to pass that the judges brought in the verdict of ‘guilty,’ but by no large majority. In cases of this nature the law did not fix the penalty beforehand, and Socrates had still the right of rating his guilt at his own price, ἰσομητὴν, his accuser having proposed, ταυτα, the penalty of death. After the defendant had named his counter-penalty, the court was bound to choose one of the two. Just as in his plea Socrates had disdained the ordinary means of working upon the feelings of the court by tears and supplications, so now he scorned the obvious way of safety still open to any man whose guilt had been affirmed by verdict. He absolutely refused to suggest any real counter-penalty, and hence an increased majority sentenced him to death.

The same courage which had animated him while speaking his defence, the same rooted conviction that they who love God need fear no evil, supported him now when his execution had become a question of days and hours, and prevented him from countenancing any plan for disobeying the laws of the state. Exceptional circumstances delayed the execution of his sentence for thirty days after

a speech on the other side of the case by the rhetorician Polycrates. For a discussion of the matter, see Spengel (Συναγωγή τεχνών, p. 141) and Rauchenstein (Philol. XVI. 1).

1 “But when they deliver you up, take no thought how or what ye shall speak: for it shall be given you in that same hour what ye shall speak.” Matthew x., v. 10.

2 Apol., p. 36 a and ibid. note on el τραίκοντα κτι.

3 ibid., p. 35 d and infra, § 73.

4 § 73.

5 It is said that the adverse majority was increased by eighty votes which had previously been cast for a verdict of ‘not guilty.’

6 Crito, p. 43 a with note on τὸ πλοῖον. Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 8. 2: “He was constrained to live for thirty days after his case was decided because it was the month of the yearly festival and embassy to Delos, and the law prohibited all public executions until the return of the sacred envoys
it was rendered, and his friends, perhaps with the connivance of
the authorities, offered him means of escape and also oppor-
tunity to use them. But he was firm in refusing these, just as
while on trial he had been firm in rejecting every opportunity to
secure either a favourable verdict or a lighter penalty. The tale
that shortly after his death the Athenians repented and actually
called the accusers to account rests on such slender authority that
it must not be taken as history.

Of all the companions of Socrates none more deeply revered the 37
master’s noble life than Plato, and no heart was more deeply stirred
by the pathos of his death. At the time Plato was still young, barely
thirty years of age.\footnote{Various dates are given for Plato's
birth. (1) The usually accepted one depends on Athenaeus, and is
the archonship of Apollodorus, Ol. 87, 3
\[= 430/29 \text{ B.C.} \] (2) Diogenes Laertius
gives Ol. 87, 4 = 429/28 \text{ B.C.}, Epa-
meinon's year as archon, and the year
of Pericles's death. (3) Zeller follows
Hermodorus, a pupil of Plato, and
fixes upon 428/27 \text{ B.C.} The birthday
is said to have been the seventh day
of Thargelion, a day sacred to Apollo.
In the year 428/27 \text{ B.C.} this came on
May 26/27, or, as others claim, May
29/30. \text{ Cf. Steinhart.}}

Aristo his father and his mother Perictione
were both of good old Athenian stock. Codrus was one of his
ancestors on his father’s side, and by his mother he was descended
from Solon. At the age of twenty he became a disciple of Socra-
tes, having until that time devoted his energies to poetry. It is
said that he was already so much of a poet that he was on the eve
of bringing out a tetralogy; but when he became a disciple of
Socrates he gave himself entirely to philosophy. At last he had
found a field which was to be all his own, a field where his genius
was soon to work wonders; for his philosophy was to guide the
spiritual and intellectual life of his countrymen to a new and
splendid consummation. Before this he had not been unacquainted

from Delos. During this time not one
of his familiar friends could detect
in his case any change in the manner
of his life from what it had always
been. And as for his previous career,
he certainly always commanded un-
paralleled admiration for living a
cheerful and contented life.” The
annual festival and embassy to Delos
—another festival, also called Δήλω,
was celebrated every four years—
came in the tenth or eleventh month
of the Athenian year (\( Μωυσείων \) or
\( Ωρηγιάπλων \)), hence the death of Soc-
rates probably occurred in Thargelion
(our May and June); the year was
399 \text{ B.C.}
with philosophy, and we are told that Cratylus had initiated him into the mysteries of Heraclitus; but not until he met Socrates had he found the guide and friend who was to lead him in all his speculations toward the goal of truth.

38 It is not possible to decide whether some of Plato’s earliest writings (e.g. the Lysis) were produced during Socrates’s life, or all of them after the master’s death. The bias of opinion now-a-days inclines to the latter view, and insists upon the unhistorical and ideal picture of Socrates which Plato everywhere alike has drawn. At all events, the questions dealt with by Plato’s earliest works were just the ones constantly discussed by Socrates, though even here and at the outset Plato displays originality. His vocation was to connect together the definitions insisted upon by Socrates and to reduce them to an ordered system by the application of a single law or principle. At the very outset he took up the same lines which his whole life was devoted to following out, and he ended by establishing dialectic as a science. Yet he never lost sight of Socrates, who always moved before him as the perfect philosopher. He valued philosophical writing only so far as it mirrored the ways, the wisdom, and the words of the ideal philosopher, and his works are pictures of the marvellous personality of Socrates. Hence it is that Plato, when he wrote, could not dispense with the peculiarly Socratic form of question and answer, but in his hands the dialogue is fashioned and developed into a new form of literature. His early interest in art and his familiarity with all the forms of poetry naturally stood him in good stead here, and we need not wonder that the poetic fire and dramatic vividness of his dialogues are universally admired.

39 Among the dialogues which he first wrote the Protagoras is perhaps the one which most conspicuously exemplifies these great qualities. Both in the subject dealt with, and in the conclusions arrived at, the Protagoras belongs to the school of Socrates. Virtue is there defined as knowledge of what is good, and in this are contained and summed up all particular virtues. Therefore, (r) virtue can be taught, and (2) no man is wicked freely and of his own proper choice. Wickedness is ignorance of what is good, and perfect goodness belongs only to God. Man’s virtue is incomplete
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and tentative only,—it is a constant struggle; God alone is invariably and forever good. There is nothing discussed here which was not an every-day topic with Socrates and his friends.

In the Gorgias Plato discusses the relation of goodness to pleasure, a matter barely touched upon in the Protagoras. The opposition between rhetoric and dialectic is most effectively drawn by contrasting the sophist and his scheme of morals with the true philosopher. Rhetoric is a sham art of living, the beau-ideal of which is the unbridled indulgence by each individual of every passing whim, a fool’s paradise where the bodily appetites are gorged. The true art of living, on the other hand, seeks and finds everywhere law, order, and righteousness (δικαίος), even though in so doing all temporal happiness and life itself be sacrificed. Higher than this earthly life is life eternal and the hereafter, where he only is blessed who has walked upon earth in the paths of righteousness. Therefore, it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong. The former does harm that lasts but a day, the latter brings enduring contamination.

This bare outline is enough to suggest that the fate of Socrates was in the mind of the writer of the Gorgias. This is confirmed by the merciless directness of its arguments, and by the tone of severity and almost bitterness which pervades the whole work. The Gorgias contains the moral teachings of Socrates and a great deal more, for there we find them as it were transfigured. Moreover, we get a glimpse of Plato’s political creed. An aristocrat by birth, he could hardly have learned the love of democracy from Socrates, though even without this master there was enough in contemporary political events to incline him to the views which he held. It has been supposed that Pericles died in the course of the same year which saw the birth of Plato. Plato’s earliest impressions about politics may therefore best be understood by reading in Thucydides the history of that time. It was the era of decay in Athenian morals both public and private, an era which Thucydides described with a heavy heart. If Plato went a step further and, in seeking for the cause of so much harm, attributed this

1 This chronological coincidence is not certain. See p. 27, note 1.
degeneration to Pericles, it surely can be urged that such a view of
the great statesman's leadership is not absolutely untenable even
when judged by the strictest standard of historical impartiality.1
But though Plato loved democracy less, it was not because he loved
the thirty tyrants more. Two of his mother's kin, his uncle Char-
mides and also Critias, were conspicuous among the Thirty, but
Plato was neither of them nor with them. What Socrates had to
endure revealed to his disciple the infamy of the Thirty and their
lust for power, while any dawning hopes from the moderate temper
shown by the newly restored democracy which supplanted them
was more than obscured by Socrates's trial and condemnation.
He found in these events new reasons for adopting the plan of
life which of old had been congenial to him, and he was thus
confirmed in his inclination to serve his country by shunning all
active participation in his country's affairs. It would surely be
rashness to urge that, in deciding upon the manner of his life,
Plato lacked either patriotism or common sense.

To avoid political entanglements, and at the same time to add
to his intellectual attainments, Plato left Athens shortly after Soc-
rates's death, and retired to Megara, the home of a group of his
philosophical friends. Euclides of Megara, a warm friend of
Socrates, was the central figure among them. Like many other
disciples of Socrates, Antisthenes for example, Euclides was at
great pains to reconcile the Socratic definitions or general ideas
with the Eleatic doctrine of the oneness of pure being. Plato
who, in the Euthyphro, early foreshadows a more abstruse account
of these general ideas than Socrates had given, naturally sought to
profit, while thinking out his own views, by those of Euclides. But
the Eleatic motionless Being worked apparently like a palsy upon
the Megarians, for Plato gained no new light from his friends
at Megara. However he certainly was impelled by his sojourn

1 The opinion of Pericles expressed
by Thucydides (ii. 65) is very favour-
able. Grote warmly defends the re-
putation of Pericles against the less
favourable comments of Plato, Arist-
totle, Plutarch, and a certain number
of modern writers. Recently Büch-
senschütz in his 'Besitz und Erwerb
im griechischen Alterthum' has again
accentuated the other side, and Herz-
berg in turn argues, Jahrbücher für
Ph. u. P. 100, 5, in favour of Pericles.
there to supplement what he knew of the Eleatic doctrine by more thorough studies. If the Socratic philosophy may be called the ground in which the tree of Plato’s knowledge took firm root, what he gained at Megara, and the familiarity with the Eleatic doctrines which he soon acquired, may be compared to the showers which watered that ground, and enabled the roots of the tree to strike deeper, and helped its branches to a fuller growth.

This same end was subserved by his further travels. He first went to Cyrene,—perhaps by way of Ephesus, where he may have wished to become acquainted with the living representatives of Heraclitus’s school,—and there spent some time with Theodorus the mathematician. Though Theodorus was the reputed exponent of Protagoras’s philosophy, Plato was chiefly drawn to him as a great mathematician and geometer. The Athenians certainly were not likely to forget the learning which he had exhibited when he visited their city.\(^1\) The importance attached by Plato to mathematics as a necessary part of right education\(^2\) is notorious, as is also his own proficiency in that branch of learning.\(^3\) After a visit to Egypt, he proceeded to Magna Grecia that he might there consort with the Pythagoreans, from whose learning he obviously expected to derive great benefit. The chief man among them was Archytas of Taras. Distinguished alike for statesmanship and as a general, Archytas had originated the analytic method in mathematics, and had solved many problems in geometry and mechanics, besides achieving a great name in philosophy. The society of Archytas and his school revived Plato’s interest in practical government, which had died with Socrates. As a sight-seer Plato extended his tour to Sicily, and was there introduced by Dio to the court of the elder Dionysius. But his Athenian visitor was too outspoken for that tyrant, and finally incurred his un-governable resentment. At the time, just before the peace of Antalcidas, there was war between Athens and the Peloponnesians,—and so it

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\(^1\) Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 10.

\(^2\) Over the door of his lecture-room was written, it is said: _Let no one unversed in geometry enter here, μηδεις ἄγεωμένης είσιν._

\(^3\) It is very commonly asserted that he solved the Delian problem (the doubling of a cube), and on doing so, criticized the usual manner of dealing with mathematics.
occurred to Dionysius that his guest should become Sparta’s prisoner of war. He was sold and carried as a slave to Aegina, whence he was finally ransomed by the generous zeal of Anniceris of Cyrene.¹

At the age of forty, Plato was again in Athens, and he brought with him great treasures of knowledge and of experience. During his absence, moreover, he had been busy writing, and the Theaetetus serves as a reminder of his sojourn at Megara and at Cyrene. It is a dialogue within a dialogue; the introductory conversation may be called Plato’s dedication of the whole work to his friends at Megara. The question, What is knowledge? is asked, and every typical answer to it, beginning with the most obvious one, Knowledge is sensation (αἴσθησις), and ending with the most abstruse one, is first stated with fairness and then with equal fairness refuted. In this dialogue we find Socrates and Theaetetus represented more effectively than anywhere else in Plato’s writings, while in the companion pictures, so eloquently drawn by Socrates, of the philosopher and the practical man or lawyer, Plato seems to be vindicating himself against fault-finders.²

¹ This whole account of Plato’s being sold as a slave and then ransomed is not well substantiated by trustworthy authorities.

² It is important at this point to have clearly before the mind some statement of Plato’s Theory of Ideas. In the Theaetetus (p. 210a) Socrates is made to say: “Then, Theaetetus, knowledge is not (1) sensation (αἴσθησις); nor is it (2) true opinion (δόξα ἀληθική); nor again, (3) true opinion coupled with definition (αἴσθησις προς ἀληθικήν).” This of course represents the view of Plato and not of Socrates, for (3) is very nearly what Socrates would have called knowledge. Without any direct allusion to his theory of ideas, Plato shows in this dialogue that no definition of knowledge is logically possible unless the definition itself contains the term defined. To define true opinion we must distinguish, and to distinguish we must have already a true opinion of the characteristic differences between one notion and another. Plato’s way out of the difficulty, which closes in on all sides and seems to leave no avenue of escape, is a recourse to his theory of ideas, and for a statement of this theory we have to go to his other dialogues. He did not reject Socrates’s definitions, but rather erected them into a symmetrically organized scheme of thought, of reality. These ideas are the realities dimly suggested by the world around us; but neither they nor anything else would ever be suggested to us or known by us if we had not lived in another and a better world where these ideas exist. We know things in this world because, before coming here, we have seen
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In the Sophist, the Politicus, and the Parmenides, we have works more or less obviously connected with the Theaetetus. These are the dialectical dialogues, so called because they are devoted to a connected account of dialectic. At the same time they contain a searching criticism of Heraclitus and of the Eleatics. One characteristic of the three works last named is that in them\(^1\) it is not Socrates who leads the discussion.

As soon as Plato returned to his native land he gathered pupils about him in the Academy, a suburban gymnasium close to his own house and garden. Here he taught with but few interruptions throughout the remaining forty years of his life. About the matter or manner of his teaching in the Academy we know nothing, unless we find it in those of his writings which were written while he was engaged in teaching.

There are weighty reasons for surmising that the Phaedrus was written at the beginning of this period,\(^2\) and accordingly it is prefaced, appropriately enough, by a graceful sketch of the scenery near Athens. Here dialectic is treated as something more than the science of that which really is (ideas); it is that and also the genuine art of putting things or oratory, and as such it is as far superior to ordinary rhetoric as reality is to sham or instruction to persuasion. Both teaching and learning are based upon the history of the human soul, and consist in a revival of memories (ανάμνησις) which are stored away in every soul while it is yet living in the divine world of ideas and before it comes to dwell on earth in a mortal frame. The relation of teacher and learner is spoken of as under the control of the pure and heaven-sent passion of love. The two become as one in order to bring forth knowledge from those original shapes of which things here are poor copies. Dialectic is the means of education and the perfected activity of thought by which we learn to neglect the bad copies and fix our minds upon the originals, which are in heaven. There they are all in their right place, and there goodness and truth shine upon them, enabling us to see them aright.

\(^1\) Lately there has been a revival of the doubt as to whether Plato wrote these three dialogues.

\(^2\) Schleiermacher considers the Phaedrus as Plato's maiden discourse; with this view other writers of eminence either wholly agree, or at least place it among Plato's earliest works.
the learner's soul. The *Symposium* (*συμπόσιον*, *banquet*) and the *Phaedo* like the Phaedrus are masterpieces of style and may be called companion pictures: the Symposium represents the philosopher in his moments of conviviality; the Phaedo portrays him face to face with death. The *Philebus* contains an inquiry into the idea of the good and is not so conspicuous for the charm of its style, since it deals with most abstruse ethical and dialectical (metaphysical) points. In the course of the dialogue a great deal is said of the Pythagorean philosophy as stated by Philolaus.1

In the Philebus, more than in any of his previous works, Plato strives to throw the light of philosophy upon the facts of life, and this he does to a still greater extent in those of his works which usually are considered his latest: the *Republic* (*πολιτεία*), the *Timaeus* and the *Critias*, all three of which are closely connected, and the *Laws*. These discourses, because they are attempts to mould facts into harmony with ideal principles, to construct the world as it should be, are called his constructive works. The most celebrated of these, and indeed the most admirable of all Plato's works, is the Republic. Beginning with the question, "What is justice?" the writer soon develops the fact that justice, belonging as it does to the state as much as to any individual citizen, can most easily be seen in the former, where it is 'writ large.' Recognizing three classes of citizens as natural and necessary in the state, he connects them with his tripartite division of the soul.2 His class of rulers correspond to the *reason* (*τὸ λογιστικὸν*); his class of warriors to the (irascible) *impulsive part* (*τὸ θυμωδὲς*); his class of producers to the *appetites* (*τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν*). These three classes in combination work out the happiness of the whole state, and it is the happiness of all which determines the teaching and training of each. The rulers follow wisdom (*σοφία*); the warriors, *courage* (*ἀρετή*); rulers, warriors, workers in unison

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1 *Cf. supra*, p. 3, n. 3.

2 This division into three parts is based in the Timaeus upon a division into two parts. The soul has (1) its immortal or rational part, and (2) its irrational or mortal part. This last (2) is subdivided into (a) a noble part (*θυμὸς*) and (b) an ignoble part (*ἐπιθυμία*). These three divisions are explained as faculties of the soul by Wildauer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Psychologie*, in the *Philosophische Monatschrift*, 1873.
follow *self-control* (σωφροσύνη). Justice (δικαιοσύνη), the virtue of virtues, works toward the determining ideal for the sake of which the limbs of the body politic coöperate; and while the collective happiness of all citizens depends on justice, justice is gained by having each of the three classes pursue its characteristic perfection or virtue. This certainly is not the Socratic doctrine of the unity of all virtues, but a modification of it.\(^1\) With this great work are connected the Timaeus and the (unfinished) Critias. The Timaeus describes the universe as an organic and rational creation, just as the state is described in the Republic. The Critias represents the ideal state as having existed in Attica before the deluge. There is also the story of their wars with the Atlantids. The dates and the facts thus given are of course purely mythical, and purport to be derived from foreign traditions. In what relation the twelve books of Plato's Laws stand to the ten books of the Republic is a question still under discussion, as is also the question whether Plato himself put the finishing touches upon his *Laws* as they have come down to us. Whether he wrote it as it actually stands or not, the work, in spite of the many eccentric views and odd turns of speech which it contains, is broadly conceived and of very great interest.

The general drift of these last works prepares us for Plato's last two visits to Sicily, where the younger Dionysius showed such promise both intellectual and moral that Plato hoped with his help to realize his new theories of government and of education. At the instance of Dio he accepted an invitation from the younger Dionysius, and again went to Syracuse in spite of the harsh treatment which had so precipitately terminated his former sojourn in that city. The too irascible elder Dionysius had died Ol. 103, 1 = 368–7 B.C. On his arrival Plato carried everything before him and it became the court fashion to imitate young Dionysius's enthusiasm for the new philosophy; but back-stairs intrigues soon turned the tables upon the reformer. His friend Dio was incau-

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\(^1\) Socrates said that wisdom was virtue. Plato said (1) wisdom acquired and exercised for the whole state is the ruler's virtue, (2) wisdom in boldly executing the ruler's commands is the warrior's virtue, (3) wisdom in obedient service to his betters is the workman's virtue.
tious, and his indiscretion was promptly punished with banishment by the same clique of flattering courtiers which soon after brought about, against the wishes of Dionysius, the dismissal of Plato. But the repentant king again urged Plato to come back, promising that Dio should be recalled. The Pythagorean circle at Tarentum urged acceptance, and finally, still hoping to carry his pet theories into effect at Syracuse, Plato made his third visit to Syracuse. It was not long, however, before all the influence of Archytas was required to get our philosopher back to Athens alive. How little Plato's high hopes of the younger Dionysius were realized, is but too plain from the character of that tyrant as afterwards exhibited.

The remainder of Plato's life was engrossed by teaching and writing. Of his pupils many were from foreign parts, and among his numerous Athenian hearers there were not a few marked men, statesmen and generals such as Chabrias Timotheus and Phocion, orators such as Lycurgus and Demosthenes. Though hard to prove, it is easy to believe that Demosthenes's keenness and irresistible readiness in argument was stimulated and perfected by a training in the dialectic of Plato. Plato lived to a green old age, and death finally surprised him in the full possession of all his faculties when upwards of eighty (Ol. 108, 1 = 348–7 B.C.). The vigor of his mind at the time is brought home to us by the tale that after death they found under his pillow a draft of the opening passage of the Republic, which he had covered with erasures and corrections. Pausanias, who made his 'grand tour' in the second century after Christ, saw the tomb of Plato in the Ceramicus (Κεραμικός), not far from the Academy. The post left vacant by Plato, the charge of his school which became known as the older Academy, was undertaken by Speusippus, a son.

1 *Cf.* Laws iv., p. 709 e sqq. This passage irresistibly suggests the general condition of things which Plato, on the occasion of his last two journeys, expected to find at Syracuse, and indeed largely what he actually did find.

2 Seneca is probably repeating an 'idle tale' when he says that Plato died on his birthday, just as he had completed his eighty-first year. A similarly unauthenticated tale is repeated by Cicero, who says (Cato major 5.13): "uno et octogesimo anno scribens est mortuus." Perhaps his word "scribens" is simply a version of the story of the tablet discovered under the philosopher's pillow.
of Plato's sister. The Chalcedonian Xenocrates succeeded Speusippus.

We may well call it a lucky chance that has preserved for us all 51 of Plato's works. They are an exhaustless treasurehouse filled to overflowing with thoughts which have been the inspiration and the delight of successive generations of men, for they appeal alike to the philosopher and to the poet; to the former by the fulness of their wisdom, to the latter by the beauty of their style. Plato chose the form of question and answer, and in presenting philosophical truth dramatised the process by which such truth is reached. Once chosen, that form became, in the hands of so great a master both of thought and of style, something new under the sun, and took its place among the other exemplars of literary art created by the Greeks as the Greek method of presenting philosophy. The various forms in which previous philosophical speculations had appeared were but the imperfect statements of unperfected theories. The one thing which these forms perfectly represented was the lack of completeness which characterized the early systems of philosophy. Socrates brought down Philosophy from the clouds of heaven to the needs of life upon earth, and, the uncompromising ordeal of his cross-questioning once passed, her worth and strength became manifest. Then at last, transfigured as it were by Plato's genius, she appeared in all the beauty of a form of literature quite worthy of her message. This is the moment which at the opening of this sketch was anticipated. In Plato's dialogues

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1 Besides the works already enumerated and the Apology and Crito, there are quite a number of others. Some of these Plato has been supposed not to have written. Those whose authenticity has been questioned connect themselves with the Protagoras; they are: the Ion, Hippias Maior and Minor, the first and second Alcibiades, Lysis, Charmides, Laches Euthyphro. Then there are dialogues connected with the so-called dialectical discourses: the Meno, the Euthydemus, the Cratylus. The Menexenus remains, and the only dialogues with which it can be in any way compared are the Apology and the Phaedrus. Of course no mention is here made of such other short discourses as have been falsely attributed to Plato but are now admitted by all to be spurious.

2 The best account of the comparative inefficiency of these early philosophers is Plato's own. Cf. the passage from the Sophist quoted supra, p. 10, note 1.

3 Cicero, Tusc. v. 4, 10, and Academ. i. 4, 15.
the central purpose and the crowning result is to stimulate in every reader a self-reliant vigor of understanding which shall grapple boldly with the self-imposed task of seeking after the fundamental idea, and achieve in the end a clear insight into the whole subject discussed. Without this effort of mind no man can ever emerge from darkness into light. That Plato did not overestimate the value of his own or of any writings is clearly shown in the Phaedrus. The views there expounded probably influenced him to choose the dialogue-form, which is a reproduction, a mirror, as it were, of the words of living truth spoken by the living teacher. That he did not however underestimate the value of philosophical writing he shows rather in deed than in word. For how, otherwise, can we account for the long series of writings produced by him from the age of thirty until the time of his death,—a period of fifty years? By writing he increased the number of those who felt his influence, and this he might well seek to do while still believing that, compared with the spoken word, the written word was dead.

52 The many resources of Plato's artistic imagination are apparent in the varied settings of his dialogues. The simplest form (1) has no introduction or preamble, but is a dialogue, with occasional interruptions from interested bystanders, in which one of the parts is taken throughout by the same speaker, usually Socrates, while the other may be successively assumed by various persons. Instances of this form of dialogue are the Gorgias and the Phaedrus, which best exemplify the dramatic power of Plato even in this simplest form of dialogue. More intricately dramatic and effective are the narrated dialogues, to which the second and third classes belong. These are (2) without preface and with no account of the persons to whom the narration or reading, as the case may be, is made,—e.g., the Republic; or (3) introduced by a short dialogue between the narrator and his friends, who soon become his attentive listeners. In (3) sometimes, though rarely, the narrated dialogue is momentarily interrupted before the close, and at the close a few words are commonly exchanged between the narrator and his auditors. Dialogues of this kind are the Symposium and the Phaedo. Just as these various forms are used accord-
ing to the demands of the subject discussed or the artistic plan of the author, so in certain of Plato's later writings, in fact very commonly where very abstruse points are considered, the dramatic form is subordinated and all but disappears.

Something must now be said of the two works before us. They are both of them closely connected with the trial and death-sentence of Socrates. Of the two the first is

THE APOLOGY OF SOCRATES.

If we heeded our first impressions on reading the Apology, we should pronounce it a report of what Socrates actually said in court, since it is given as a speech made by Socrates and we feel convinced that Socrates would naturally have made just such a speech. But there is nothing in this fact alone that necessarily bears such a construction, for Plato's dialogues are all of them conversations more or less fictitious, and yet are represented as carried on in the most life-like manner by historical personages. To reach any trustworthy conclusion as to the historic accuracy of the Apology would require more information than that supplied by Plato himself, and yet Plato is the only witness whom we can trust.\(^1\) We have, therefore, to depend chiefly upon internal evidence.\(^2\) There is no doubt that, not Plato only, but any disciple and friend of Socrates who had been present on such a momentous occasion would have been more than eager to spare no pains in accurately reproducing the words of his master,—of the father of his soul's new-birth. He would have left no stone unturned in striving to reach and to write, 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the

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\(^1\) We are not warranted in pinning our faith to Xenophon's (?) Ἀπολογία Σωκράτους, a production whose origin and value are equally doubtful. Xenophon's Memorabilia, on the other hand, is inadequate for our purpose.

\(^2\) Schleiermacher and Zeller uphold the accuracy of Plato's report. The former argues that the speech suits all the circumstances too well to allow of its not being an exact report, while the latter strives to deal with the arguments used to prove his untrustworthiness. Ueberweg lately has taken this same point of view with great decision. In the admirable introduction of Steinhart is to be found the best presentation of the opposite view.
truth,' that it might live as a monument of the great man's moral and intellectual worth forever. And individually Plato must have regarded such an undertaking as his opportunity to appeal to the supreme court of intelligent and unprejudiced mankind from the death-sentence pronounced by an unjust court upon the incomparable master. In such an enterprise Plato's memory would undoubtedly do good service. Yet it is hard to see how a mind like his, distinguished rather for its devotion to speculative truth and for its obedience to the laws of artistic and poetical symmetry than for its submission to the inelastic canons of history, could, even in such a case as this, have endured the straight-jacket of stenographic accuracy. Plato doubtless heard with attentive ears and held with retentive memory all that was spoken before the court by the man he loved best. And indeed no hand was better trained than his in presenting faithfully the peculiar conversational genius of Socrates. But for all that, and by means of it all, he has gained and used the second sight of a sympathetic and creative imagination; he has given us more than the actual defence of Socrates in court. In Plato's Apology, Socrates on trial for his life stands before us in clear outline, sharply contrasted with any typical presentation of the drift of contemporary public opinion; for public opinion, so far as it opposed him and his ways, is personified by his named and unnamed accusers.\footnote{Cf. Apology, p. 18 sqq.} He is condemned in court, but before the tribunal of the eternal fitness of things he and his life-work stand acquitted.

\section*{54} However, we have no right to assume that this could not all be accomplished without unduly sacrificing historical accuracy. The nobler, the more appropriate we suppose Socrates's actual words to have been,—and no one will incline to say they were not appropriate and noble,—the less would Plato feel called upon to depart from a simple report of what he had actually heard. In the absence of anything like convincing proofs of the contrary, it is reasonable, with due allowance for Plato's artistic bent and after taking into consideration the circumstances under which he wrote, to conclude that his Apology of Socrates resembled very closely
the speech actually made in court by Socrates. The circumstances under which Plato wrote lead however to the following qualification of this statement of substantial identity. Any speech reported in writing necessarily differs from the speech as originally made, and no orator even can write down from memory the words he has used,—as for Socrates he spoke on the spur of the moment without previous notes or preparation of any kind. 1 Plato heard him just as Thucydides heard Pericles, and as Thucydides, with the most earnest desire to reproduce as a part of history Pericles's speeches, 2 could not avoid making them by his manner of statement to some extent his own, so it was with Plato and the speech of Socrates. He could not, in spite of the accuracy which he observed in reproducing the situation at the trial and the words to which he had so attentively listened, avoid giving the Apology of Socrates in a way which makes it a work of his own, though at the same time it is the genuine defence of Socrates. 3 The success with which Plato brings before us the living persons concerned in Socrates's trial is the best proof that he allowed himself a certain freedom of expression in presenting the matter and manner of Socrates himself. Among Plato's many works distinguished for vividness of dramatic characterization, the Apology is one of the most noteworthy. In the Apology we have the most life-like of Plato's many portraits of Socrates.

We find many inequalities in the speech of the Apology, and 55

1 Cf. Apology, p. 17 c. Those unconvinced by the genuine ring of this passage may still doubt. We know Socrates chiefly from Plato, hence discussions of Plato's trustworthiness are apt to beg the question.


3 There is an important difference between the relation of Thucydides to Pericles and that of Plato to Socrates. The intimacy of ten years' standing between the two latter made their case one of ideal friendship, where, at least in intellectual matters, what belonged to Socrates was Plato's, and vice versa. Therefore Plato, if he made the defence of Socrates characteristically his own, could be sure that it was also and for that reason characteristically Socrates's. Was not Plato, therefore, better prepared to deal with Socrates, the friend of his youth, than was Thucydides to deal with Pericles, who certainly was not one of his intimates?
indeed a tendency here and there to repetition and circumlocution.\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 26 b ad fin. and c, also p. 28 e sqq.} This is not only characteristic of Socrates in general, but particularly characteristic of him or of any one when speaking off-hand. Equally characteristic of Socrates is the cross-examination\footnote{Cf. Apol., pp. 24 d - 27 e.} and the frequent recourse which is had to the dialogue form;\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 20 a - e; p. 29 e at the end sqq. and elsewhere.} for Socrates undoubtedly went as far in this direction as the rules of Athenian pleading would allow.

No matter whether we take the speech as a verbal report or as, in the main, an invention of Plato, if we once admit that its aim was to vindicate Socrates before the whole world no less than to influence the particular men who were his judges, it is easy to understand the line of defence taken in the Apology. The counts in the indictment against him are summarily dealt with, for Socrates is chiefly anxious to show that the sole cause of his accusation is the wide-spread prejudice against him. This prejudice he grapples with, and seeks by analyzing to remove it, appealing in justification of all that he had habitually said and done to his commission from God. The careless way in which he quotes\footnote{Cf. supra, § 31.} the terms of the indictment, — he reverses the order of the counts against him and deals with them in that order, — would prove the speaker's indifference to the opinion of his judges, if such laxities were not known to be very common in the Athenian courts. Far more important, therefore, or rather all important, is the fact that he does not meet the accusation of disbelief in the gods of Athens. We have seen that nothing would have been easier than a triumphant refutation of this charge; yet the matter is passed over, and Socrates prefers to merge the narrower question in a consideration of the more sweeping charge of downright atheism, of disbelief in all gods. Evidently Socrates cared little for winning his case, but much for the opportunity afforded him to enlighten his fellow-citizens as to the wider and deeper import of the point at issue. The device by which the terms of the accusation to be met were enlarged\footnote{Cf. Apol., p. 20 b sqq.} was one sanctioned by the traditional procedure in
courts\(^1\) at Athens. Under cross-examination on the meaning of his bill of indictment, the accuser himself gave to Socrates the wider interpretation best suited for the answer with which it was to be met.

The manner in which Socrates talks of death and of the hereafter is very striking. There is more than a conviction that compared with wickedness death is no evil, for that conviction is made the firmer by the comforting hope that death is but the door which leads to everlasting life and happiness. If this be considered not Plato's addition but Socrates's literal statement, then the moral steadfastness and the joy with which Socrates hailed death's deliverance was the firmest foundation for Plato's own doctrine of the immortality of the soul, which is stated in the Phaedo and elsewhere.

The closing words on immortality play an important part in the tragic development of the situation; for the first part and the verdict of guilty which succeeds it awaken a sense of cruel injustice, which, by the second part and the ensuing sentence of death, is soon brought to a second climax but is finally mitigated by the closing words of Socrates. This third part bears we may say to the two parts that precede it a relation similar to that borne by the \textit{Eumenides} of Aeschylus to the preceding plays of the Oresteian trilogy, and solves a tragic situation by merging a narrowed view of justice in a broader one by which it is superseded.

The first of these three subdivisions, which is the defence proper, is complete in itself. Though all the laws of oratorical art are here carefully observed, the usual practices of oratory are sharply criticised. The five natural heads of the argument certainly are unmistakable, since, by carefully following the connection of thought, we can easily mark the words in which the speaker dismisses one point and takes up another.

\(^1\) \textit{Cf. infra, § 71, note 2.}
INTRODUCTION.

ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST PART, OR THE DEFENCE PROPER,  
cc. i–xxiv.

(a) c. i.  Introduction (προοίμιον, exordium)  
= {principium.  
insinuatio (ἐφοδος).

(b) c. ii. Statement (πρόθεσις, propositio) of the case and of the  
plan in the plea.

(c) cc. iii–xv. Refutation (λύσις, confutatio)  
= { of former accusers, cc. iii–x.  
= { of Melctus, cc. xi–xv.

(d) cc. xvi–xxii. Digression (παράκεντα, digressio) on Socrates’s life.

(e) cc. xxiii, xxiv. Peroration (ἐπίλογος, peroratio). This is an attack  
upon the usual form of peroration, and ends with  
a confession of trust in God.

An introduction (a) is always intended to prepare the hearers for  
listening to the speaker’s plea. This is especially hard in the face  
of prejudice against the speaker’s person or against his case. The rules of speech-writing here prescribe recourse to insinuation  
ἐφοδος, a subtle process by which the speaker wins over the sympathies of his audience. He may do this (1) by attacking his opponent, (2) by conciliating his audience, (3) by strongly stating his personal hardship in the case, or (4) by putting concisely the difficulties involved in dealing with the facts. After the introduction follows (b) the statement πρόθεσις. This is commonly a  
plain unvarnished tale covering the matters of fact involved. If  
such an account be unnecessary the statement sets forth simply the  
plan of the plea. This plan is not unfrequently accompanied by a subdivision (partitio), which is sometimes simply a summary of  
heads (enumeratio), ¹ and sometimes a detailed account of topics (expositio). ² Here, again, Socrates’s defence follows the rules of oratory. Next comes the most important part, the proof (πιστις, probatio), represented by (c) the refutation which naturally falls, as indicated above, under two heads. In the manner

¹ Rhet. ad Herenn. I. 10, 17: Enumeratione utemur, cum dicemus numero, quot de rebus dicturi simus.  
² Ibid. Expositio est, cum res, quibus de rebus dicturi sumus, exponimus breviter et absolute.
of refutation here given, the genuine Socrates is in his element, and here he is pictured to the life. After proof or refutation, as the case may be, comes, in the programme of oratorical orthodoxy, (d) a digression. This was the orator's opportunity to try his wings. The theme chosen in a digression needed no more than an indirect bearing upon the argument of the case, and the ornamental part which the digression often played has led to the use of another term for it, i.e. exornatio or embellishment.\footnote{Rhet. ad Herenn. II. 29, 46: Exornatio constat ex similibus et exemplis et rebus indicatis et amplificationibus et ceteris rebus quae pertinent ad exaugandam et collocupletandam argumentationem.} This, too, can be found in Socrates’s speech, and so perfect is its beauty that the laws of school- oratory are more than satisfied. Yet, embellishment though it be called, this part of the speech has nothing that is far-fetched or beside the point; in the Apology it is the complement of the preceding negative refutation, its positive and required reinforcement (confirmatio). The transition to (e) the peroration is plainly marked. At this point the orator, and more than ever if he were on trial for his life, made a desperate appeal to the feelings of his hearers. No means of moving the judges were left untried. Recourse to such methods Socrates condemned as equally dishonest and dishonorable.\footnote{Cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 4. 4: "οδηγείν ἡθέλησε ταῖς εισαύτων ἐν τῇ δικαστηρίῳ παρὰ τῶν νόμων ποιήσαι, ἵνα ἄραν αὐτόν ἄμα τοὺς ἐπικράτεις, ἐπεὶ τοι γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ταύτα ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἔχει τὴν ὑπομονὴν καὶ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπικράσειν." It appears that there was no special law forbidding in so many words an oratorical appeal to the emotions of the judges in the ordinary courts. This is confirmed, indeed, by Aristotle in his Rhetoric (I. 1, a passage particularly important in connection with the Apology). There Aristotle first criticizes various rhetorical practices, and then proceeds to say: "prejudice, pity, anger, and all such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with facts, but affect only the judge himself. Hence, if all legal proceedings were regulated as in certain states distinguished for particularly good laws, these emotions would play no part whatever. Indeed, all agree on this point, some urging that the law should prescribe this course, while others enforce the principle, and rule out any plea which is off the point. This is the rule of procedure before the Areopagus, and a very good rule it is. A judge should certainly never have his mind warped by the influence of anger, of jealousy, or of pity brought to bear upon him. To have recourse to these is exactly the same as for a carpenter to give a twist to his rule before using it." To the procedure of the Areopagus we may perhaps apply Quintilian’s words (VI. 1, 7): "Athe-}
the Apology is an attack upon the ordinary practice of pleaders in court. Not unmanly subserviency to men, but manly submission to God’s will are heard in the closing words of this defence.

60 Such was the temper of the Apology written for Socrates by Plato, and as such, whether intentionally or unintentionally, it must have been in striking contrast with the drift of the plea which Lysias is said to have elaborated for the same case. The tradition that Plato undertook to plead in the capacity of Socrates’s advocate (συνήγορος) but was not allowed to do so rests on very slight authority. It is therefore ridiculous to suggest that this plea, which Plato did not prepare, was the first outline afterwards worked up in the Apology.

61 The second and third parts, which come respectively after the first and the second verdict, can hardly be expected to answer all the requirements of a set speech. And yet these are symmetrically arranged, and their topics skilfully set before us. The second part naturally opens with an allusion to the verdict of ‘guilty’ just rendered; any regular peroration would have been out of place before the third, which is the suitable conclusion both for the first part and the second. And where, indeed, is there a more eloquent and nobly impressive ending than this? That part of it addressed to the judges who voted for Socrates’s acquittal is certainly made most prominent and very appropriately so. For these judges, they who alone are worthy of that title, are his chosen friends; to their kindred souls he confides the unspeakable hopes of happiness after death that are stirring within him, and invites them to be of good cheer and not to fear death. In so doing, even while death sfares him in the face, he does not blench, but obeys his captain and works as the servant of God.

62 Closely connected with the Apology is the dialogue called the

CRITO.

This dialogue belongs to the first class of Plato’s dialogues; it is a conversation pure and simple, neither narrated nor read to an

1 Cf. supra, § 34 and note.
2 Cf. supra, § 62.
INTRODUCTION.

audience introduced at the beginning. There are two speakers only, Socrates and Crito. Their close friendship has been mentioned in the Apology (p. 33 d). This intimacy was unbroken, and though Crito was much absorbed by the care of his extensive property, yet, in all the fortunes of Socrates's life, Crito had been his firm friend. And now that a sentence which he could not but regard as unjust had been pronounced upon his friend, Crito rebelled against its execution and against the shame of seeing Socrates die a criminal's death. To prevent this he was willing to risk his fortune and his civil rights. The lucky combination of circumstances which furthered the plans made for this end has already been explained.\(^1\) Apparently, nothing prevented Socrates's escape from prison but Socrates. At this juncture Socrates stands before us as the ideally loyal citizen. Though opposed to the principles of the democracy at Athens, he submits without reservation to its laws and exhorts all others to do the like. This, he declares, is the first and the most imperative duty of every citizen. Such is the historical groundwork of the dialogue. The dramatic picture given of this situation admits of the application of various terms used to designate the development of the plot in a Greek tragedy.

ANALYSIS OF THE CRITO.

(a) cc. i, ii. Prologue (προλογος); the characters and their mental situation (μνησθε καὶ καλαθος).

(b) cc. iii–x. Entanglement (δέσις or πλοική) of the logical situation.
1. c. iii. The threats of the multitude.
2. c. iv. The prayers of friends.
3. c. v. The jeers of enemies.

1. cc. vi, vii. The threats are many but duty is one.
2. c. viii. Nothing should warp our idea of duty.
3. cc. ix, x. It is wrong to run away from prison, and wrong should not be done, even in retaliation.

\(^1\) Cf. supra, § 36 and note.
INTRODUCTION.

(c) cc. xi-xv. Clearing up (ἀφέως). The laws of Athens require his submission and his death.
1. cc. xi, xii. Socrates owes them life liberty and happiness.
2. cc. xiii, xiv. They require and he has promised obedience.
3. c. xv. He will gain nothing by disobedience.

(d) cc. xvi, xvii. Epilogue (ἐπίλογος). There are laws in Hades which can reach him who disobeys law upon earth.

64 Like the Apology, this work bears memorable witness to the nobility of Plato's mind, and it reveals especially his lofty patriotism. As for Socrates, we see in both these works that not words only but deeds prove him a more law-abiding citizen than scores of men whose spurious good-citizenship is well portrayed on many pages of the Crito (e.g. p. 45 c). The very laws of the land, as well as the example of Socrates submitting to his unjust sentence of death, declare in no uncertain tones to every Athenian what true patriotism is and how it is preserved.

65 The Crito is by no means simply the chronicle of a conversation actually held; though it is based upon facts, it must still be recognized as Plato's work. This is proved by the finished skill both of plan and execution displayed in this dialogue, short and simple though it is. Moreover, in the Crito we see that Plato has made a step forward in his notion of duty. For here is the earliest statement of Plato's 'golden rule': Injustice always is wrong; it is wrong to retaliate injustice by injustice. In the Gorgias (see supra. § 40) this rule is applied more universally and put upon its rational basis. Indeed, from a philosophical point of view we may regard the Crito and the Apology as a suitable preface to the Gorgias, if we do not forget that both are primarily pictures of the one great master whom Plato in all his works most delighted to honor.

1 For most of the details of the analysis given above Cron is not responsible, though it is substituted for his § 63, where there is a less detailed analysis of the dialogue on the same principle.
2 See on ὁς οἱ πολλοὶ οἰονται, Crito, p. 49 b.
APPENDIX

ON ATHENIAN COURTS OF LAW.¹

Six thousand Athenian citizens were entrusted with the power to decide law-suits. Choice was made by lot every year of six hundred men from each of the ten tribes (φυλαί), and any citizen over thirty years of age was eligible. Every one thus chosen was liable, after taking the prescribed oath² of office, to be called upon to act as a δικαστής; δικασταί, juries,³ was the official name by

¹ The chief authority is Meier and Schömann, Der Attische Prozeß, Cal-vary (Berlin, 1884). See also K. Fr. Hermann, Lehrbuch der griechischen Staatsalterthümer, and G. F. Schö-mann, Griechische Alterthümer, 2 volumes, of which the first has been translated into English, and published under the title Antiquities of Greece by Rivingtons (London, 1889).

² The oath, which is cited in the speech of Demostenes against Timo-ocrates (140–151), is of doubtful authen-ticity. Schömann and Lipsius (p. 155, note 17), by omissions and bracketed additions change the formula there given into the following, which, excepting the last bracketed clause,—a conjecture of Fränkel's,—is not far from the real form: ψηφιώμαι κατὰ τοῦς νόμους καὶ τὰ ψήφισματα τοῦ δήμου τοῦ Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῆς βουλῆς τῶν πεινα-κοσιῶν, [περὶ δὲ τῶν νόμων μὴ δοκὶ, γρώμη τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ οὗτος χάριτος ἐνεχώ σοι ἐξήθρας], ... καὶ ἀκροάσωμαι τοῦ τε κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου δικηγοῦν διμοίριαν, καὶ ψηφιώμαι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὃς ἐν ἡ δίκαιος, [καὶ ἐπικρινώντε μὲν μοι ἔτη πολλὰ καὶ ἀγάθη, ἐπικρινώντε δὲ ἡξίωσεν ἀυτῷ τε καὶ γένεις]. I will vote in accordance with the laws and enactments of the Athenian people and of the Senate of Five Hundred, [and where there is no law, in accordance with my best knowl-edge of what is just, unmoved alike by favor and by enmity], ... and I will give impartial hearing both to the accuser and to the defendant, and vote on the question at issue in the suit. [If I keep this oath let blessings be my portion; if I break it let ruin seize on me and all my kindred.] See on ὑμώμονε νῦν, Apol., p. 35 c.

³ The use, in other connexions, of δικαστής with the meaning of judge leads many to translate δικασταί judges and not juries. Neither of these words is satisfactory, but to describe a body of citizens without any technical knowledge of the law as judges is certainly more misleading from a modern point of view than to call them juries. It must be remembered, however, that the presiding magistrate did not perform the duties of a modern judge in any important respect, so that the δικασταί had the substantial powers both of judge and jury in all cases brought before them.

⁴ The customary form in addressing them was ἄ ννθρες δικασταί, but this could be varied. We have sometimes ἄ νθρες Ἀθηναίων, sometimes ἄ νθρες, and once and again ἄ Αθηναίοι. Cf. Apol., pp. 17 a, 22 e, 20 d, 30 b.
which they were addressed. These six thousand were divided into a reserve of one thousand, to be used as substitutes etc., and a main body of five thousand for regular service. A subdivision of the five thousand was then made into ten courts, of five hundred each, called δικαστήρια, for, like the English word court, δικαστήριον may mean a judicial body as well as the place where such a body sits in judgment. Sometimes a court was composed of less than five hundred jurymen, e.g. of two or four hundred; sometimes we find two or more courts of five hundred sitting as one, but it is doubtful whether the whole six thousand ever sat as one court. The even numbers, 200, 500, 1000, etc., were habitually increased by one, and for that purpose a δικαστής was drawn from the 1000 supernumeraries. This precaution was taken to avoid a tie vote.

On days appointed for holding court each of the subdivisions above mentioned was assigned by lot to one of the places used as court-rooms, and there tried the suit appointed for that time and place. Each juryman received as the badge of his office a staff (βαστίλα) corresponding in color to a sign over the door of his court. He also received a ticket (σύμβολον), by showing which he secured his fee after his day’s service. Cf. Dem. De Cor. 210. A fee of one obol (about three cents) for every day’s session was introduced by Pericles, and afterwards trebled by Cleon.

Almost all cases except those of homicide were tried in these Heliastic courts, and the jurymen were called also ἕλιαστα from the name ἕλια, given to the largest court-room in Athens. The most general term to designate a law-suit is δίκη, though the same word also has the narrower meaning of a private suit. According as the complaint preferred involves the rights of individuals or of the whole state, δίκαιον in the wider sense were subdivided into (1) δίκαιον in the narrower sense, private suits, and (2) γραφή, public suits. Since the state was the real plaintiff in public suits, any fine which in such suits might be imposed upon the defendant went to the state; accordingly in public suits, the accuser, as a rule, was entitled to no part of the penalty.

In the ordinary course of procedure, every plaintiff was required to present his indictment (γραφή), or complaint (λήγεια), in writing to the particular magistrate whose department included the matters
involved. Most suits thus came before the nine archons, commonly before one of the first three or before all of the remaining six. The first archon, — called ὁ ἀρχον par excellence, — dealt especially with charges involving family rights and inheritance; the second archon, called βασιλεύς, with those involving the regulations and requirements of religion and public worship; the third archon, called πολίμαρχος, dealt with most cases involving foreign-residents (μόνοκοι) and foreigners; the remaining six, — called the Thesmothetae, — dealt with almost all cases not especially assigned to the first three. There were, however, cases which were disposed of by other magistrates, or otherwise especially provided for.

The accusation had to be made in the presence of the accused, who had previously been served with due notice to appear. Legal notice required the presence of two witnesses to the summons (κλητήρες). If the magistrate allowed proceedings in the case, the terms of accusation were copied and posted in some public place, and at the time of this publication a day was fixed, upon which both parties were bound to appear before the magistrate for the preliminary investigation (ἀνάκρισις). There the plaintiff’s charges and the defendant’s answer, both of them already written down and handed in, were reaffirmed under oath, and both parties submitted to the magistrate such evidence as they intended to use. The reaffirmation or confirmation under oath was called διωμοσία, sometimes ἀντωμοσία. The evidence submitted consisted in citations from the laws, documentary evidence of various kinds, the deposits of witnesses, and particularly any testimony given under torture (βάσανος) by slaves, which had been taken and written down in the presence of witnesses. The magistrate fixed his official seal

1 Cf. (Dem. xlv. 46) the written charge (Ἀλέξις) in a private suit: Ἀπολλόδορος Παυλίνως Ἀχαρνεύς Στεφάνως Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνεύς ψευδομαρτυρῶν, τιμημα τίλαντον. τὰ δ᾽ευθὺ μοι κατεμαρτύροντες Ἀτέφανας καὶ μαρτύρησας τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, Απολλοδόρος θεὸς Ἀχαρνιστής, Μεσοποταμιακός, who accused Stephanus the Acharnian, son of Pasion, accuses Stephanus the Acharnian, son of Menecles, for giving false testimony; the damages named are fixed at one talent. Stephanus testified falsely against me in the statements recorded in the evidence submitted. The answer is: Ἐτέφανος Μενεκλέους Ἀχαρνέως τάληθ' ἐμαρτύρησα μαρτύρησαν τὰ ἐν τῷ γραμματείῳ γεγραμμένα, the testimony which I... gave is true as recorded in the evidence submitted.

2 διωμοσία refers strictly to the double oath of the two parties; ἀντωμοσία to the defendant’s oath. But both are used for each singly.
upon all the documents thus submitted, and took charge of them against the day when the case was to be tried.

70 On the day (ἡ κυρία) when a court was to sit upon any case, the magistrate who had presided over the preliminary investigation proceeded to the appointed court-room, where he met the δικαστὴς assigned by lot (ἐπικελευθέρωμαι) to the case. Both parties to the suit, having been previously notified, were required to put in an appearance. Proceedings in court were opened by some religious ceremony; then the clerk (γραμματικός) read aloud the written accusation and the reply, and finally the parties to the suit were successively called forward to state their case. This was the opening of the case (εἰσαγωγή τῆς δίκης) by the magistrate (εἰσαγωγεύς). *Cf.* Aristoph. Vesp. 860 ff., Antipho, vi. 42.

71 The law required that every man should conduct his own case in person, and hence those who were not themselves skilful pleaders generally recited speeches which had been written for them by others. Still, the law permitted a man to appear in court accompanied by advocates (σύνηγοροι), who came as his friends, and therefore were not supposed to be paid for their trouble; not infrequently, after a short speech from the principal, the most important part of his plea was made by one of his advocates. *E.g.* Demosthenes’s speech on the Crown was made as Ctesipon’s advocate. The water-clock (κλειστρα, sometimes called simply τὸ ὄρος) was used to measure the time allotted to each for pleading before the court. When called for, the written documents offered in evidence were read by the clerk, and meanwhile the clock was stopped. By way of precaution, the witnesses whose depositions were read had to be present in court and acknowledge their testimony. While making his plea a man was protected by law from interruption by his opponent, and the law required his opponent to answer his questions. The jurymen had a right to interrupt the speaker

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1 To this correspond the words ἡ εἰσόδος τῆς δίκης, Crito, p. 45e, just as we find εἰσόδεις used both of τῆς δίκης and of τοῦ ἐκφρασθεὶτοῦτας. Correspondingly, we find εἰσάγησθαι and εἰσίναι said both of the suit and of the parties to the suit, meaning substantially the same thing. Hence the presiding magistrate, ἤγειραν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, is also called δὲ εἰσαγωγεύς.

2 According to the terms of the νόμος quoted in Dem. xlvii. 10: τοῦ ἀντίδικου ἐπάναγες εἶναι ἀποκρίνεσθαι ἀλλά τὸ ἐρωτῶμεν, μαρτυρεῖν δὲ μὴ,
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(1) if in their opinion he was off the point, (2) if they required fuller explanation on any point whatsoever. Of course, there were frequent attempts to prejudice the jurymen instead of enlightening them, and nothing was commoner than to make appeal to their sympathies. It was by no means an unusual occurrence for a defendant to appear in court with his wife and children, or with infirm and helpless parents, and sometimes with friends of great popularity or of high character; he depended upon these to act as his intercessors with the court. Such practices, though manifestly tending to disarm the severity of the law and to defeat the ends of justice for which the court was organized, seem never definitely to have been prohibited in any court except the Areopagus.

When the pleas had been made, the jurymen proceeded without preliminary consultation to decision by a secret vote. In public suits, only one speech was allowed to the plaintiff, and one to the defendant. In private suits, two were allowed to each. The jurors generally voted with bronze balls or discs, either solid (to denote acquittal) or perforated (to denote condemnation). These were called ψήφοι. If the vote was a tie, the case went in favor of the defendant; and, in a public suit, if less than one-fifth of the votes were for the plaintiff, he was fined, and also debarred from ever again acting as plaintiff in a similar suit. This fine was fixed at 1000 drachmas, about $170. The plaintiff in such a suit also incurred both these penalties if, without good and sufficient excuse, he failed to appear in court, and thus by his own act allowed that his case was bad. If the defendant failed to appear, the case went against him by default (see on ἐρήμην κατηγοροῦντες, Apol. 18 c), and he was pronounced guilty in contumaciam. In most private suits, the plaintiff, under similar circumstances, forfeited one-sixth of the sum which he claimed; this forfeiture was called ἵππαλα, one obol for every drachma.

Suits, both public and private, were divided into (1) δίκαιοι 73 τιμητοί, in which, if it decided against the defendant, the court had still to determine the degree of punishment to be inflicted

the two parties to the suit are required to answer each what question the other asks, but cannot give testimony as witnesses. Cf. Apol., p. 25d.
(τίμημα), because no penalty was fixed by law; and (2) ἀγώνες ἀριστουργοῦ, in which, after deciding against the defendant, the court had no further decision to make, because the penalty was fixed by law. In cases of the former kind, if they were public suits, — like the γραφή ἀριστείας brought against Socrates, — the accuser proposed the penalty which he considered adequate,¹ and the accused, if convicted, had the right to make a counter-proposition; then followed the decision of the court.² It is still a moot point whether the judges were confined to a choice between these two propositions or could, if they saw fit, inflict a third penalty midway between the two.

74 The ordinary penalties for crimes against the state were death, banishment, loss of rights of citizenship (ἀριστεία), confiscation of property, and fines. All these are summed up in the formula constantly used at Athens: διὰ τὴν παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι,³ what a man must suffer or pay for his offence. In case the convicted defendant was not an Athenian by birth, he might be sold into slavery, and thus additionally punished by the loss of his freedom.

75 The magistrates who had to oversee the execution of the punishment of death were called the Eleven (οἱ ἕνδικα). Ten men on this board were chosen by lot every year, one from each of the ten tribes; the eleventh was a scribe, γραμματεύς. They had general charge of all prisons, and they issued the order requiring their subordinates⁴ to execute the penalty of death.

¹ Cf. supra, § 31; also, § 60 and note. ² The technical terms which were used are found in Apol., pp. 36 b, 37 c. ³ It is noticeable that not only τίμημα but also ἀποτίσαι (Xen. Apol. 23) were used. ⁴ Cf. Phaed., p. 110 b.
ΠΑΙΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΩΣ.

I. "Ὁ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πεπόνθατε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, οὐκ οἶδα. ἐγώ δὲ οὖν καὶ ἄυτὸς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ὁλίγου ἐμαυτοῦ ἐπελαθόμην· οὖτω πιθανῶς ἐλεγον. 
καὶ τοις ἀληθέσεις γε ὃς ἐπος εἰπεῖν οἴδει εἰρήκας. 
μάλιστα 5 δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν δὲν ἐφεύσαντο, τούτο ἐν ὑμῖν ἐλεγον ὃς χρήμα ὑμᾶς εὐλαβεῖσθαι μὴ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ ἐξαιτητη.

17 I. 1. ὃ τι μὲν ὑμεῖς· ἐγὼ δέ: not ὑμεῖς μὲν· ἐγὼ δέ because the clauses as wholes, not ὑμεῖς and ἐγώ, are contrasted.

ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: instead of the more usual and technical ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί, which Socrates reserves for his closing words (40 a to the end) addressed to those who voted for his acquittal. See on ὁ ἄνδρες κτ., 26 d, and Introd. p. 49, note 4. —πεπόνθατε: have been affected, though act. in form is pass. in meaning, and therefore takes ὑπ’ with the gen.

2. ὃ σοι: introduces an asserted fact, which is contrasted with the preceding statement of uncertainty, but at any rate, Lat. certe. Cf. Xen. An. i. 3, 5, καὶ μὲν δικαία ποίησιν οὐκ οἶδα, ἀληθεύει δ’ οὖν ὑμᾶς κτ., whether I shall be doing what is right I do not know, but at any rate I will choose you. Hdt. iii. 30, καὶ ἐλέησαν λόγοι ἐπιστοι μὲν ἐνοπλοῖ Ἑλλήνων, ἐλέησαν δ’ Ἰν, and arguments were urged which to some Greeks seem apocryphal, but at any rate they were urged.

καὶ αὐτὸς: even myself, sc. "How then may not you have been affected!"

3. ὁλίγου: sc. δεῖν, used abs. G. 328; Π. 956 and 743 b. Cf. 22 a. —πιθανῶς, ἀληθὲς: these words state and contrast the respective aims of rhetoric and of dialectic (philosophy).

4. ὃς ἐπος εἰπεῖν: qualifies the sweeping denial in οἴδει, hardly anything. G. 268; Π. 956. For an equiv. idiom in Herodotus, cf. Hdt. ii. 15, τὸ δὲ λόγῳ ἐξειρήσθη, ἀναιρεθάντως, has only recently, so to speak, come to light.

5. αὐτῶν ἐν ἑθαύμασα τῶν πολλῶν: connect both gens. with ἐν. αὐτῶν, about them, designates the persons who are responsible for the ἐν (cf. below δ, τούτο ἡμῖν ἀνακριθτώτατον). τῶν πολλῶν gives the sum of which ἐν is part. See also on τοῦς πολλοὺς in 18 b.—τούτο: explaining ἐν and in appos. with it.—ἐν ὑμῖ: refers to the passage where the statement is made.

6. χρὴ: the original warning was χρὴ εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρή, but not χρὴν, would be grammatically possible. G. 243; Π. 032. For the use of χρὴν, cf. 33 d, 34 a, and Lach. 181 c. G. 222, x. 2; Π. 897.
πλατωνος

ότε τε ως δεινον οντος λέγειν. τὸ γὰρ μη αἰσχυνθῇμαι ὅτι αὐτίκα όντ' εἰμον ἐξελεγχθήσονται ἔργῳ, ἐπειδὼν μηδ' ὀπωσδεὶν φαίνωμαι δεινος λέγειν, τούτω μοι ἐδοξεῖν αὐτῶν τῶν ἀνασχυντότατον εἰναι, εἰ μη ἄρα δεινον καλοὺσω οὖτοι λέγειν τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ τούτῳ λέγονσιν, ὀμολογούν ἃν ἔγογγε οὐ κατὰ τούτους εἰναι ἤρτωρ. οὖτοι μὲν γονὶ, ὡσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, ἦ τι ἢ οὐδὲν ἀληθὲς εἰρήκασιν· ὑμεῖς δὲ μου ἀκούσεσθε πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. οὐ μέντοι

17 10. εὶ μὴ ἄρα: unless perchance, Lat. nisi forte. In order to suggest that the one safest way out of the difficulty is to beg the whole question at issue, ἄρα introduces a definition of good speaking, and ironically connects with it the assertion that Socrates is a good speaker.

11. εἰ μὲν: if indeed. This use of μὲν, like many others, shows its connexion with μὴν. The supposition is merely restated.

12. οὐ κατὰ τούτους: but not after their pattern. A parenthetical statement, which he proceeds to explain (see on μοιχος, 21 b, and cf. 27 c). The explanation begins with οὐ μέντοι and ends with the chapter. Pending this explanation, these words mean a better or a worse speaker than they, i.e. one not on their level.

13. γονί: at all events.— ἦ τι ἢ οὐδὲν: little or nothing. Cf. Πρ. iii. 140, ἀναιβηθηκε ἢ τις ἢ οὐδεὶς κο παρ' ἡμέας αὐτῶν, hardly a single one of them has ever been here. Χεν. Στρ. vii. 5. 46, τούτων δὲ τῶν περιστηκότων ἢ τινα ἢ οὐδένα οἶδα, now of these bystanders I know next to no one at all.

14. υμεῖς δὲ μου ἀκούσεσθε: instead of ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀκούσεσθε. The position of υμεῖς suggests a contrast with οὐτοί μὲν; the sense calls for ἐμοὶ δὲ (ὑμεῖς) ἀκούσεσθε. This collocation leaves oppportunity for bringing out πάσαν τὴν ἀλήθειαν with great prominence. For a similar shifting of emphasis, cf. Χεν. Αν. iii. 1. 25, κάγω δέ, εἰ μὲν υμεῖς ἔθελετε ἐξομαί ἐπὶ ταῦτα, ἔκεισθαυ ὑμῖν βοῦλομαι, εἰ δ' ομεῖς τά πρεπέτε μὲ ἥγεσθαι, οὐδὲν προφασίζομαι τὴν ἥλικιαν, now I for one, if you are minded to bestir yourselves to accomplish this, am ready to follow your lead; if you however appoint me to lead you I make no excuse on the score of my age.

See App.

15. κεκαλλιετημένος κτλ.: in Crat. 399 a b Διὶ φίλος is quoted as a βήμα; when changed to Δίφιλος it becomes an ἓνομα. Here ἓνομα means words, βήμα means phrases. In grammar ἓνομα means noun, βήμα means verb. The κόσμος τῶν λόγων (ορνατός) means specifically the use of tropes and figures of speech. Orators took great pains in the choice of single words, and in the collocation and suitable arrangement of their words in phrases. Accordingly, in Συμπ. 108 b, Socrates is made to bestow un stinted praise upon Agathon's speech: τοῦ καλλον τῶν ὄνομάτων καὶ βήματων τις οὐκ ἐξελάδηγι ἀκοίων, who would not have been beside himself on hearing words and phrases of such marvellous beauty? Then he contrasts his own fashion of speaking with Aga-
15 μᾶ Δία, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, κεκαλλιπετημένους γε λόγους, ἀσπερ οἱ τούτων, ὑμᾶς τε καὶ ὑόμασιν οὐδὲ κεκοσμημένους, ὅλ' ἀκούσσεσθε εἰκῇ λεγόμενα τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν εἰνόμασι· πιστεύω γὰρ δίκαια εἶναι ἅ λέγω, καὶ μηδὲς ὑμῶν προσδοκιστάτω ἄλλως· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ὑπὸ πρέποι, ὃ 20 ἀνδρὲς, τῇδε τῇ ἥλικίᾳ ὃσπερ μειρακίων πλάττοντι λόγους εἰς ὑμᾶς εἰσιέναι. καὶ μεντοί καὶ πάνυ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοῦτο ὑμῶν δεομαὶ καὶ παρείμαι· ἐὰν διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων ἀκούστε μου ἀπολογουμένου δὲ ὁσπερ εἰσβα λέγειν καὶ ἐν thon's as follows: ὥς οὖν εἴ τι καὶ τοιοῦτον λόγον δείξει, περὶ 'Ερωτος ταλῆθη λεγόμενα ἄκοιδε, ὑμῶμασι: οὐκ θέσῃς ἡμᾶς καὶ θέσῃς ἡμᾶς τοιαύτη, ὡστὶ δέ ἂν τις τέχνη ἐπεκδουσέ, consider now whether you feel the need of such a speech as this, of hearing the truth told about love in words and phrases arranged just in the way they suggest themselves (cf. εἰκῇ λεγόμενα). See Introd. 36.

17. εἰκῇ, τοῖς ἐπιτυχοῦσιν ὑ司令ασι: the same fact stated under two different but parallel aspects, σχῆμα ὣν παραλλήλου. See on παρατάξεις, 18 b, and on καὶ ἀντιτάξεις, Crit. 46 d, and for the facts Introd. 34. Also for freq. scns at the unrefined illustrations and homely vocabulary of Socrates, cf. Gorg. 489 b-491 c. Cf. also Xen. Men. i. 2. 37. δὲ Κριτιάς, “ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῦ σε ἀπέξεσθαι” ἕτη “δεοστε, ἦ Σάκκαρτες, τῶν σκυτῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτῶν καὶ τῶν χαλκῶν· καὶ γὰρ οἷοι αὐτῶι ήδη καταστράφησα διαβρολομένου ἐπὶ σου.”
18. ἐλέγω: referring to the speech which follows, ἵδη πλεία.—μηδὲς προσδοκιστάτω: for the aor. imp. third pers. in prohibitions, see GMT. 80, n. 1 b; G. 264, n.; H. 874 b.

20. τῇδε τῇ ἥλικίᾳ: for a man as old as I. πλάττοντι agrees in gender with ἐμα, i.e. the person involved in πλάτα

to: and suggested, though not explicitly, by τῇδε (equiv. to τῇ ἐφ). The comparison is attracted into the dat., i.e. ὁσπερ μειρακίων stands for ὁσπερ μειράκιον ἂν πλάττοι.

21. εἰς ὑμᾶς: before you, sc. τοῖς δικαστάσις, i.e. τοῖς δικαστήριοι. Cf. the similar use of εἰς—καὶ μέντοι καὶ πάνυ: yes, and most fervently too. καὶ μέντοι = a rhetorical ‘yes,’ the second καὶ adds a specification of the intensity with which the request is made, “and indeed I beg of you, and I beg you most fervently too.”

22. δεομαὶ καὶ παρείμαι: cf. 27 b, παρηγοράμαχη: τῶν αὐτῶν λόγων: “this has respect primarily to the conversation with Meletus, which is prefaced by the request, 27 b, μὲν θερμιβεῖν ἐὰν ἐν τῷ εἰσώθητι τρόπῳ τοῖς λόγοις ποιώμαι. But, as something like this was recognized under the name of ἐφάπτεις (see Introd. 71), the reference here prob. extends to the conversations rehearsed (20 a), alluded to (21 c sqq., 23 c), and imagined (23 b, 29 c), in the course of the defence; perhaps also to the castigation intermingled with it (39 d, 31 c, 35 b, e).” R.

23. καὶ ἐν ἄγορα καὶ ἄλλοθε: see Introd. 25.


24. τραπεζίων: τράπεζα (banks) as well as shops, esp. those near the market place, were favorite lounging places at Athens. Cf. Lys. x. 5, καμοι μέν τά προετιμόμενα διέλεκτο εὔτι τῇ Φιλίου τραπέζῃ, now the facts just recited I gathered from a conversation at Philius's bank. Cf. also Id. xxiv. 19-20, where, to meet the charge that his shop is the resort of evil minded persons without visible means of support, the defendant says: ταύτα λέγων οὖθεν ἐμοὶ κατηγορεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἁλλῶν δοσὶ τέχνας ἔχουσι (who follow trades), οὐδὲ τῶν ὡς ἔμελεισότων (my customers) μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ὡς τῶν ἁλλῶν δημουργοὺς (tradesmen). ἔκαστος γάρ ὠμόν εἰσίσται προσφορὰν (frequent, lounge in) ὁ μὲν πρὸς μυροπολέον (perfumer's), ὁ δὲ πρὸς κουρέων (barber-shop), ὁ δὲ πρὸς σκυτοσομεῖον (cobbler's), ὁ δ' ὅποιον ἵνα τεχνίη καὶ πλείστοι μὲν ὡς τῶν ἐγγυμάτων τῆς ἀγορᾶς κατασκευασμένοις (keeping shop), ἥλισθοντι δὲ ὡς τῶν πλείστων ἐχόμενα αὑτῶς. On the last point, cf. Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 1, where Socrates αἰσθανόμενοι αὑτῶν (sc. τῶν ἐθνουσίων) δία νεότητα (because he was so young) ὁπως εἰς τὴν ἀγορᾶν εἰσίοντα, εἰ δὲ τι βοολότῳ διαπράζωσα, καθίστατα ἐς ἰνιοποιεῖτον τι (a harness-maker's) τῶν ἐγγύς τῆς ἀγορᾶς, εἰς τόσο καὶ αὐτὸς ἦν κτὲ. 

25. θορυβέων: θορυβεῖν and θορυβαίς describe noisy demonstrations whether of approval or disapproval, and are used esp. of large assemblies. Cf. Rep. vi. 492 b, ὅταν συγκαθίζομαι ἀδρόοι οἱ πολλοὶ εἰς ἐκκλησίας ἢ εἰς δικαστήρια ἢ θέατρα ἢ στρατόπεδα ἢ τῶν ἁλλῶν κοινῶν πλῆθους ἔλλασιν οὖν πολλῷ θορύβῳ τὰ μὲν ψεύδα τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, τὰ δὲ ἐπικόνωσιν... καὶ ἐκθέοντες καὶ προσφέρουσιν κτέ., whenever the multitude gathers and crowds the seats of assemblies, courts, theatres, or camps, or collects in any place where crowds commonly resort, and there makes a great uproar with shouting and clapping of hands meting out praise to this and blame to that in a speech or a play, etc. 

26. ἐπὶ δικαστήριον: “the prep. has the notion of presenting one's self to the court. Cf. Isae. Frg. (Dion H. de Isae. 10), λέγειν ἐπὶ δικαστηρίου. The ἀναβέβαια refers to the βῆμα.” R. 

27. ἐβουμήκοντα: see Introd. 17 and App. Cf. also Lys. xix. 55, ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐτή γεγονός ἢ ἢ τριάκοντα ὡθε τῷ πατρὶ οὖθεν πώς ποτὲ ἀντεῖπον, ὡθε τῶν πολιτῶν οὖθει μοι ἐνεκάλεσεν (brought accusation), ἐγώ ό τεικὸν τῆς ἀγορᾶς οὖθεν πρὸς δικαστηρίῳ οὐδὲ πρὸς βουλευτηρίῳ ἡθεν ὡθεκότει, πρὸς ταύτῃ τῆς συμφορᾶς γενέσθαι. 

28. ἐνθάδε: i.e. ἐν δικαστηρίοις. The gen. τῆς λέξεως depends upon ξένως (G. 182, 1; H. 757 a), the adv. of ξένως,—used almost in the sense of ἀπιως,—which in this sense takes the gen., but is rare in Att. prose. 

ἀστερ σοῦ ἄν κτέ.: for the position
απολογία Σωκράτους.

30 τῇ φωνῇ τε καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ ἐλεγον ἐν ὀσπερ ἐτεθράμμην, καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τοῦτο ὑμῶν δέομαι δίκαιον, ὡς γέ μοι δοκῶ, τὸν μὲν τρόπον τῆς λέξεως ἔαν — ἵσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἵσως δὲ βελτίων ἄν εἴη — αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο σκοπεῖν καὶ τοῦτω τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν, εἰ δίκαια λέγω ἢ μὴ· δικαστοῦ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ, ὑήτορος δὲ τὰλθῆ λέγειν.

Π. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν δίκαιος εἰμι ἀπολογησάσθαι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα μου-ψευδή κατηγορημένα καὶ τὸν πρῶτον κατηγόρους, ἐπειτα δὲ πρὸς τὰ υπότερα καὶ τοὺς υπότερους. ἐμοῦ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροὶ γεγόνασι πρὸς ἐμοῦ di keπερραβούν, ἀποτελεῖν ἐμοὶ πρὸς τὰ υπότερα καὶ τοὺς υπότερους. ἐμοὶ γὰρ πολλοὶ κατηγοροὶ γεγόνασι πρὸς ἐμοῖς...
5 ὑμᾶς καὶ πάλαι πολλὰ ἤδη ἔτη καὶ οὖν ἄλλης λέγουντες, οὓς ἐγὼ μάλλον φοβοῦμαι ἢ τοὺς ἀμφὶ Ἀντων, καὶ περὶ ὧν ταῦτα καὶ τούτους δεινοὺς· ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι δεινότεροι, ἢ ἄνδρες, οἱ ὑμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐκ παῖδων παραλαμβάνοντες ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόρουν ἐμοῦ, ὡς ἔστι τῷ Σωκράτῃ, σοφὸς ἄνηρ, τὰ τε μετέωρα φροντιστᾷ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ παιδα παραλαμβάνοντες ὡς ἐκεῖνοι βασιλειοὺς παιδαγωγοὺς ἄνωμαζον. But this sense is too narrow for the present context. More to the point is Gorg. 483 ε, where λαμβάνειν is used in a wider sense, which is analogous to that of παραλαμβάνειν here, τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐφρωνευστ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νόμων λαμβάνοντες· δι’ ὧν ἄνδρες κατηγοροῦντες κτλ., taking the best and most vigorous of our number in our earliest youth, and by incantations subduing us as if we were young lions.

9. ἐπειθόν τε καὶ κατηγόροντες: prejudiced you against me by unceasing accusations. Strictly speaking κατηγοροῦντες ἐπειθόν is required, but coordination here idiomatically takes the place of subordination. — τῷ Σωκράτῃ: τῷ with prop. names conveys an indefiniteness and uncertainty which are always uncomplimentary and which in this case amount to scorn, an individual (somebody or other) named Socrates. Cf. what d’you call him? used colloquially in Eng.

10. σοφὸς ἄνηρ: these words are practically intended to mean a Sophist. “The title σοφὸς ἄνηρ would at once be understood as a class-appellation, cf. 23 a, 34 e; in it the meaning and associations of Philosopher are uppermost, yet not so distinctly as to exclude those of Sophist.” R. — τὰ τε μετέωρα... ἀνεξηγητικοῦ: popular prejudice coined this phrase, or something like it, to stigmatize all
scientific investigation into nature. With such investigation began and ended the earliest Greek philosophy (Introd. 2–12), and even Socrates’ contemporaries, the Sophists,—notably Hippias,—were much addicted to it. See Introd. 14. Cf. Prot. 316c, ἐφανερωτε ἐπὶ δὲ πρὸς τῷ κατὰ τῶν μετέφερον κατάρρημα ἄττα διέρρη οἷς ἔτην ἤπειραν, and they (Eryximachus, Phaedrus, and Andron) appeared to be plying Hippias with astronomical questions about nature and the heavenly bodies. The phrase τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς (where ὑπὸ has the very unusual sense of beneath and covered by) does not refer to definite matters searched into, but is part and parcel of a sweeping assertion that nothing either high or low, nothing “in heaven above or in the earth beneath or in the waters under the earth” is safe from their fatuous and futile curiosity. This popular view is amusingly exaggerated and dramatized by Aristophanes in the Clouds, 184–234. Here the word ἀπαντά adds a final touch of exaggeration. — φυσικήσας: used trans. here like φυσικεῖν with acc. For a dat. similarly governed, cf. τὴν ὑμην τῷ θεῷ ὑπερπισταν, 30a, where see note. See also App.—“This ‘accusation,’ σοφὸς . . . ποιῶ,” both as given here, and as repeated with mock formality in 10b, is nothing more than a vivid way of representing, for a rhetorical purpose, the popular prejudice, in which the court shared. The charges it contains are two-edged, being borrowed partly from the vulgar representation of the Philosopher, partly from that of the Sophist; the μετέφερα φυσικήσας points to the Philosopher, the τὸν . . . ποιῶν to the Sophist.” R.

11. τὸν ἴττῳ λόγον κτέ.: any teaching of rhetoric, as such, must contain hints as to the most effective means for making the best of a bad case by presenting it skilfully. How far this must be condemned should not be decided without reference to circumstances and facts. To-day it is equally impossible to assert that a lawyer in all cases is bound not to defend a client whose cause he knows to be unjust. Popular opinion at Athens seems to have been convinced that the Sophist’s single aim in teaching rhetoric was to communicate the art of proving that black was white. Cf. the Clouds, 880–1104, where Aristophanes introduces the δίκαιος λόγος and the δίκαιος λόγος respectively. They have an argument in which the δίκαιος λόγος wins. Cf. Cic. Brut. 8, where the excellent Claudius says of the Sophists: docere se profitebantur quemadmodum causa inferior (ita enim loquebantur) dicendo fieri superior posset. His opposuit se se Socrates, qui subtilitata quadrata disputandì refellere corum instituta solebat verbis.

13. οἱ δεινο; in the pred. The accusers just mentioned as κατ’ ἐθο-χ’ν δεινο.

14. οὖν θεούς κτέ.: the investigations alluded to above were, it was charged, not only a foolish waste of
15 ἐπειτὰ εἰςων οὗτοι οἱ κατῆγοροι πολλοὶ καὶ πολὺν χρόνον ἦδη κατηγορηκότες, ἦτι δὲ καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἡλικίᾳ λέγοντες πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἐν ἕναν μάλιστα ἐπιστεύσατε, παῖδες οὗτες, ἡμοὶ δὲ ὑμῶν καὶ μειράκια, ἀτεχνώς ἐρήμουν κατηγοροῦντες ἀπολογουμένου οὖν δεῖ. 

16 τὰ ὑσώματα αὐτῶν τε αὐτῶν εἰδέναι καὶ εἴπειν, πλὴν εἰ τις ἡ κωμῳδιστικὸς τυχανεί αὖν. ὡςοι δὲ φθόνῳ καὶ διαβολῇ 

17 ἐν ἕναν ἐπιστεύσατε: for the potential ind. with ἕν denoting what may have happened and perhaps did happen, see G. 226, 2, ν. 2. See the examples in L. and S. s.v. ἐπιστεύσατε. 

18 ἐρήμουν κατηγοροῦντες: supply δίκην. The fem. termination is used in this idiom, though ἐρήμος is more commonly of two terminations, and κατηγοροῦν ἐρήμου, in exactly the sense required here, occurs in Dem. xxi. 87. The acc. is cognate with κατηγοροῦντες. G. 150; H. 715 b. Cf. also the common law phrases, δικαίων γραφήν, prosecute an indictment, φιδέναι γραφήν, defend a suit at law. The sense of the whole is repeated in untechnical language by the appended ἀπολογουμένου οὖν δεῖ. In fact the case they prosecuted always went by default, with none to speak for the defendant. When either party to a lawsuit failed to appear, the court, as we say, entered a default against him, ἐρήμου καταγγέλσαι τινάς, and either one of the two parties to the suit who appeared ἐρήμου κρατεῖ οὐ ἐρήμου αἱρεί, sc. δίκην. In such a case a plaintiff, if present, ἐρήμου κατηγορεῖ (δικήν) and the absent defendant ἐρήμου ὀφλισκάζει δίκην. — ἄτεχνως: absolutely, i.e. without artifice, and hence simply, as a matter of course.

19. ὡςοι δὲ κτῆτος ἀνθρώπων κτέ. τοῦτο, the correlative of ὡς, is suppressed for brevity's sake. τοῦτο ὡς must be read between the lines. The clause with ὡς stands in appos. to this suppressed antecedent. Often a further step toward brevity is taken, and in place of such a clause as this one with ὡς we have an independent clause, sometimes even introduced by γάρ. Cf. Isoc. viii. 58, ἡ δὲ πάντων σχετικά ἐστιν, οὐ γὰρ ὕσσωμαι ἐν ποιμένας εἰναι τῶν πολιτῶν τοῦτοι πιστοτάτους φίλακες ἡγομένας τῆς πολιτείας εἰναι, but, what is of all things most grievous! We are wont to consider those the commonwealth's most trustworthy guardians whom we should consider as the meanest of our citizens.

20. κωμῳδιστικὸς: the Clouds of Aristophanes (see Introd. 26) is here more esp. alluded to, since it contains the specific charges just mentioned. Cratinus, Ameipsias, and Eupolis also ridiculed Socrates/
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χρώμενοι ὡμᾶς ἀνέπειθον, — οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πεπεισμένοι 18 ἄλλοις πείθοντες, — οὗτοι πάντες ἀποροτάτοι εἰσιν. οὐ δὲ γὰρ ἀναβιβάσασθαι οὖν τῇ ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἐνταυθοῖς οὐδὲ 25 ἐλέγχει σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἀτεχνῶς κατάμαχε τοιαύτη ἀπολογούμενον τε καὶ ἐλέγχει μηδέν δεῖ ἀποκρινομένου. ἀξιῶσατε οὖν καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὁππότε ἐγὼ λέγω, διτούς μου τοὺς ἐκατηγόρους γεγονέναι, ἔτερους μὲν τοὺς ἀρτι καθηγορή-σαντας, ἔτερους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι οὓς ἐγὼ λέγω, καὶ οἴπερ τε 30 δέν πρὸς ἐκεῖνος πρῶτον μὲ ἀπολογίσασθαι καὶ γὰρ ὑμεῖς ἐκεῖνον πρῶτον ήκούσατε καθηγορούντων, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν ὡστερῶν εἰλα ἀπολογητέου δή, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ ἐπιχειρήτεον ὑμῶν ἐξελέσθαι τῇ διαβολή, ἢν ὑμεῖς ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἐσχέτε, ταὐτὴν ἐν

18 main statement of the preceding sent. about the anonymous accusers, ὁ δὲ ... εἰποῦν. On the loose conversational structure of such sent.s, see Introd. 56.

25. ὁππότε σκιαμάχεοι κτέ.: τὰ καὶ used here to connect, not two different ideas, but two different ways of putting the same idea. Socrates would be sure always to use his favorite method of question and answer, and therefore σκιαμάχεοι ἀπολογούμενον for him would be practically ἐλέγχει μηδέν δεῖ ἀποκρινομένου. By thus saying one and the same thing twice over, the speaker expresses his idea all the more effectively.

27. ἀξιῶσατε: the two notions of ἐξον, worth (price) and right, are as usual blended in this word, duly grant. Notice the persistent recurrence in various forms of the idea conveyed by ὁππότε ἐγὼ λέγω. See Introd. 55.

29. οὕς λέγει: refers to b above. —οἴπερ κτέ.: it was common for a speaker to ask the court to approve of some order of topics which he proposed to follow. For a fuller description of ἐκεῖνος, see b above; notice that it refers to ἔτερους δὲ τοὺς πάλαι. These old-time accusers, though the last-mentioned, were the most remote in thought, for Anytus and his crew were actually present as τῶν ὡστε shows. H. 696 b.

32. εἰλα: well, pointing to what has just been said, and implying that the whole must be accepted by his hearers as a matter of course. It is like “So far, so good!” ἐστῳ often has the same force. Grammatical arguments are used to prove that this εἰλα is nothing more nor less than the alternative form used not infrequently in place of the opt. εἶπον. The force of δή is very much that of εἰλα, for it indicates that the duty of making some plea must be taken for granted.

33. τὴν διαβολή: the prejudice pro-duced by the slanders just described.

34. ἐσχέτε: acquired. See on ἐρχηκα, 20 d, and cf. Hdt. i. 14, τὴν τυπανίδα
οὕτως διλέγω χρόνῳ. βουλομένη μὲν οὖν ἂν τοῦτο οὕτως
γενέσθαι, εἰ τι ἁμενον καὶ ύμιν καὶ ἐμοὶ, καὶ πλέον τι μὲ
posτομία ἀπολογοῦμεν· οἴμαι δὲ αὐτὸ χαλέπων εἶναι, καὶ
οὐ πάνω· με λανθάνει οὐν ἑστών. ομοὶ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ἴτω
ὅτι τῷ θεῷ φίλοι, τῷ δὲ νόμῳ πειστέον καὶ ἀπολογητέον.

III. Ἄναλάβωμεν οὖν ἕξ ἁρχῆς, τίς ἡ κατηγορία ἐστὶν
ἑξ ἦν ἡ ἐμὴ διαβολὴ γέγονεν, ἢ ἃ καὶ πιστεύων Ὀμητός
με ἐγράφατο τὴν γραφὴν ταύτην, ἐινὲ τί δὴ λέγοντες
διέβαλλον οἱ διαβάλλοντες; ἃσσπερ οὖν κατηγορών τὴν
και ἀντιμοίσιαν δεῖ ἀναγνώριν αὐτῶν. Ὁ σωκράτης ἄδικεὶ καὶ
περεραγαζότατο ζητῶν τὰ τέ ύπὸ γῆς καὶ οὐράνια καὶ τὸν

οὐτὸς ἔσχον οἱ Μερμαύδαι. When ἔσχον
means, be in possession, ἔσχον means,
came into possession. G. 200, x. 5 b;
H. 841. — ταύτην: resumptively after
the interrupting clause of explanation
introduced by ἦν.

36. εἰ τι: if at all. — ἁμαίνον: used
without an expressed standard of
comparison because the opposite in-
evitably suggests itself, “better in
any way than that I should not ac-
complish anything.”

πλοῦν ποιεῖν: pro f i c e r e.

38. οὐ πάνω: not at all. Here cer-
certainly hardly would not be adequate.
Cf. μόις πάνω, 21 b.

39. τῷ θεῷ: the divine will or God.
The art. is used not because any par-
ticular god is referred to, but with a
43 d, and see on τῷ θεῷ, 35 d and 42 a,
and δ θεός, Crit. 54 ε.

III. 2. πιστεύων: not as above,
18 c, fidem habens, but rather con-
fident or f r e t u s. Cf. Alc. I. 123 c, τι
οὖν ποτὲ ἔστων ἐμε πιστεύει το με-
ράκον; Come now, on what does
the youth rely? — Μελέτος: see Introd.
30, and for γραφῆς, ibid. 67.

4. ἄστιπρ οὖν κατηγόρων: a freq.
idiom in comparisons; the leading
and dependent clauses are briefly
blended in one; ἀναγνώρι as well as
ἀντιμοίσια are involved in this con-
solidation. The reference is to the
formal reading of the documents in
a suit before the full court. On ἀντι-
μοίσια, see Introd. 69.

5. ἄδικε: very commonly, as here,
ἀδικεῖν has almost the force of a pf.
One of its obvious meanings is ἀδικεῖν
eἰμι, which practically signifies, I have
done wrong or I am guilty. GMT. 10,
1, 4; H. 827.

6. περεραγαζότατο: is a busybody. A
busybody either minds other people’s
business or makes too much of his
own. Socrates is accused of the first;
for a good case of the second, cf. Nep.
Arist. 1. 4, sibi non placere quod
tam cupidus elaborasset, ut
praeclaros et caeteros Iustus appel-
laretur. Cf. 20 c, περιπέτειρον προγρα-
ματευμένον, and see on τὰ μετάφρα in
18 b. — οὐράνια: the art. is omitted
because ὅποι γῆς καὶ οὐράνια form one
conception. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. i. 19,
Σωκράτης δὲ πάντα ἤγειτο θεοὺ ἐδέιναι,
tὰ τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα
καὶ τὰ σεγή βουλευόμενα (the unuttered
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65

ἡπεὶ λόγον κρείττων ποιῶν καὶ ἄλλους τὰ αὔτὰ ταύτα δι-δάσκων. ἒκοιαντὴ τις ἐστι· ταύτα γὰρ ἔσωτε καὶ αὐτοὶ ε ἐν τῇ Ἀριστοφάνους κωμῳδίᾳ, Σωκράτη τινὰ ἐκεῖ περι-φερόμενον, φάσκοντα τε ἀεροβατεῖ καὶ ἄλλην πολλήν φλυαρίαν φλυαροῦτα, ὥσιν ἐγὼ οὖθεν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν περὶ ἐπάτω. καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἀτμαξίων λέγω τὴν τοι-αύτην ἐπιστήμην, εἰ τις περὶ τῶν τοιούτων σοφὸς ἔστι· μὴ πως ἐγὼ ὑπὸ Μελήτου τοσαύτας δίκας φύγομι·

ο. plans in man's thought). In Prot. 315, Plato satirizes the astronomical lore of Hippias.

7. ἄλλους...διδάσκων: see Introd. 11 and 25.

ο. τοιαύτης τις: Socrates alone is responsible for the exact words; the accusation itself is vague.—ταύτα γὰρ ἔσωτε: in the Clouds, Aristophanes put before the Athenians their own feelings against Socrates, he dramatized a prejudice already existing.

9. Σωκράτη τινὰ κτέ.: in appos. with ταύτα. For the force of ταύτα, see on τις Σωκράτης, 18 b; it implies that Socrates in the Clouds bears no close resemblance to the real Socrates.

Cf. Clouds, 218-225, where Strepsia-ides on entering Socrates' thinking-shop says: Who is this man up there in the basket? Hearing it is Socrates, he asks him what he's about. Socrates answers ἀεροβατῷ καὶ περι-φρονῷ τὸν ἥλιον, on air I tread and oversee the sun.

10. φασκοντα κτέ.: subordinated to περιφρόμενον.

11. ἐν: referring to all statements of the sort above mentioned.—οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν: a reinforcement of the οὔτε stated disjunctively. Cf. 21 b and 24 a; also for a similar locution, cf. Dem. ix, 5, οὔτε μικρὸν οὔτε μέγα οὔτε τῶν δεότων (that you ought
to do) ποιῶντων ὑμᾶν κακῶς τὰ πράγματα ἐχεῖ. See on ἕ τι ἦ οὖθεν, 17 b.

12. οὐχ ὡς ἀτμαξίων: cf. in e below, καὶ τούτῳ γέ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι. “Such knowledge is a fine thing, if any one has it.” Socrates ironically hints that no one has it. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. i. 11, οὖν ὡς περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἕπερ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ πλεί-στοι, διελέγετο, σκοτῶν ὅπως ὁ καλοίμε-νος ὑπὸ τῶν συμφωνών κόμματι ἐρω, καὶ τίσιν ἀνδράξι (by what necessary laws) ἑκατόν γίνεται τῶν υἱῶν ἁλλὰ κ. ἶ τοὺς φρονιζοντας τὰ τοιαύτα μωραίνον-

τας ἀπεθανοῦν. Those who pursued these studies were crazy, he thought, because man ought first to know himself (cf. id. i. 12, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν αὐτῶν ἐσκόπει, ποτὲ ποτὲ νομίσαν-τες ἰκανῶς ἢ ὅτι τὰ ὁμογένεια εἰδέ-

ναι ἔχονται ἐπὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν τοιούτων φρονίζειν, and 38 a below), and because these physicists looked into questions which were really beyond the sphere of man (ibid., ἢ τά μὲν ἀνθρώπεια παρείν, τά δαμόνια δὲ σκο-

πούντες, ἡμοῦντες τὰ προσήκοντα πράττειν) and therefore arrived at impotent conclusions (cf. id. iv. 7. 6-7). See on ἐκ τῆς κτέ., 26 e, and Introd. 10.

14. μὴ...φύγομι: Schanz brackets these words: "quia sanam interpretationem spernunt." Stallbaum punctuates "μὴ...φύγομι!"
19 ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἐμοὶ τούτων, ὃ ἀνδρὲς Ἀθηναῖοι, οὔδὲν μέτεστιν. μάρτυρας δὲ αὐτοῖς ύμῶν τοὺς πολλοὺς παρέχομαι, καὶ ἀξίω ὑμὰς ἀλλήλους διδάσκειν τε καὶ φράζειν, ὡσοι ἐμοῦ πώποτε ἀκηκόατε διαλεγομένου· πολλοὶ δὲ ύμῶν οἱ τουοῦ- τοί εἰσι· φράζετε οὖν ἀλλήλους, εἰ πώποτε ἡ σμικρὸν ἡ μέγα ἤκουσέ τις ύμῶν ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν τουούτων διαλεγο- μένου· καὶ ἐκ τοῦτων γνώσεσθε ὅτι τοιαύτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τάλλα περὶ ἐμοῦ ὃ οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν.

IV. 'Ἀλλὰ γὰρ οὔτε τούτων οὔδὲν ἐστιν, οὐδὲ γ' εἰ τινὸς ἀκηκόατε ὃς ἐγὼ παῖδευεν ἐπιχειρῶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ χρη- ματα πράττομαι, οὔδε τοῦτο ἄλληθές· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῦτο γε μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι, εἰ τις οἶδος τ' εἰθ' παιδεύειν ἀνθρώ- 
πος ὡστὲ Γοργίας τε ὁ Δεούτινος καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κείος καὶ Ἰππίας ὁ Ἡλεῖος. τούτων γὰρ ἕκαστος, ὃ ἀνδρὲς,
οἶς τ' ἐστὶν ἰῶν εἰς ἐκάστην τῶν πόλεων τοὺς νέους, οἷς 19 ἔκειστι τῶν ἑαυτῶν πολιτῶν προῖκα ἐξουσιών ὃ ἄν βούλωναι, — τούτους πέθουσί τάς ἐκείνων ἐξουσίας ἀπολείπονται, 20 ποὺς σφίζει ἐξουσιών χρήματα διδόντας καὶ χάρων προσείδευσι. ἔπει καὶ ἄλλος ἄνήρ ἐστί Πάριος εὐθαδείς σοφός, ὅν ἐγὼ ἰσπάσας ἐπιδημότυντα· ἔτυχον γὰρ προσελθὸς ἄνδρι οὐ τετελεῖκε χρήματα σοφιστᾶς πλεῖον ἢ ἐξυπηρέτες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλία τῷ Ἰππονίκου τοὔτον οὖν ἀνηρόμην — 15 ἐστόν γὰρ αὐτῷ δῦνεε — ὃ Καλλία, ἥν ἄν γενεί, οἱ μὲν σου τῷ νείτῃ πώλω ἢ μόσχῳ ἐγενέσθην, εἰχομέν οὖν αὐτῷ ἐπιστάτην λαβείν καὶ μισθώσασθαι, ὃς ἐμελλεν αὐτῷ καλῷ τε καὶ ἀγαθῷ ποιήσεις τὴν προσήκουσαν ἀρετὴν· ἢν δ' ἂν οὕτως ἢ τῶν ἰππικῶν τις ἢ τῶν γεωργικῶν· ὁν δ' 20 ἐπειδῆ ἀνθρώπω ἐστόν, τίνα αὐτῶν ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἐπιστάτην λαβείν; τίς τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς, τίς ἀνθρωπίνης τε καὶ

19 ironical surprise of Socrates is reproduced by the anacoluthon in this sent. With oĭ̂̃ 1' ἐστὶν the speaker apparently leads up to πείθων, but the emphatic τῶν νέων οἰ οἰ καλῶν (as is summed up) is followed by πείθωσι instead. (The pl. after ἐκάστος is not uncommon. H. 609 a.) Then comes the statement of a fact which is surprising, they pay these men, and finally the climax is capped by their giving them thanks to boot. To give this last point προσείδειν, which should be a partic. like διδότας, is put on a par with ἐξουσιών. For a fuller account of these teachers, see Prot. 316 e ff.

20 11. ἔπει καὶ ἄλλος: “the men just named are not the only ones, for also, etc.”

12. ἰσπάσας: ὁμολογ. see ἰσπάσμενον, 22 e.

14. Καλλία: at Callias’s house foreigners, and particularly foreign Sophists, were welcomed. Callias’s fondness for Sophists is humorously brought out in the Protagoras, where he is almost crowded out of house and home by them. The indulgence of this and of other tastes exhausted his resources, and he died in poverty. His father Hipponicus fell in the battle at Delium (424 B.C.)

17. ὃς ἐμελλέν: for ἐμελλόν and the inf., without ἄν, expressing a past likelihood which was not realized, see GMT. 40, 2, n. 3 e. Here is a present likelihood (see id. a for an analogous use of ἑστὶ) which is not realized, who would, in the case supposed (εἰ...μεθώσασθαι), proceed to make them, etc.

21. τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης κτῆς: sc. the b boys must be civilized and humanized. Civilization involves the existence of the family and the state, and these require education. Cf. Arist. Pol. i. 2. 9, ἀνθρώπως φύσει πολιτικῶν συν, man is by nature a political animal.
political, to the present state; if we may, in the twenty
of the seven, is true, they may, in the twenty.

25 δόσκει: Εὐηνος, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, Πάριος, πέντε μνών.

καὶ ἐγὼ τὸν. Εὐηνὸν ἐμακάρισα, εἰ ώς ἀληθῶς ἔχω ταύτην
τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ οὔτος ἐμελεῖς διδάσκει. ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ ε

αὐτὸς ἐκκαλυνόμην τε καὶ ἡβρυνόμην ἀν, εἰ ἡπιστάμην
ταῦτα. ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ἐπίσταμαι, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι.

V. Ἄπολαβοί ἂν οὖν τις ὑμῶν ἱσως. ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες,

τὸ σὸν τῷ ἐστὶ πράγμα; πόθεν αἱ διαβολαὶ σοι αὕται γε-

20 25. Εὐηνὸς κτ.: not a word is wasted
in this answer, upon the brevity of
which largely depends the humor
of the story. Evenus is elsewhere
mentioned as a teacher of oratory
and a writer of elegiacs. A few such
poems attributed to him still exist.
Here he is introduced as a Sophist
and a teacher of virtue. The small-
ness of his charge for instruction
prob. measures accurately the value
attached to it by his contemporaries,
and places him and his teaching in
the second rank. Protagoras charged
100 minas. There have been attempts
to distinguish between a younger and
an elder Evenus, both of whom came
from Paros and wrote elegiacs. If
there were two, allusion is here made
to the elder.

26. το ἐστὶν καὶ διδάσκει: in the
original statement which Socrates
may be supposed to have in mind,
both of these were in the indic. Both
might change to the opt. (e.g. 77, 1; II. 987) after ἐμακάρισα. The change
to the opt. from ἐστιν throws το ἐστιν, as
it were, into the background, leaving
οὗτος ἐμελέως διδάσκει, which contains
a very pointed insinuation, in the
more vivid indic. See App.

27. ἐμελέως: synonymous with
δρῆς. Its opposite is πλημμελᾶς (dis-
cordantly or falsely, of a false note).
The word also conveys by innuendo
the notion that the teaching of Ev-
enus is cheap, and this is the point here
made. In Crit. 100 Ba, μετρίουs and
παρά μέλος, πλημμελῶs and ἐμελέηs are
used as contradictories.

V. All error is distorted truth; until
a man sees the truth which a particu-
lar error caricatures, he will not re-
nounce his error; to denounce error
as such is therefore not enough.
Thus far Socrates has argued against
the grossly erroneous popular opinion
of himself; now he proceeds to exhibit
the truth. His upright conduct has
been exasperating, for obedience to
God has led him to defy men.

1. ἀλλ', ὁ Σώκρατες κτ.: objections
dramatized and put in the form of
questions. The argument is: “there
must be some cause.” Hence the γαθ
in οὐ γὰρ δῆσαι.

2. τὸ σὸν πράγμα: What is that you
have been about? or better, What is this
about you? Accordingly πράγμα is used
either in the sense of pursuit, study, or
plan of life; or it has no independent
meaning, but is joined with the art.
γόνασον; οὖ γὰρ δὴσον σοῦ γε οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων περιττό-
τερον πραγματευομένου ἔπειτα τοσαῦτη φήμῃ τε καὶ λόγος
5 γέγονεν, εἰ μὴ τί ἐπραττες ἀλλοίῳ ᾧ οἱ πολλοὶ· λέγει οὖν
ἡμῖν τί ἔστω, ἵνα μὴ ἡμεῖς περὶ σοῦ αὐτοῦχεδιαξωμεν.
ταυτὶ μοι δοκεῖ δίκαιον λέγειν ὃ λέγων, κἂν ὡς ἦμιν πειρα-
α σομαὶ ἀποδείξαι τί ποῖ τοῦτο ὁ ἐμοὶ πεποίηκε τὸ τε
ὀνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν. ἀκούετε δή· καὶ ἵσως μὲν δόξω
10 τοῦ ὃμίῳ παῖζειν, εἰ μέντοι ἵστε, πᾶσαν ὑμῖν τὴν ἄλη-
θειαν ἐρᾶ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὃ ἀνδρέας Ἀθηναίοι, διὸ οὖν ἂλλ' ἥ
δια σοφίαν τινὰ τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ἐσχήκα. ποιῶν δὴ σοφίαν
ταύτην; ἢπερ ἐστὶν ἵσως ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία. τῷ ὑπὲρ γὰρ

20 and σῶ, the whole being a paraphrase
for ἵσως. See on τὸ τοῦ Ἰωάκημος
πράγμα, Crit. 53 d.

3. περιττότερον: what overpasses
the limit restraining common men,
and hence provokes suspicion. See
on περιττότερον, 19 b, and cf. Soph.
Ἀντ. 68, τὸ γὰρ περισσά πράτειν οὐκ
ἔχει νοῦν οὐδένα. Eur. Bacch. 427 ff.,
σοφῶν δ' ἀνέχειν πραπίδα φρένα τε πε-
ρισαῖον παρὰ φωτών τὸ πάθος
5 τι τὸ φαύλοτέρον εὐμίσκει χρήται τε
(whate'er the multitude of lowlier men
puts faith in and practices) τῶν ἂν
δεχομαίνεται. That σοῦ δ... πραγματευο-
μένου (although as you say you have been
doing nothing) conveys a statement of
fact, not a supposition, is shown by
οὐδέν. The ἐπείτα points the con-
trast between two statements of fact,
10 (1) σοῦ (gen. after φήμῃ) πραγματευ-
μένου, and (2) τοσαῦτη φήμῃ γέγονεν.
The words ei μὴ τι... οἱ πολλοὶ (see
App.) re-state (1) more mildly and as
a supposition. "The evil report did
not arise about you while you were
doing nothing out of the way, unless
your behaviour was eccentric." A
man may be eccentric and yet keep
within bounds; cf. below d and e, also
20 c.

8. τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολήν: sc. d
σοφός. To be distinguished from φήμῃ
tε καὶ λόγος only as bringing out the
bad repute which was their result. Cf.
the Lat. n o m e n. The words τὴν δια-
βολήν show that ἐνομα is not to be
taken in its usual sense of good name
or fame, but closely with διαβολήν,
both the name and the blame.

11. ἄλλ' ἢ: this collocation with
οὐδέν indicates that ἄλλ' ἢ arose from
the use of ἄλλος. For a case where
ἄλλος precedes it, cf. 34 b.

12. ἐσχήκα: I have become pos-
essed of and still have. See on ἐχεῖς,
19 a, and Phaedr. 241 b, νοῦν ἢ ἂν ἐσχή-
κώς καὶ σεσωφρονώσκως, after he had
come to full understanding and gained
self-control.

τολαὶ... ταύτην: this question
stands upon the heels of the preceding
sent. so close that διὰ is not
repeated. τολαὶ is in the pred.; we
might expand to τολαὶ σοφία ἢ τοῦτο
δὲ τῶν ... ἐσχήκα. H. 618.

13. ἢπερ: sc. διὰ ἢ κειλῆν τοῦτο ...
ἐσχήκα, ἢπερ κτῆ., just that which.
κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός: οὖτοι δὲ τάχ’ ἂν οὐς ἄρτι 20
15 ἐλέγουν μὲίξω τινὰ ἢ κατ’ ἀνθρωπον σοφίαν σοφὸς εἶναι, ἢ ἐ
οὐκ ἔχω τὸ λέγω. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐγώγε αὐτὴν ἐπισταμαί, ἀλλ’ ὁστὶς φησὶν πεδεταί τε καὶ ἐπὶ διαβολὴ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. καὶ
μοι, ὁ ἄρδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μὴ θορυβηθῆτε, μηδὲ ἐὰν δόξῳ τι
ῦμν μέγα λέγειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν ἔρω τὸν λόγον ἄν δὲν λέγον,
20 ἀλλ’ εἰς ἀξίωρεών ὅμιν τὸν λέγοντα ἀνοίω. τῆς γὰρ

15. ἦν οὖς ἔχω κτῆ.: ironical. Such wisdom is one of two things, either superhuman or no wisdom at all.

18. μὴ θορυβηθῆτε: do not interrupt me with noise, strictly referring to the moment fixed by ἄν δόξῳ κτῆ. In 21 a, and 30 c, the pres. is used (μὴ θορυβηθῆτε) because the request is less precise, make no disturbance. GMT. 80; II. 874 a.

19. μέγα λέγειν: not of course in the sense of speaking out loud (cf. Rep. v. 440 b, ὁ Ἀδελίατος μέγα ἠδὴ λέγων, beginning to speak above his breath), but in that of μεγαλοφορεῖν, as μέγα φρο

Boys with women's voices
Strive to speak big, and clap their female joints
In stiff unwieldy arms against thy crown.

— οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸν κτῆ.: a compressed form of statement, made effective with the audience by the allusion to certain Euripidean strains. (Cf. Eur. Frg. 488, κοῦν ἐμὸς ὁ μύθος ἄλλ’ ἐμὴς μητρὸς πάρα, not mine the word, I heard it from my mother. This line is parodied in Symp. 177 a, ἢ μὲν μοι ἄρχῃ τοῦ λόγου ἐστι κατὰ τὴν Εἰρήνηδον Μελανίπην: οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς οἱ μῦθοι ἄλλα Φαίδρω τοῦθε. The same sentiment is found in Eur. Hec. 513, λέγω γὰρ ἐστιν οὐκ ἔμως, σοφῶν οὐ ἰσος, not mine the word: by clerkly men 'twas spoken. Hor. Sat. ii. 2, nec meus hic sermo est sed quae praecepit Ofeilus.) For a similarly compressed statement, cf. ἰκαθὼν τῶν μάρτυρων, 31 c. "A pred. adj. or subst. is often a brief equiv. for one clause of a compound sent." H. 618. ἔμω and ἀξίωρεω are both preds., and special point is given them by their position. This sent. is far more telling than what might be spun out of it, sc. λέγειν γὰρ λόγον καὶ δ λόγος ἄν ἔρω

20. ἀνοίω: in the sense of shifting responsibility. For ἀναφέρα in that sense, cf. Eur. Orest. 414 ff., ἂλλ’ ἦσιν ἥμιν ἀναφέρα τῆς ξυμφορᾶς... Φοῖ-

τῆς γὰρ ἔμης, εἰ κτῆ.: it required skill as well as modesty to avoid blurtin out here with τῆς ἔμης σοφᾶς. The εἰ δὴ τῆς ἔστι interrupts just in time. Cf. Isocr. xv. 50, περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἔμης οὐ ταξινομεῖ καλεῖν διευ-

every you like to call it.
twenty. All these allusions had the effect of influencing the court in favor of what they were about to hear.

25. σφοδρός: Chaerephon was a born enthusiast. Cf. Charm. 153 b, Chaerephon δέ, ὅτε καὶ μανικός ὄν, ἀνασπασμὸς ἐκ μέσων θει πρὸς με. Aristophanes calls Chaerephon "a bat" (Birds, 1554); Chaerephon and Socrates belong to the jaundiced barefoot brotherhood (Clouds, 194). Browning, Aristophanes's Apology,

In me 'twas equal balanced flesh rebuked Excess alike in stuff—guts Glauketes Or starveling Chaerephon; I challenge both.

26. καὶ δὴ ποτὲ καὶ κτ.: well then really once. Cf. 18 a. The regular way of introducing a particular instance of what has been stated generally. What Chaerephon did at Delphi was an instance of his σφοδρότητι.

τούτο: a cognate acc. after μαντεύονται in anticipation of ήρετο κτέ. For τούτο referring forward, see H. 690 a. For a similar acc. after μαντεύονται, cf. Eur. Ion. 346 f., Ἡμ. ὁ 'εκτεθεὶς (exposed) πάις τοῦ 'στεφείς εἰσορθοφόρος (alive)? ΚΡ. οὐκ οἷον οὐδεὶς ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι.

27. ἄπειρα λέγω: I repeat, lit. just what I am saying. Cf. 17 c and 20 e.

28. ἄνειλεν σὺν Ἡ Πυθία: σὺν closes an explanatory digression and leads back to μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέσχομαι. The
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η Πυθία μηδένα σοφώτερον εἶναι. καὶ τούτων πέρι ὁ 21
30 ἀδελφὸς ὑμῖν αὐτοῦ ὁ ὁποῖος μαρτυρήσει, ἐπειδὴ ἐκεῖνος
teteléutήκειν.

VI. Σκέφασθε δὲ ὅν ἕνεκα ταῦτα λέγω· μέλλω γὰρ τὸ
ὑμᾶς διδάξειν ὅθεν μοι ἡ διαβολὴ γέγονε. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐγὼ
ἀκούσας ἐνεπηθύμην ὁποῖοι· τί ποτε λέγει ὁ θεὸς, καὶ τί
ποτε αἰνίττεται; ἕγω γὰρ δὴ ὁ ὅτε μέγα ὁ ἄνθρωπος
5 ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὑμῶν· τί όν τοις λέγει φάσκων ἐμὲ
σοφώτατον εἶναι; οὐ γὰρ δήποτε πενθεταί γε· οὐ γὰρ

oracle in question is lost, but we have a
very fair substitute in 'Sophos Σοφοκλῆς
soφότερος ὁ Ἐρυθής ἄνδρον ὑποτάνων ἢ ὁ ὁποῖος
Δικράτης Σοφώτατος.
See the Schol. on Arist. Cloud, 144.
29. ὁ ἀδελφὸς: sc. Chaerocrates.
We are told that once, when the two
were at variance, Socrates intervened

b VI. 3. τί ποτε αἰνίττεται: through
modesty Socrates takes it for granted
that this is “a dark saying.” For a
genuinely enigmatical oracle, cf. Paus.
ν. 3. 5, γίνεται δὲ τοῖς βασιλεῶισιν
(Tenennus and Cressphontes) αὐτῶν
λόγιον τὸ ἄρτος, ἡγεμόνας τὴς καθοῦν
ποιεῖσθαι τὸν προφθαλμὸν, that they
should make “the three-eyed” leader of
their home return. The “three-eyed”
turned out to be Oxylus, son of
Andromen, whom they met riding on a
one-eyed mule; acc. to Apollodorus,
Oxylus was one-eyed and bestrode a
two-eyed horse. See an essay on Greek
Oracles by F. W. H. Myers, in his
volume entitled Essays Classical (Lon-
don, 1883).

5. σοφὸς ὑμῶν: see on ἐπισταμένον, 22 c.
—λέγει φάσκων: λέγει here refers to
the meaning and φάσκων to the words
in which it was conveyed.

6. οὐ δήποτε: of course I do not sup-
pose. ποῦ adds a shade of uncer-
tainty to the stress of δή. Notice
that Socrates’s long struggle (μὴν ἀνά
is dramatized in these short,
quick sents., which suggest a man
talking to himself.—οὐ γὰρ δῆμος: it
would be against his nature. God,
being by nature truthful, could not
lie; cf. Rep. ii. 382 c, πάντα γὰρ
ἀφετέρου τῶν δαιμονῶν τε καὶ τῶν θεῶν,
the nature of divinity and of God is
absolutely void of falsehood. The
implicit faith of pious Greeks in oracles,
esp. in those of Apollo, is proved
directly by such words as Pindar’s
ψευδών οὐχ ἀντεται, he (Apollo) sets
not his hand to falsehood (Pyth. iii. 9),
τὸν οὐθετικὸν φευτεῖ γεγένετ, ‘tis unlawful
for him to have part in a lie (Pyth.
ix. 42). It is also shown indirectly
by the horror, expressed so often by
the tragedians, at finding Phoebus’s
speech untrue. Against all blasphem-
ous attribution of falsehood to the
gods, Plato defends the faith in
Rep. ii. 383 b, where he reprobates the fol-
lowing lines of Aeschylus (spoken by
Thetis in a lost play), καὶ τὸ Φοῖβο
θεῖον ψευδέται στόμα | ἥπιοιον εἶναι μα-
τική βροντή τεχνή (with skill prophetic
straughter) ὁ δ’ αὐτὸς ὄμμαν, αὐτὸς ἐν τοιῇ
παρὼν (marriage-feast) αὐτὸς τὰς εἰς
αὐτὸς ἐστιν ὁ κτανῶν | τὸν παῖδα τῶν
ἐμῶν. The hesitating tone adopted by
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

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θέμως αὐτῷ, καὶ πολλὰ μὲν χρόνων ἦπορον τί ποτε λέγει, 21 ἐπειτὰ μόνος, πάνυ ἐπὶ ζητησει(αὐτοῦ···)αιτήτην τινα ἐτραπόμην. ἦλθον ἐπὶ τινα τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι, ὡς 10 ἐνταῦθα, εἰπερ ποι, ἐλέγξεν τὸ μαντεῖον καὶ ἀποφανῶν ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι οὕτως ἐμοὶ σοφάτερος ἦστι, σύ δ' ἐμὲ ἐφησα. διασκοπῶν οὖν τοῦτον — ὑνόματι γὰρ οὐδὲν δέομαι λέγειν, ἦν δὲ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν πρὸς δὲν ἐγὼ σκοπῶν τοιοῦτὸν τι ἐπαθον, ὃ ἄνδρες 'Ἀθηναῖοι — καὶ διαλεγό-15 μενος αὐτῷ, ἐδοξεί μοι οὕτως ὁ ἀνήρ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι σοφὸς

21 Socrates in mentioning this oracle (21 a), and his interpretation here, suggest that he himself would never have asked Chaeerophon’s question; the question could be settled by human means and in such cases Socrates’ practice agreed with the sentiment in Eur. Hel. 753 ff.,

The gods why question? Nay, we rather should
With sacrifice approach them, and a prayer
For what is good, disdaining prophecy, . . .
What prophecy will lead the sluggard man
to thrift?
Of prophets best good counsel is and sense.

Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 0, δαιμονών (were crazed) ἐρή δὲ καὶ τοὺς μαντευόμενους ἄκατοις τοῖς ἀνραταίς θεοὶ θεθεῖ θεοὶ μαθῶσιν διακρίνειν (to learn and know thoroughly).

8. μέγας πάνω: after a long struggle, a qualification of ἐπειτὰ ἐτραπόμην which repeats parenthetically the idea of πάνυ χρόνων. For a similar parenthetical qualification, see on οὗ κατὰ τοῦτον, 17 b. For the position of πάνω, see on οὗ πάνω, 19 a.—τοιαύτην τινα: sc. ζητησίν, purposely vague, “which I began in some such way as this.” See on τοιαύτην τις, 19 c.

10. ἀποφανῶ τῷ χρησμῷ: the oracle is personified.

11. ἅρ: introducing direct quotation, GMT. 79; H. 928 b.—ἵστι: really is. This whole clause was spoken with special emphasis.

13. πρὸς δὲν ἐπαθον: cf. Gorg. 485 b, ἀδοξάσθεν πάχω πρὸς τούς φιλοσοφοῦτας διοπερ πρὸς τούς φιλοσοφούς καὶ ταξινωτας, in the case of philosophers I feel just as I do about people who lisp and are childish. Contrast the use of πρὸς in such expressions as πρὸς ἐμαυτῶν σκοπῶν, pondering in my mind; πρὸς ἄλληλοις σκοπούμεν, we consider among ourselves (cf. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ἀλογίζομεν in d below).

14. καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὐτῷ: strictly speaking, this covers the same ground as διασκοπῶν τοῦτον. Socrates has no test except by conversing with his man.

15. ἐδοξεί μοι: idiomatically substituted before δοκεῖ (to seem) to avoid ἐδοξα in the unusual but possible sense, I came to the opinion. The same ana- colution occurs both when the nom. part. precedes (cf. Xen. An. iii. 2. 12, καὶ εὐξάμενοι τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι ὄργον ἐν κατακάνων τῶν πολεμιῶν τοσοῦτας χιλιάραι καταθύσει τῇ θεῷ, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐχὼν ἱκανὰ εὑρίσκω, ἐδοξεὶν αὐτὸ τις κατ' ἐμαυτὸν πνευματικαὶ θείες κτε.) and when it follows (cf. Th. iii. 36, καὶ ὑπὸ οργῆς ἐδοξεὶν αὐτὸ τις οὗ τοὺς παρόντας μόνον ἀποκατεῖναι ἄλλα καὶ τοὺς ἐπικαταστήσειν Μυτηναύως δοσοὶ Ἰβάδωσι, ἔκα-
πάλαι ὑποκειμένος καὶ μάλιστα ἐκεῖ, εἶναι: δ') 21 οὖν' κατείστα ἐπειρώμην αὐτῷ δεικνύοναι ὅτι οὐκ οἷον εἶναι σοφός, εἰς δ') οὖν. ἐντεύθεν οὖν τούτῳ τε ἀπηχθομήν καὶ ἀπλοῖς τῶν παρόντων: πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν δ') οὖν ἀπειροῦ ἐλπίζομη ὅτι τούτῳ μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐγὼ σοφότερος εἰμι· κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ ἧμῶν οὐδέτερος οὐδὲν καλὸν κάγαθον εἴδεναι, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν οἷος τε ἐκεῖνος οἷον εἴδως, ἐγὼ δέ, ὡσπερ οὖν οὐκ οἶδα, οὖδὲ οἶομαι. Εἰκά γ') οὖν τούτῳ γε σμικρῷ· τῳν· αὐτῷ τούτῳ σοφότερος εἶναι, ὅτι α μῆ οἴδα 25 οὖδέ οἴομαι εἴδεναι. ἐντεύθεν ἐπ' ἀλλοῦ ἢ τῶν ἐκείνων δοκούμενων σοφότερων εἶναι, καὶ μοι ταύτα· ταύτα ἐδοξε· εικά καὶ ἐνταῦθα κάκεινω καὶ ἀλλοις πολλοῖς ἀπηχθομήν.

VII. Μετὰ ταύτ' οὖν ἡ ἡμείς ἐφεξῆς ἢ αἰσθανόμενος μὲν καὶ λυποῦμενος καὶ δεδώκα τι ἀπηχθανόμην, ὁμώς δὲ

21 καλούντες τὴν ἀποστασιν', taxing them with their revolt).

19. πρὸς ἐμαυτὸν ... ἀλογίζοιν: see on line 13 above.

20. οὕτως ... εἰδί: not really dependent like ἤτι οἴοισε in line 17, but like ἤτι οἴοσεi ... ἦτοι in line 11 above.

23. ὡστερ πρό τιν: the oūn leads back to κινδυνεύει μὲν γὰρ κτένει, which in turn contains a reaffirmation of ἐγώ γὰρ ... σοφός ἦν, b above. Here oūn, not oūdēn, is used, because the antithesis is between not-knowing and false assumption of knowledge. — ἱούκα γ') οὖν: now it seems at least that, etc. γ') οὖν is a better reading than γοὺν, since ἱούκα and τοioτον require precisely the same stress in the connexion of thought. One of the many examples of γέ repeated in Hom. is II. v. 258, τοιῶτον δ') οὖν πάλιν ἀδίκες ἀποικετεῖν ὡκεῖς ἤπειροι ἢμφα ἡμῖνεσε, εἰ γ') οὖν ἔτερος γε φύγησιν.

24. αὐτῷ τούτῳ: serves to prepare the way for the clause with ἤτι, which gives a detailed specification of what is indefinitely stated in σμικρῷ τίνι.

VII. 1. οὖν: pointing back to the end of 21 b. — ἡμείς: straightforward or immediately, vividly bringing up the moment of past time alluded to.

2. ἤτι ἀπηχθανόμην: this gives the fact of which Socrates says he was always conscious (αἰσθανόμενος), so that he was constantly tormented (λυποῦμενος) and terrified (δεδώκα). With λυποῦμενος and δεδώκα, ἤτι would mean because; these two parts. should therefore be attached to αἰσθανόμενος. Notice, however, that αἰσθανόμενος followed by ἤτι (that) is a very uncommon const. Cf. ἀπηχθομήν in οὖν above with ἀπηχθανόμην, here in something like the sense of the colloquial “was getting myself disliked.”

ὁμῶς δὲ ἵδοκε: correlate. with αἰσθανό-μενος μὲν, breaks out of the partic. const. Socrates, in stating his determination to do his duty, adopts a conversational style. See on ἱδοξε μοι in
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21 ἀναγκαίον ἐδόκει εἶναι τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ περὶ πλείστου ποιεῖν θαυμά τας τοὺς τί δοκοῦντας εἰδέναι. καὶ ηῇ τῶν κύων, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι — δεῖ γὰρ πρὸς ὑμᾶς τάληθη λέγειν — ἢ μὴν ἐγὼ ἔπαθον τί τοιοῦτον, οἱ μὲν μᾶλλον εὐδοκοῦντες εὐδοκάν μοι ὅλως δεῖν τοῦ πλείστου εὐδείας εἶναι ητούμενι κατὰ τὸν θεόν, ἀλλοι δὲ δοκοῦντες φαντάτεροι ἐπιεικέστεροι ἡ πλατάνου (plane-tree) ή κρινό (ram) εἰς τῶν ἄλλων τοιοῦτον. οἱ γὰρ μέγιστοι δρκος ἀπαντά: λέγω κύων, ἐπείτα χην θεός δὲ σίγων (they named no god), Κρατίνος Χέλωις (i.e. in the Chirona). κατὰ τοὺς δὲ δήμους ἡμῶν ἴνα μὴ κατὰ θεοὺς οἱ δρκος γίγνονται, τοιοῦτοι δὲ καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι δρκος. Ἄ humor-21 ous turn is given to this oath in Gorg. 482b, μὰ τὸν κύων τὸν Ἀγαθοτοῦ θεόν. Socrates would swear by the Egyptian god, but not by any of the gods whom he worshipped. His objection to doing this may be illustrated by the reasons for “An act to restrain the abuses of players,” 3 James I. c. 21. “For the preventing and avoiding of the great abuse of the holy name of God in Stage-plays, Enterludes, May-games, shews, and the like.” See Clarke and Wright on Merch. of Ven. i. 3.

4. ιτέου οὖν: a change to the dir. discourse strikingly introduced by the narrator. Such a transition is often resorted to for the sake of vivdiness. Cf. Xen. An. v. 5. 24, παρελθὼν δ' αὖ τῶν ἄλλος εἶπεν ὅτι οὐ πάλιν θεο- σάμενοι ἤκουν, ἄλλοι επιδείξουσιν ὅτι φιλοι εἰσι. καὶ ξειδος, ἦ μὲν ἐλήθη κτέ. Id. vii. 1. 39, where the transition is the reverse, μέλα μοῖρας, ἐὴν, διαφραγμά- μανος ἢκιν λέγειν γὰρ 'Ἀναξιβίον δὲ ττε κτέ. Still more striking is Id. Bell. i. 1. 27, παρήγαγαν ἄνδρας ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι, μημημένους δὲ τε ναυμαχίας αὐτοὶ καθ' αὐτῶν νικήκατε, they charged them to be brave men and not to forget in how many sea-fights, “with only your own forces, you have been victori- ους.” — σκοποῦντι: not σκεφτόμενοι, for Socrates simply proceeds as he began. Hence the subj. of σκοποῦντι is not expressed. See on Διαπυρδσμένην, 27. a.

5. η τῶν κύων: this form of asseveration is a whim of Socrates, upon which the Schol. says, Ἠραδαμούθος δρκος οὖτος δὲ κατὰ κυνὸς ή χνὺς (goose)
him in thinking that he understood it.

11. ἡσπερ πόνους τινὰς πονοῦντος: my Herculean labors, as I may call them; the gen. agrees with ἔμοι implied in its equiv. ἐμὼν. G. 137, n. 1; H. 691. The words πόνους πονοῦντος were sure to remind his hearers of several passages in the tragedians, where Heracles, a character endeared to them chiefly by his heroic struggles, recounts his labors. Socrates compares his own intellectual encounters with the physical ones endured by Heracles, and recounts in a half-tragic vein these "labors" imposed of God. Cf. Soph. Trach. 1046 f. and 1080 ff.,

In many a heat, by fearful odds hard pressed,
With arms and straining back ere now I strove . . .
Hands, hands, my back, my breast, O arms of mine,
Still, still, ye are the same whose sometime strength
In haunts Nemean smote the shepherd’s bane,
And tamed the lion whom none dared approach,
Or look on, etc.

Cf. Eur. H. F. 1255–1280, and esp. the chorus, 348–456; Browning in Aristophanes’s Apology; translates the whole of this play.—ἔνα μοι καὶ κτέ.: Socrates, assuming for the sake of his point an attitude of opposition, says that he thought he was refuting the oracle (cf. 22 c) while really he was proving it to be irrefutable. This achievement is ironically stated as his real purpose. Cf. ἢν used by Hom. in indignant or ironical questions, e.g. Il. xiv. 304 f., Ἀργείων, καὶ δ’ αὕτη μεθ’ ἑκτορίν ἡ ἄρη τῆς ἄρη καὶ κύδως ἄρετα, Ἀργιέως, and must we to Priam's son Hector again yield the day, that he on our ships may lay hands and be sure of renown? Socrates was, he here implies, guided to just the result which he least expected. This might easily suggest the irony of fate, so tragically exemplified in Sophocles's Oedipus the King, which was first performed about 429 n.c. and presumably was familiar to the court. In clauses with ἢν (ἕτελ, and ἕτελθῇ), καὶ is freq. used simply for greater stress. Cf. Gorg. 501 c, συνχαρῶ, ἢν οὐ καὶ περιαθῇ ὀ λόγος, just to help your argument on to its close. This is not like καὶ μεθ’-νομί below, b, where καὶ means also. The opt. clause ἢν γένοιτο depends upon πονοῦντος, which represents the impf. G. 204, n. 1; Π. 850 a.

14. καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους: see the passage from the Ion quoted in the note on c below. The καὶ ἀνθρώποι are hardly included here. The idea that the genuine poet was a being endowed with exceptional wisdom was common in ancient times. Cf. Arist. Poet. 9. 8,
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μάλιστα πεπραγματευόμαι αυτοὶς, διηρώτων ἃν αὐτοὺς τί ἐπάτε, ὥν ἀμα τι καὶ μανθάνομι παρ᾽ αὐτῶν. αἰσχύνομαι οὖν ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὥς ἄδρες, τάληθ᾽ ὁμοί δὲ ῥήτεοι. 20 ὥς ἔπος γὰρ εἰπεῖν ὅλγον αὐτῶν ἀπαντεῖ οἱ παρόντες ἐν βέλτιον ἔλεγον περὶ δὲ αὐτοὶ ἐπετούμησαν. ἔγνων οὖν καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν ἐν ὅλγῳ τούτῳ, ὅτι οὐ σοφίας ποιεῖν ἢ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τυλί καὶ ἐνθυσιαζόμεθα ὡσπερ οἱ θεομάντες καὶ οἱ χρησμοδοί. καὶ γὰρ οὕτωι λέγοιοι μὲν 25 τολλά καὶ καλά, ἰσχαῖ δὲ οὐδὲν ὃν λέγουσι. τοιούτοι δὲ μου ἐφάνησαν πάθος καὶ οἱ ποιηταὶ πεπονθότες, καὶ ἀμα 

17. πεπραγματεύομαι: used here as a pass., as is made evident by αὐτοῖς, the dat. of the agent. G. 188, 3, and 197, 2; H. 769. See also App. — διηρώτων ἃν: see on 20 below.

18. ἢ ἀμα κτῆ.: mentioned as a subordinate end to be reached by the way. For καί, see on 11 above.— αἰσχύνομαι: this discovery was discreditable to the poets, and Socrates hesitates to mention it. For this same borrowing of shame from another's actions, see Crit. 45 d and e. When αἰσχύνεσθαι means feel shame at the thought of an action, it takes the inf., as here, instead of the partic. Socrates feels shame at the idea of telling what nevertheless must be told, because it is the truth.

20. οἱ παρόντες: those who were present, i.e. the bystanders. Hence ἐλεγον, used with the same iterative force as διηρώτων ἃν above. GMT. 30, 2; H. 835.

22. φύσει τυλί καὶ ἐνθυσιαζόμεθα: the dat. φύσει and nom. partic. characterize the same subj. in two parallel ways. Hence they are appropriately coupled by means of καί. Cf. 18 b. — φύσει: by (grace of) nature. Here used to express what Plato elsewhere means by θεία μορφή, by the grace of heaven. Acts done φύσει are done unconsciously, are inspired by something below the surface of our every-day selves, whereas conscious acts are, if right, guided by τέχνη and σοφία, art and wisdom. Cf. Ion, 533 e–534 c, πάντες γὰρ οἱ τῶν ἐπών ποιηταὶ (epic poets) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὐκ ἐκ τέχνης (out of knowledge of their art) ἀλλὰ ἐνθεοὶ (inspired) δυναῖς καὶ κατεχόμενοι (possessed) πάντα ταῦτα τὰ καλά λέγουσιν ποίησις, καὶ οἱ μελοσοιοι (lyric poets) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἄστασις... ὅτε οὖν ἐκ τέχνης ποιούμεθα (writing poetry) ἀλλὰ θεία μορφή, τὸ οὖς τῆς τῆς ἐκατάσθαντα ποιεῖν καλῶς, ἢ τῷ καὶ τῷ Ἰούσα αὐτῶν ἄρµησαν, ὅ µὲν διῳδάµβοις (one can write dithyrambs), ὅ δὲ ἐγκάμα (hymnus of praise), ὅ δὲ ὑπορχῆσα (choral songs, accompanied by a lively dance), ὅ δ' ἐπί (epice), ὅ δ' ἱμβος (iambics) ... διὰ ταῦτα δὲ τὸς ἐξαιρέουκας τούτων τῶν νου ῃ (taking all reason out of them) τούτοις χρήσει υπηρέταις καὶ τοῖς χρησμοθείς καὶ τοῖς μάντεσι τοῖς θείοις.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

78

ησθόμην αυτών διὰ τὴν ποίησιν οἰομένων καὶ τάλλα 22
σοφωτάτων εἶναι ἀνθρώπων ὡς οὐκ ἦσαν. ἀπῆλθα οὖν καὶ
ἐνευθέθην τῷ αὐτῷ οἴομένος περιγεγονέναι ὑπερ καὶ τῶν
30 πολιτικῶν.

VIII. Τελευτῶν οὖν ἐπὶ τοὺς χειροτέχνας ἦσαν. ἐμαυτῷ
γὰρ ἔννοησαν οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένοι ὡς ἔτος εἰπεῖν, τοῦτος δὲ αὐτῷ
γὰρ ἦδεν ὁτι εἰρήνοιμη τολλά καὶ καλὰ ἐπισταμένους. καὶ
τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔφεσθην, ἀλλ' ἦπισταντο ἢ ἐγὼ οὐκ ἦπι-
5 στάμην, καὶ μου ταύτη σοφώτεροι ἦσαν. ἀλλ', δὲ άνδρες
Ἀθηναίοι, ταύτα μοι ἔδοξαν ἔχειν ἀμάρτημα, ὡς περὶ καὶ οἱ
ποιηταῖ, καὶ οἱ ἁγαθοὶ δημιουργοὶ. δίᾳ τὸ τῆν τέχνην κα-
λῶς ἔξεργαξασθαι ἐκαστὸς ἥξιον καὶ τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα
σοφώτατος εἶναι, καὶ αὐτῶν αὐτὴ ἡ πλημμέλεια ἐκεῖνην

22
27. ἡσθόμην οἰομένων: like ἀκοου-
τεῖ ἐξετασμένων, 23 ε. The acc. oc-
curs in 20 θ, δν ησθόμην ἐκδημονία.
Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 1, αἰσθάνεσ-
τεν Δαμπερκέλα τὸν πρεσβύτατον
μὴν ταῦτον πρὸς τὴν μητέρα χαλεπα-
νοῦτα (in a passion with his mother).

28. σοφώτατων: pred. agreeing with οἰομένων, which contains the subj. of
ἐμνα.—ἀνθρώπων: part. gen. G. 108;
H. 630.—δὲ οὐκ ἦσαν: sc. sopol. Cf.
Xen. Mem. iv. 6. 7, ἦπισταται ἐκαστος,
τοῦτο καὶ σοφός ἦτον. On the acc.
of specification, see G. 100, 1; H. 718.

VIII. 1. τελευτῶν: finally. For
partics. used adverbially, see GMT.
109, n. 8; G. 138, n. 7; H. 908 a and
610 a.

4. ἦπισταντο: they knew, without
any implication that they have ceased
to know at the time when he speaks.

6. ὡς περὶ καὶ, καὶ οἱ κτέ.: this rep-
tition of καὶ is idiomatic in correl.
sents., and may be represented by one
Eng. word, also. With οἱ ποιηταῖ it
is easy to supply ἔχουσιν from the
ἐχειν of the leading clause; similar
cases are very frequent in Greek.

7. διὰ τὸ κτέ.: here begins the ex-
planation which the preceding clause
demands. γὰρ might have been added,
I.e. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ... ἔξεργαξασθαι, or, τὴν
γὰρ τέχνην ἔξεργαξασθεῖν κτέ.

8. τάλλα τὰ μέγιστα: adjs. used
subst. take the art. after δ ἄλλος quite
as commonly as substs. do. τὰ μέγιστα
refers to affairs of state and of the
common weal, as in Rep. iv. 426 c,
σοφὲς τὰ μέγιστα and Gorg. 484 c,
γνώσει, ὅς ἐπὶ τὰ μείζων ἔλθη, ἔδωσε
ζῆν φιλοσοφίαν, you shall know if once
you proceed to affairs of larger concern
and give up philosophy once for all.
Cf. also Xen. An. ii. 6. 10, and in

22
27.
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10 τὴν σοφίαν ἀπέκρυπτεν, ὡστὸς με ἐμαυτόν ἀνερωτῶν ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ, σῶτερ δεσμὶς  ὀντὸς ὡσπερ ἔχω ἔχει μήτε τι σοφὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἐκείνων σοφίαν μήτε ἀμαθῆς τὴν ἀμαθίαν, ἥ ἀμφότερα ἀ ἐκείνοι έχουσιν ἔχειν. ἀπεκρύμενην οὖν ἐμαυτῷ καὶ τῷ χρησμῷ ὅτι μοι λυσιτελοὶ ὡσπερ ἔχω ἔχει.  

IX. Ἐκ ταυτητῆς δὴ τῆς ἔξετάσεως, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλαὶ μὲν ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασι καὶ οἶαι χαλεπώταται καὶ βαρύταιτα, ὡστε πολλὰς διαβολὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν γεγονέναι, οἶνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι, σοφὸς εἶναι. οἴονται γὰρ

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22 Menex. 334 a, ἐπὶ τὰ μείζω ἐπινοεῖς τρέπεσθαι καὶ ἥχειν ὡμῶν ἑπίχειρεις.  
9. πλημμέλεια: see on ἐμμελῶς, 20 c.  
10. ὡστε με: not ὡστ' ἐμε, which would be too emphatic. It represents ἀπεράτων ἐμαυτὸν without ἐτά.  
e Cf. e below, and see App. — ὑπὲρ τοῦ χρησμοῦ: in the name of and, as it were, on behalf of the oracle.  
11. δεσμίην ἐκ: that is "if it were mine to choose." εἶ μοι γένοιτο ἡ ἀρεσίς is implied. Notice the idioms δεσμὴ ἔχω ἔχειν and ἀ ἐκείνοι έχουσιν ἔχειν. In both the order is just the reverse of the natural Eng. one. In Lat., the corresponding idioms follow the same order with the Greek.  
12. μήτε τι: τι strengthens the negation μήτε. Cf. οὐτὶ, μὴτι.  
IX. 1. δή: here used by way of closing and summing up the previous line of argument. On ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, see Introd. p. 49, n. 4.  
23 a Cf. Rep. iv. 428 e, ὅνομαί τινες εἶναι, are called by certain names. Prot. 311 e, σοφίσκην ὅνομάζοντες τὸν ἄθλον εἶναι. Lach. 192 a, ὃ Ζώκρατες, τί λέγεις τοῦτο δ εν πάσιν

15 ἔχειν.

23 of ὕνομα δὲ τοῦτο λέγεσθαι: instead of ὅνομα δὲ τοῦτο ἐλεγομένη. Although δὲ co-ordinates the whole with πολλαὶ μὲν κτ. and the two form the leading clause, yet the inf. λέγεσθαι half incorporates these words with the δέ clause. This irregular const. is perfectly clear in a conversational style like that of Socrates. It has the effect of stating more distinctly the fact that this epithet σοφὸς, as applied to Socrates, is the capital instance of πολλαὶ διαβολαὶ and results from them.—σοφὸς: introduced to explain precisely what is meant by ὅνομα τοῦτο. The nom. σοφὸς leads back to the main statement πολλαὶ ἀπέχθειαι μοι γεγόνασι, which, however, dwells in the speaker's mind as ἀπέχθημα. σοφὸς agrees acc. to rule with the nom. subj. of this ἀπέχθημα. G. 130, n. 3; Η. 940. If ἐμε, the acc. subj. of λέγεσθαι, had been expressed instead of understood, this nom. would not have been possible.—εἶναι: the inf. εἶναι is idiomatically used with pred. nouns or adjas. after ὅνομαί εἶναι, ὅνομαζονταί, and the like. Cf. Rep. iv. 428 e, ὅνομαί τινες εἶναι, are called by certain names. Prot. 311 e, σοφίσκην ὅνομὰζον τὸν ἄθλον εἶναι.
5 με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτῶν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἕνώς 23 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξει. τὸ δὲ κινδυνεύει, ὥς ἀνδρεῖς, τῷ ὄντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτο λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπινὴ σοφία ὁλίγον τυχός ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς. καὶ

9. τοῦτο λέγειν: sc. ὅτι ἀνθρωπινὴ σοφία κτῆ. The argument runs as follows: “People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wiser of men is simply that ‘human wisdom is vanity.’ He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name ‘Socrates’ because he needs a particular instance.” The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακὰ λέγειν τιν. Cf. Crit. 48a. See App.

10. ὁμιλητὴς ἢ εἰ: in this compressed idiom ἢ alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 55, n. 3; H. 906, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2, ἠστικά τε αὐτῶν ὁμιλητὴς ἢ (sc. ἀστικά) εἰ τις πάλαι συνεθερμένος καὶ τάλαι φιλῶν ἀστικά.

13. ταὐτ' οὖν: cf. Prot. 310e, ἀλλ' δ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἥκω τάρα σε, that's
καὶ ἔρευνῷ κατὰ τὸν θεόν, καὶ τῶν ἀστῶν καὶ ξένων ἄν
15 τῶν οἰκωμαὶ σοφῶν εἶναι· καὶ ἐπειδὰν μοι μὴ δοκῇ, τῷ θεῷ
βοηθῶν ἐνδείκνυμαι ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ σοφὸς. καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης
τῆς ἀσχολίας οὔτε ἐν τῷ τῆς πόλεως πρᾶξαι μοι σχολὴ
γέγονεν ἄξιον λόγου οὔτε τῶν οἰκείων, ἀλλ’ ἐν πενίᾳ μυρίᾳ εἰμὶ
diā τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν.

X. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οἱ νέοι μοι ἐπακολουθοῦντες οἰς
μάλιστα σχολῆς ἐστώτων, οἱ τῶν πλουσιωτάτων, αὐτόματοι

just why I have come to you. G. 100, 2, b; H. 710 c. The object is omitted
as in Gorg. 503 d, ἐὰν γράφῃς καλῶς, εἴδεις, if you search in the right way,
you shall find. Cf. εἴδας below in d.

14. καὶ ξένων: notice the not unusual grouping under one art. of two
words connected by καὶ.

15. τῷ θεῷ βοηθῶν: cf. on ὑπὲρ τοῦ
χρησμοῦ, 22 e.

677 e, μυρίαν τὶνα φοβητῶν ἐρμιδαί; Rep.
vii. 520 c, μυρίῳ βάλτων. Cf. Xen.
Oecon. ii. 1–4, where Critobulus and
Socrates converse substantially as follows:
"C. I have gained reasonable
self-control; therefore, Socrates, give
me any hints you can: tell me the best
way to manage my property. But
perhaps you think me already quite
rich enough. S. That is my own
case, not yours. I am sure that I am
a rich man, but I consider you pov-
erty-stricken, and sometimes I am
quite worried about you. C. I like
that, Socrates! For heaven's sake
do be good enough to tell me what
price you imagine that your property
would fetch, if sold, and what mine
would sell for. S. I am sure a fair
buyer would be glad of the chance of
getting my house and all my property
for five minas (about eighty-five
dollars). I am sure you are worth
more than a hundred times that sum.

23 C. How comes it then that you are
so rich and I so poor? S. My
income provides amply for all my
wants, but for your wants you need
three times as much as you have."

The possession of five minas must have
placed Socrates in the lowest of the
four classes established by Solon, that
of the ἕνεκες. Originally this lowest
class had few political duties and
no political rights; later on, a law
proposed by Aristides gave them the
same rights as the others."

19. τῷ τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν: cf. Phaedr. 244 e, ἢ μνήμη ἐγγυημένη καὶ
προφητεύοσα οἷς ἔσει, ἀπαλλαγὴν εἴρη-
tο, καταργούσα πρὸς θεῶν εἰχάς τε καὶ
λατρείας, madness intervened and by
prophesying to those who were in straits
found relief by recourse to prayer unto
the gods and the observance of their rites.

The dat. (less freq. the gen., with verbal
nouns occurs chiefly after nouns
such as λατρεία and εἰχά, which express
the abstract idea of the act
denoted by the verb; but Plato uses
both the gen. and dat. with ἐπηρέασθαι,
and the gen. with ἐκσυνόψα; while the
dat. with βοηθῶς is familiar in many
Greek authors. In the const. with
ἐπηρεία below, 30 a, the dat. τῷ θεῷ
takes the place of the gen. here.

X. 2. αὐτόματοι: of their own motion,
5 με ἐκάστοτε οἱ παρόντες ταῦτα αὐτὸν εἶναι σοφὸν, ἢ ἂν 23 ἄλλον ἐξελέγξω: τὸ δὲ κυδυνεύει, ὃ ἄνδρες, τῷ ὅντι ὁ θεὸς σοφὸς εἶναι, καὶ ἐν τῷ χρησμῷ τούτῳ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία ὀλίγου τῶν ἀξία ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενός: καὶ φαίνεται τούτῳ λέγειν τὸν Σωκράτη, προσκεχρῆσθαι δὲ τῷ ἐμῷ ὄνοματι ἐμὲ παράδειγμα ποιούμενος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ ἐνιοῦν ὅτι οὗτος ὕμων, ὃ ἀνθρωποὶ, σοφότατος ἦστιν, ὡστε ὅ ὥσπερ Σωκράτης ἔγνωκεν ὅτι οὐδενός ἄξιος ἐστὶ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ πρὸς σοφίαν. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ μὲν ἐστὶ καὶ νῦν περιών ζητῶ

Or. 16. 52, rem difficilem, di immortales, atque omnium difficillimum, a thing which, heaven knows, is hard; or rather, hardness can no further go.

9. τοῦτο λέγειν: sc. ὅτι ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη σοφία κτῆ. The argument runs as follows: “People credit me with knowing all the things which I convict my neighbors of not knowing. The truth is far otherwise, for God alone has real knowledge. The meaning of his dark saying about my being the wisest of men is simply that ‘human wisdom is vanity.’ He does not mean that Socrates has any other than human wisdom. He only uses the name ‘Socrates’ because he needs a particular instance.” The double acc. with λέγειν closely resembles the idiom κακὰ λέγειν τωδ᾽. Cf. Crit. 48 a. See App.

10. ὅσπερ ἄν et: in this compressed idiom ἄν alone represents a whole clause, which the context readily suggests. GMT. 53, n. 3; H. 905, 3. For a case where the ellipsis is a simpler one, cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 3. 2, ἦσπερτε ταὐτὸν ὅσπερ ἄν (sc. ἀστάξετο) οἷς πάλαι συνεχαρμένοι καὶ πάλαι φιλῶν ἀστάξετο.

13. ταῦτ' οὖν: cf. Prot. 310 e, ἄλλ' ἂν ταῦτα καὶ νῦν ἦκε παρὰ σε, that's
X. Proos de toutois oie neoi moi epakoloubounites ois malistata scholē eston, ois tôn plounswatátow, autōmatoi

more than a hundred times that sum.

C. How comes it then that you are so rich and I so poor? S. My income provides amy for all my wants, but for your wants you need three times as much as you have.

The possession of five minas must have placed Socrates in the lowest of the four classes established by Solon, that of the θήτες. Originally this lowest class had few political duties and no political rights; later on, a law proposed by Aristides gave them the same rights as the others.

19. tīn tōu theou lαtrēian: cf. c Phaedr. 244 e, ἢ μανή ἐγγεγομένη καὶ προφητεύουσα ὡς ἔδει, ἀπαλαγήν εὔρε
to, καταφυγοῦσα πρὸς θεῶν εὐχὰ τε καὶ λατρείας, madness intervened and by prophesying to those who were in straits found relief by recourse to prayer unto the gods and the observance of their rites. The dat. (less freq. the gen.) with verbal nouns occurs chiefly after nouns such as λατρεία and εὐχή, which express the abstract idea of the act denoted by the verb; but Plato uses both the gen. and dat. with ὀπηρέτως, and the gen. with ἐπικουρος; while the dat. with βοηθῶς is familiar in many Greek authors. In the const. with ὀπηρέτως below, 30 a, the dat. τῷ theō takes the place of the gen. here.

X. 2. autōmatoi: of their own motion,
χαίρουσιν ἄκοιντες ἐξεταζόμενων τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ 23 

αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἰτ’ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἄλλους 

ἐξετάζειν· κἀπείτα, οὖν, εὐρίσκουσι πολλὰν ἀφθονίαν 

οἰομένων μὲν εἰδέναι τι ἀνθρώπων, εἰδότων δὲ ὄλγα ἢ 

οὐδὲν. ἐνετέθεν οὖν οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν ἐξεταζόμενοι ἐμοὶ ὅργυ- 

ζοῦνται, ἀλλ’ ὑπ’ αὐτοῖς, καὶ λέγουσιν ὡς Σωκράτης τίς 

αὕτη μιαρότατος καὶ διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους· καὶ ἐπειδὰν 

τις αὐτοὺς ἔρωτα ὑπ’ τι ποιῶν καὶ ὅ τι διδάσκων, ἔχουσι μὲ 

ν οὐδὲν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἄγνοοιν, ὅταν δὲ μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀπορεῖν, 

τὰ κατὰ πάντων τῶν φιλοσοφῶν πρὸχειρισμένα, ταῦτα λέ- 

γοῦσιν, ὅτι τὰ μετέφρασεν καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ θεῶν μὴ νομί-

to be construed with ἐνακολουθεῖν.

3. χαίρουσιν κτ.: Plato compares 

the disconcerting effect of Socrates’s 

homely method with the charm 

exercised by the smooth discourse 

of men like Protagoras and Gorgias. 

Compare the ironical account of 

the persuasive charms of Gorgias, 

Protagoras, and Hippias in 10 e above, 

where especially the implication of 

tοῦτον 

πείθωσι should be noticed. Cf. Prot. 

317 c-319 a, where Protagoras is 

represented as giving a very taking 

account of his own teaching for the 

benefit of young Hippocrates.

4. μιμοῦνται, εἰτ’ ἐπιχειροῦσιν κτ.: 

they are for imitating me, and then 

they undertake, etc. No strict sequence 

in time is here marked by εἰτα, although 

their readiness to imitate must logically 

have preceded the acts in which 

their imitation consisted. For a most 

lively description of the early symp- 


539 b. In other editt. μιμοῦμαι is 

substituted for μιμοῦνται, needlessly, since 

this use of εἰτα, where κατα would 

seem more natural, is quite common. 

Cf. 31 a, and also Xen. Mem. ii. 2, 14, 

tοὺς ἄνθρωπους φυλάξῃ μή σε αἰσθάμενοι 

tῶν γονέων ἀμελεύσατε πάντες ἀτιμάσω-

σιν, εἰτα ἐν ἐρημίᾳ φιλῶν ἀναψίγησιν. 

6. ὄλγα ἢ οὔδεν: see on ἢ ὁ ὁδόν, 

17 b. and on ὄλγον καὶ οὐδένος, 23 a.


An. ii. 1. 10, where καὶ ὃ is used with 

the same meaning. See App. — Σω-

κράτης τί: see on τίς Σωκράτης, 18 b.

11. ἀλλ’ ἄγνοοιν: see App.

12. τὰ κατὰ πάντων κτ.: ταῦτα 

means the familiar well-worn com-

monplaces. These may be found in the 

Clouds of Aristophanes. Xenophon, 

referring specifically to the λόγων 

τέχνης, which is not lost sight of here, 

uses almost the words of our text in 

Mem. i. 2. 31, τὸ κοινὸν τοῖς φιλοσόφοις 

ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐπιτιμώμενον ἐπιφέρων 

αὐτῷ, (Critias) making against him the 

charge made by the many against phil-

osophers in general. Cf. 18 b c, 19 b, 

and see on εἰ γὰρ ὕφασκον, Crito, 44 a.

13. ὅτι τὰ μετέφρασεν κτ.: the sense 

requires that from line 10 διδάσκων 

should be understood, or rather δι-

δάσκαλον διαφθείρει τοὺς νέους. On this 

implied διδάσκαλον depend (1) the two 

accs. τὰ μετέφρασε, τὰ ὑπὸ γῆς, and (2) 

the two infs. νομίζειν and τοιεῖν. Cf. 

26 b and 19 b.
ΔΙΕΝ καὶ τὸν ἦττον λόγον κράττων ποιεῖν. τὰ γὰρ ἀληθῆ, 23
ομάι, οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλειν λέγειν, ὅτι κατάθηλοι γίνονται
προστοιούμενοι μὲν εἰδέναι, εἰδότες δὲ οὐδέν. ἄτε ὅν,
ομαὶ, πιλότοιμοι ἄντε καὶ σφοδροὶ καὶ πολλοὶ καὶ ἐντε.
εταχμένως καὶ πυθανός λέγοντες περὶ ἐμοῦ, ἐμπεπλήκασιν
ὑμῶν τὰ ὅτα καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν σφοδρῶς διαβάλλοντες. ἐκ
20 τούτων καὶ Μέλητος μοι ἐπέθετο καὶ Ἀντος καὶ Δύκων,
Μέλητος μὲν ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν ἀρχόμενος, Ἀντος δὲ
ὑπὲρ τῶν δημιουργῶν καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν, Δύκων δὲ ὑπὲρ 24
τῶν ῥήτορων ώστε, ὅπερ ἄρχόμενοι ἑγὼ ἔλεγον, θαμά.

23 d 14. τὰ ἀληθῆ: the truth, namely δι
κατάθηλοι κτ. Eng. idiom requires a
sing. or an abstract noun more fre-
quently than the Greek, e.g. ταῦτα
often means this. H. 635. Cf. Phaed.,
62 d, ἀλλ’ ἀνθός μὲν ἄκρος τόσθ’
ἂν οἰνοθεία ταῦτα, ἑκτόνων εἶναι ἠπ’
τοῦ δέσποτα, but a fool might perhaps
think this, that he ought to run away
from his master.

16. εἰδέναι: one man claims knowl-
edge of this, and another, knowledge
of that; the absurdity is in all cases
the same, i.e. their claiming knowl-
edge at all.

e 17. ἐνταταγμάνως: either (1) in
phrases well combined, or (2) with their
forces drawn up, or (3) = κατὰ τὸ ἐντα-
ταταγμάνων, i.e. according to a concerted
plan. (2) and (3) make it refer to
the united efforts of those represented
by the three accusers. ἐνταταγμάνως,
the reading adopted by Schanz, means
about the same as σφοδρῶς below, i.e.
con t e n t e, with might and main. This
would really amount to the same as
(2), and suits the context far better
than (1) or (3).

19. ἐκ τούτων: "it is upon this foot-
ing,—namely that of an old general
prejudice, aggravated by supervening
personal animosity,—that I am now
attacked by, etc." R. In spite of
19a, ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, which
stares the fact here alluded to, "in
consequence of" would here be an
inappropriate translation for ἐκ.
On the accusers, see Intro. 30.

21. ὑπὲρ τῶν ποιητῶν, δημιουργῶν,
πολιτικῶν, ῥήτορων: we must not press
the word ὑπὲρ. The accusers merely
represented the feelings of their respec-
tive classes. The ῥήτορες have not been
expressly mentioned before. For the
ποιηταῖ, cf. 22 a; for the πολιτικοῖ, cf.
21 e; for the δημιουργῶν, cf. 22 d.
Prob. the ῥήτορες were thought of
under the general designation of πολι-
τικοί. This is the more likely because
the line between men who habitually
spoke on public questions, and what
we may call professional speakers,
was not yet clearly drawn at Athens.
All this lends weight to the sugges-
tion that the words καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν
are a later addition, for which Plato
is not responsible. See App. In
favor of keeping the words, however,
is the fact that Anytus, who, like
Cleon, was a βυρσοδέφης, tanner, came
into collision with the views of Socra-
tes rather as a πολιτικός. than as a
ΠΛΑΤΟΝΟΣ

ζομ' ἀν εἰ οὖν τ' εἴην ἔγω ὑμῶν ταύτην τὴν διαβολὴν ἔξε-. 24
25 λέσθαι ἐν οὖσι όλιγῷ χρόνῳ οὖσι πολλῆς γεγονῦναι. ταὐτ' ἐστὶν ὑμᾶς, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τάληθη, καὶ ὑμᾶς οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν ἀποκρυψάμενοι ἔγω λέγω οὖν ὑποστειλάμενοι. καὶ τοῖς οἶδα σχέδον ὅτι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀπεχθάνομαι ὡς καὶ τεκμήριον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγω καὶ ὅτι αὐτῆ ἐστὶν 30 ἡ διαβολὴ ἡ ἐμὴ καὶ τὰ αἰτία ταύτα ἐστὶ. καὶ ἐὰν τε γών εάν τε αὐθες ζητήσητε ταύτα, οὕτως εὑρήσετε.

XI. Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὃν ὁ πρώτοι μου κατηγοροῦν κατηγοροῦν αὐτῇ ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ ἱκανή ἀπολογία πρὸς ὑμᾶς πρὸς δὲ Μέλητον τὸν ἀγαθὸν τε καὶ φιλόσοφον, ὥς φησί, καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους μετὰ ταύτα πειράζομαι ἀπολογεῖσθαι. αὐθεὶς γὰρ ὅτι ὁ οὐσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν τούτων οὕτως κατηγοροῦν, λάβωμεν.

23 δημογράφοι. It may be that Socrates had aristocratic views about the de¬
24 basing effect of manual labor similar to those of Plato and Aristotle. Cf.
25 Xen. Oecon. iv. 2 and 3, where Socrates is represented as saying that the
26 mechanical arts enervate men's bodies and womanize their souls. Also (ibid.
27 vi. 7) where Socrates again is made to say that in case of an invasion the
28 τεκνίται will prove cowards.

26. ταύτ' ἐστιν ὑμῖν: there you have,
27. ὑποστειλάμενος: the meaning here is illustrated by many places in
28. Dem., e.g., xxxvii. 48, καὶ τῷ μηδὲν ὑποστειλάμενοι μὴ δυσχεράντων κλαθῶν καὶ ὑποστειλάμενοι, by his readiness to resort to absolutely undisguised and shameless wailing and lamentation. See also xix. 237. ἀναγκῇ δ' ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, μετὰ παρατησία διαλεχθῶμεν μηδέν ὑποστειλόμεθα.

28. τοὺς αὐτοὺς: sc. by just such undisguised and unmitigated statements.
29. αὐτῇ, ταύτα: both pred.

31. οὖσας εὑρήσετε: supply ἔχοντα.

The finite verb is also left out in such cases, cf. Rep. ii. 360 d, ταύτα μὲν οὖν δὴ οὕτως, sc. ἔχει.

XI. 2. πρὸς ὑμᾶς, πρὸς Μέλητον: cf. 18 a, ἀπολογήσομαι πρὸς τὰ διάτερα (sc. κατηγορημένα) καὶ τοὺς ὑστέρους (sc. κατηγορούς); the Greek idiom is ἀπολο¬
30. γεῖσθαι πρὸς (1) τοὺς δυσκότας, (2) τοὺς κατηγορούς, (3) τὰ κατηγορημένα. In
31. the idiom is to plead (1) before the court, (2) against the accusers,
32. (3) against (to) the accusations.

3. τῶν ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ φιλόσοφων: that upright and patriotic man. The
33. addition of ὅς φησι suggests that few or none encourage Meletus in “laying
34. this flattering union to his soul.”

4. ἀδίκες... αὖ: once more... in
35. turn. A strong distinction is made
36. between the serious accusation of the
37. first accusers, those who have prejudiced the public mind, and that of
38. Meletus.

5. ὁσπερ ἐπὶ τούτων ἐς τον κα¬
39. τηγόρων: as if these were a second set of accusers. Cf. 19 b, ὡς οὖν κατηγ—
αὐ τὴν τούτων ἀντιμοσίαν. ἔχει δὲ πως ὅδε· Σωκράτης 24
φησίν ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ
θεοὺς οὕς ἡ τόλις νομίζει οὐ νομίζοντα, ἔτερα
dὲ δαιμόνια καὶ νά. τὸ μὲν δὴ ἐγκλημα τοιοῦτων ἐστὶν. 10
τοῦτον δὲ τοῦ ἐγκλήματος ἐν ἐκαστὸν ἐξετάσωμεν.
φησὶ γὰρ δὴ τοὺς νέους ἀδικεῖν μὲ διαφθείροντα. ἔγω δὲ γε, δὲ
ἀνδρές Ἀθηναίοι, ἀδικεῖν φημὶ Μέλητον, ὧτι σπούδῇ χα-
ριντίζεται ῥάδιως εἰς ἁγώνα καθιστᾶς ἀνθρώπους, περὶ
πραγμάτων προσποιομένους σπούδαζεν καὶ κηδεσθαι ἐν
15 οὕτω τούτῳ πάντως ἐμὲλήσθην. ὡς δὲ τούτο οὕτως ἔχει
πειράζομαι καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι.

XII. Καὶ μοι δεύρω, ὃ Μέλητε, εἰπέ· ἀλλο τι ἡ περὶ
πολλοῦ ποιεῖ ὧπως, ὅσ βέλτιστοι οἱ νεώτεροι ἐσονται;

Socrates distinguishes between two sets of accusers, but maintains that
the charges preferred by his actual accusers (Anytus, Meletus, and Ly-
con) are based upon those of his real accusers (public prejudice and mis-
representation).

6. ἔχει δὲ πως ὅδε: πῶς, substantially, implies that the quotation is not
literary. See Introd. 31 and 56. Cf.
Xen. Mem. ii. 1, 21, Πρόδικος . . . περὶ
τῆς ἄρτης ἀποφαίνεται δέ πως λέγων.
7. φησίν: Meletus, already named
as the chief accuser.

9. τὸ ἐγκλῆμα: see Introd. 67.
11. ἔγω δὲ γε: see on 22 d.
12. σπούδῃ χαράντιζεται: this is
an ἐξήγωρ; for χαράντιζεθαι is akin
to παῖζεν, the subst. to which, παιδί, is
the contradictory of σπούδῃ. “Me-
letus treats a serious business (an
accusation involving life and death)
as playfully as though the whole mat-
ter were a joke.” Cf. 27 a.
13. εἰς ἁγώνα καθιστᾶς: ἁγών is the
usual word for a suit at law; hence
the phrase ἁγώνισθαι δίκην, contend
a law-suit. The sing. is used dis-
tributively, involving men in a law-suit.
Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 8. 4, ἕφοροι . . . κύριοι
ἀρχοντας . . . κατασταζαι καὶ ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ
περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἁγώνα καταστήσατο,
the ephors had power both to supersede
and to imprison the magistrates and to
bring them to trial for their lives.
14. ὅν: not dependent upon ὃ ὅν
which is an adv. acc. See on τούτων,
20 b.
15. τοῦτο: gives greater vividness
than ἀντίστροφ would give.
16. καὶ ὑμῖν: “so that you can see
it as plainly as I can.”

XII. 1. δεύρω, εἰπέ· come and tell
me. Cf. below, ὅτι δὲ νῦν εἰπέ. δεύρω
is freq. found instead of ἔρχομαι, ἔλθει.
Cf. Theaet. 144 d, θεᾶτητε, δεύρο παρά
Σωκράτη, come here, Theaetetus, and
sit by Socrates. Homer has a similar
idiom. Cf. Od. xvii. 529, ἔρχομαι, δεύρο
καλέσον ἵνα ἀντίλθ φίληρς ἐνίσχυσθη, come,
summon him hither, that face to face he
may tell me himself: On the cross-ex-
amination, see Introd. 71.—Διὰ τοῦ ἐν.
’Εγώγε. Ἡθ ὡν καὶ εἰπὲ τῷ τοὺς τίς αὐτοῦς βελτίους ποιεῖ; ἂν δὴ ὄνομα ὑπὲρ ὑἷος ἐμὸν γέ ὑοῦ. τὸν μὲν γὰρ διαφθείρου ὡς ἔχειν ἑσάχεις τουτοῦ καὶ κατηγορεῖς. τὸν δὲ δὴ βελτίους ποιοῦντα ἢτι εἰπὲ καὶ μὴν τοῦτος τίς ἔστω. ὁρᾷς; ἦ Μέλητε, ὅτι σὺ γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; καίρῳ οὖν αἰώνων σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ ικανον τεκμήριον ὅτι ἐγὼ λέγω, ὅτι σοι οὐδὲν μεμέληκεν; ἀλλ’ εἰπὲ, ἀγαθέ, τίς αὐτοῦς ἁμείνως ποιεῖ; Οἱ νόμοι. Ἀλλ’ οὐ τότε ἐρωτῶ, ἢ βελτίστε, ἀλλὰ τίς ἀνθρωπος, ὡς ὁ πρῶτον καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἶδε, τοὺς νόμους. Οὕτω, ὁ Σώκρατες, οἱ δικασταί. Πῶς λέγεις, ὁ Μέλητε; οἴδε τοὺς νέους παιδεύειν οἶδε τέ εἰσι καὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσι; Μά. 15 λιστά. Πότερον ἀπαντεῖς, ἦ οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν, οἱ δ’ οὕς; Ἀπαντεῖς. Ἕ γε νῆ τὴν Ἡραν λέγεις καὶ πολλὴν ἀφθονίαν τῶν ὀφελοῦντων. τί δὲ δή; οἴδε οἱ ἁρισταὶ βελτίους ποιοῦσιν ἦ οὕ; Καὶ οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ βουλευταί; Καὶ οἱ βου. 25
Λευταί. Ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὁ Μέλητε, μή οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, οἱ
20 ἐκκλησιασταί, διαφθείροντι τοὺς νεωτέρους; ἡ κάκεων
βελτίων ποιοῦσιν ἀπαίτεις; Κάκεων. Πάντες ἄρα, ὡς
ζουκεῖν, Ἀθηναῖοι καλοῦσι κἀκαθοῦσι πλὴν ἐμοῖς, ἐγὼ
δὲ μόνος διαφθείρω. οὕτω λέγεις; 'Ελλ' σφόδρα ταῦτα
λέγω. Πολλὴν γ' ἐμοῦ κατέγνωκας δυστυχώς. καὶ μοι
25 ἀπόκριναι. ή καὶ περὶ ἵππους οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν; οἱ
μῦν βελτίων ποιοῦντες αὐτοὺς πάντας ἄνθρωποι εἶναι, εἴς χ
δὲ τις ὁ διαφθείρων; ἡ τοῦνατίνις τοῦτον τὰν εἶς μὲν τις
βελτίων, τὸν τὸν ποιεῖν εὐσίγονοι, οἱ ἰππικοὶ. οἱ
dὲ πολλοὶ, εἰπτερ ἐφισσίασι καὶ χρωνταί ἵππους, διαφθείρον-
30 συν; οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ περὶ ἵππων καὶ τῶν
ἀλλῶν ἀπάντων ὠφέλει; πάντως δὴπο, ἐὰν τε σὺ καὶ Ἀνυ-
tος οὐ δῆτε εάν τε φήτε. πολλὴ γὰρ ἀν τις ἐυδαιμονία εἰν

25 a 19. ἀλλ' ἄρα κτῆ.: cf. Euthyd. 290 e, ἕξω. ἀλλ' ἄρα, ὡς πρὸς Δίος, μὴ ὁ Ἄθησιπ-
τος ἦν ταῦτ' εἰπὼν, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι; KP. ποῖος Κτήσιππος; S. Why then, good
gracious! have I forgotten, and was it
Ctesippus who said it? C. Ctesippus?
rubbish! Questions with μὴ take a neg-
ative answer for granted. The use of
ἄρα here marks the last stage in Soc-
rates's exhaustive enumeration. Only
the ἐκκλησιασταί are left. "Somebody
in Athens is corrupting the youth.
We have seen that it is nobody else.
and hence possibly it is these gentlemen."
But this is absurd, hence πάντες ἄρα
Ἀθηναίοι κτῆ.—οἱ ἐκκλησιασταί: this
has probably crept into the text, and
was originally a marginal note, put in
by way of giving a word parallel to ἀκροαταί and βουλευταί. There was
good reason for varying the strictness
of discourse by saying οἱ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλη-
σίᾳ. There seems less reason for put-
ting this last idea in two ways. All
Athenians twenty years of age in full
standing (ἐπίτυμοι) were members of
the public assembly (ἐκκλησία) at
Athens.
27. τοῦνατινι πᾶν: quite the re-
verse, an adv. acc. perhaps of measure
or content. Cf. Gorg. 518 b, ἀλλὰ τὸ δὲ
μοι εἰκε ἐκ τοῦτο, ἐλέγονται ὁι Ἀθηναίοι
dia Periklēs bēltōs γεγονόι, ἡ πᾶν
τοῦνατινι διαφθεὶρην ἐν' ἐκεῖνον.
In Crit. 47 b c d, Socrates appeals from
the many and ignorant to the few,
or to the one who has special knowledge.
29. διαφθείρουν: by its emancipa-
tion from the government of δοκεῖ
this statement is made especially vig-
orous. The transition has already been
half made by εἰς μὲν τις, where in-
instinctively we supply ἐστι in spite of
δοκεῖ.
31. πάντως δὴπο: before this Soc-
rates waits a moment, to give Meletus
opportunity to answer.
32. οὐ φήτε: the answer no is made
prominent by the order of clauses.
ἐὰν οὐ φήτε, if you say no, ἐὰν μὴ φήτε,
περὶ τοὺς νέους, εἰ eis μὲν μόνος αὐτοὺς διαφθείρει, οἷ 25
ἀλλοι ἀφελούσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὁ Μέλητς, ἰκανῶς ἐπιθεῖ· ὁ
35 κνυσαι ὅτι οὐδεπώποτε ἐφρόντισας τῶν νέων, καὶ σαφῶς
ἀποφαίνεις τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν, ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι μεμέληκε
περὶ ὅν ἐμὲ εἰςάγεις.

XIII. Ἐπὶ δὲ ἦμιν εἰπὲ, ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητς, πότερόν
ἐστιν, φικέων ἁμενον ἐν πολίταις χρηστοῖς ἢ πονηροῖς;
ὁ τάν, ἀπόκριναι. οὐδὲν γὰρ τοι χαλεπών ἑρωτῶν. οὐχ οἱ
μὲν πονηροὶ κακὸν τι ἐργάζονται τοὺς ἀεὶ ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν

33. εἰ διαφθείρει, ἀφελοῦσιν: the pres. indic. here is not used in the
prot. that immediately belongs to the
apod. πολλῆ... ἤν εἶπ. GMT. 54, 1 a. The
connexion of thought requires an
intervening prot. or some qualifying
adv. like εἰκότως. This implied prot.,
with its apod., goes with εἰ διαφθείρει,
ἀφελοῦσιν. Cf. 30 b and, for a case
where διαφθείρει represents the prot.
required by the sense, Xen. An. vii. 6.
15, εἰ δὲ πρόσθην αὐτῷ πάντων μάλα
φιλοῦν ἄν, νῦν πάντων διαφορώτατος
(most at variance) εἰμι, πῶς ἐν ἔτι
δικαίως... ὧν ἐμῶν αἰτίαν εἰχομι;

34. ἐπιθείκουσα: the mid. perhaps
implies criticism of Meletus's bearing,
since ἐπιθείκωνθαί and ἐπιθείζεις are
used of pretentious performances.
Here, however, ἐπιθείκουσα means
primarily ἐπιθείκων σαυτόν. G. 190;
H. 812. For the added ἐτι clause, see
the next note, and on τίς εἰσίν, 24 d.

36. ὅτι οὐδὲν σοι κτῆ.: appended to
explain τὴν σαυτοῦ ἀμέλειαν. Here at
least is the pun upon Meletus's name
(cf. also 26 b), for which the constant
recurrence of the idea of μεμέληκεν
(variably expressed, ἐμέλησεν and
περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖν in 24 c, μέλον γέ σοι
and μεμέληκεν in 24 d) has already
paved the way. For similar plays
upon words, cf. Soph. O. T. 395, ὁ
μηδὲν εἰδὼς Οἰδίπους, Symp. 185 c, Παύσανος
δὲ παυσαμένου, and the obvious
play upon Agathon's name, ib. 174 b;
Rich. Il. ii. 1,
Old Gaunt indeed, and gaunt in being old,...
Within me grief hath kept a tedious fast;
Gaunt am I for the grave; gaunt as a grave.

XIII. 1. ὁ πρὸς Δίως Μέλητς: for the
same order, cf. Men. 71 d, σὺ δὲ
αὐτὸς, ὁ πρὸς θεόν Μένων κτῆ. For
a different order, see 26 b, Crit. 46 a.
In 26 e the voc. is not expressed.

3. ὁ τάν: my friend, or my good
friend. Cf. Dem. i. 26, ἀλλ' ὁ τάν,
οὐχὶ βουλήσαται. The orthography is
much disputed, and we find ὁ τάν,
διαν, and ὁ 'τάν.
4. τοὺς ἐγγυτάτω ἑαυτῶν ἐνταγε:
i.e. those who were most unavoidably
influenced by them.
5 ὁντας, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθὸν τι; Πάνω γε. Ἐστιν οὖν ὅστις βούλεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἔξω θόντων ἐκπίπτει γὰρ ὁ νόμος κελέει ἀποκρίνεται. ἔσθι ὅστις βούλεται βλάπτεσθαι; Οὐ δή. Φέρε δὴ, τότερον ἔμε εἰςάγει δεύρῳ ὡς διαφθείροντα τοὺς νεωτέρους καὶ πονηροτέρους ποιοῦντα ἐκόντα ἡ ἀκόμα; Ἕκοντα ἔγνως. Τί δή, ὃ Μέλητε; τοσοῦτον σὺ μοῦ σοφώτερος εἰ τηλικοῦτον ὄντος τηλικοσθέ ὡς, ἢ όστε σὺ μὲν ἐγνωκας ὅτι οἱ μὲν κακοὶ κακῶν τι ἐργάζονται αἰε τοὺς μάλιστα πληθύνον ἐναντίων, οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοὶ ἀγαθοὶ ἔγω δὲ δὴ εἰς ἐν τοσοῦτον ἀμαθίας ἡκώ, ὡστε καὶ τοῦτο ἄγνωσι, ὅτι, εάν τινα μοῖχηρον ποιήσω τῶν ἔξωθόντων κινδυνεύσω κακῶν τι λαβέω ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡστε τοῦτο τὸ τοσοῦτον κακῶν ἐκὼ ποιώ, ὡς φης σὺ; ταῦτα ἔγω σοι οὐ πείθομαι, ὃ Μέλητε, οἴμαι δὲ οὐδὲ ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ἀλλ’ ὡς οὐ διαφθείρω, ἡ, 20 εἰ διαφθείρω, ἀκών, ὡστε σὺ γε κατ’ ἀμφότερα ἑσύνει. εἰ δὲ ἄκων διαφθείρω, τῶν τοσοῦτων καὶ ἀκοινοῦν ἐμαρτη.

7. ἀποκρίνω: after a pause. — δ’ ἀνομος κτέ.: see Introd. 71 with note 1.

11. τοσοῦτον σὺ κτέ.: τηλικοῦτος and τηλικόσθε, acc. to the context, mean indifferently so young or so old. See Introd. 30. Notice the chiastic order: — σὺ ἐγνωκας τηλικοῦτον τηλικόσθε.

Cf. below, 26 ο ἐν, and Euthyph. 2 b, νέος γάρ τις μοι φαίνεται καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνομάζει μέντοι αὐτόν, ὡς ἐγγύμαι, Μέλητος, ἄπτε δὲ τῶν ἔνατον Πιτθέα, εἰ τιν’ ἐν μ’ ἔχεις Πιτθέα Μέλητον, ἐπὶ τετενάρθηκα καὶ αὐτὸν εὐγένειον εἰπέργουν δὲ, a young person who, I conceive, is not much known: his name is Meletus and Pitthis is his deme, — perhaps you remember a Meletus of Pitthis, who has rather a beak, a scrubbed beard, and lank long hair.

15. ἀγνωσία: for the indic. with ὅστε, see GMT. 65, 3; H. 927.

16. κακῶν τι λαβεῖν απ’ αὐτοῦ: in the case supposed the κακόν is the natural result. It is stated, however (cf. the equiv. idiom ἀγαθόν τι λαβεῖν παρὰ τινός), as something which the victim goes out of his way to obtain.

18. οἴμαι οὐδένα: cf. Lach. 180 ο, κανονεν ἐτοιμος (sc. εἰμί), οἴμαι δὲ καὶ λάχατα τόνδε (sc. ἐτοιμον εἶναι).

19. ἡ, ἀκών: the verb is supplied from its subordinate clause, εἰ διαφθείρω. More usually the verb of the subord. clause is implied and that of the leading clause expressed. Socrates believed that all sin was involuntary, οὐδέποτε ἐνὸν ἐμαρτέναι. See Introd. 17.

21. καὶ ἀκοινοῦν: strictly speaking this is superfluous, since τοσοῦτον takes
μάτων οὖ δεύρο νόμος εἰσάγειν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ἵδια λαβόντα 26 διδάσκειν καὶ νουθετεῖν. δὴ λοι γὰρ ὅτι ἔαν μᾶθω, πάθος-
μαί ο ζε ἄκωκ ποιώ. συ δὲ ἔνγεγενοσθαι μὲν μοι καὶ δι-
25 δάκαι ἐφυγες καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησας, δεύρο δὲ εἰσάγεις, οἱ
νόμος ἐστὶν εἰσάγειν τοὺς κολάσεως δεσμένους, ἀλλ' οὐ
μαθήσεως.

XIV. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τούτῳ μὲν δὴ λοι
ο ἐγώ ἔλεγον, ὅτι Μελήτω τούτων οὐτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν τὸ
πάπτοτε ἐμέλησεν. ὦμως δὲ δὴ λέγε ἡμῖν, πῶς μὲ φῆς δια-
φθείρειν, ὦ Μέλητε, τοὺς νεωτέρους; ὁ δὲ λοι δὴ ὅτι, κατὰ
5 τὴν γραφὴν ἦν ἓγράφησα, θεοὺς διδάσκοντα μὴ νομίζεις οὖν
ἡ πόλις νομίζει, ἔτερα δὲ δαιμόνια κακά; οὐ ταῦτα λέγεις

the necessary meaning from its rela-
tion to ἄκωκ. Here is another case of
Socrates's homely fashion of repeating
himself. See Introd. 55.—For the
gen. of the charge after εἰσάγειν, see
on εἰσάγειν, 24 d.

23. παῦσομαι κτ.: from τοιώ we
must supply τοῖν we must supply παῦσομαι. Such
an ellipsis as this is obvious, and
therefore not uncommon. See App.

25. ἐφυγες κτ.: you declined. So-
crates offered Meletus every op-
portunity for such an effort. See
Introd. 25. The compound διαφθέι
gen in this sense is more common, but cf.
Eur. Herac. 505 f., αὐτόι δὲ προστι-
θέντες (imposing) ἄλλων τόνων, πα-
ρὸν σεαὐτόν (when they might be wholly
spared), φευξάμεσα μὴ θανεῖν. From
this quotation it appears that
μὴ might have been used before ἐγ-
γενέσθαι and ἰδίζει. See Arnold's edit.
of Madvig's Syntax, 150, Rem. 3.
For cases of διαφθέιγειν qualified by a
neg. and followed by τὸ μὴ οὖ and μὴ
οὐ, cf. Soph. 225 b, οὐκέτι διαφθεί
tai (sc. ὁ σοφιστής) . . . τὸ μὴ οὐ τοῦ
γένους (kind) εἶναι τοῦ τῶν θαυματο-

τοῖν τοῖς εἰς. GMT. 95, 3. Phaedr. 28
277 d ὀ, τὸ γὰρ ἓγραφει ... οὐκ ἐκφεύγει
tῇ ἀλήθεια μὴ οὐκ ἐπονειθαντον εἶναι.
GMT. 95, 2 c. For an entirely differ-
ent case, cf. 39 a, where τὸ ἀποθείου
represents ἀθάνατον.

XIV. 2. τοῦτων: see on ὅτι, 24 c. b
—οὔτε μέγα οὔτε μικρὸν: a stronger
way of saying οὐδέν. The whole is
adv., and therefore in the cognate
acc. rather than in the gen. See G.
160, 2, and 150, ν. 2; H. 719 b.

3. ὄμως δὲ δὴ: all the carelessness
of Meletus is accumulated in ὄμω,
and thus the adversative force of δὲ
is enhanced, while δὴ brings the state-
ment of contradiction to a point; that
is, δὴ marks transition from a general
to a special account of τὴν τοῦ Μελή-
tου ἀμιλείαν.

4. ὁ δὲ λοι: appends a more precise
and pressing question to the first, and
anticipates the answer. In Lat. an
is used in this way. The ellipsis in
ὅτι κατὰ κτ. is to be supplied from
πῶς μὲ φῆς διαφθείρειν;

6. ταῦτα: does not go with λέγεις
but with διδάσκων.
ἈΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

8. ὅτι διδάσκων διαφθείρω: Πάνω μὲν οὖν σφόδρα ταῦτα λέγω. Πρὸς αὐτῶν τοὺς, ὥστε Μέλητε, τούτων τῶν θεῶν ὄντων ὅ γίγνοις ἔστιν, εἰπεὶ ἔτι-σαφέστερον καὶ ἐμοί καὶ τοῖς ἀνδράσι τούτοις. ἡ γὰρ οὐ δύναμαι μαθεῖν πότερον εἰς καὶ δεξαμενείς διδάσκειν με νομίζεις ναὶ τινας θεοὺς, καὶ αὐτὸς ἄρα νομίζω εἰναι θεοὺς, καὶ οὐκ εἰμὶ τὸ παράπαν άθεός οὐδὲ ταύτη ἁδικώ, οὐ μέντοι οὕσπερ γε ἡ πόλις, ἀλλ' ἔτερος, καὶ τούτ' ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐγκαλεῖς, ὅτι ἐτέρους: ἡ παύτᾳ-15 πασί μὲ φύς οὔτε αὐτῶν νομίζεις θεοὺς τοὺς τῇ ἄλλῳ ταῦτα διδάσκειν. Ταύτα λέγω, ὅσ τὸ παράπαν οὖ νομί-ζεις θεοὺς, ὥσ τὰ ταῦτα λέγεις.

7. πάνω μὲν οὖν κτέ.: Meletus agrees and asserts with all his might and main, I assure you exactly that is what I do mean. πάνω and σφόδρα give strength to the assertion ταύτα λέγω (cf. 26 α.), οὖν signifies agreement with Socrates, and μὲν (a weakened μὴν) gives him the assurance of it.

8. ὅτι διδάσκων: that is, οὖτε λέγωμεν. A prep. is more usual, but compare Thuc. i. 140. 3, τὸ Μεγαρέων ἤφιοσμα, with id. 139. 1, τὸ περὶ Μεγαρέων ἤφιοσμα. There are many cases where the gen. is used without a prep. (esp. where περὶ would seem appropriate). ἡ κτέ. 47, 7, 6. Stallbaum, however, insists that περὶ is not implied here, and distinguishes between περὶ ὅν ὁ λόγος and ὅν ὁ λόγος, just as between λέγειν (have in mind) τινα καὶ λέ-γειν περὶ τινος. That such a distinction sometimes holds good is plain from other passages in Plato. Cf. Stallb. in loc. and Soph. 200 α., σὺν ἡραγον δὴ φράζειν περὶ οὗ τ' ἐστι καὶ ἐστὶν (sc. δὲ λόγος).

10 ff. πότερον λέγεις κτέ.: the two horns of this dilemma are, I. πότερον . . . διὶ ἔτερος, and II. ἡ διδάσκειν. In I. there are two subdivisions:
ouδè ἡλιον ουδε σεληνην αρα νομιζω θεους ειναι, ωστερ οι δ' αλλοι ανθρωποι; 'Μα Δ'ε, μ' ανδρες δικασται, επει των μεν 20 ηλιον λιθου φησιν ειναι, την δε σεληνην γην.' 'Αναξαγορον οιει κατηγορειν, ω φιλε Μελητε, και ουτω καταφρονεις τωνδε και οιει αυτοις απειρος γραμματων ειναι, ωστε ουκ 26 

18. ουδε...ουδε: not even...nor yet.—αρα: the insinuation of Meletus was both startling and unwelcome to Socrates, who nevertheless meets it in a tone of playful irony. Every religious-minded Greek reverenced the sun. No appeal was more solemn and sincere than that to ἡλιος παντοτης. Accordingly this appeal is constantly met with in the most moving situations created by tragedy. Ajax, when in despair he falls upon his sword, and outraged Prometheus from his rock, both cry out to the sun. Ion, before entering upon his peaceful duties in the temple, looks first with gladness toward the sun. Both Heracles and Agave are saved from madness when they once more can clearly recognize the sun. That Socrates habitually paid reverence with exemplary punitiveness to this divinity not made by human hands is here suggested and is still more plainly shown in Stephan. 220 d, where, after some account of a brown study into which Socrates had fallen, we read: δ' δε [Σωκρατης] ειστεκε μεχρη εως ογυνετο και ηλιος άνεχων. Επειτα φξετα απω προσευχημενος τω ηλιω, then, after a prayer to the sun, he took his departure. On Socrates's religion, see Introd. 32.

19. μ' ανδρες δικασται: Meletus uses this form of address, which Plato is careful not to put into the mouth of Socrates. See on δ' ανδρες κτις, 17 a.

20. 'Αναξαγορον: see Introd. 10. Diog. Laert. ii. 3, 4, reports that Anaxagoras declared των ηλιου μοδρων ειναι διαφυρον (a red hot mass of stone or iron) και μετας της Πελοποννησου... την δε σεληνην οικησεις ηχειν και λιθους και φαραγγας (raunes). From this last apparently the public inferred that Anaxagoras held the belief which Meletus attributes so wrongfully to Socrates, i.e. την δε σεληνην γην. The real view of Socrates in regard to such an account of the "all-seeing sun," as was attributed to Anaxagoras, is perhaps represented by the parenthetical refutation introduced by Xenophon in Mem. iv. 7. 7. For a criticism of Anaxagoras which is more worthy of Socrates himself, see the one attributed to him in the Phaedo, 97 c-99 d. The capital objection there made to Anaxagoras is that he unfolds his dogmatic views ἀμελήσας τας ἄλλας αἰτίας λέγειν. The argument here is: "apparently you take me for Anaxagoras, and forget that it is Socrates whom you are prosecuting." Diogenes Laertius, ii. 3, 6, gives a startling story about Anaxagoras: φαι δ' αυτων προειθεων (prophesied) την περι Αιγινοποιων (Ἀγιασσωταμι) του ηλιου πτωσιν (the fall of the stone), δυ εικεν εκ του ηλιου πεσειθαι. 21. ουτω: qualifying απειρος below as well as καταφρονεις.

22. γραμματων: in literature. ἡμιματα stand in the same relation to μαθαιματα as litterae to disciplinae. Plato meant to be outspoken in dealing with the stupidity which led the court to pronounce Socrates guilty.
eἰδέναι ὅτι τὰ Ἀναξαγόρου βιβλία τοῦ Κλαξομενίου γέμει 28 τούτων τῶν λόγων; καὶ δὴ καὶ οἱ νέοι ταῦτα παρ’ ἐμοῦ
μανθάνουσιν, ἀ ἐξεστώ ἐνίοτε, εἰ πάνω πολλοὺ, ὁ δραχμῆς
ἐκ τῆς ὀρχηστρᾶς πριγμένους Σωκράτους καταγελᾶν, ἐὰν ο
προσποίηθαι ἐαυτὸν εἶναι, ἄλλως τε καὶ οὕτως ἀτόπα ὄντα.
—οὐκ εἰδέναι: ὦ̣ because Socrates wishes to suggest the most positive form of statement: οὕτως ἀπειρο
γραμμάτων εἶναι διότι οὐκ ἦσαν ὁ δικτ. This vivid use of οὖ̣ for μή in inf. clauses after διότι is not uncom-
mon where it is indifferent whether the indic. or infin. is used; thus here διότι οὐ̣κ ἦσαν οὐ̣κ ἦσαν μή̣ εἰδέναι
would be equally regular and διότι οὐ̣κ εἰδέναι is a mixture of the two. See GMT. 65, 3; II. 1023 b.
23. βιβλία: cf. Diog. Laert. ii. 3, 8, πρῶτος (sc. of the philosophers) δὲ
Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ βιβλίαν ξεδώκε (pub-
lished) συγγραφῆς.
24. καὶ δὴ καὶ: and now you expect people to believe that it is from me, etc.
25. δ. . . ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας πρα-
μένους: sc. the doctrines, not the books.
 —ἐνίοτε: that is when, as they often might, they chanced to see a play in which those doctrines were promul-
gated, as in Eur. Orest. 982,
Where hangs a centre-stone of heaven and earth
With linked chains of gold aloft suspended,
Where whirls the clod erst from Olympus flung.
There I would go.
It is said that, in the lost play of
Phæthon, Euripides called the sun
χρυσώθαν, a clod of gold. Such utterances
could be heard by any who paid the price of admission and
listened to this poet’s choral odes,
which were sung ἐκ τῆς ὀρχήστρας. The
price of admission to the theatre of
Dionysus thus appears to have been
at most (εἰ πάνω πολλοῦ) one drachma.
Ordinary spectators paid two obols,
one-third of a drachma, or about six
cents. Pericles passed a law providing
that Athenians who asked for it
should receive two obols for this pur-
pose from the public treasury. The
mention here of a maximum admis-
sion price of one drachma suggests
that the better places may have been
reserved by the manager (called θεα-
τρώνις or θεατροπόλης, sometimes even
ἀρχιτέκτων) for those who could pay
more than six cents. In the account
rendered (see Rangabé, Antiquités Hel-
léniques, the inscription numbered 57,
lines 30–33, also C. I. A. I. 324, pp.
171, 175) for building the Erechtheum
(407 b.c.) is found the following item:
ἀναλώματα: ἄνθισμα: χάρται οἰο-
νήτες δύο ἐς τὰ ἀντιγραφὰ ἐνεπρό-
ψαυμέν ἑπτα, expenditures: purchases:
[item] bought two sheets of paper upon
which we wrote our accounts, 2 drachmas
and 4 obols. It is accordingly absurd
to suggest that a volume of Ἀνα-
αγóρας at this time could have cost
as little as one drachma, even if it
could be proved that books were
sold in the orchestra of the theatre
of Dionysus; or if, that failing,
we were content with the notion of
a book-market close to the Agora.
The part of the ἄραφδε where the
statues of Harmodius and Aristoge-
ton stood bore the name ὀρχήστρα,
but nothing goes to show that books
were sold there.
27. ἄλλως τε καὶ . . . ἀτόπα: the more
so because of their singularity. "With-
out taking even that into account, the youths must know well enough that these are not my doctrines.” Etymologically ἀτομα suggests not absurd, but uncommon, eccentric. See the preceding note.

28. ἀλλ' ὅ πρὸς Διός, οὐτωσὶ σοι δοκῶ οὐδένα νομίζειν θετεν. 28 ἐστι; οὖν μεθύοι μα Δι' οὖθ' ὄπωστοι. Ἀποστολοί γ' εἰς, 30 ὁ Μέλητε, καὶ ταῦτα μέντοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖς, σαυτῷ. ἐμοὶ καὶ γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐσι, ὁ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πάντ' ἐστιν ὡς τίρατθεὶς καὶ ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ἀτεχνῶς τὴν γραφήν ταύτην ὑποθείναι καὶ ἲκολασία καὶ νεότητι γράφασθαι. Εἰς οὖτε γὰρ ἀπετείχειν ἐννετείρετο διαπεραματεῖν, ἀρα γνώσει. 36 ταύτα Σωκράτης ὁ σοφὸς δὴ ἐμοῦ χαρινεύτομένοι καὶ ἐναν-

34. διαπεραμάτων: “one participial clause (ἐστετείρετο) within another (διαπεραμάτων); as Rep. viii. 555 c, τὸν ἀλήθειαν ἐνεῖντες ἄργων τιτρόκοκτοι, they (the business men) inserting their sting, that is, their money, into any who yields them opportunity, keep inflicting wounds. Notice that it is ἀπετείχειν, a ‘mock-riddle,’ one which has no answer.” R. Cf. for the use of the pres. partic. Phaed. 110 c d, οἶδα γὰρ καὶ ἰδοὺ ἀγ-γέλλων. Χερ. Ηρ. ii. 4. 37, ἐπιμνηκότα... λέγοντας δι' κτέ. Αν. ii. 4. 24, ἐ γλωστὸς αὐτοῦ ἐπεφάνθη... σκοτών εἰ διαβαλλον τῶν πολιτῶν. Ηδ. iv. 5. 8, βρωτόν (eatables) διδύσλου καὶ δίσπεμα διδότας κτέ. See on σκοτώντα, 21 e. Usually διαπεραμάτων takes the gen., but here the question which follows explains the nature of the διαπεραμάτων.
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τι εμαυτῷ λέγοντος, ἢ ἐξαπατήσω αὐτὸν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοὺς ἀκούοντας; οὗτος γὰρ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῶς ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, ἔσπερ ἂν εἰ έπιοι ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης θεοὺς οὐ νομίζων, ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων. καίτοι τούτῳ ἐστι παιδοῦντος.

ΧV. Ἐνεπισκέψασθε δή, ὁ ἄνδρες, ἢ μοι φαίνεται ταύτα λέγειν· σὺ δὲ ἡμῖν ἀπόκριναι, ὁ Μέλητε· ὑμεῖς δὲ, ὅπερ κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἡμὰς παρείπεσόμεν, μέμησθε (μοι μὴ τὰ) θορυβεῖν, ἕαν ἐν τῷ εἰσθότι τρόπῳ τοὺς λόγους ποίωμαι. 5 ἐστιν οὕτως ἀνθρώπων, ὁ Μέλητε, ἀνθρώπεια μὲν νομίζει πράγματ' εἶναι, ἀνθρώπους δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ἀποκρινέσθω, ὁ ἄνδρες, καὶ μὴ ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω· ἔσθ' ὅστις ἵππους μὲν οὐ νομίζει, ἵππικα δὲ πράγματα; ἡ ἀυληταῖς μὲν οὐ νομίζει ἐεῖναι, ἀυλητικὰ δὲ πράγματα; οὐκ ἐστιν, ὁ 10 ἄριστε ἄνδρῳ· εἰ μὴ σὺν βούλει ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἐγὼ σοι ενισχυμένου: for the gen. of noun and partic. with γράφεται, see examples cited in note on ἀριστέων, 22 c.

36. τοὺς ἄλλους: see on τοὺς ἄλλους, below.

37. τὰ ἐναντία λέγειν αὐτῶς εἰσαύτῳ κτι.: to contradict himself in so many words. A more positive phrase than ἐναντία ἐμαυτῷ λέγειν above.

ΧV. 2. ταύτα λέγειν: sc. ἀδικεῖ Σωκράτης... θεοὺς νομίζων κτι.

4. τοὺς λόγους: the art. has nearly the force of a poss. here. G. 141, §. 2; H. 658. In many such cases as here the art., strictly speaking, points out something which the context has already suggested. To all such suggestions a Greek audience was very sensitive. Hence the freq. and delicate use of the dem. art. in Greek. G. 143; H. 654. On the method of Socrates, see Intro. 18, 21, 25, 26.

7. ἄλλα καὶ ἄλλα θορυβεῖτω: be always trying to get up a disturbance; more lit., disturbing in one way and another. Cf. Xen. An. i. 5. 12, καὶ οὕτως μὲν (Menon's soldier) αὐτῶς ἰμαρτεν (missed) ἄλλος δὲ ἄλθε (sc. τοῖς τον Κλέαρχον καὶ ἄλλοις, ἐπα τολολ κραυγής γενομένης. Ibid. vii. 6. 10, μετά τούτων ἄλλος ἀνέστη ὡμοίως καὶ ἄλλοις. See also Euthyd. 273 b, ὅτε Διονυσάδωρος καὶ ὁ Θεόβαρος πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστάταις (stopped) διελεύσασθην ἀλλάξων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλην ἀποβλέποντες εἰς ἡμᾶς (now and then glancing at us). The acc. is after the analogy of θόρυβον θορυβεῖν, i.e. a cognate acc., G. 159; H. 716. Here Meletus (cf. 25 d) gives no answer apart from such demonstrations of disgust as Socrates complains of. The words in e below, ὅπτω τούτωι ἀναγιαζομεοι suggest that the court was finally forced to interpose. Of course many "waits" of one kind or another may have oc-
λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους τοῦτοις. ἄλλα τὸ ἐπὶ τούτῳ γε ἀπό- 27 κρίναι· ἔσθι δόστις δαίμόνια μὲν νομίζει πράγματι ἐστὶ, σ ὅ- δαίμονας δὲ οὐ νομίζει; ὃς ἀνήγας ἄπεκρίνη ὑπὸ τούτων ἀναγκαζόμενος. οὐκόν δαίμο- 15 να μὲν φήσι με καὶ νομίζειν καὶ διδάσκειν, εἰτ' οὖν κανά- εὶτε παλαιά· ἄλλ' οὖν δαίμονα γε νομίζω κατὰ τὸν ςὸν λόγον, καὶ ταύτα καὶ διωμόδος ἐν τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ. εἰ δὲ δαίμονα νομίζω καὶ δαίμονας δῆτι πολλή ἀνάγκη νομί- 20 ζευ μὲ ἐστιν· οὐχ οὖτως ἔχει; ἔχει δὴ· τίθημι γάρ σε ὅμολογοντα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀποκρίνει. τοὺς δὲ δαίμονας

Socrates meant a divine agency, but Meletus had wrested it into the sense of a divine being. So that here the equivocation of Meletus is simply re- turned upon himself. Contrast, where Socrates is speaking uncontroversially of his monitor, the distinctly adj. use, θειὸν τι καὶ δαίμοναν, 31 c.” R.

17. τῇ ἀντιγραφῇ: elsewhere and in its stricter use this means the written affidavit put in as a rejoinder by the accused; rarely as here, the accusation or the written affidavit of the accuser. So in Hyper. Eux. §§ 4, 33 (Col. 20, 40). Harpocratio on the word ἀντιγραφῇ says, evidently referring to this passage: Πλάτων δὲ ἐν τῇ Σωκράτους ἀπολογία τὸ αὐτὸ καλεῖ ἀντιμοσίαν καὶ ἀντιγραφήν. See Introd. 69 and n. 1 and 2.

19. ἔχει: repeated by way of answering yes after οὕτως ἔχει; similarly the simple verb is often repeated after a compound form. See on Crit. 44 d. — δή; certainly. Such an affirmation is not only self-evident (justified by common sense), but also follows from the admission which Meletus already has made.

20. τοὺς δαίμονας κτῆ: the definition here given is consistent with
αὐχὲ ἤτοι θεοῦς γε ἡγούμεθα ἡ θεῶν παιδας; φης ἦ οὐ; 

Πάντως, οὐκόν εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγοῦμαι, ὡς σὺ φῆς, εἰ μὲν θεοὶ τινὲς εἰσών οἱ δαίμονες τούτῳ ἂν εἰς ἐγὼς φημὶ 

σε αἰνίττεσθαι καὶ χαριντίζεσθαι, θεοὺς οὖν ἤγομενον 

25 φάναι ἐμὲ θεοὺς αὐτῇ γενέσθαι πάλιν, ἐπειδήπερ γε δαίμονας 

ἡγοῦμαι: εἰ δὲ αὐτοὶ δαίμονες θεῶν παιδές εἰσὶ νόθοι τινὲς 

ἡ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἡ ἐκ τινῶν ἄλλων, ἢ δὲ καὶ λέγονται, τίς ἂν 

ἀνθρώπων θεοὶ μὲν παιδας ἡγοῖτο εἰναι, θεοὺς δὲ μη; 

ομοίως γὰρ ἄν ἀτοπον εἰη, ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ τις ἰππων μὲν παι- 

27 Greek usage from Homer to Plato. 

In Homer θεός and δαίμων, applied 

to any divinity in particular or to 

divinity in general, are all but inter-

changeable terms. The distinction 

between them, if distinction there is, 

suggests itself rather in the adjs. 

derived from them than in the two 

nouns themselves. Hesiod, Op. 108-

125, calls the guardian spirits that 

watch over men δαίμονες; to the 

rank of δαίμονες he says those were 

raised who lived on earth during 

the golden age. He distinguishes 

between θεός, δαίμονες, and ἤμοιες, and 

this same distinction is attributed to 

Thales. On this Plato based 

the fancy expressed in the Symposium 

(202c): πᾶν τὸ δαίμονιον μεταξα 

(intermediate) ἐστι θεοῦ τε καὶ βθητοῦ 

... ἐρμηνεῦν καὶ διαπρωμείον (interpre-

ting and convoking) θεοῖς τὰ παρ' 

ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἄνθρωποι τὰ παρὰ βθεῖν, 

τῶν μὲν τὰς ἰδεσείς καὶ θυσίς, τῶν δὲ 

τὰς ἐπιτάξεις τε καὶ ἁρμαβάς (commands 

and rewards) τῶν θυσίων.

21. φῆς ἦ οὐ: three Eng. words, 

yes or no?, will translate this. See 
on οὐ φῇτε, 25b. 

22. εἰπερ δαίμονας ἡγούμαι κτὲ.: a 

complex prot., which falls into two 

simpler conditions, each of which ex-

cludes the other. The latter apply 

the broader supposition εἰπερ δαίμονας 

ἡγοῦμαι in turn to alternative apodoses, 

both of which it limits. Cf. Xen. An. 

vii. 6. 15, for a very similar construc-

tion: ἐστὶ γε μὴν φέτεσθαι ἡμῖν 

Σεῦθης περὶ τοῦ μοσθοῦ, — this might 

readily have taken the form of a 

prot., — εἰ μὲν ἐπικάνω αὐτῷ, δικαίω 

ἀν μὲ καὶ ἀπεξεῖθει καὶ μεσίτη. εἰ δὲ 

πρόσθεν αὐτῷ ... φίλος ἃν νῦν ... δια-

φορῶτατον εἰμι, τῶς ἄν ἐτι δικαίω ... 

δι' ὅμοιον αὐλαν ἐχομι; On the com-

bination of indec. and opt., see GMT. 

54, and on εἰ διαφθεῖρε, κτὲ., 25d 

above.

23. τοῦτο ἐν ἑι: by τοῦτο the 

preceding conditions, εἰπερ ... ἡγοῦμαι and 

ei ... δαίμονες, are grasped into one; and, 

thus combined in τοῦτο, they become 

the subj. whose pred. is the suppressed 
(ἐκεῖνο) antec. of δ. To δε αἰνίττεσθαι 

καὶ χαριντίζεσθαι is appended φάναι, 

which explains it and has the same 

subj.; all this points back to θεοῦ οἰ 

νομιζών ἀλλὰ θεοὺς νομίζων, 27b. 

27. ἄν: equiv. to εἰ ἄν, for “when 

the antecedent stands before the rela-

tive, a preposition (in this case εἰ) 

belonging to both usually appears 

only with the first.” See H. 1007. — 

δῆ: you know.

XVI. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ οὖν ἄδικω κατὰ τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, οὐ πολλῆς μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ἀπολογίας, ἀλλὰ ἰκανὰ καὶ ταύτα· ὥς δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν ἑλέγων, ὡς πολλῆς μοι ἄπειθεια γέγονε καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς, εἴ ὢτε ὡς ἄλληθες ἔστι. καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστω ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάντερ ἀἱρῇ, οὐ Μέλητος οὐδὲ Ἀνυτος, ἀλλ' ἡ τῶν πολλῶν διαβολῆ τε καὶ φθόνος. ὅ δὲ πολλοὺς καὶ

33. ἡ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι, κτε.: this no doubt was Socrates's real view of the case of Meletus (cf. 23d), whereas all that precedes is only to bring home to the court how foolish and self-contradictory the charge is. ἄπορῶν καὶ ἀποτερώμενοι, in connexion with ἐγράψας, refer to continued action in past time. — ἐγκαλοῖς: the opt. represents Meletus's original reflexion τί ἐγκαλῶ; The subj. might have been retained. GMT. 71.

34. ὅπως δὲ σὺ κτε.: here Socrates closes his argument to the effect that it is a contradiction in terms to say of one and the same man (1) that he is a complete atheist, and (2) that he believes in δαμονία. The second τὸν αὐτοῦ must be regarded as redundant, a simple repetition of the first one which might be dispensed with. See App.—πείθοις ὅς ὃς [οὐ]: is not simply pleonastic, as in the case of two negatives in the same clause, but it is irrational, and can hardly be right. ὅπως means how or by which after μηχανή. A similar use of ὃς is explained GMT. 65, 1, 4.

XVI. 1. Ἀλλὰ γὰρ... ταύτα: this phrase dismisses one topic to make room for the next one.

5. ὃ ἐμὲ αἰρήσει, ἐάντερ ἀἱρῇ: will be the condemnation of me, if condemnation it is to be. αἰρέων καὶ ἀλλοκενθαί are technical terms of the law, as is the case with φεῦγειν and διώκειν.

7. δή: certainly. The allusion is to facts generally known and acknowledged, cf. 31 d.—πολλοὺς καὶ ἄλλους καὶ ἄγαθους: instead of καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς καὶ ἄγαθον. The first καὶ is the idiomatic καὶ of comparisons. Cf. 22d, ὅπερ καὶ οἱ ποιηταί, and the idiom εἰ τις καὶ ἄλλος. The second καὶ is
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άλλους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἀνδρὰς ἵρηκεν, οἴμαι δὲ καὶ αἰρήσεως. 28
οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν ἐμοὶ στή. ίσως δὲ ἄν οὐν εἶποι τις. εἰπ' ἃ
10 οὔκ αἰσχύνει, ὁ Σώκρατες, τοιούτον ἐπιτήδευμα ἐπιτηδεύεται,
ἐξ οὐ κινδυνεύεις νυν ἀποθανεῖν; ἐγὼ δὲ τούτῳ ἂν δίκαιον
λόγον ἀντείποιμι, οτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὡς ἀνθρωπε, εἰ οὐκ
dειν κινδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζην ἢ τεθνάαι ἀνδρα-
ὸτον τι καὶ σμικρον-οφελός ἔστω, ἀλλ' οὔκ ἔκειν μόνον
15 σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερα δίκαια ἡ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ
ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ἔργα ἢ κακοῦ. ἡ φαύλοι γὰρ ἄν τῷ γε σὺ
λόγῳ εἰς τῶν ἡμιθέων ὅσοι ἐν Τροίᾳ τετελευτήκασαν οἷς τε ὁ
ἀλλοι καὶ ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦός, δς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδυνοῦ

28 equally idiomatic, and joins πολλοῖς
with a second adj. Cf. πολλοὶ καὶ
σοφοί ἄνδρες.

9. οὐδὲν δὲ δεινὸν μὴ ἐν... στη: the
rule is in no danger of breaking down in
my case. Cf. Phaed. 84 b, οὐδὲν δεινὸν
μὴ φοβηθή, we need not apprehend that
the soul will have to fear. Gorg. 520 d,
and Rep. v. 465 b. There is a touch of
irony in this way of saying "I do not
think." Socrates as it were en-
lists on the side of the rule. This
idiom throws no light on οὐ μὴ with
subj. or fut. indic. GMT. '80, 1,
υ. 2. For the quasi-impersonal use
of στή, come to a stand-still, cf. Arist.
Eth. Nic. vi. 9. 9, στήσεται γὰρ κάκει.
Theat. 153 a, ἐως μὲν ἐν ἡ περιφορὰς
κινούμενη καὶ ἡ θλίως, πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ
σώζεται... ei δὲ σταΐη τοῦτο ὁπερ
deδέν (l tethered), πάντα χρήματι ἄν
δια-

φορείη. In such contexts the aor.
stήμα denotes the entrance into a
state of quiet or collapse. GMT. 10,
ν. 1. — αὐτ' οὖκ αἰσχύνει: a question
indicating surprise. The perversity
of Socrates, in view of the fact just
recited, is unreasonable. When such
a question is accompanied by an
urgent statement of the reason for
surprise (here τοιούτον... ἓξ οὗ, κτ.), it
may be introduced by εἶτα or ἐπείτα,
otherwise not.

11. ἵγω δὲ κτ.: cf. Crit. 48 d for
the same thought, and Xen. An. iii. 1.
43, for its application to the risks of
war. In the Ajax of Sophocles, 473–
480, the same idea is brought to the
following climax:—

Honor in life or honorable death
The nobly born and bred must have.

13. κινδυνον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάαι: the
question of life or death. Cf. for
the use and omission of the art., Rep.
i. 334 c, κινδυνεύομεν (perhaps we, etc.)
οὐκ ὤρθες τὸν φίλον καὶ ἐξ ὁμοῦ
θεᾶς (have defined). Cf. for the
thought, Aj. 475–476:—

τι γὰρ παρ' ἡμαρ ἡμᾶρ τέρτεσ' ἐκεὶ
προσελπεία κάνασεια τοῦ γε καταβείνι

15. δὲ τὰν πράττῃ: whenever he does
anything. GMT. 62. See App.

17. τῶν ἡμιθέων: i.e. τῶν ἡρώων.
Hesiod, W. and D. 158, calls the
fourth race, ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων θείων γένος οἰ
καλέσται | ἡμιθέοι κτ., and he counts
among their number the heroes that
laid siege to Thebes and to Troy.

18. ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νῦός: any appeal c
to the example of Achilles was always
catephrónhse parà to aiôxhron ti úpomeíanai, óste épeidhí
ev ên ìpêr aútî prothumouménnê. "Ektoûra âpokteînai,
theôs óusâ, ouwswî pws, òs ëgôi oîmai. ò pai, ei tímpwra-
seis Patróklw tâ étaîr oîn fônon kai "Ektoûra âpokte-
neis, aútous âpobanê. aúttîka vàpî toi, fhsî, mêu'
"Ektoûra pòtûmos étoîmos. ó de taûta ákousas toû mê
25 tânâtou kai toû kûdûnoun âlignôrfe, polû de mûllon
deîsas to ënê kàkos òn kai toûs filoûs mû âtîwreîn, a
aúttîka, fhsî, òtrnaihê dikhê èpithêis tê aûkówn, ùna
mû ènîbûde ùmên katalêpástos parà ùnóûi korwîswn
âkthos àrûrphs. mû aútou ûiei frountisai tânâtou kai
30 kûdûnoun; ouâw gàp èxei, ò òndres 'Athanâi, tû èlîstheîa-
ocin tîs èautûn tâdê énè $$e$$ àgghásmenon belstistôn èwai ùn'
very telling. The enthusiasm with
which all Greeks regarded this hero
was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art
in which he appeared. Homer, Od.
xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his
favored condition in the lower world
hardly to be endured. The post-
homeristic story-tellers said that he was
living in the Islands of the blest. Cf.
Symp. 179 c, where this same scene be-
tween Thetis and Achilles is quoted,
and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmo-
dius: —

No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead,
But in the Islands of the Blest men say,
Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away,
And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him
Simonides, wishing no doubt to make
Achilles' happiness complete, repre-
sented him as married to Medea in
Elysium.

21. òtrnaihê ouvû: added in a very un-
usual way, because the circumstance
has unusual weight. The utterance
of Thetis was not only prompted by
the natural anxiety of a mother for
her son, but also was inspired by the
unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf.
Hom. Od. iv. 309 and 488, thôl êi te
pánta ùsasîn. The passage from Hom.
Il. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely
in part (ouwswî pws), and partly word
for word.

24. ó de taûta âkousas kte.: at
this point ùstè is forgotten. The
long speech and explanation given to
Thetis makes this break in the const.
very natural. In fact, this clause is
as independent as if a co-ord. clause
(with or without ùmên) had preceded
it.—tôi tânâtou: notice the excep-
tional use of the art., which is usually
omitted with ârastos as an abstract
noun. Cf. 28 c, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a b,
Critt. 52 c. For the art. used as here,
cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. ùû... ouî: see on álî 'éra, 25 a. d
31. é$$â$$xhous $$e$$ $$â$$xhôs: instead
of $$ê$$ $$ê$$ $$â$$xhous $$e$$ kelevouthês or even $$ê$$ $$â$$xhôs. Some such expression is
called for grammatically by the form
of the first alternative $$ê$$ $$ê$$ $$â$$xhous
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ. 101

ἀρχοντος ταχθῇ, ἐνταῦθα δεῖ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μένοντα κιν- 28
dινεύων μιθέων ὑπολογιζόμενον μιθή θάνατον μιθή ἄλλο
μιθέων πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ.

XVII. Ἐγὼ οὖν δεῦρ᾽ ἐνεύοις εἰργασμένος, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς

πρὸτε. This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts
better. The commander's order, if
given at all, was peremptory, and re-
quires a more positive statement than
the less urgent ἄγαπαμεν ἐν τῇ
In the
sense ὑπ’ ἄρχοντος ταχθῇ is the alter-
native of ἀνεύν τὰ ἄρτη. See App.
33. ὑπολογιζόμενον: as in b above,
ὑπολογίζομαι means take into account,
i.e. in striking a balance. Cf. Crit.
48d, where nearly the same idea is
expressed. For a detailed descrip-
tion of the process of striking a
balance involved in ὑπολογίζομαι, cf.: Phaedr. 231b, οἱ μὲν ἔρωτες σκο-
τοὺς ὡς τὸ κακόν διείστωσε... καὶ ἀ
πεποίησαν ἐς, καὶ ἐν εἰργον πόνον
προστιθέντες ἤγοιται πάλαι τὴν
ἄξιαν ἀποδεικνύει χάριν τοῖς ἑρωμένοις.
τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔρωσιν οὗτ ἐν τοῖς ὀλειῶν
ἀμέλειαν διὰ τὸ ὅτι προφασίζομαι
οὕτῳ τούς παρελθόντας πόνους
ὑπολογίζομαι κτῆ. The force of
ὅτι here is very near to that of ἄρτη
and, so far from primarily indicating
a process of subtraction, it involves
first of all an addition.
34. πρὸ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ: moral turpi-
tude (tūrpe), not death, was the harm
which Socrates struggled to avoid at
any and every price. Cf. 20b and
Soph. Ant. 95 ff.,

Nay, leave me and my heart's untoward plan
To suffer all thou fear'st; naught will I suffer
That shall entice me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the prop-
osition that disgrace is more fright-
ful than death, Socrates can now
answer the question of 28 b, if he can
prove that it would have involved,
and would still involve, disgrace for
him not to have followed the pursuit
which has brought him in danger of
his life. This point he makes clear by
an appeal to the analogy of military
discipline, which, as he claims, applies
to his relations to the gods. He is a
soldier in the army of Apollo.

1. δεῦρ᾽ ἐνεύοις... λίποιμι τὴν τά-
ξιν: much here depends upon disen-
tangling past, pres., and fut. See
GMT. 55, 3, Rem. The prot. (limiting
the apod. δεῦρ᾽ ἐνεύοις kτῆ. lit. I should
prove to have done a dreadful thing) in-
cludes various acts in the past which
are looked upon from a supposed time
in the fut. It falls into two parts: one,
marked off by μὲν, states (in the form
of a supposition) well-known facts in
the past; the other, distinguished by
dεὲ, states a supposed future case in
connexion with certain present cir-
cumstances. See on 5. The outra-
geous conduct for him would be with
this combination of facts and convic-
tions, after his past fidelity to human
trusts, at some fut. time to desert his
divinely appointed post of duty: if
while then I stood firm I should now
desert my post. The repetition of μὲν
and δὲ respectively is for the sake of
clearness. For the same repetition
cf. Isocr. vii. 18, παρ᾽ οἷς μὲν γὰρ
μῆτε φυλακῇ μῆτε ἥδια τῶν τοιοῦτων καθεστήκη μὴθ᾽ αἱ κρίσεις ἄκριβεσιν εἰς,
pαρὰ τούτους μὲν διαφθείρεσθαι καὶ
tὰς ἔπεισεῖς τῶν φότεσων, δὴν δὲ μῆτε
λαθεῖν τοῖς ἄδικοις βξοῖν ὅτι μῆτε
φανερῶς γενομένοις συγγνώμης τυχεῖν,
Athenians, under the leadership of their warrior-king, ran a blockade against the Athenians, resulting in a serious check to the power of Athens. The battle, fought by the Athenians, involved a Spartan general named Brasidas. The Spartan general, however, was killed in the battle.

The Athenians were victorious, but their victory was short-lived. The Athenian fleet under the command of Pericles returned from the Peloponnesian War, but the Spartan fleet, under the command of Brasidas, defeated the Athenians in the battle of Naupactus.

This victory was a significant blow to Athens, which had already sustained losses in the previous conflict. The Athenians were now facing the prospect of a border war, which they were ill-prepared to face.

The Athenian fleet returned to the Peloponnesian War, but the Athenians were now facing a new set of challenges. The Athenians were now facing a new set of challenges, which would eventually lead to the end of their empire.

The Athenians were now facing a new set of challenges, which would eventually lead to the end of their empire.
amples of what is known.

Notice that both Plato and Xen. say ἐπὶ (not ἐν) Δηλίῳ, because at the time there was no extended settlement at or near the place. For the gallantry of Socrates in the retreat, cf. Symp. 221 a b. Alcibiades was mounted, and therefore could observe better than at Potidaea how Socrates behaved, and he says: ἂν ὥσιν ἐν θεᾶσασθαι Σωκράτης, ὅτε ἀπὸ Δηλίου φυλή ἀνεχώρει τὸ στρατόπεδον... πρῶτον μὲν δοὺν περὶ πάντων Λάχρης (his companion in flight) τῷ ἕμφρον ἐγὼ ἔπειτα δῆλος ἄν... ὅτι εἶ τις ἐνέται τοῦτον τοῦ ἄνδρος, μᾶλλον ἀρρυμένως ἄμφωντα. See also the similar testimony of Laches in Lach. 181 b.

4. ἐμὸν καὶ ἐκείνουν ἀποθανεῖν: The repeated allusions which are scattered through Plato's dialogues to the brave conduct of Socrates in these battles show that it was well known at Athens.—διότε καὶ ἄλλος τις: just like many another man. He is careful not to make too much of the facts. The indef. τις here means some, i.e. any indefinite person, because many persons are thought of under ἄλλος.

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος: i.e. now that my post is assigned me by the god, a circumstance of the supposition εἰ λίπομι, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἐγὼ φίληθην τε καὶ υπελάβον: as I thought and understood, sc. when I heard the oracle which was given to Chaerephon.—διών: depends on the force of commanding in τάττοντος. Apollo gives him an injunction, to the effect that he must live, etc.

8. λίπομι τὴν τάξιν: so worded as to suggest λιποταξία γραφή, a technical phrase of criminal law. Any one convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his civil rights, i.e. suffered ἀτύλια.

9. τῶν: τολ, truly, emphasizes this repetition of the strong statement which begins the chapter.

14. δ' ὦκ' εἰδέναι: sc. δ' δοκῶν εἰδέναι, i.e. the same indef. subj. which is to be thought of with the preceding infs. Cf. below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the third person, when it means vaguely any one (the French on) or anything, is
15 τον οὖδ᾽ εἰ τυγχάνει εὐτώ ἀνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον ὃν 29 τῶν ἁγάθων, δεδιασμένος ὡς εἰ ἐνδοτές ὅτι μέγιστον τῶν κακῶν ἦν. καὶ τούτῳ πάσιν οὐκ ἁμαθία ἦν· γὰρ ἡ ἐπονείδιστος ἡ οὐκ ἐνεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ ὤδε; ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἄνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἑσσες διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ εἰ δὴ τῷ σοφώτερον τοῦ φαίνει, εἰσαι, τούτῳ ἄν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδὼς ἰκανώς περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδον οὐτῶ καὶ οἴομαι οὐκ εἰδέναι· τὸ δὲ ἄδικεν καὶ ἀπεθεῖν τῷ βελτίων, καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὅτι κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρόν ἦστιν οἶδα. πρὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν δὲν οἴδα ὅτι κακά ἦστιν, ἀ μὴν οἶδα εἰ 25 ἁγαθά ὅταν τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύξομαι· ἀπετέ οὖδ᾽ εἰ με νῦν ὑμεῖς ἀφίσετε Ἀνύφω ἀποτήρισεν, ὅς εἰ

29 not expressed. — τὸν θάνατον οὖδ᾽ εἰ: by prolepsis for οὖν εἰ δ᾽ ἔδοκεν, not even whether, i.e. whether death may not actually be. Thus he is as far as possible from knowing that death is the greatest of harms. For a fuller statement, cf. 37 b. See on τοῦ θανάτου, 28 e, for the use of the art.

15. δὲν: here, as usual, in the gender of ἁγάθων, which is implied in the pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἁγάθων.

17. τούτῳ: not in the gender of ἁμαθία. This makes a smoother sent. than αὕτη πάσιν οὐκ ἁμαθία ἦστιν αὕτη ἦν, which was the alternative. —

b αὕτη ἡ ἐπονείδιστος: that very same reprehensible, limiting ἁμαθία and recalling the whole statement made above, 21 b—23 e.

19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ δὲν: repeated for the greater effect. Both represent the same point of superiority, i.e. διὰ της. Notice the cleverness of the ellipsis after ἄν. Socrates thus evades any too circumstantial praise of himself. For the ellipsis in the leading clause, see on ἡ . . . ἄκων, 25 e. —

καὶ ἐνταῦθα: here too.

20. εἰ δὲ: if really, i.e. if, as the oracle suggests.

21. οὐκ εἰδὼς . . . οὖτω: i.e. δοκεῖ οὐκ οἴδα . . . οὖτω. οὐτως sums up a previous partic. clause, and its force is nearly so likewise. Cf. Men. 80 e, ταύτῃ μᾶλλον αὕτω ἀκορων οὖτω καὶ τούς ἄλλους ἀπορεῖν τοῖς.

24. ἄν . . . ἐστιν: a notable instance of assimilation. G. 153; H. 994. See on ἄν εἰ δ᾽ ἄτι κακῶν διὰ των, 37 b. κακὰ is related to ἄν as ἁγαθά in the next line is related to αὕτη.

—οἴδα εἰ: see on τοῦ θανάτου κτδ., above a.

26. εἰ ἀφίσετε . . . εἰ οὖν ἀφίστε, εἰσώμαι ἀφίστε: the speaker weakens εἰ νῦν ἀφίσετε (if you are now ready to acquit me) by the explanatory detail of εἰ μοι εἰσώμαι and by various reiterations of the conditions upon which this release may be granted, until the weaker clause εἰ ἀφίσετε comes of itself to his lips as all that is left of the more positively worded prot. with which he began. — ἀποτήρισσεν: conveys the idea of disregarding rather than that of disbelieving. This meaning
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εφὴ ἡ τὴν ἀρχὴν οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύρο εἰσέλθεω ἦ, ἐπεὶ δὴ 29 εἰσῆλθον, οὐχ οἶδον τε ἐσαι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτεῖναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὡς, εἰ διαφευγόμην, ἢδη ἂν ὑμῶν οἱ νεῖες 30 ἐπιτήδευσατε ἡ Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπασι διαφθαρήσουσατ—εἰ μοὶ πρὸς ταῦτα εἰσοῦσι· ὦ Σώκρατε, νῦν μὲν Ἀντίω ὅ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμέν σε, ἐπὶ τοῦτο μέντοι ἐπὶ ἀκεχείται ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ζητήσει διατρίβεις μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖς· εάν δὲ ἄλλως ἐπὶ τοῦτο πράττων, 35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν με, ὅπερ ἐσοῦ, ἐπὶ τοῦτος ἀφίοντο, τι εἴπομι' ἂν ὑμῖν ὅτι ἐγὼ ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖαι, ἀστάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισόμαι δὲ μᾶλλον τῷ θεῷ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐσπερῶ ἂν ἐμπνεύσω καὶ οἶδο τε ὅ, ὅν μη πανθομαι φιλοσόφων καὶ ὑμῖν παρακελεύομένοις τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύομεν ὅτι ἂν ἐργάζομαι ὑμῖν, λέγων ὀλίπερ εἰσώθα, ὅτι, ὅ

29 of ἀποστιῶν is not uncommon in Plato. Cf. Laws, 941 c, ὅ μὲν οὖν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ ἐστί καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἀπαντάντων ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ἑπτά τοι, ταῦτα τοῖς ἑπτά τοι, ἄκηκαν καὶ ἐπανέκτησαν τοι. See Intro. 70 with the note. Meletus probably argues: “If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies.”

29. εἰ διαφευγόμην: fut. opt. in indir. disc. GMT. 26; 69, 1; H. 855 a. — ἐν... διαφθαρήσουσατ: an uncommon apod. GMT. 37, 2, κ. 1; H. 845. See App.

33. ἐφ᾽ ὅτε: for const. with inf., see GMT. 99; H. 990 a.

35. οὖν: after a digression.

36. ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι: a fictitious apostrophe. Cf. Dem. viii. 35, εἰ οἷς 'Ελληνες ἐρωσθέντες ὑμᾶς, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πέμπτε ὅτι ἡμᾶς ἐκάκτησαν πρεσβεῖς κτδ. See App. — ἀπάξωσάν μι καὶ φιλῶ: you have my friendship and my love, but, etc. ἀπάξωσάν μι designates the greeting of friends. Cf. Od. iii. 34-35, where Nestor and his sons see Telemachus and Mentes, ἀδρόοι ἤλθον ἀπαντάντες, ἢ χερσίν τῇ ἁπάστοκτο καὶ ἐφοράσαν ἀγώνων. Cf. also Il. x. 542, τοι δὲ χαρέντες δὲ εἰ ἴῃ ἡ ἁπάστοκτο ἐπούσας καὶ νειληψίσας.

37. πεισόμαι: cf. Acts iv. 19, ὅ δὲ Πέτρος καὶ Ἡλεάντης ἀποκραθήσετε εἰσοῦ τοῦτον· εἰ δικαίων ἐςτιν ἐναίοιν (in the sight) τοῦ θεοῦ, ὑμῶν ἀκούειν μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ κρίνατε, ἰδι. ν. 28, πειθαρχεῖν (obey) δὲ καὶ τοῦθε ἁνάρτησον.

38. οὖ μὴ παύσωμαι: see on οὖν κτδ., 28 a. For οὖ μὴ with the subj. in strong denials, see GMT. 89, 1; H. 1032.
ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖοι ὡν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εἰδοκομοτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν, χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ἀισχύνει ἐπιμελούμενος ὁπως σοι ἐσται ὃς πλείστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονίσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ψυχῆς ὅπως ὃς βελτίστη ἐσται οὐκ ἐπιμελεί οὐδὲ φροντίζεις; καὶ εάν τις ὑμῶν ἄμφισβητη καὶ φη ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, οὐκ εὑροὶ ἀφήσων αὐτῶς οὐδὲ ἀπεμι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρήσομαι αὐτὸν, καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εάν μοι μὴ δοκῇ κεκτῆσθαι ἁρέτην, φάναι δὲ, οὐνειδῶ ὅτι τὰ πλείσταν ἄξια περὶ ἕλα-50 χίςτον ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείονος. ταῦτα 30 καὶ νεωτέρο καὶ πρεσβυτέρω, ὅτι ἐν ἐνυγγάνω, ποιησώ, καὶ ἐξήν καὶ ἀστῷ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῖς ἀστοῖς, ὡς μοι ἐγγυ-
of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The corre-
30 a

tion of ὅσον readily suggests itself with μᾶλλον. Cf. the same case, 39 d.
Cf. Euthyph. 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεότερος γέ
, γνώριμον ἐι οὖν ἐκ λατανίαν ἀνθρώπον ὃς ἐκ τῆς ἴσης ἡμερῶν.

5. τὴν τῷ θεῷ ὑπηρέταιν: see on δῦναι, Crit. 60 e, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ ὁμολογεῖ, 23 c; cf. also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ὅσιν οὖν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέφηλα ἐκτιμήσεως, 18 b. ὑπηρέταιν takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, e.g. Cic. de Legg. i. 15, 42, Quod si iustitiae est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populum, etc.

58. πρότερον: sc. ἦ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ὃς τῆς ψυ-

59. ψυχῆς. μὴν is not a third specification with μήτη...μητέ. It serves only to connect οὗτα σφόδρα with πρότερον, and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

60. εἰ ἀρετὴ χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and the mending of his fortunes; this is ἀρετή (skill in the art of right living), i.e. wisdom (σοφία). See on εἰς σοφίαν, 29 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the so-

b

φιστής Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαιμονίας διδάσκαλος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἐξε-

all οὐκ ἐπήρεσθαι, λέγω! οὖν εἰ ἀρετὴν ἔχεις ἀρετὴ γίγνεται,

all ἀλλ' εἰ ἀρετῆς χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄγαθα τοῖς ἀνθρώ-

ποις ἀπαντᾷ καὶ ἔφη καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα
κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ύπομείναι, ὡστε ἐπειδή 28 εἶπεν ἡ μήτηρ αὐτῶ-προθυμομένη ἑκτορά ἀποκτείναι, θεὸς οὖσα, οὐτωσὶ πως, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι. ὡ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρ-σείς Πατρόκλων τῷ ἑταίρῳ τοῦ φόνου καὶ ἑκτορά ἀποκτε-νεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ. αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ’ ἑκτορά πότιμος ἐτοίμος. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τοῦ μὲν 25 θανάτου καὶ τοῦ κινδύνου ὀλιγῳργησε, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον δείσας τὸ ξῆν κακὸς ὁν καὶ τῶν φίλων μὴ τιμωρεῖν, αὐτίκα, φησί, τεθναῖην δίκην ἐπιθεῖς τῷ ἀδικοῦντι, ἣν μὴ ἐνθάδε μείω καταγελάστος παρὰ νήνοι κορώνιων ἀχθος ἀροῦρης. μὴ αὐτῶν οἰει φροντίσαι θανάτον καὶ 30 κινδύνου; οὕτω γὰρ ἔχει, ὡ ἅγιος Ἀθηναίοι, τῇ ἁληθείᾳ. οὐ γὰρ τὶς ἐαντοῦ τέξει ἡ ἑγγοσάμενος βέλτιστον εἶναι ἡ ὑπ’

c very telling. The enthusiasm with which all Greeks regarded this hero was shown by temples raised in his honor and by countless works of art in which he appeared. Homer, Od. xi. 489, tells how Achilles found his favored condition in the lower world hardly to be endured. The post-homeric story-tellers said that he was living in the islands of the Blest. Cf. Symp. 179 c, where this same scene between Thetis and Achilles is quoted, and the scholion (Bergk 10) to Harmodius:—

No, sweet Harmodius, thou art not dead, But in the Islands of the Blest men say, Where lives swift-foot Achilles far away, And Tydeus' son, they say, brave Diomed.

We hear that Ibycus, and after him Simonides, wishing no doubt to make Achilles's happiness complete, represented him as married to Medea in Elysium.

21. θεὸς οὖσα: added in a very unusual way, because the circumstance has unusual weight. The utterance of Thetis was not only prompted by the natural anxiety of a mother for her son, but also was inspired by the unerring wisdom of a goddess. Cf. Hom. Od. iv. 309 and 408, θεοὶ δὲ τῇ πάντα ἔσαιν. The passage from Hom. II. xviii. 70 ff., is quoted rather loosely in part (οὕτωι πως), and partly word for word.

24. ὁ δὲ ταῦτα ἀκούσας κτλ.: at this point ὡστε is forgotten. The long speech and explanation given to Thetis makes this break in the const. very natural. In fact, this clause is as independent as if a co-ord. clause (with or without μὲν) had preceded it.—τοῦ θανάτου: notice the exceptional use of the art., which is usually omitted with θανάτος as an abstract noun. Cf. 28 e, 29 a, 32 c, 38 c, 39 a, b, Crit. 52 c. For the art. used as here, cf. 29 a, 40 d, 41 c.

29. μὴ...οἷς: see on ἀλλ᾽ ἢ, 25 a. c

31. ἡ ὑπ᾽ ἀρχόντος ταχθή: instead of ἡ ὑπ᾽ ἀρχόντος κελευσθῆς or even ταχθῆς. Some such expression is called for grammatically by the form of the first alternative ἡ ἑγγοσάμενος
αρχοντος ταχθη, ενταῦθα δει, ως εμοι δοκει, μενοντα κιν- 28
dυνεν μηδεν υπολογιζομενον μητε θανατου μητε άλλο
μηδεν προ του αισχρου.

XVII. Εγω ουν δεναι αν ειην ειργασμενοι, ω ανδρες

κτε. This irregular interjection of the finite const. represents the facts better. The commander’s order, if given at all, was peremptory, and requires a more positive statement than the less urgent ηγησιμεος κτε. In the sense υν’ αρχοντος ταχθη is the alternative of ειαντων ταξιν. See App.

33. υπολογιζομενον: as in ια above, υπολογιζεσθαι means take into account, i.e. in striking a balance. Cf. Crit. 48 δ, where nearly the same idea is expressed. For a detailed description of the process of striking a balance involved in υπολογιζεσθαι, cf. Phaedr. 231 ι, οι μυν έρωτες σκο- πουσιν δεκακες διεθνος . . . και δ πεποιηκασιν οι, και δα έλευθον πολον προστιθεντες ηγούνται παλαι την δεξιαν άποδεικνυαν χαρι τοις ερωμενοις.

τοις δε μη έρωσιν ουτε την των οικειων άξιεινι δια τοιτο έστι προφασιζεσθαι ουτε τοις παντελονθενος πονοις υπολογιζεσθαι κτε. The force of υστε here is very near to that of κατι, and, so far from primarily indicating a process of subtraction, it involves first of all an addition.

34. προ του αισχρου: moral turpi- tude (τυρπε), not death, was the harm which Socrates struggled to avoid at any and every price. Cf. 20 β and Soph. Ant. 95 ff.,

Nay, leave me and my heart’s untoward plan
To suffer all thou fear’st; naught will I suffer
That shall estop me from a righteous death.

XVII. Having established the propo- sition that disgrace is more fright- ful than death, Socrates can now answer the question of 28 β, if he can prove that it would have involved, and would still involve, disgrace for him not to have followed the pursuit which has brought him in danger of his life. This point he makes clear by an appeal to the analogy of military discipline, which, as he claims, applies to his relations to the gods. He is a soldier in the army of Apollo.

1. δεναι αν ειην . . . άλοιμα την τα- δεν: much here depends upon disen- tangling past, pres., and fut. See GMT. 55, 3, Rem. The prot. (limiting the apod. δεναι αν ειην κτε, lit. I should prove to have done a dreadful thing) includes various acts in the past which are looked upon from a supposed time in the fut. It falls into two parts: one, marked off by μεν, states (in the form of a supposition) well-known facts in the past; the other, distinguished by δε, states a supposed future case in connexion with certain present circum- stances. See on 5. The outra- geous conduct for him would be with this combination of facts and convic- tions, after his past fidelity to human trusts, at some fut. time to desert his divinely appointed post of duty: if while then I stood firm I should now desert my post. The repetition of μεν and δε respectively is for the sake of clearness. For the same repetition cf. Isocr. vii. 18, παρ ρ’ οις μεν γαρ
μητε φυλακη μητε ζημια των τοιοτων καθεσθηκε μεθ’ αλειψεις ακριβεις εισιν, παρα το τοιτοι μεν διαφορετεσθαι και τας επεικεις των φθοςων, δε ου δε μητε λαθει τοις αδικουσι βεβαιως έστι μεθε
φανεροι γενομενοι συγκωνως τυχειν,
'Αθηναῖοι, εἰ, ὅτε μὲν με οἱ ἄρχοντες ἐτάτον, οὐς ὑμεῖς ἔπειλεν ἄρχειν μου, καὶ ἐν Ποτιδαῖᾳ καὶ ἐν 'Αμφιπόλει καὶ ἐν ταῖς κακοπεθείσαι, for (they knew) that while among those who have neither established safeguards nor penalties for such crimes nor any strict organization of justice, that while among these, I say, even righteous characters are corrupted; at the same time, where wrong-doers find it easy neither to conceal their transgressions nor to secure condonation when detected, there I say (they knew that) evil dispositions end by dying out. Cf. also Gorg. 512 a. Notice that the μὲν clause is important only with reference to the δὲ clause, upon which the main stress is laid; the δὲ clause is made prominent through the contrast afforded by the logically subordinate μὲν clause. This same relation is indicated in the Eng., French, and German idiom by the use of some word like “while” in the μὲν clause.

2. οἱ ἄρχοντες: not the nine archons, but, as the context shows, the generals in command upon the field of battle. — ὑμεῖς ἔλεος: the δικασταὶ are here taken as representing the whole ἄνδρας, from which they were selected by lot. See Intro. 66. Perhaps Socrates has also in mind the other Athenians present at the trial. See on 24 e and 25 a. The generals were elected by show of hands (χειροτονία) and their electors were the εκκλησιασταὶ. Cf. 25 a.

3. ἐν Ποτιδαῖᾳ . . . Δηλὼ: Potidaea, a Corinthian colony on the peninsula Chalcidice, which became a tributary ally of Athens without wholly abandoning its earlier connexion with Corinth. Perdiccas, king of Macedonia, took advantage of this divided allegiance to persuade the Potidaeans to revolt from Athens, which they did in 432 B.C. The Potidaeans, with the reinforcements sent them by the Peloponnesians, were defeated by the Athenian force under Callias. For two whole years the town was invested by land and blockaded by sea, and finally made favorable terms with the beleaguering force. In the engagement before the siege of Potidaea, Socrates saved Alcibiades's life. Cf. Symp. 219 e–220 e, where Alcibiades gives a most enthusiastic and witty account of the bravery and self-denial of Socrates during the whole Potidaean campaign, and says of the battle in question: ὅτε γὰρ ἡ μάχη ἤν εἶ (after) ἦν ἐμοὶ καὶ τάρατσια (the prize for gallantry in action) ἔδωκαν οἱ στρατηγοὶ, οὐδὲς ἄλλος ἦμεν θαυμασθῆναι ἄνθρωπον ἢ οὕτως, τετραμελέον (when I was wounded) οὐκ ἔθελον ἀπολιθεῖν, ἀλλὰ συνδιεσώσας καὶ τὰ ὀπλα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐμε. Alcibiades says that Socrates ought to have had the prize which was given to himself by favoritism. Cf. Charm. 153 b c. — The battle at Amphipolis, an Athenian colony on the Strymon in Thrace, took place in the year 422. The Athenians were defeated, and their general, Cleon, perished in the rout, while Brasidas, the Spartan general, paid for victory with his life. — Delium was an enclosure and a temple sacred to Apollo in Boeotia near Oropus, a border town sometimes held by the Athenians and sometimes by the Boeotians. The battle, which was a serious check to the power of Athens, resulted in the defeat and death of their general, Hippocrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 4, ἐδο ἦ τε σὺν Τομιδῷ τῶν χιλίων ἐν Δε-
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5 άλλος τις και ἐκκυδύνευον ἀποθαναίων, τού δὲ θεού τάττοντος,
οὐς ἔγω φήσθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον, φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζήν
καὶ ἐξετάζοντα ἐμαυτόν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐνταῦθα δὲ φοβηθείς
ἡ βάναυσιν ἡ ἄλλο ὁπωδὶ πράγμα λίποιμι τὴν τάξιν. 29
dενὸν τάν εἰς, καὶ οὐς ἀληθῶς τότε ἀν μὲ δικαίως εἰσάγοι
tις εἰς δικαστήριον, ὅτι οὐ νομίζω θεοὺς εἶναι ἀπείδου
τῇ μαντείᾳ καὶ δεδομένῳ βάναυσι καὶ οἴομενοι σοφός εἶναι
οὐκ ὅν. τό γὰρ τοῦ βάναυσι δεδείναι, ὡς ἀνδρεῖς, οὐδὲν
ἄλλο ἐστιν ἡ δοκεῖν σοφόν εἶναι μὴ ὅντα· δοκεῖν γὰρ
eιδέναι ἐστιν ἃ οὐκ οἴδει. οἷδε μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς τοῦ βάνα-

28 Βαδεῖλε συμφορὰ γένετο καὶ ἡ μεθ᾽ Ἰπποκράτους ἐξὶ Δηλίῳ, ἐκ τοῦ
tοῦ τεταπείνωσαι (has been hum-
bled) μὲν ἡ τὰν Ἀθηναίων πρὸς τοὺς
Βοωτοὺς κτέ. Notice that both Plato
and Xen. say ἐξ (not ἐν) Δηλίῳ, be-
cause at the time there was no ex-
tended settlement at or near the place.
For the gallantry of Socrates in the
retreat, cf. Symp. 221 a b. Alcibiades
was mounted, and therefore could ob-
serve better than at Potidæa how
Socrates behaved, and he says: άξιον
ἂν θεάσασθαι Σώκρατης, ὅτε καὶ Δηλίου
φυγῇ ἀνεχᾶτο τὸ στρατόπεδον... πρῶ-
tον μὲν δον περὶ Λάρισας (his com-
panion in flight) τῷ ἐμφρῷν εἶναι:
ἐπειτα ἥλιος ὄν... ὅτι ἡ τὶς ἐψηταί
τοῦτον τοῦ ἄνδρος, μᾶλα ἐρμηνεύον ἀμ-
νεῖται. See also the similar testimony
of Laches in Lach. 181 b.

4. ἔμενον καὶ ἐκκυδύνευον ἀποθαναίων: The repeated allusions which are scat-
tered through Plato’s dialogues to the
brave conduct of Socrates in these
battles show that it was well known
at Athens. — δισέρ καὶ ἄλλος τις:
just like many another man. He is
careful not to make too much of the
facts. The indef. tis here means
some, i.e. any indefinite person, be-
cause many persons are thought of
under ἄλλος.

5. τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος: i.e. now
that my post is assigned me by the god,
a circumstance of the supposition ἐλ
λίποιμι, which is repeated in ἐνταῦθα.

6. ὡς ἔγω φήσθην τε καὶ ὑπέλαβον:
as I thought and understood, sc. when
I heard the oracle which was given
to Chaerophon. — δείν: depends on
the force of commanding in τάττοντος.
Apollo gives him an injunction, to
the effect that he must live, etc.

8. λίποιμι τῆν τάξιν: so worded as
to suggest λιποταξία γραφή, a tech-
ical phrase of criminal law. Any one
convicted of λιποταξία forfeited his
civil rights, i.e. suffered ᾀτιμα.

9. τάν: τό, truly, emphasizes this
repetition of the strong statement
which begins the chapter.

14. ὁ οὖν οἴδει: sc. ὁ δοκεῖν ἐδεικνύει,
i.e. the same indef. subj. which is to be
thought of with the preceding infs.
Cf. below b, and 39 d. As a rule, the
third person, when it means vaguely
any one (the French on) or anything, is
15 τον οὖν' εἰ τυγχάνει σὺν ἄνθρώπῳ πάντων μέγιστον δι' 29
tῶν ἁγαθῶν, δεδιαστ' ὅ' ὡς εἰ εἰδότες οτι μέγιστον τῶν
κακῶν ἐστὶ. καὶ τούτῳ πώς οὖν ἁμαθία ἐστίν αὕτη ἢ 20
ἐπονειδιστος ἢ τον οἰκεσθαι εἰδέναι ἃ οὐκ ὁδεγ.; ἡγώ δ', ὁ
ἀνδρες, τούτῳ καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἵνας διαφέρω τῶν πολλῶν ἁν-
θρώπων, καὶ εἰ δή τω σοφώτερος τῶν φαίην, εἰναι, τούτῳ 25
ἀν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰδότις ἱκανός περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδον οὕτω καὶ οἰο-
μαι οὖν εἰδέναι. το δὲ ἄδικων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τῷ βελτίων,
καὶ θεῷ καὶ ἄνθρώπωι, ὅτι κακῶν καὶ ἀισχρῶν ἐστιν οἶδα.
ὑπὸ οὖν τῶν κακῶν δι' οἴδα ὅτι κακά ἐστιν, ἢ μή οἴδα εἰ
25 ἁγαθά ὄντα τυγχάνει οὐδέποτε φοβήσομαι οὐδὲ φεύγωμαι.

29 not expressed.—τὸν θανατόν οὖν' εἰ: 20. νῦν 
by prolepsis for οὖν' εἰ ὁ θανατός, not
even whether, i.e. whether death may
not actually be. Thus he is as far
as possible from knowing that death
is the greatest of harms. For a fuller
statement, cf. 37 b. See on τὸν θανα-
τόν, 28 c, for the use of the art.
15. δι': here, as usual, in the
17. τούτῳ: not in the gender of
genre of ἁγαθῶν, which is implied in the
 JNIEnv of ἁμαθία. This makes a smoother sent.
pred. μέγιστον τῶν ἁγαθῶν.
than αὕτη πὼς ἁμαθία ἐστίν αὕτη
19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἁν: repeated for
κτῆ, which was the alternative.—
the greater effect. Both represent
b αὕτη ἢ ἐπονειδιστος: that very same
the same point of superiority, i.e. δι' κτῆ.
reprehensible, limiting ἁμαθία and re-
Notice the cleverness of the
calling the whole statement made
ellipsis after ἁν. Socrates thus evades
above, 21 b–23 c.
any too circumstantial praise of him-
19. τούτῳ, τούτῳ ἁν: repeated for
self. For the ellipse in the leading
the greater effect. Both represent
the same point of superiority, i.e. δι' κτῆ.
the idea of disregarding rather than
the clause, see on ἄν... ἀκον, 25 e.—
that of disbeliefing. This meaning
καὶ ἐνταῦθα: here too.
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ἐφ' ἂν τὴν ἄρχην οὐ δεῖν ἐμὲ δεύτερο εἰσελθέων ἃ, ἐπειδὴ 29 εἰσήλθοι, οὐχ οἶδον τε εἶναι τὸ μὴ ἀποκτείναι με, λέγων πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅσ, ἐι διαφευγόμην, ὡδ' ἄν ὑμῶν οἱ νυεῖς 30 ἐπιτίθεναι τὰς Σωκράτης διδάσκει πάντες παντάπισι διαφθαρήσονται — εἰ μοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐίσοντε μοί. Σώκρατες, νῦν μὲν Ἀνύξω οὐ πεισόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἀφίεμεν σε, ἐπὶ τούτῳ μέντοι ἐφ' ὕπτε μηκέτι ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ἤτησίς διατριβεῖν μηδὲ φιλοσοφεῖν· εάν δὲ ἀλών, ἐπὶ τούτῳ πράττων, 35 ἀποθανεῖ· εἰ οὖν μὲν, ὅπερ ἐίσον, ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀφίοντε, ἀ εἴποι μ' ἄν ὑμῖν ὃτι ἐγώ ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίαι, ἀσπάζομαι μὲν καὶ φιλῶ, πεισομαί δὲ μᾶλλον τῇ θεῷ ἡ ὑμῖν, καὶ ἐσωπερ ἄν ἐμπνεύς καὶ οἶδος τε ὃ, οὐ μὴ παύσωμαι φιλοςοφήν καὶ ὑμῶν παρακελεύομένος τε καὶ ἐνδεικνύομεν 40 ότι ἄν ἄει ἐνυχάνων ὑμῶν, λέγων οὔτε ἐισόμη, ὅτι, δὲ

of ἀπετείνεται not uncommon in Plato. Cf. Laws, 941 c, ὃ μὲν ὁν πεισθεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ λόγῳ εὐτυχεῖ τε καὶ εἰς χρόνον ἐπικαὶ, ὃ δὲ ἀπετέθεα τῷ μετὰ ταῦτα τοιῷ τινι μαχίζοντα νῦμῳ. 27. οὐ δεῖν, οὖν τε ἂναί: in the original form this would be οὖν ἐδει καὶ οὖν οἶδον τε ἐστιν. GMT. 15, 3, H. 853 a. — εἰσελθείν: on this use of εἰσερχεῖαι, see Intr. 70 with the note. Meletus probably argues: "If Socrates had not been prosecuted, his evil communications might have been ignored; once in court, his case allows but one verdict. To acquit him is to sanction all his heresies."


33. ἐφ' ὑπτε: for const. with inf., see GMT. 99; H. 990 a.
35. οὖν: after a digression.

36. ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίαι: a fictitious apostrophe. Cf. Dem. viii. 35, εἰ οἱ Ἑλληνες ἐρωτεθμήν ὑμᾶς, ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίαι, πέμπετε ὃ ἡ ἡμᾶς ἐκάστωτε πρίσμβεις κτέ. See App.—ἀσπάζομαι καὶ φιλῶ: you have my friendship and my love, but, etc. ἀσπάζεσθαι designates the greeting of friends. Cf. Od. iii. 34–35, where Nestor and his sons see Telemachus and Mentes, ἀρνόθ θηδον ἄπαντες, χερσιν τ' ἡ σάκοντο καὶ ἑρδαιαθαι ἄνων. Cf. also II. x. 542, δι' ἔρεντερ δὲ ξείος ἠπάντο εἰσε ἐπεσεῖ τε μειλιχοῦν.


38. οὗ μὴ παύσωμαι: see on οὐδὲν κτέ., 28 a. For οὗ μη with the subj. in strong denials, see GMT. 89, 1; H. 1032.
ἀριστε ἀνδρῶν, Ἀθηναῖος ὄν, πόλεως τῆς μεγίστης καὶ εὐδοκιμωτάτης εἰς σοφίαν καὶ ἱσχύν, χρημάτων, ἢν αἰσχύνη-ἐπιμελούμενος σώμα σοι ἦσταί ὡς πλεῖστα καὶ δόξης καὶ τιμῆς, φρονήσεως δὲ καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ τῆς ἐν ψυχῆς ὑπὸ ψυχῆς ἄκτιστη ἦσταν ὡς επιμελείσθησαν. καὶ οὐκ ἠδυνατή, ἀφήσωμεν αὐτῶν ἄπειμι, ἀλλ' ἐρήσωμαι αὐτῶν καὶ ἐξετάσω καὶ ἐλέγξω, καὶ εἲ αὐτοὶ μὴ δοκήσαν χαίρειν, φαίναι δὲ, οὐκετὶ ὅτι τὰ πλεῖστον ἄξια περὶ ἐλα-χίστου ποιεῖται, τὰ δὲ φαυλότερα περὶ πλείστον. ταύτα καὶ νεωτέροι καὶ πρεσβυτέροι, ὅτως ἄν ἐντυγχάνω, ποιησόμεθα καὶ ἐξερχόμεθα καὶ ἀστῶ, μάλλον δὲ τοὺς ἀστοῖς, ὡς μοι ἐγγυ-
τέρω ἐστὶ γένει. ταῦτα γὰρ κελεύει ὁ θεός, εὐ ἰστε, καὶ ἔγω οἷομαι οὐδὲν ποι ὡς μεῖον ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι εἰν τῇ
55 πόλει ἡ τῆν ἐμὴν τῷ θεῷ υπηρεσίαν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο πράττων ἐγὼ περιέρχομαι ἡ πείθων ῥμῶν καὶ νεωτέρων
καὶ πρεσβυτέρων. μήτε σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μήτε χρη-
μάτων προτερον μηδὲ οὕτω σφόδρα ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς ὅπως ὃ
(ὡς ἄριστη) ἐσται, λέγων· οὐκ ἐκ χρημάτων ἄρετή γίγνεται,
60 ἀλλ' ἐκ ἄρετής χρήματα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἀγαθὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἀπαντά καὶ ἱδία καὶ δημοσία. εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα

30 of Socrates insensibly returns to his hearers, in whom he sees embodied the whole people of Athens. The cor-
30 a

 face readily suggests itself 11th μᾶλλον. Cf. the same case, 39 d.
Cf. Euthyphr. 12 c, καὶ μὴν νεωτέρος γε ἵνα εἰ οὐκ ἔλατον ἡ δαίμον ὑφότερος.
15. τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ υπηρεσίαν: see on δοκιμάζειν, Crit. 50 c, and contrast τοῦ θεοῦ λατρείαν, 23 c; cf. also τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσιν ὧν, d below; see also on τὰ μετέωρα φροντισθῆς, 18 b. ὑπηρεσία takes the same dat. of interest which is found with the verb from which it is derived. The Lat. idiom is the same, e.g. Cic. de Legg. i. 15. 42, Quod si iustitia est obtemperatio scriptis legibus institutisque populum, etc.

58. πρότερον: sc. ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς, which has to be supplied out of ἀς τῆς ψυ-
χῆς. μηδὲ is not a third specification with μήτε ... μήτε. It serves only to connect οὕτω σφόδρα with πρότερον,
and is neg. only because the whole idea is neg.

60. ἐκ ἄρετῆς χρήματα: the foundation of real prosperity is laid in the character; the best of windfalls is natural good sense sharpened by experience; this is the making of your successful man's character, and

b

the mending of his fortunes; this is ἄρετή (skill in the art of right living), i.e. wisdom (σοφία). See on eἰς σοφίαν,
20 d. Such is in substance Socrates's theory of getting on in the world, which may be gathered from Xenophon's Memorabilia in many places: see (i. 6) his defence against the σο-
φιοτῆς Antiphon, who accuses him of being κακοδαίμων ὄνταρχος; (ii. 5) his hint to a parsimonious friend, ἐξο-
τάζειν ψυχήν ὑπόστου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη; (ii. 6. 22–25) his analysis of what makes a καλὸς τῷ κἀγαθῷ (gentleman),
where of all such he says, δῶναιντα ποιεῖται (fusting) καὶ διψώσεις ἄλλωσ
σίτου καὶ ποτοῦ κουνεῖν ... δῶναιντα
d καὶ χρημάτων οὐ μόνον τοῖς πλεονε-
κτεῖν (selfish greed) ἀπεχόμενον, νομίζως
(righteously) κουνεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαρκεῖν
ἀλήθειας; and see particularly (ii. 7, 8,
9, and 10) the success which his practi-
cal advice brought to his friends Aris-
tarchus, Euthéras, Crito, and Diodo-
rus in their various difficulties. For a full elaboration of Socrates's rule of right living in the abstract, see his conversation on ἐν πράσινω with young Callias, τῷ Ἀρτέμιδω μεσάκιοι, Euthyd. 278 e–282 d, where Cleinias is startled to learn that σοφία is ἐνυχία (good-
luck). The gods endow us with such
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταῦτα ἀν εἴη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ 30
tίς μὲ φήσιν ἀλλὰ λέγει ἡ ταῦτα, οὐδὲν λέγει. τίρος
tαῦτα, φαίην ἂν; δ’ Ἀθηναίοι, ἡ πείθεσθε Ἀνύτῳ ἡ μῆ, 65
καὶ ἡ ἁφίητε ἡ μὴ ἁφίετε, ὡς ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἂν ποιήσοντος
ἀλλα, οὐδ’ εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλλὰ ἐμμεί-
vνατέ μοι οἰς ἐδεήθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖν ἐφ’ οἰς ἂν λέγων,
ἀλλ’ ἀκούειν· καὶ γὰρ, ὡς ἐγὼ σοίμαι, ἀνήσεσθε ἀκούοντες.
μέλλω γὰρ οὖν ἄτα ὑμῖν ἔρειν καὶ ἀλλα, ἐφ’ οἰς ἰσως

common sense as we have, Enkaph. 15 a, Rep. ii. 300 d, 375 c-e, 379 b c; 30
we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, Rep. x. 013, 017 e.

62. ταῦτα ἂν εἴη βλαβερά: this ταῦτα, 66. πολλάκις: many times or many
call this, covers more ground than the ἁφίητε above. The first means what
tαῦτα above. The first means what 66. deaths. The Eng. idiom like the
Socrates says, the second means that Greek requires no definite στ. ὁ θανά-
and also the fact that he says it. 66. ὁμίον. A certain period then in
“If this corrupts the youth, my prac-
"to die a hundred" 66. In certain cases in Greek as
tice in saying it would do harm; but in Eng. a large number is specified.
the truth cannot corrupt them, there-
Cf. ἄκηκος μυριάκις ἄγῳ βούλωμι, 6. 63.
fore my speaking it can do no harm. 66. Demonstheles not
To prove that I am a corrupter of the 63. τρεῖσαμενος, quoted from Χ. of Α.
youth, you must prove that I have 3. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes does
said something else; that cannot be 63. τρεῖσαμενος, quoted from Χ. of Α.
proved, for it is not true.” With ei 3. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenes not
63. πρὸς ταῦτα: wherefore. 64. ὡς ἐμοὶ κτέ.: knowing that I
65. ὡς ἐμοὶ κτέ.: knowing that I should never alter my ways. 6. 65.
in apod. with ἄν, see GMT. 54, 1 b; 66
ποιήσω τοῖς ἀν ἐρόειν, cf. ei ὠφελοῦσιν,
H. 901 a. 30
25 b, where see note.

63. pro's tauta: wherefore.
65. ows emo kte: knowing that I
in apod. with ean, see GMT. 54, 1b; 30
should never alter my ways. poihsow
H. 901 a.
30 tois ean eroin, cf. ei ofelousin,
66. pollakis: many times or many
c tois plesw isedshe. 30
25b, where see note.
63. pro's tauta: wherefore.
65. ows emo kte: knowing that I
30
should never alter my ways. poihsow
H. 901 a.
30
tois ean eroin, cf. ei ofelousin,
66. pollakis: many times or many
c
tois plesw isedshe. 30
5 βοήσεσθε· ἀλλὰ μηδὲν όποιεῖ τούτο. εὖ γάρ ἢστε, 30 ἕαν ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε τοιοῦτον ὄντα οἶκον ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μείζω βλάψετε ἢ ὑμᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψεις οὐτε Μέλητος οὔτε Ἄνυτος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν δύναντο· οὔ γὰρ οἶομαι θεμιτὸν· ἐμαῖν ἀμείονον ἂνδρὶ ὑπὸ χεῖρονος ἂ
10 βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνως μεντὰν ὅσως ἢ ἐξελάσειεν ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν· ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὕτως μὲν ὅσως οἴσται καὶ ἄλλος τίς που μεγάλα κακᾶ, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ οἴομαι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιῶν ἂ οὕτως ὑπὶ ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἄδικος ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτηνύναι· νῦν οὖν, ὃ ἂνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πολλοῦ δὲν
15 ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαρτοῦ ἀπολογεῖσθαι, ὡς τίς ἂν οἴοτο, ἄλλῳ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, μη τι ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τήν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσων ὑμῖν ἐμοὶ καταψηφισάμην. ἐὰν γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτείνητε, ε

30 times already. The third γάρ, now, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γάρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after ἐνθείας, and in general after any prefatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, 20 e. γάρ with this force is esp. freq. after δὲ (τοῦ δὲ) μεγίστου, δεινότατον, also after σημείων δὲ, τεκμήριον δὲ and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. βοήσεσθα: this is more than a disturbance (θορυβεῖν); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτὸν ἀμείονι ἂνδρὶ βλάπτεσθα: cf. 21 b. θεμιτὸς takes the dat., and, after the analogy of ἔξεστιν, an inf. (βλάπτεσθα) is added. The pass. βλάπτεσθαι makes this const. appear more unusual than e.g. in Phaedo, 67 b, μὴ καθαρῷ (unclean) γὰρ καθαρῷ ἐφάπτεσθαι μὴ ώθενθεί. For the import of the words θέμιος and θεμιτὸν, see on 21 g, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνως μεντὰν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειεν: ἀποκτείνως is used here secondarily of the δικασταῖ and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. ἀτιμία involved the forfeiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the ἀτιμος was looked upon by the state as dead, i.e. he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. Cf. Rep. viii. 553 b, εἰς δικαστήριον ἐμτεσάντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποθανόντα ἢ ἐκτεθήντα ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τῆν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. See App.

11. ἄλλος τίς που: many other. See on ἄλλος, 28 e.

15. ἂν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν: cf. Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, Euthyph. 5 d c, εἴ ἢδε εἰμὶ ἐπιχειρήσει (ὁ Μέλητος), εὐροίμι δὲν, ὃς οἴσαι, ὅπε καθότου (ruten) ἕστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἡμῖν πρότερον περὶ οἴκου λόγος γένοιτο ἐν τῷ δικαστήρῳ ἡ περὶ ἐμοῦ.
οὐ ραδίως ἀλλον τοιοῦτον ἑυρήσετε, ἀτενίζωσ, εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπὲ, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὡσπερ 20 ἵππῳ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναίῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νωθεστέρῳ καὶ δεομένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μνώτος τινος. οὖν ὁμώς δικεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθεικέναι, τοιοῦτον τινα δὴ ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνείδιζων ἕνα ἔκα.

30 18. ἀτενίζω...προσκείμενον: added instead of a clause with oios to explain τοιοῦτον. See on oios dedôthai, 31 a.—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἰπὲ: though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech." This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humorous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκείμενον is the regular pass. of προστεθεικέναι. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

21. ὑπὸ μνώτος τινος: by a gadfly. For this word, cf. Aesch. Supp. 307, 329, ἐπὶ δάκτυλον (ox-driving) μυκτήρων κυνηγών (arguing on), ὀστροφαὶ (gadfly) καλώσιαν αὐτῶν ὁ Νεῖλος πέλας. Also in the Prometheus Io's tormentor is called ὀστροφαὶ (507) and ἰδονακίμως μύκως (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ἢπηλιάτης μύκως. Notice how humorously (γελοιότερον) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the μύκως is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκαθήθων), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (οἱ νυστάζοντες). Then they make an impatient dash (κρούσατες) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 90, nec Tenebris addita Juno; Ussuam aberit. μύκως is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of spur. See App.—τινος: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is starting. —οὖν δὴ μοι δικεῖ ὁ θεὸς...προστεθεικέναι: lit. in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state,—such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc., a repetition of προσκείμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit. translation. Notice that oûn really refers not to the μύκως simply but to the μύκως engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοιοῦτον τινα and the explanatory clause with δὲ.

23. ὀνείδιζων ἔκαστον: ὀνείδιζων alone requires the dat. Cf. II. ii. 254, τῷ νῦν Ἀτρείδης Ἀγαμέμνονος ποιμένι λαῶν ἦσαν ὁ νειδίζων, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponderating influence of πείθων; both πείθων and ὀνείδιζων are however introduced simply to explain ἐγείρων, with which they are as it were in opposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions presumptive in part and partly reprehensive.

24. τὴν ἡμέραν...προσκαθήθων: this specifies the means by which the
στον οὐδὲν πάνιμα τὴν ἡμέραν δὴν πανταχοῦ προσκαθίσαται ἡ ἡμέραν. Οὐκ ἦν οὖν ἄλλος οὐ διὰ ἐν τῷ νυστάζοντας αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνάθυμον, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντος εἰς ἀναθύμονα, κρούσαντες ἐν μὲ, πειθόμενον Ἀνάπτυχον, ἀνάθυμον ἀν ἀποκτεῖναι, εἰτα τὸν λόγον βίων καθεύδοντες διατελεῖτ' ἂν, εἰ μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεος ὑμῖν ἐπιπέμψαντες ἀποκτεῖνατε. ὅτι δ' ἐγὼ τυχανῶν δ' τοιούτων, οὐδ' ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδομέναι, ἐνθεδ' ἂν κατανοήσατε· οὗ γὰρ ἀνθρωπίνη ἀνύκω=κει τὸ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτὸν ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνεχεσθαι τῶν οἰκείων ἀμελουμένων τοσαῦτα ἔθη την τοῦ ἄνέτερον πράσσειν ἂν, ἰδίᾳ ἐκαστῳ προσοντα ὡσπερ πατέρα ἡ ἀδελφὸν προσβύτερον, πειθόντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀριθμῆς. καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπελανον καὶ μισθόν λαμβάνον ταῦτα παρεκκλείοντο με, εἰχον ἐν τυν λόγω· νῦν δ' ὅρατε δ' καὶ αὐτοῖ, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦντος ταῦτα πάντα ἀναισχύντως οὖν καθηγοροῦντες τοῦτό γένει.
οὗχ οἰοί τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχόμενοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινα ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἱτησα. ἰκανὸν γὰρ, οἷμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τοῦ μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πενίαν.

XIX. Ἡσώς ἂν οὖν δόξειν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὅτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδίᾳ μὲν ταύτα ἔμμεθαν περιών καὶ πολυπραγμονῶ, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμετέρον.

41. οὐχ οἰοὶ τε: "They would doubtless make the assertion, cf. 10 d; but what they did not find it practicable to do was to bring evidence in support of it." R. The leading idea of the clause ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι...μάρτυρα is expressed in the partic., not in ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι. For cases where ἀληθῶς, used with a partic., does not contain the main idea, cf. 28 b, 20 d. Crit. 53 c. — τοῦτο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι: sc. ταύτην τὴν ἀναισχυνταν ἀπαναισχυντὴσαι. ἀπό in this compound contributes the idea of completion, which in the case of shamelessness involves going to an extreme, to go to such an extent with their shamelessness, or, to be so absolutely shameless as this. The kindred notion of fulfilling a task undertaken is also involved. Cf. Xen. An. i. ii. 2. 19, ἀποθεοῦσα, meaning pay off the arrears of a promised sacrifice.

43. τὸν μάρτυρα: sc. παρέχομαι μάρτυρα καὶ ὁ μάρτυς ὑπὸ παρέχομαι ἰκανὸς ἐστιν. Cf. 20 e. ἰκανὸν is used predicatively, and the necessity of the art. is obvious.

XIX. 1. Ἡσώς ἂν οὖν δόξειν ἄτοπον: Socrates has two good reasons: (1) his divine mission, (2) the personal disaster involved in any other course. Of these the first really includes the second. That he did not regard abstention from public duty as in itself commendable is proved by his conversation with Charmides (Xen. Mem. iii. 7), ἀξιόλογον μὲν ἄνδρα ὑπτα, ἁρινότα τε προσφέρατο τῷ δήμῳ (to address the people) καὶ τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελεῖται. He pointedly asks Charmides: ei δὲ τις, δυνάτος ἂν τῶν τῆς πόλεως πραγμάτων ἐπιμελέμενος τὴν τε πόλιν ἀβέβειν (ad- vance the common weal) καὶ αὐτὸς διὰ τοῦτο τιμᾶσθαι, ἄκοψτε δὴ τούτου πράττειν οὖν ἐκάκτους διὸ λοιπὸν νομίζοιτο; See also ibid. i. 6. 15.

2. πολυπραγμονῶ: am a busybody. See on περιεργάζεται, 10 b. Nothing short of a divine mission could justify this. Plato invariably uses the word in an unfavorable sense. Cf. Gorg. 526 c, ἀνδρὸς φιλοσόφου ταύτων πράξεων καὶ οὐ πολυπραγμονοῦσας ἐν τῷ βίῳ. There is a subtle irony in πολυπραγμονῶ as here used by Socrates. It was his business to mind other people's business, therefore he was far from being really πολυπραγμονῶ: Cf. Xen. Mem. iii. 11. 16, καὶ ὅποις ἐπικατάτοις (ridiculing) τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμόφθην (abstention from business), "'Αλλ', ὃ Θεοδότης," ἤρπα, "οὐ γὰρ μοι βαδίων ἐστὶ σχολάσα (be at leisure) καὶ γάρ τια πράγματα πολλά καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀγαλλία (keep me busy)." Cf. 33 a 6.

3. ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος: there is no implication, as in 17 d, of ἐπὶ τὸ βήμα. The πλῆθος commonly assembled in the Pnyx, to which Socrates
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ρον ἔμβουλεύεις τῇ πόλει. τούτου δὲ αἰτιῶν ἐστιν ὡμεῖς 31 εἰμοὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκόατε πολλαχοῦ λέγοντος, ὅτι μοι θεόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῇ], ὦ δὴ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ α ἐπικωμοδὼν Μέλητος ἔγραψατο. ἐμοὶ δὲ τούτο ἐστιν ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον φωνῇ τίς γυνηκόμενη, ὥς ὅταν γένηται αἱ ἀποτρέπει με τούτο δ ἀν μέλλων πράττειν, προτρέπει δὲ οὔ-

10 ποτε. τούτο ἐστιν ὃ μοι ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. καὶ παγκάλως γέ μοι δοκεῖ ἐναντιοῦσθαι. εὐ γὰρ ἰστε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ ἐγὼ πάλαι ἐπεχείρησα πράττειν τὰ πολιτικὰ πράγματα, πάλαι ἂν ἀπολόληκα καὶ οὔτ' ἂν ὑμᾶς ὁφελήκη οὐδὲν οὔτ' ἂν ἐμαντόν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀξιοθεσθε ὥς ἐναντιοῦται τὰ πολιτικὰ πράττειν. εὐ γὰρ ἰστε, ὃ ἀνθρώπων σωθήσεται οὔτε ὑμῖν οὔτε ἄλλω πλήθει οὐδενὶ γυνηκώς ἐναντιοῦμενος καὶ διακωλών πολλὰ ἀδικα καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἐστιν τοῦ ὅποι μαχοῦμενον 32

31 thus would, like every one else, be obliged to ascend. Cf. Dem. xviii. 169, ομεῖς δ' εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ἔπορεύεσθε καὶ... τὸ πλήθος τοῦ ψυμερον: see on τῷ πλήθει, 21 a.

5. θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, [φωνῇ]: see Introd. 27, with first Ι. on p. 21, and 32. φωνῇ is explanatory of the vague θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον, and is in the pred.: a something divine and from God manifests itself to me, a voice. This thought is earnestly reiterated below in nearly the same words. See App.

6. δ ὅποι τι: see on δ ὅποι καὶ, 28 a. — ἐπικωμοδὼν: Meletus caricatured Socrates’s utterances about the θείων τι καὶ δαιμόνιον by making them out to be the belief in καὶ τὰς δαιμόνια. Cf. 28 e.

7. ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον: ever since my boyhood. This partic. followed by ἀνθρώπων is remarkable repetition of the neg. Cf. 34 e.

9. ἀποτρέπει, ἐναντιοῦσθαι πράττειν: cf. 32 b, and see on μὴν τοιοῦτο, — τούτο: governed by πράττειν, which is expressed in the subordinate clause. Cf. Lach. 179 a, ἀνείπαι αὐτῶν ὅ τι βοηθοῦνται τοιοῦτοι, to leave them free to do what they wish.

12. πάλαι... πάλαι: the rights and duties of Athenian citizenship began as soon as a man was twenty.

13. ἀπολούληκτιφελήκη: the earlier Att. writers rarely use the plpf. in -ειν. G. 119, 4; H. 458 a.

15. οὐ, οὔτε, οὔτε, οὔδεν: a remarkable repetition of the neg. Cf. 34 e.

16. γυνηκώς: uprightly or openly.
υπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου, καὶ εἰ μέλλει ὁλογόν χρόνον σωθήσει· 32 σταί, ἰδωτείνω, ἀλλὰ μὴ δημοσιεύειν.

XX. Μεγάλα δ' ἔγγει ὑμῖν τεκμήρια παρέξομαι τούτων, οὐ λόγους, ἀλλ' ὁ ύμεῖς τιμᾶτε, ἐργα./ ἀκούσατε δὴ μον τὰ ἐμοὶ ἔμβασικικήτα, ἵσα εἰδήτε ὅτι οὐδ' ἄν ἐνὶ υπεικάθομι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον δεῖσας θάνατον, μὴ 5 υπείκους δὲ ἀμα ἀπολογίην. ἐρῶ δὲ υμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ

19. καὶ εἰ: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying that even then the conclusion is unasailable; εἰ καί (cf. 30 ε) introduces a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion remains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. ἀλλὰ μὴ: and not. The Eng. idiom avoids the Greek abruptness. For ἀλλὰ in abrupt transitions, see H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. οὐ λόγους κτή.: as Demosthenes says (II. 12), ἀπα μὲν λόγος, ἂν ἄτη τὰ πράγματα (deeds), ματαίων τι (folly) φανεται καὶ κενὼν. Cf. Lach. 188 e-e, where the harmony of a man's deeds and words is spoken of as τῷ ὑπνῖ ζην ἡμιομένοι ἀλτῶν ἀκτοῦ τῶν θεῶν σύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἄτεχνως διωριστὶ ... ἦπερ μόνη Ἑλληνική ἵστα ἀρμονία, really living in tune, where a man makes his own life a concord of words and deeds, composed really in the Dorian mode, which is the only true Greek harmony.—δ' ύμεῖς κτή.: the audience as representing the Athenians in general. "You appreciate facts only, there is no nonsense about you." Here appears what amounts to the common τόπος of rehearsing a man's services in his own defence, of which practice Lysias (xii. 38) says, οὐ γὰρ δὴ οὐδὲ τούτῳ ἀλτῷ προσήκει ποιήσαι, ἐπεὶ ἐν τῇ ὑπεικάθομίς τοῖς εἰδωλικοῖς ὡστ' ἐφ' ἐπὶ τὰ κατηγοροῦμεν μὴδὲν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, περὶ δὲ

σφών αὐτῶν ἐτέρα λόγοντες (raising side issues) ἐνιατε ἐξαπατῶσιν, υμῖν ἀποδικικόντες ὡς στρατιώται ἀγαθοὶ εἰσίν κτλ. For another instance of this practice indulged in, cf. 28 ε—20 a.

3. οὐδ' ἄν ἐνὶ: stronger than οὐδὲν ἄν. Cf. Corg. 512 e, τὴν εἰμαρμέρην (fate) οὐδ' ἄν εἰς ἐκφόρον, and ibid. 521 e, ὡς μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Ζάκρατε, πιστεῖν μηδ' ἄν ἐν τοῖς παθεῖν ... How confident you seem, Socrates, that you never will suffer any of these things! G. 77, 1, n. 2; H. 290 a.

4. υπεικάθομι: second aor. opt. from ὑπεικέειν with ἄθ appended to the stem, i.e. ὑπεικέειν. G. 119, 11; H. 494 and a. The present ὑπεικάθομι, like διακάθομι (διακέειν), ἀμωδάθομι (ἀμωδέειν) and σχέθειν (σχέειν), is prob. a fiction. It is hard to prove that this θ adds strength to the meaning of ὑπεικέειν. In certain cases this θ is appended in the pres. τελέθειν, φαίθειν, φλεγθείν. Cf. Curt. Grisch. Etym. pp. 62 and 63.

5. ἀμα ἀπολογίην: if this, as Schanz maintains, is what Plato really wrote, the necessary ἄν gets itself supplied from οὐδ' ἄν ἐν ἕν above. Cron, following Stallbaum, writes ἄμα καὶ ἀμάν; Riddell defends Λατ's conjecture, ἀμάν καν. The text here still remains hard to establish. See App.—φορτικὰ καὶ δικαικα: cheap and tedious commonplace, a collocation which suggests the words of Callicles, who,
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δικαίως, ἀλήθεια δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ, ὦ Ἀθηναίοι, ἀλήθευ μὲν 32 ἀρχὴν οὐδεμίαν πάποτε ἦρξα ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἐβουλεύομαι δέ· καὶ ἐνυχεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή Ἀντιοχὸς πρωτανεύοισα, ὅτε

by way of reproof, says to Socrates (Gorg. 482 c) ὦ γὰρ τῇ ὄντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς τοιαύτα ἄγιας διάφορα καὶ διήμητρικά, φάσκουν τὴν ἀλήθειαν διότι εἰς δικαίως διήμητρικά. Cf. Rep. ii. 367 a, ταῦτα... ἡθοπαθείας τε καὶ ἀλλοι ποὺ τις ἐπί δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης λέγοιε τὸν, μετατρέφοντες αὐτῶν τὴν ἀνάμιμνον δικαιοσύνης, δὲ γὰρ έμοι δοκεῖ. For διήμητρικά, which has the sense of in bad taste, cf. Gorg. 494 e, where Callicles, shocked at Socrates’s remarks, says ὃς ἄτομος εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ ἄτεχνος διήμητρις. See also on κεκαλλιστημένους, 17 c. It was common in the courts and assemblies at Athens for the speakers to call a spade a spade. Of course they always declared that they must speak the truth, and the whole truth: This duty was often made the pretext for utterances not strictly in good taste.

b /7. ἐβουλεύομαι δέ: but I was chosen to the senate, i.e. the senate of five hundred, chosen by lot. One of this senate’s chief duties was to act as a committee, so to speak, before whom came, in the first instance, the questions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία (assembly). A preliminary decree (προβολέννα) from this senate was the regular form in which matters came before the assembly.

8. ἐνυχεῖ... πρωτανεύοισα: the fifty representatives in the senate of each of the ten tribes (each φυλή taking its turn in an order yearly determined by lot) had the general charge of the business of the senate, and directed the meetings both of the senate and of the popular assembly, for 35 or 30 days, i.e. one tenth of the lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board of fifty (whose members were called πρωτανεύοισα during its term of office) one member was chosen every day by lot, as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπιστάτης held the keys of the public treasury and of the public repository of records, also the seal of the commonwealth, and, further, presided at all meetings of the senate and of the assembly. Later (prob. in 378 b.c.), the archonship of Nausinicus, when the board of nine πρόεδροι, whom the ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by lot from the non-prytanising tribes, was established) a new officer, the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρόεδρων, relieved him of this last duty. In Socrates’s time, the φυλή πρωτανεύοισα, and the ἐπιστάτης of the day, had the responsibility of putting to the vote (ἐπιστάτης ἐκφεύγει) any question that arose or of refusing to allow a vote. Socrates belonged to the δῆμος Ἀλοτρικῆς in the φυλή Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as an afterthought; ἡμῶν ἡ φυλή would have been sufficient, though less circumstantial.—ότε ὁμοίως κτέ.: after the Athenian success off the islands called Argothae, in 406 b.c. This battle is also spoken of as ἡ πέρι Δέσβαν ναυμαχία, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 32–35. The victorious generals were promptly prosecuted for remissness in the performance of their duty. Accused of having shown criminal neglect in failing to gather up the dead and save those who, at the end of the engagement, were floating about on wrecks, they pleaded "not guilty." The squad-
λέγων διαφθείρω τοὺς νέους, ταύτ᾿ ἂν εἶη βλαβερά· εἰ δὲ τίς μὲ φησιν ἄλλα λέγεω ταύτα, οὐδὲν λέγεω. πρὸς ταύτα, φαίνω ἂν; ὥς Ἀθηναῖοι, ἢ πεθέσθη ἴναι τίρτις τῷ μη, καὶ ἢ ἀφίετε ἢ μὴ ἀφίετε, ὥς ἔμοι οὐκ ἂν ποιήσωντος ἄλλα, οὔτ' εἰ μέλλω πολλάκις τεθνάναι.

XVIII. Μὴ θορυβεῖτε, ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, ἄλλα ἐμμείνατέ μοι οἷς ἐδείχθην ὑμῶν, μὴ θορυβεῖτε ἐφ' οἷς ἂν λέγω, ἀλλ' ἀκούετε· καὶ γάρ, ἥν ἐγὼ ἀιματικήν ἀκοῦσαί τε ἀκούσαί μέλλω γὰρ οἷς ἄτα ὑμῶν ἐρέων καὶ ἄλλα, ἐφ' οἷς ἰσως

common sense as we have, Euthyph. 15 a, Rep. ii. 306 e, 375 c-e, 379 b c; we owe it to them that it is possible to thrive and in the end to win, Rep. x. 613, 617 e.

62. ταύτα ἂν εἶη βλαβερά: this ταύτα, all this, covers more ground than the ταύτα above. The first means what Socrates says, the second means that and also the fact that he says it. "If this corrupts the youth, my practice in saying it would do harm; but the truth cannot corrupt them, therefore my speaking it can do no harm. To prove that I am a corrupter of the youth, you must prove that I have said something else; that cannot be proved, for it is not true." With ei diaftheirw, taute an ein, cf. ei opheloiasan, 25 b, where see note. 63. prois taute: wherefore.

65. ὥς ἔμοι κτλ.: knowing that I should never alter my ways. poiesontos an represents poiesan an. GMT. 41, 4; H. 845 and 861. Cf. Dem. xix. 342, tois aitwv an ekelw poiesontas άναρχηκότες ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἔσσετο. See on diaftheirw, 20 e. For an important question of Ms. reading here, see App. For the ei mello used as periphrastic fut. see GMT. 25, 2; H. 846. For the indic. fut. or subjyr. pres. in prot. depending upon the opt. in apod. with an, see GMT. 54, 1 b; H. 901 a.

66. pollakias: many times or many e

deaths. The Eng. idiom, like the Greek requires no definite sp. fashion such as "to die a hundred deaths." In certain cases in Greek as in Eng. a large number is specified. Cf. akhias auroikias anw boylow, Ar. Nub. 738; etnon (for peanom); babaiax, auroikias el to blf, Rea. 63. Cf. triposmenos, quoted from XI. An. iii. 2. 24 on 30 a. Demosthenesthese not unnaturally uses auroikias where he exclaims (ix. 65), tevnavai de auroikias kriptet ou kolakeia ti poiesan Pliantou. tevnavai: the absolute contradictory of eiπη, here used rather than the somewhat weaker αποθετηκειν. This distinction is, however, not strictly maintained. Cf. 39 e, 43 d, and the similar use of kaliein and keklesthain, giynakesin and giynkeinai, muvakesin and muvei, kalakesin and kalkesin.

XVIII. 2. ois edithηn υμων: he asked them μηθορυβεσ. See above on borubebin, 17 d, and on μηθορυβηστη, 20 e.

3. kal yar, mellosw yar, ei yar iste: the first γαρ is closely connected with ακοουειν, the second goes back to the leading clause μηθορυβεσ and accounts for the renewal of a request which the speaker has made three
5 βοήσεσθε. ἀλλὰ μηδάμως ποιεῖτε τοῦτο. εὖ γὰρ ἵστε, 30 ἐὰν ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖνητε τοιοῦτον ὡστα οὖν ἐγὼ λέγω, οὐκ ἐμὲ μεῖζῳ βλάψετε ἄ μιᾶς αὐτούς· ἐμὲ μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν βλάψειν οὔτε Ἄληθος οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ὄνωμι θεμιτῶν ἐκαί ἀμείνου ἀνδρὶ ὑπὸ χείρονον αὐτὸν βλάπτεσθαι. ἀποκτείνει μεντὰν ἰσώς ἢ ἐξελάσειν ἢ ἀτιμώσειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα οὗτος μὲν ἰσώς οὐσει καὶ ἄλλος τὸ ποὺ μεγαλὰ κακὰ, ἐγώ δ’ οὐκ οἰμάι, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον ποιεῖν ὃ οὗτος νῦν ποιεῖ, ἄνδρα ἀδίκως ἐπιχειρεῖν ἀποκτινώναι. νῦν οὖν, οἳ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, πολλοῦ δὲν 15 ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπολογείσθαι, ὡς τὸ ἂν οὐστο, ἄλλ’ ὑπὲρ ύμων, μὴ τὰ ἐξαμάρτητε περὶ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δόσῳ ύμῶν ἡμοῦ καταψηφίσαμεν. εὖ γὰρ ἐμὲ ἀποκτεῖνητε, ἐ

30 times already. The third γὰρ, now, merely points the new statement for which Socrates has been preparing the court. Compare the use of γὰρ after prons. and advs., e.g. 31 b after ἐνδῶθη, and in general after any profatory form of words to give point to any statement which is expected, as in τῆς γὰρ ἡμῆς, 20 e. γὰρ with this force is esp. freq. after τὸ δὲ (τὸ δὲ) μέγιστον, δεινότατον, also after σημεῖον δὲ, τεκμήριον δὲ and other favorite idioms of like import in Plato and the orators. H. 1050, 4 a.

5. βοήσεσθε: this is more than a disturbance (θρομβεῖν); it is an outcry.

9. θεμιτῶν ἀμείνου ἀνδρὶ βλάπτεσθαι: cf. 21 b. θεμιτῶν takes the dat., and, after the analogy of ἐξεστίν, an inf. (βλάπτεσθαι) is added. The pass. βλάπτεσθαι makes this const. appear more unusual than e.g. in Phaedo, 67 b, μὴ καθαρῷ (unclean) γὰρ καθαρὸν ἐφάπτεσθαι μη σοῦ θεμιτῶν ς. For the import of the words θέμισις and θεμιτῶν, see on o) γὰρ θέμισις, 21 b.

10. ἀποκτείνει μεντὰν, ἢ ἀτιμώσειν: d ἀποκτείνειν is used here secondarily of the δικασταί and the whole people, and primarily of the accusers whose prosecution aims at compassing Socrates's death. ἀτιμα involved the forfeiture of some or of all the rights of citizenship. In the latter case the ἀτέμος was looked upon by the state as dead, i.e. he had suffered "civil death" (la morte civile), and his property, having no recognized owner, was confiscated. Cf. Rep. viii. 553 b, εἰς δικαστηρίων ἐμπεσόντα ὑπὸ συκοφαντῶν ἢ ἀποδασών ἢ ἕκτοσον ἢ ἀτιμωθέντα καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπασαν ἀποβαλόντα. See App.

11. ἄλλος τὸ ποὺ: many another. See on ἄλλος, 28 e.

15. ἀλλ’ ὑπὲρ ύμων: cf. Euthyphro's remark just before the trial, Euthyph. 5 b c, εἰ ὅπα ἐμὲ ἐπιχειρήσει (ὁ Μέλητος), ἐφροῦμ ἢ, ὡς οἴμαι, ἢτῃ σαρκός (rotten) ἔστι, καὶ πολὺ ἂν ἢ μῖν πρότερον περὶ ἐκείνου λόγος γένοστο ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ ἡ περὶ ἕμων.
οὐ ῥαδίως ἀλλὸν τοιοῦτον εὐρήσετε, ἄτεχνος, εἰ καὶ γελοιό-τερον εἶπεῖν, προσκείμενον τῇ πόλει [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ], ὡσπερ 20 ὑπ' ἰππῶ μεγάλῳ μὲν καὶ γενναῖῳ, ὑπὸ μεγέθους δὲ νοθεστέρῳ καὶ δεμένῳ ἐγείρεσθαι ὑπὸ μωστὸς τῶν. ᾧν δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ἐμὲ τῇ πόλει προστεθείκαι, τοιούτων τινα δὲ ὑμᾶς ἐγείρων καὶ πείθων καὶ ὀνειδίζων ἔνα ἔκα-

18. ἄτεχνος ... προσκείμενον: added instead of a clause with ὁς to explain τοιοῦτον. See on ὁς δεδόθη, 31 a.—εἰ καὶ γελοιότερον εἶπεῖν: though it sounds rather absurd to say so, or better, "if I may use such a ludicrous figure of speech." This is thrown in to prepare his hearers for the humoro-
tuous treatment of a serious subject which follows. A close scrutiny of the simile shows that Socrates mistrusted the sovereign people. προσκεί-
μενον is the regular pass. of προστεθεῖν. See below (22) for the same idea put actively. See App. for the reading ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and for the remaining difficulties here involved.

tήρων (urging on), ὀλιστρον (gadfly) καλοῦσιν αὐτὸν ὁ Νελλος πέλας. Also in the Prometheus Io's tormentor is called ὀλιστρον (507) and διστόμως μῶση (674 f.). Here the tormentor of Athens is a ἵππολατὴ μῶση. Notice how humorously (γελοιότερον) the situation is met. First the Athenians are compared to a horse bothered out of inaction by a buzzing horse-fly. The metaphor of the horse is not pressed, but that of the μῶση is ingeniously elaborated as follows: "Socrates gives them no rest but bores them all day long (προσκαθίζων), and does not allow them even a nap; he bothers them incessantly when they are drowsing (οὶ νυστάζοντες). Then they make an impatient dash (κροβ-
ceutes) at him which deprives them forever of his company." For similar irony, cf. Verg. Aen. vi. 90, nec licea crisi addita Juno|Ufquam aber
it. μῶση is by some taken in its later and metaphorical sense of spur. See App.—τῶν: like the Lat. quidam used to qualify an expression which is starting. —οἷον δὴ μοι δοκεῖ ὁ θεὸς ... προστεθεῖκαι: lit. in which capacity God seems to me to have fastened me upon the state,—such an one (in fact) as never ceases, etc., a repeti-
tion of προσκείμενον [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]. Avoid the awkwardness of too lit.
translation. Notice that ὁἷον really refers not to the μῶση simply but to the μῶση engaged in enlivening the horse. This is implied by τοιοῦτον τινα and the explanatory clause with δὲ.

23. ὀνειδίζων ἑκατον: ὀνειδίζων alone requires the dat. Cf. Il. ii. 254, τῷ νῦν Ἀτρέαδη Ἀγαμέμνονι ποιμένι λαών ἥσαι ὀνειδίζων, and below 41 e. The acc. here is due to the preponder-
dering influence of πείθων; both πεί
thων and ὀνειδίζων are however intro-
duced simply to explain ἐγείρων, with which they are as it were in apposition. The awakening process here thought of prob. consisted of questions persua
sive in part and partly reprehens.

24. τὴν ἡμέραν ... προσκαθίζων: this specifies the means by which the
στον οὖδὲν παύομαι τήν ἥμεραν δὴν πανταχοῦ προσκαθίστηκα· ὁ ἀνδρεῖς, ἀλλ' εἰ τις εἰμι πειθοθε, φείστεθε μου· ἤμεις δ' ἵσως τάχι· ἀν αὐτομένω, ὡσπερ οἱ νυστάζοντες ἐγειρόμενοι, κρούσαντες αὐν, πειθομένων 'Ἀνύω, ῥαδίως ἂν ἀποκτείνατε, εἴτε τὸν λοιπὸν βίων καθευδούντες διατελοῦντ' ἂν, εἰ 30 μὴ τινα ἄλλον ὁ θεὸς ὑμῖν ἐπιτέμησε κηρόμενοι ὑμῶν. ὅτι δ' ἐγώ τυγχάνω ἂν τοιοῦτος, οἷος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ τῇ πόλει δεδόσθαι, εὐθείᾳ αὐν κατανοήσαντε· ὡς γὰρ ἀνθρώπινως ἐοικε τῷ ἐμὲ τῶν μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἀπάντων ἡμεληκέναι καὶ ἀνέγερθαι τῶν οἰκεῖων ἄμελουμένων τοσάτα ἡδη ἐπι. 35 τὸ δὲ ὑμέτερον πράττειν ἄει, ἑδής ἐκάστῳ προσίστων ὡσπερ πατέρα ἢ ἀδελφὸν πρεσβύτερον, πειθοῦντ' ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρέτης· καὶ εἰ μέντοι τι ἀπὸ τούτων ἀπέλαυναι καὶ μισθῷ λαμβάνων ταῦτα παρεκελευόμην, εἴχον αὖ τινα λόγον· νῦν δὲ ὅρατε δὴ καὶ αὐτοὶ, ὅτι οἱ κατηγοροῦν τῶλα πάντα ἀνασχύντως οὖν κατηγοροῦντες τούτο γε 30
οὐχ οἷοι τε ἐγένοντο ἀπαναισχυντῆσαι, παρασχομένοι μάρτυρα, ὡς ἐγὼ ποτὲ τινὰ ἢ ἐπραξάμην μισθὸν ἢ ἔγινε. ικανὸν γὰρ, οὕμαι, ἐγὼ παρέχομαι τὸν μάρτυρα, ὡς ἀληθῆ λέγω, τὴν πεπώναι.

XIX. Ισως ἂν οὖν δοξεῖν ἄτοπον εἶναι ὃτι δὴ ἐγὼ ἰδία μὲν ταῦτα ξυμβουλεύω περεύω καὶ πολυπραγμον, δημοσίᾳ δὲ οὐ τολμῶ ἀναβαίνων εἰς τὸ πλῆθος τὸ ὑμέτε-
καὶ διὰ τὰ δικαία καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεται. [φωνῇ, δὲ ἡ καὶ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ἀπεκείνετο τὸ μέλλον οὐδὲν οὐκ ἀν ἐμαντῶν. καὶ μοι μὴ ἀνατρέξει ἡ λέγουσιν τάληθεν... ὅπως ἦσαν καὶ δικαίως καὶ παράνομα ἐν τῇ πόλει γίνεται ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκαιον ἐστὶ τὸν τῷ ὀντὶ μαχομένον.
υπερ του δικαιου, κα ι μελει δλιγον χρονον σωθησε· 32
καθαι, ιδωτευειν, άλλα μη δημοσιευειν.

XX. Μεγαλα δε έγωγε υμιν τεκμηρια παρεξομαι
τουτων, ου λόγων, αλλ δουμεις τιματε, έργα. 
ακούσας δη μου τα εμοι ξυμβεβηκότα, ίνα ειδητε οτι ουδέ
αν ενι υπεικαθομι παρα το δικαιου δειςας θανατου, μη
5 υπεικων δε ήμα απολογημην. έρω δε υμιν φορτικα μεν καλ

19. καλ ει: introduces a very extreme form of supposition, implying
that even then the conclusion is unsailable; ei kal (cf. 30 ε) introduces
a condition implying that in that case, as in many others, the conclusion re-
mains. See H. 1053, 1, 2.

20. αλλα μη: and not. The Eng.
idiom avoids the Greek abruptness.
For all in abrupt transitions, see
H. 1046, 2 b.

XX. 2. ου λόγοι κτι.: as Demos-
thenes says (11, 12), επεις μεν λόγοι,
αν απε τα πράγματα (deeds), ματαιων τι
(folly) φαίνεται και κενον. Cf. Lach.
188 ε-ε, where the harmony of a
man’s deeds and words is spoken of
as τον άνθρωπων καινομήν αυτος αυτού
του βλοε σύμφωνον τοις λόγοις προς τα
εργα, ανετωσ δωριστι . . ηπερ μονη
'Ελληνιξ ετειν αρμονια, really living in
where, a man makes his own life a
concord of words and deeds, composed
really in the Dorian mode, which is the
only true Greek harmony.—δυ ρεις κτι.: 
the audience as representing the Athen-
iains in general. “You appreciate
facts only, there is no nonsense about
you.” Here appears what amounts
to the common τοσο of rehearsing a
man’s services in his own defence, of
which practice Lysias (xii. 38) says,
ου γαρ δε ουδε τουτο αυτο προσηκει
ποιησαι, οπω εν τηδε τη πολει ειδομε-
νου εστι, προς μεν τα κατηγορη-
μενα μηδειν απολογεισθαι, περι δε

σφων αυτων ζητη αλλατες (raising side
issues) ενποτε ξεπαθησαι, υμιν άπο-
δεικνυτες δε απαταιοι αγα-
θοι ειναι κτι. For another instance
of this practice indulged in, cf. 28 ε-
20 α.

3. ουδε τε εινε: stronger than ουδενι
αν. Cf. Gorg. 512 ε, την ειμαρμενη
(fate) ουδεν ει εις έκπονοι, and ibid.
521 ε, δε μοι δικαικη, δ εκραται πιστεω-
ειν μη εν τοις παθειν . . . How
confident you seem, Socrates, that you
never will suffer any of these things!
G. 77, 1, ν. 2; H. 290 a.

4. υπεικαθομι: second aor. opt. from
πεικαθειν with aθ appended to the stem,
The present υπεικαθειν, like διωκαθειν
(διοκειν), άνωθειν (άωθειν) and σχε-
θειν (σχειν), is prob. a fiction. It is
hard to prove that this θ adds strength
to the meaning of υπεικαθειν. In certain
cases this θ is appended in the pres.

5. άμα απολογημην: if this, as Schanz
maintains, is what Plato really wrote,
the necessary ην gets itself supplied
from ουδε τε εινε above. Cron, fol-
lowing Stallbaum, writes άμα κα τε
αν; Riddell defends Ast’s conjecture,
Άμαι καν. The text here still remains
hard to establish. See App.—φορ-
tικα κα δικαικα: cheap and tedious
commonplaces, a collocation which
suggests the words of Callicles, who,
by way of reproof, says to Socrates (Gorg. 482 e) "if you fail to obey, I, Zákra-
tes, will accuse you before the whole
democracy, and charge you with
opposing the will of the demos.

... ὑπάρχει... of which, and the
entire business of the assembly.
For which reason, the assembly was
held in open court, and at Athens for
the speakers to call a spade a spade.
Of course they always declared that
they must speak the truth, and that
truth: This duty was often made the pretext for
utterance not strictly in good taste.

2b ~ The ἐποιόμενος elect at the
senate, i.e. the senate of five
hundred, chosen by lot. One of
this senate's chief duties was to act as a
committee, so to speak, before whom
came, in the first instance, the ques-
tions to be dealt with by the ἐκκλησία
assembly). A preliminary decree (προ-
βολεύμα) from this senate was the
regular form in which matters came
before the assembly.

8. ἔτυχεν... προτανεύουσα: the
fifty representatives in the senate of
each of the ten tribes (each ἄνθρωπος
taking its turn in an order yearly deter-
mined by lot) had the general charge
of the business of the senate, and
directed the meetings both of the
senate and of the popular assembly,
for 35 or 36 days, i.e. one tenth of the
lunar year of 354 days, or in leap-
years, for 38 or 39 days. Of this board
of fifty (whose members were called
προτάνων during its term of office) one
member was chosen every day by lot,
as ἐπιστάτης, or president. The ἐπι-
στάτης held the keys of the public
treasury and of the public repository
of records, also the seal of the com-
monwealth, and, further, presided at
all meetings of the senate and of the
assembly. Later (prob. in 378 n.c.,
the archonship of Nausinicus, when
the board of nine πρεσβυροι, whom the
ἐπιστάτης chose every morning by
lot from the non-pretending tribes,
was established) a new officer, the
ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρεσβυρῶν, relieved him
of this last duty. In Socrates's time,
the φυλή προτανεύουσα, and the ἐπι-
στάτης of the day, had the responsi-
bility of putting to the vote (ἐπιφυ-
σεῖν) any question that arose or of
refusing to allow a vote. Socrates
belonged to the δήμος Ἀλάσεικη, in the
φυλή 'Ἀντιοχίς. Notice the addition of
'Ἀντιοχίς here without the art. and as
an afterthought; ἕμων ἡ φυλή would
have been sufficient, though less cir-
cumstantial. — ὅτε ὑμεῖς κτέ.: after
the Athenian success off the islands
called Argothae, in 406 b.c. This
battle is also spoken of as ἦ πελ Ἀρ-
γον ναυμαχία, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 32-35.
The victorious generals were promptly
prosecuted for remissness in the per-
formance of their duty. Accused of
having shown criminal neglect in fail-
ing to gather up the dead and save
those who, at the end of the engage-
ment, were floating about on wrecks,
they pleaded "not guilty." The squad-


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ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

άμεις τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς τοὺς οὐκ ἀνελομένους τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας ἐξουσιοδοτῶν ἀθροίσας κρίνειν, παρανόμοι, οὗ ἐν τῷ ἔστερῳ χρόνῳ πᾶσιν ὑμῖν ἐδοξεῖ. τὸν ἐγὼ μόνον

32
done detailed for this duty had been hindered, they said, by stress of weather. The main fleet went in pursuit of the worsted enemy. The details of the case for and against them cannot satisfactorily be made out, though the reasons are many and strong for thinking them innocent. The illegality of the procedure by which they were condemned is undoubted. They were condemned ἄνωθεν (1) because judgment was passed upon them ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, ἢ μὴ ψυχῆς ἀκαταστα;—this was illegal, since not only the general practice at Athens, but the decree of Cannons (τοῦ Καννωνοῦ ψήφισμα) provided διὰ ἀπερατον τοὺς κρίνειν, — (2) because they had not reasonable time allowed them for preparing and presenting their defence. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 5; ἐξεκτελεῖτο ἀπελογήσασθαι, οὐ γὰρ προϋπήρθε σφίσι λάγος κατὰ τὸν νόμον. See Xen. Hell. i. 6. 33 ff. and 7; Men. i. 1. 18; iv. 4. 2.

9. τοὺς δέκα στρατηγοὺς: the round number of all the generals is given here. One of the ten, Archestratus, died at Mitylene, where Conon, another of them, was still blockaded when the battle was fought. Of the remaining eight who were in the battle, two, Protomachus and Aristege-nes, flatly refused to obey the summons to return to Athens. Thus only six reached Athens, and these, Pericles, Lysias, Diomedon, Erasides, Aristocrates, and Thrasyllos, were put to death. — τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίας: not only the dead but those who were floating about in danger of their lives. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 11, παρὴλθε δὲ τις τὴν ἐκκλησίαν φάσας ἐκ τοῦ εὐχαίρετον ἀρκετάν (on a meal-barter) σωθῆναι ἐπιστέλλειν (enjoined upon) τῷ αὐτῷ τοῖς ἀπολλυόμενοι (those who were drowning), τάν σωθεὶ ἀπαγείλατο τῷ δήμῳ, ὁτι οἱ στρατηγοὶ οὐκ ἀνελοίμοι (res- cued) τοὺς ἀριστοῦς ὑπὲρ τῆς πατρίδος γενομένους. Cf. Xen. An. i. 2. 3, where τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων is equivo. to τοὺς ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις ὑπατικὸς ἐκ τῶν πόλεων. Here the fuller expression would perhaps be οὐκ ἀνελομένους ἐκ τῆς ναυμα- χίας τοὺς ἐν αὐτῇ ναυμαχησάντας τε καὶ κακῶς πεπραγμένας. G. 191, n. 6; H. 788 a. For this subst. use of οἱ ἐκ with the gen. there are many parallels; such subst. use is common with prep. denoting close relation to their object, — in, on, from, etc. Notice the point given to παρανόμοι by its position; it comes in almost as if it began an independent sent. Cf. Lach. 183 b, τοῦτοι δὲ ἢν ὑπέθη τραγῳδίαν καλῶς τοῖς ἐπικούρεσσις διδύμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐπιδικεύωσις ἐκκατοστάσεις Xe- nonophon says that the Athenians soon repented of their rash and illegal action. Cf. Xen. Hell. i. 6. 35, καὶ οὗ πόλλος χρόνος δεσπο- τεῖ τοῖς ἁθηναίοις καὶ ἐφημερισταῖς, οὕτως τὸν δὴν ἐξηκάτησαν (deceived) προβολῆς αὐτῶν εἶναι (their case was thus prejudiced by an informal vote of the assembly) καὶ ἐγνωρίσαν καταστῆσαι, ἢς ἐν κρίσει. The fate of these generals was remembered thirty years afterward by the Athenian admiral Cha- brias. He won a great victory off Naxos (n.c. 370) but neglected to pursue the enemy, in order to save the men on the wrecks and bury the dead. Cf. Diod. xv. 35.
τῶν πρυτάνεων ἡμαρτιώθην μηδὲν πομέν παρὰ τοὺς νόμους ὶδικοὶ, καὶ ἔτσι οἷον ὄντων ἐνδεικνύει μὲ καὶ ἀνάγει τῶν ῥητόρων καὶ ὑμῶν κελευόντων καὶ
15 Βοώτων, μετὰ τοῦ νόμου καὶ τοῦ δίκαιου ἱσχῦν μᾶλλον με ό δεῖν διακωνυνεῖν ἢ μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι· μή δίκαια· βουλευόμενων φοβηθέντα δεσμοῦν ἡ θάνατον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἢν ἐπὶ δημοκράτουμένης τῆς πόλεως· ἐπειδὰ ὥστε ὀλγαρχία ἐγένετο, οἱ τρίακοντα αὐτὶς ἐπαιτημάτωνεν με πέμπτον
20 αὐτῶν εἰς τὴν βόλον πρόσεταξαν ἀγαγεὶν ἐκ Σαλάμινος

32 12. ἡμαρτιώθην: used absolutely as often.—μηδεν πομεν: after the neg. idea in ἡμαρτιώθην. GMT. 95, 2, n. 1 p. H. 983 and 1029. But cf. 31 d e.
13. καὶ ἐναντία ἑυσεμάκην: and I voted against it, i.e. allowing the question to be put. See App. Socrates was ἐνοπλάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων on this day and followed up this opposition,—manifested when in consultation with the other πρυτάνεως,—by absolutely refusing to put the question to vote. Cf. Gorg. 474 a; Xen. Mem. i. 1. 8; iv. 4. 2. For a different account of the facts, see Grote's Greece, c. 64, fin. Connect ἐναντία ἑυσεμάκην with μόνος τῶν πρυτάνεων. ἐνδεικνύειν, ἀναγεῖν: ἐνδεικτίζει and ἀπειργάζει were two summary methods of procedure in making prosecutions. Both dispensed with the usual delay, and allowed the magistrates (in ἐνδεικτίζει, it was the board of the Thesmothetae; in ἀπειργάζει, it was usually the board called of ἐνδεικτικά) to deal summarily with certain charges. ἐνδεικτίζει was a form of summary indictment, laying information usually against one who discharged functions or exercised rights for which he was legally disqualified, as when an ἅτωμος entered public places in Athens; ἀπειργάζει was the summary arrest and giving in charge of a man caught in actual crime. Cf. Poll. viii. 49, ἢ δὲ ἀπαγωγῆ, ὅταν τις ἐγελεισθαῖ, ἡ ἀπαγωγή τοῦτον ἠμοῦν ἐπ' αὐτῷ φιάλει λαβῶν ἀπαγόρευ. The two processes might therefore be used in the same case.
14. τῶν ῥητόρων: these professional speakers had no class privileges; only their more frequent speaking distinguished them from ordinary citizens.
15. Βοώτων: cf. Xen. Hell. i. 7. 12, τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἔθελε δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ μὴ τις ἔδει τῶν δήμων πράττειν δὲν βούληται. Apparently the crowd jeered at Socrates. Cf. Gorg. 474 c, πέροιο (a year ago) βουλεύετο λαχών, ἐπειδὴ ἡ φύλος ἐπρυτάνευε καὶ ἐδείκτηκε ἐνπειρατίζειν, γέλωστα παρείχον καὶ οὐκ ἡπειρατίζειν ἐνπειρατίζειν.
16. μεθ' ὑμῶν γενέσθαι: to place e myself on your side.
19. οἱ τρίακοντα: they were called the Thirty rather than the Thirty Tyrants.—αὖ: in turn. Both democracy and oligarchy, however opposed in other respects, agreed in attempting to interfere with the independence of Socrates.
20. εἰς τὴν βόλον: the Rotunda. The name ekias was also applied to it from its resemblance to a parasol. Cf. Harp. (c.v. βόλος) who further says it was the place ὅπου ἔστων
Δέοντα τὸν Σαλαμίνον ἵνα ἀποθάνων. οία δὴ καὶ ἄλλοις ἐκείνοι πολλὰ προσέταττον θεοῦ μὲν μέλει, εἰ μὴ 25 ἀγροκότερον ἢν εἴπετι, οὐδ' ὅτι οὖν, τοῦ δὲ μηδὲν ἄδικον μηδὲν αὖσιον ἐργάζεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ πᾶν μέλει. ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐκείνη ἡ ἁρχὴ οὐκ ἐξεπληθήσεν οὕτως ἰσχυρὰ οὕτα, ὥστε ἄδικον τι ἐργάζασθαι, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ ἐκ τῆς θόλου ἑξηλθομεν, οἱ μὲν τέταρτοι ὁχοντι εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ ἦγα-

23. ἀναπλήσαν: implicate, the Lat. implere, or contaminare. ἀναπλέως is used similarly. Cf. Phaed. 673a, ἐὰν δὲ μάλιστα μηδὲν ὅμιλον τὸ σώματι μηδὲ κοινωνέωμεν, μηδὲ (except so far as) πᾶσα ἀνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀνακριβλῶμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως. With this passage cf. especially Antipho, ι, α, 10, συγκαταμι-

26. τούτου δὲ: pointedly summar-

29. ὁχοντι, ὁχόμεν: went straight
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30 γον Δέοντα, ἐγώ δὲ ψυχόμην ἀπίων οὐκαθε. καὶ ἵσως ἃν διὰ ταῦτ’ ἀπέθανον, εἰ μὴ ἡ ἀρχὴ διὰ ταχέων κατελύθη· καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν ἔστοιται πολλοὶ μάρτυρες.

XXI. Ἄρ’ οὖν ἂν μὲ οἷοσθε τοσάκι, εἰ ἐπραττόν τὰ δημόσια καὶ πράττων/ἀξίω, ἀνδρός ἀγαθοῦ ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ, ὃσπερ χρῆ, τοῦτο περὶ πλείοντον ἐποιοῦμην; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, δ’ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναίων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων-οὖνεις. ἄλλ’ ἐγώ δὲ παντὸς τοῦ βίου δημοσία-τε, εἰ ποῦ τι ἔπραξα, τοιούτως φανοῦμαι, καὶ ἰδία ὁ αὐτὸς οὐτός, οὔτε πώποτε ἐνεγχωρήσας οὐδὲν παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον οὔτε ἄλλω οὔτε τούτων οὖν εἰς οὐ διαβάλλοντες ἐμε φασίν ἐμούς μαθήτας εἶναι. ἐγώ δὲ διδάσκαι·

10 λος μὲν ὦνεον πώποτ’ ἑνεόμην· εἰ δὲ τίς μου λέγοντος καὶ-τέ ἐμαντοῦ πράττοντος ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκούειν, εἴτε νεώτε·

32 d off. The recurrence of the same word only makes more plain the difference of the courses pursued.

31. ἀὰ ταχείων: a common expression with Thucydides and Xenophon, equiv. to ἀὰ τάχους. Cf. διὰ βραχείων, Prot. 339 a; Gorg. 449 a. The Thirty were only eight months (June 404–Febr. 403) in power, for they ceased to rule when Critias fell at Myronchia in the engagement with Thrasybulus and the returned exiles. In the interim before the restoration of the democracy, ten men, doubtless one for each pole, were put in their place. Cf. Xen. Hell. ii. 4. 23.

32 e μάρτυρες: possibly proceedings were here interrupted for these witnesses, though it seems quite as likely that Socrates is appealing to the δικασταί themselves to be his witnesses. Hermann, who thus understands it, reads ὡμῶν instead of δικαίων, an unnecessary change.

XXI. 1. Ἄρ’ οὖν: by οὖν we are referred to what immediately precedes for our answer to this question.

2. ἐπραττόν: distinctly refers to a continued course, a line of action.

3. τοῖς δικαίοις: whatever was just, neut., a concrete way of expressing an abstraction.

5. ἄλλ’ ἐγώ: i.e. “however it may be with others, as for me, I, etc.”

6. τοιοῦτος: explained by ἐνεγχωρήσας. This amounts to a very direct appeal to the facts, and may be regarded as a shorter substitute for τοιοῦτος φανοῦμαι ὅστε (οὐ οὗς) μηδὲν ἐνεγχωρήσας, καὶ γὰρ φανοῦμαι μηδὲν ἐνεγχωρήσας. For the commoner but more vague idiom, cf. Crit. 46 b.

9. ἐγώ δὲ κτέ.: see Introd. 26, fin.

11. τα ἐμαντοῦ πράττοντος: see on πολυπραγμον, 31 e. ἐπιθυμεῖ does not exclude either ἐπιθεμήνας or ἐπιθυμησοῦν, but rather implies them. Cf. τυχεῖν in 18 d. The notion of habitual action is conveyed in the form of the same single act indefinitely repeated.
ros eите пресβύтерос, ουδενί πώποτε ἐφθόνησα, οὐδὲ χρη- ματα μὲν λαμβάνων διαλέγομαι, μή λαμβάνων δὲ οὐ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μοῖροι καὶ πλούσιω καὶ πέντη παρέχω ἐμαυτόν ἐρωτάν, καὶ εάν τις βουλήται απόκρινόμενος ἄκοινες δὲν ἄν λέγω. καὶ τούτων ἐγὼ εἰτε τις χρηστὸς γίγνεται εἰτε μή, οὐκ ἂν δυκαίως τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι, δὲν μήτε ὑπεσχόμην μηδὲν μηδὲν πώποτε μάθημα μήτε ἐδιδάξα· εἰ δὲ τὶς φησι παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ πώποτε τι μαθεῖν ἡ ἄκοινι αἰδώ τι μή καί ἄλλοι πάντες, εὐ ἵστε ὅτι οὐκ ἄληθῆ λέγει.

12. οὐδὲ: applies neither to the μέν nor to the δὲ clause separately, but to their combination. See on δειναν ἄν εἰρήν. 28 d.

13. ἀπόκρινόμενος ἀκούειν: characteristic of the Socratic συνουσία. See Introd. 19. — ἄκοινεν κτε.: first ἄκοι- ειν is to be construed with βουληται (see on τοῦτο, 31 d), then παρέχω ἐμαυτόν ἄκοινες is to be supplied from the preceding. After παρέχω, ἄκοι- ειν, like ἐρωτάν above, expresses purpose. See G. 265 and H. 951; also, for the use of the act. voice, see G. 261, 2, Rem.; H. 952 a. Socrates means: I am ready for questions, but if any so wishes he may answer and hear what I then have to say.

16. τούτων ἐγὼ κτε.: ἐγὼ is placed next to τούτων for the sake of contrast, while τούτων, though it is gov- erned by τίς, inevitably adheres to τὴν αἰτίαν ὑπέχοιμι. This last corre- sponds as a pass. to αἰτίαι ὑπέρφερον or προστιθέμαι. The notion of respon- sibility is colored, like the Eng. "have to answer for," with the implication of blame. For an account of those whom Socrates had chiefly in mind, see Introd. 24 and 33.

17. ὑπεσχόμην: is meant probably as a side thrust at imposing prom- ises like the one attributed to Pro- tagoras about his own teaching in Prot. 319 a. Socrates himself followed no profession strictly so called, had no ready-made art, or rules of art, to communicate. His field of instruction was so wide that he can truly say that, in the accepted sense of διδάσκων and μαθάνειν at Athens, his pupils got no learning from him. They learned no μάθημα, acquired no useful (professional) knowledge. He put them in the way of getting it for themselves. Plato makes Soc- rates decline to become the tutor of Nicias’s son (Lach. 207 d). He taught nothing positive, but removed by his searching questions the self-deception which prevented men from acquiring the knowledge of which they were capable. See his successful treatment of the conceited Ἐθιθόμος ὁ καλός, in Xen. Mem. iv. 2.

19. ἄλλοι πάντες: not very different in meaning from ἄλλος τίς, 28 e. It differs from οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες, the common reading here, just as πάντες ἄνθρωποι (all conceivable men) differs from πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι. In such cases if the noun alone would not have taken the art, it does not take it when qualified by τίς and the like. Compare all others and all the others. Here we have a complete antithesis,
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XXII. Ἀλλὰ διὰ τὶ δὴ ποτὲ μετ' ἐμὸν χαίροντι τνὲς πολὺν χρόνον διατρίβοντες; ἀκηκόατε, ὅ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι: πᾶσαν ὡς τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔγω εἴπον, ὅτι ἀκούοντες χαίροντον ἐξεταζομένοις τοῖς οἰομένοις μὲν εἶναι σοφοῖς, δὲ οὕτω εὖ ἐστι γὰρ ὧν ἀκαμαθέναι. ἐμοὶ δὲ τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ φήμη, προστέτακται ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πράττειν καὶ ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὅπερ τίς ποτε καὶ ἀλλή θεία μοῦρα ἀνθράπω καὶ ὁτιοῦ προστετάξει πράττειν. ταῦτα, ὅ Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ἀλήθη ἐστι καὶ εὐλεγεῖτα. τὸ γὰρ ἐγὼ τῶν νέων τούτων μὲν διαφθείρω, τοὺς δὲ αὐτῶν πρεσβύτεροι

33 to ἔδη, which takes the place of the more usual δημοσία; Socrates calls attention to the publicity of the places where he talks (cf. 11 c) and to the opportunity of conversing with him offered to all alike.

c XXII. 3. εἴπον: the ὅτι clause really answers διὰ τὶ ... διατρίβοντες; but grammatically it is an appended explanation of τὴν ἀλήθειαν, and is governed by εἴπον. — ἀκούοντες, ἐξεταζομένοι: both are in close relation with χαίροντι; contrast the const. of the same particles. in 23 c.

5. οὕτω ἀκαμαθέναι: i.e. ἤδιστον, a case of λεπτότης (simplicity), or μείωσις (diminution), quite like the Eng. not at all unpleasant. Such are the common οὕτω ἴκαστα (πάντων μάλιστα) and οὐ πάνω (cf. not quite). Socrates perhaps agreed with La Rochefoucauld, Maximes, 31, Si nous n'avions point de défauts, nous ne prendrions pas tant de plaisir à en remarquer dans les autres. — ως ἐγὼ φήμη: as I maintain, implying not so much that he makes his assertion now as that he now emphatically calls attention to the assertion already made and substantiated. For the analogous use of the pres. expressing continued result of past action, see GMT. 10, n. 4; H. 827. Here φήμη almost means I am maintaining and have maintained. See on ἐπερέληξον 21 a, and cf. Luch. 193 c, βούλει ὦν ὃ λέγομεν πειθώμεθα τὸ γε τοσοῦτον; ... τὰ λόγια δὲ καρτερεῖν κελεύει.

6. ἐκ μαντείων, καὶ παντὶ τρόπῳ: a phrase which suggests that ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου has made room for παντὶ τρόπῳ. The καὶ before παντὶ is best rendered by and generally. For the facts, cf. 21 b and Crit. 44 a.

7. τίς ποτὲ καὶ ἀλλή: ever at any time at all, any other.

8. θεία μοῖρα: will of Providence. What is appointed by the Deity is contrasted with a man's own choice; the phrase freq. qualifies what man attains or enjoys through no effort or desert of his own but almost ἀγαθὴ μοῖρα (by the grace of good luck). Cf. Rep. 403 a; Arist. Eth. i. 9. 1.

9. εὐλεγεῖτα: easy to prove, not easy to disprove. So εὐλέγχω means prove a point by disproving its contradictory.

10. εἴ γὰρ δὴ: for if really, i.e. as we must suppose if Meletus speaks truth.

11. χρῆν κατηγορεῖν: ἕν is not required. GMT. 49, 2, n. 3 a. The con-
γενόμενοι ἔγνωσαν ὅτι νέοις οὖσιν αὐτοῖς ἐγὼ κακὸν πώς τὰ ποτὲ τι ἔξυπνολευσα, νυνὶ αὐτοὺς ἀναβάινοντας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖν καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι· εἰ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον, τῶν 15 οἰκείων τωσ τῶν ἐκείνων, πατέρας καὶ ἀδελφοὺς καὶ ἄλλους τοὺς προσήκοντας, εἶπερ ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ τι κακὸν ἐπε- πόνθεσαν αὐτῶν οἱ οἰκεῖοι, νῦν μεμήσθαι [καὶ τιμωρεῖ- σθαι]. πάντως δὲ πάρεσον αὐτῶν πολλοὶ ἐνταυθοὶ οὖς ἐγὼ ὄρω, πρῶτον μὲν κρίτων οὕτως, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ 20 δημότης, Κριτοβούλου τοῦ δὲ πατήρ· ἐπείτα Λυσταύας ὁ ἐ 33
d clusion states an unfulfilled obligation.
H. 897. All the prots. here expressed, including ei diaphēρω and ei ἐπετόνθες, belong to the first class (GMT. 49. 1; H. 803), and the apod. χρὴν involves its own unfulfilled condition. GMT. 49, 2, n. 3, Rem. 1. χρὴν together with this implied prot. forms the apod. which goes with ei diaphēρω κτ. GMT. 55, 1. This prot. is disjunctively elaborated in two parallel clauses, (1) ei γρωσαν, (2) ei δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ἥθελον. See on ei ἐπείτα κτ. 27 δ. Instead of ei ἐπείτα ἐπείτα we have ei τέ (like ἐπείτα ... οὐδέ), which gives a certain independence to the second member. Hence it is treated as a condition by itself, and the leading protasis, ei diaphēρω, is substantially repeated in ἐπείτα ἐπετόνθες. If (as Meletus urges) I am corrupting some young men, and have corrupted others, then (if they were doing their duty) they would, supposing some of them concurred on growing older that in their youth I, etc., now stand forth, etc.
13. ἀναβάινοντας: see on ἐπὶ δικα- στήριον, 17 δ.
15. τῶν ἐκείνων: on the repetition of the art. here, see G. 142, 2; II. 698.
16. τοὺς προσήκοντας: Eng. idiom suggests either τῶν προσήκοντων or προσήκοντας without the art. After the detailed enumeration, πατέρας . . . ἄλλους, τοὺς προσήκοντας is introduced appositively to sum up, and therefore the article is used.
17. καὶ τιμωρεῖσθαι: combine with μεμήσθαι, and the idea is that of μνη- σικακεῖν, a word which had lately been much used in the political turmoils at Athens. Cf. the final agreement between oligarchs and democrats, Xen. Hell. ii. 4, 43, ἐμὸς μὴ μνησικακή- σειν.
18. πάντως: as in answers, cer- tainly.—ἐνταυθοὶ: connect with πα- ρεῖσαι, which thus denotes the result of παρέναι. We might call it here the perf. of παρέναι. Cf: Xen. An. i. 2, 2, καὶ λαβότεν τὰ ἐπὶ παρένας εἰς ξάρσεις. For the converse, cf. 30 ε, ἐνταῦθα οὐκ ἦν.
19. Κρίτων: it is he whose name is given to the well-known dialogue of Plato. See Intro. 62.
20. δημότης: see on ἐνυχὶ πρωτανέ- 
ουσα, 32 b.—Κριτοβούλου: although his father Crito modestly declares (Euthyd. 271 b) that he is thin (αληθι- φόρος) in comparison with his exquisite playmate Clinas (cousin of Alcibiades), Critobulus was famous for his beauty. See Xen. Symp. 4, 12 ff.
He was one of Socrates's most constant companions. The Oeconomicus of Xenophon is a conversation between Socrates and Critobulus. The affection between Socrates and Crito is best shown by the pains taken by the former in furthering Critobulus's education. In the Memorabilia (i. 3. 8 ff.) Socrates indirectly reproves Critobulus by a conversation in his presence held with Xenophon. The same lesson he reinforces (ii. 6. esp. 31 and 32). That it was needed appears from the impetuous character shown by Critobulus in Xenophon's Symposium. Cf. 3. 7, τι γάρ σὺ, ἥγη, ὁ Κριτόβουλε, ἐπὶ τὴν μεγίστην φρονεῖς (of what are you proudest?); ἐπὶ καλὲς, ἥγη. That Critobulus perplexed his father is shown in Euthyd. 306 δ, where, speaking of his sons, Crito says: Κριτόβουλος ὁ ἰδίων ἡλικίαν ἔχει (is getting on) καὶ δεῖται τίνος, διά τις αὐτὸς ἄνδρα ἄνησε. — ὁ Σφήττος: of the δῆμος Σφήττος in the φυλή Ἀκαμάτης.

21. Αἰσχίνου: like Plato, Xenophon, and Antisthenes, Aeschines (surnamed ὁ Σωκρατικός) carefully wrote down the sayings of Socrates after the master's death. Three dialogues preserved among the writings of Plato have been attributed to Aeschines the Socratic. The Eryxias possibly is by him, but hardly either the Axiouchus or the treatise περὶ ἀρετῆς. Aeschines was unpractical, if we can trust the amusing account given by Lysias (fr. 3) of his attempt to establish, with borrowed money, a τέχνη μωρεψης (salve-shop). His failure in this venture may have led him to visit Syracuse, where, according to Lucian (Parasit. 32), he won the favor of Dionysius. — Ἀντιφῶν: Aeschines and Antiphan here present should not be confused with their more celebrated namesakes, the orators. This Antiphon was of the δῆμος Κρισια in the φυλή Ἕρακλης, but nothing further is known of him.

22. Εὐπήνου: the same whom Socrates saw (Xen. Mem. iii. 12) νέος τε ὑπατα καὶ τὸ σῶμα κακῶς ἔχοντα. Socrates reproached him then and there for not doing his duty to himself and to his country by taking rational exercise. — τοίνυν: moreover, a transition. The fathers of some have been named, now he passes on to the case of brothers.

23. τοῦτο: i.e. the one in question.

25. ἐκεῖνος γε: he at least, i.e. ὁ ἐκεῖνος = ὁ τοῦ Ἀιδοῦ, Θεόδοτος, named last but the more remote. Cf. Euthyd. 271 b, where ἐκεῖνος refers to Critobulus just named. — αὐτὸς: Νικόστρατος, of whom he is speaking. Since his brother is dead, Nicostratus will give an absolutely unbiassed opinion. — καταδεπτθήν: lit. deprecari, but really it means here overpersuade, i.e. persuade a man against his better judgment. Cf. κατα-χαριζομαι, 35 c.

26. Θέαγης: this brother of Para-
Odé de Ἄδειμαντος ὁ Ἀρίστωνος ὁ ἄδελφος οὗτοι Πλάτων, καὶ Αἰαντόδωρος οὗ Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ δε ἄδελφος. καὶ ἀλλος πολλοὺς ἐγὼ ἔχω ὑμῖν εἰπεῖν, ὅτι τινα ἐχρῆμ-μάλα λιστα μὲν ἐν τῷ ἔαντον λόγῳ παρασκέβαι Μέλητιν μάρτυρα. εἰ δὲ τὸτε ἐπελάθετο, νῦν παρασκέβασθα, ἐγὼ παραχωρῶ, καὶ λεγέτω, εἰ τι ἔχει τοιοῦτος. ἄλλα τούτου πάν τούναντίων εὑρήσετε, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς, πάντας ἐμοὶ βοηθεῖν ἐτοίμουσ τῷ διαφθείροντι, τῷ κακὰ ἐργαζόμενω τοὺς οἰκεῖοι αὐτῶν, ὃς φασὶ Μέλητος καὶ Ἀντως. αὐτῷ μὲν γὰρ ὁ

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lus is known through Rep vi. 496 b, where Plato uses the new proverbial expression, ὁ τοῦ Θεάγος χαλώς, the bridle of Thages, i.e. ill health. Such was the providential restraint which made Thages, in spite of political temptations, faithful to philosophy; otherwise, like Democritus, his father, he would have gone into politics. Democritus is one of the speakers in the Theages, a dialogue wrongly attributed to Plato.

27. Ἀδεὶμαντος: son of Aristo and brother of Plato and of Glaucon (Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 1); both of Plato's brothers were friends of Socrates. Glaucon and Adimantis are introduced in the Republic; Adimantis is older, and is represented as not so familiar a footing with Socrates as his younger brother.

28. Ἀπολλόδωρος: surnamed ὁ μανᾶς because of his intense excitability. Cf. Sympos. 178 d. This is nowhere better shown than in the Phaedo, 117 d, where he gives way to uncontrollable grief as soon as Socrates drinks the fatal hemlock. In the Symposium, 172 e, he describes his first association with Socrates with almost religious fervor; In the Ἀπολλογία Σωκράτους (28), attributed to Xenophon, he is mentioned as ἐπιθυμή- της μὲν ἱσχυρός αὐτῷ (Σωκράτους), ἄλλος δ᾽ εὐθῆς (a simpleton). Of the persons here mentioned, Nicostratus, Theodotus, Paralus, and Aegaeidorus, are not elsewhere mentioned; and of the eleven here named as certainly present at the trial (there is doubt about Epigenes) only four (or five with Epigenes), Apollodorus, Crito, Critobulus, and Aeschines, are named in the Phaedo as present afterwards in the prison.

29. μάλιστα μὲν: by all means. In the clause beginning with εἰ δὲ, εἰ τῷ ἔαντον is referred to by τότε and contrasted with νῦν παρασκέβασθα. 31. ἔγω παραχωρῶ: parenthetical. "The full expression occurs Aeschin. iii. 165, παραχωρῶ σοι τῷ βήματι, ἐν τῷ εἴρης." R. The time used for introducing evidence was not counted as a part of the time allotted for the pleadings, but the water-clock (τὸ ῥημά) was stopped while a witness was giving account of his evidence. Cf. Lys. xxi. 4, 8, 11, 14, and 16, καὶ μοι ἐπὶ ἐδρεῖ (addressed to an officer of the court) τῷ ῥημᾷ. See App.

35. γὰρ: calls upon us to draw a conclusion suggested by the preceding clause. Socrates means: this fact (πάντας βοηθεῖν, κτλ.) proves my inno-
οἱ διεφθαρμένοι τάχ’ ἂν λόγον ἔχουν βοηθοῦντες. οἱ δὲ ἀλήθευσαν, προσβύτεροι ἦδη ἄνδρες, οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες, τίνα ἄλλου ἔχουσι λόγον βοηθοῦντες ἐμοί ἄλλ’ ἢ τὸν ὅρθον τε καὶ δίκαιον, ὅτι ξυνίσασι Μελήτῳ μὲν 40 ψυχομένῳ, ἐμοὶ δὲ ἄληθευοντι;

XXIII. Ἐκεῖ δὴ, ὁ ἄνδρες· ἂ μὲν ἔγω ἐχομ’ ἂν ἀπολογεῖσθαι, σχεδὸν ἐστὶ ταύτα καὶ ἄλλα ἰσως τοιαῦτα. τάχα δὲ ἄν τις υἱῶν ἀγανακτήσεις ἀναμνήσθεις ἐαυτοῦ, ὅ εἰ δὲ μὲν καὶ ἐλάσσω τουτοῦ τοῦ ἀγώνος ἀγώνιζον μενος ἐδεήθη τε καὶ ἱκέτευε τοὺς δικαστὰς μετὰ πολλῶν δακρύων, παιδία τε αὐτοῦ ἄναβιβασάμενος, ἵνα ὁτι μάλιστα ἔλεεθείη, καὶ ἄλλους τῶν οἰκείων καὶ φίλων πολλοὺς, ἔγω δὲ οὔδεν ἀρα τούτων ποιήσω, καὶ ταύτα κυνδυνεύων,

34 cence; for how else can we account for the following? γάρ applies to both clauses αὐτοῖ μὲν and οἱ δὲ; more especially to the latter. For λόγων ἔχουν, see on εἰ μὲν ταῦτα, 31 d.
37. οἱ τούτων προσήκοντες: this partic., like ἄρχον and συνάρχον, has by usage become substantially a noun. The poets apparently were the first to use parties, in this way. Cf. Aesch. Pers. 245, ἰδῶν τοῖς τε κοῦσι; Eur. El. 335, ὃ ἐκεῖνον τεκάν. The participial use and the use as a noun subsisted side by side. Cf. Legg. ix. 868 b, τῶν προσήκοντων τῷ τελευτάσκατι, and ibid. τοὺς προσήκοντας τοῦ τελευτάσκατος. GMT. 108, 2; H. 906.
38. ἀλλ’ ὑ: see on ἀλλ’ ὑ, 20 d.
XXIII. 1. εἰν δὴ: this closes the argument proper of the defence, and marks the beginning of the peroration.
2. ἰσως τοιαῦτα: in much the same strain.
3. ἀναμνήσθεις ἐαυτοῦ: many δικασταῖ had been defendants.

4. εἰ δεήθη κτ. : see, esp. for the force of μὲν and δὲ, on δεῖνα ἐν εἰρή, 28 d. — ἀλάττω ἀγώνα: the μέγιστος ἀγών was one involving a man's franchise and his life. Cf. Dem. xx. 99, παιδία γάρ παραστήσεται καὶ κλαθεί καὶ τούτοις αὐτὸν ἐξαίρεται, and 186, οἶδα τοῖν ὅτι τὰ παιδία ἐχὼν δὲν ἰητάται (the defendant will bring his children and burst into lamentations) καὶ πολλοὺς λόγους καὶ ταπεινῶς ἐξεί, δακρύων καὶ ὑσ ἐλεεεινότατον ποιῶν αὐτὸν. For another appeal which was customary in Athenian courts, see on οὐ λόγουs καὶ φορτίκα καὶ δικαίωκα, 32 a.

6. παιδία αὐτοῦ: see App.
8. ἔγω δὲ ἀρα: and then finds that I. To be sure Socrates had enough friends and to spare who were present in court, but he refused to make such wrongful use of their presence and sympathy. ἀρα implies that any one who knew Socrates of course would be surprised at such unseemliness where he was concerned.
όσ Áν δόξαιμι, τὸν ἔσχατον κώδων. τάχ’ οὖν τις ταῦτα εἴη δὴ τις ὑμῶν οὕτως ἔχει—οὐκ ἀξίω μὲν γὰρ ἔγωγε· εἰ δ’ οὖν, αὕτη ἐν μον-δοκῷ πρὸς τούτον λέγειν λέγων ὁτι ἔμοι, ὁ ἅριστε, εἰσιν μὲν ποῦ τινες καὶ οἰκεῖοι· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ αὐτὸ τὸ τοῦ Ὄμηρου, οὐδ’ ἔγω ἀπὸ δρύος οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης πέφυκα, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων, ὡστε καὶ οἰκεῖοι μοι εἰσὶ καὶ νεῖσι, ὃ άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, τρεῖς, εἰς μὲν μειράκιον ἤδη, δύο δὲ παιδία· ἀλλ’ ὁμώς οὐδένα-αὐτῶν-δεύρο-ἀναβιβασάμενος, δεήσομαι ὑμῶν ἀποψηφίσασθαι. τί δὴ οὖν 20 οὐδὲν τούτων ποιήσω; οὐκ αὐθαδιζόμενος, ὃ άνδρες Ἀθηναίοι, οὐδ’ ὑμᾶς ἀτιμάζων· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν ἥπαραλέως ἔγω ἔχω (with the gen. of the proper name) is common in quotations. No verb is expressed, and the quotation is in apposition with τοῦτο, etc. Cf. Theaet. 183 e, Παρμενίδης δὲ μοι φανεταί, τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου, αἰδοῖς τε μοι ἁμα δεινός τε. This const. is not confined to quotations. Cf. the freq. use of ὅτιν τάτοραν as in Phaed. 60 e, δύοιν τάτοραν, ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ἐτοί κτησισθαι το εἰδέναι ἢ τελευτησαίν. The quotation is from Hom. Od. xix. 168, οὐ γὰρ ἀκόλουθος ἔσσε παλαιφάτου οὐδ’ ἀπὸ πέτρης.

16. καῖ, καῖ: not correlative. The first καῖ means also, while the second introduces a particular case under οἰκεῖοι and means indeed or even.

17. τρεῖς: not added attrib. but appositively, three of them. Their names were Lampsicles (Xen. Mem. ii. 2. 1), Sophroniscus, and Menexenus. Diog. Laert. II. 20; Phaed. 116 b.

20. αὐθαδιζόμενος: it is not in a vein of self-will or stubbornness. See on c above.

21. εἰ μὲν ἥπαραλέως ἔχω κτέ: e
ΑΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.

πρὸς θάνατον ἡ μῆ, ἂλλος λόγος, πρὸς δ' οὖν δόξαν καὶ 34 ἐμοὶ καὶ υἱῶν καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει οὐ μοι δοκεῖ καλὸν εἶναι ἐμὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ποιεῖν καὶ τηλικώδεις υἱῶτα καὶ τούτῳ τού-
25 νομά ἔχοντα, εἰτ' οὖν ἀληθὲς εἰτ' οὖν ψεύδος· ἄλλ' οὖν δεδογμένοι γέ ἐστι τὸ Σωκράτη διαφέρειν των τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων. εἰ οὖν υἱῶν οἱ δοκοῦντες διαφέρειν εἰτε σοφία 35 εἰτε ἀνδρεία εἰτε ἀληθὴς ἤτυνον ἄρετὴ τούτων εὐσείαν, αἰσχρῶν ἄν εἰς· ὀιοῦσπερ ἔγω πολλάκις ἑώρακα τινὰς,
30 ὡτιν κρίνοντα, δοκοῦντας μὲν τι εἶναι, θαμάσια δὲ ἐργα-
ζομένους, ὡς δεινὸν τι οἰδίμους πείσονται εἰ ἀποθανοῦν-
tαι, ὀσπερ ἄθανατων ἐσομένων, ἂν οἰμέτες αὐτῶν μῆ

whether I can look death in the face or not. At this point the grammatical consistency breaks down. ἄλλ' ought to be followed by a partic. (ὁδεμένοι perhaps), but ὑπ' ὁμοίον is the only trace of it. See on ὁμοίον δὲ ὅσκει, 21 e. The anacoluthon (Π. 1063) is resorted to because Socrates wishes to mention his real motive, and yet to avoid saying bluntly "I am too brave to do anything so humiliating." Having said εἰ μὲν φαραγλῶς κτι. the next clause (πρὸς δ' οὖν κτι.) shapes itself accordingly.

22. ἂλλος λόγος: another question or matter. Cf. Dem. ix. 16, εἰ μὲν γὰρ μικρὰ ταῦτα ἢ μερῶν ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐμελλεν, ἂλλος ἂν εἰς λόγοις αὐτοῖς.—δ' οὖν: but at all events or at any rate, like certe after sive—sive. See on δ' οὖν, 17 a.

24. οὖν: see on ἀποτέρει, 31 d.
—τούτο τοὐνομα: στ. σοφίς. See on ὑνομα δὲ κτί., 23 a. Socrates purposely avoids using the word σοφίς either here or below.

25. ψεύδος: used as the contrary of the adj. ἀληθὲς. Cf. Euthyd. 272 a, ἐὰν τε ψεύδος, ἐὰν τε ἀληθεὶς ἤ. Sometimes it is even used attrib. with a

noun. Cf. Polit. 281 b, παράδοξον τε καὶ ψεύδος ὑνομα. Cf. Hom. Π. ix. 115, ὥ γέρων, οὕτι ψευδός ἐμὰς ἀτας κα-
tελέξας. ἄλλ' οὖν δεδομένοι γε ἐστι: however that may be, people have ar-
ived at the opinion. Cf. Prot. 327 c, ἄλλ' οὖν ἀληθής γούν πάντες Ἰσά
ακαλοὶ ἄν πρὸς τοὺς θαυμάστας (non-profes-
sionals).

26. το: used here to indicate that what follows is quoted. G. 141, n. 7.

27. οἱ δοκοῦντες: those generally re-
a

pected. Here Socrates may have had Pericles in mind, if Plutarch's gossip is truth. Cf. Peric. 32 b, Ἀσπασίαν μὲν οὖν ἐρημησατο, πολλὰ
πάντα παρὰ τὴν δίκην, ὡς Αἰχίλιος φησίν, ἀφεὶς ὑπὲρ ἀτῆς δικρα καὶ δηθεῖς
τῶν δικαστῶν, he begged Aspasia off,
though Aeschines says it was by a flag-
grant disregard of justice, by weeping for her and beseeching the jury.

32. ἄθανατων ἐσομένων: the subj. of this gen. abs. is the same as that of ἀποθανοῦντα.
This is not the regular const., for usually the gen. abs. ex-
presses a subord. limitation, and clear-
ness demands an independent subj.
Here, and in many cases where it intro-
duces an independent idea, it depends
ἀποκτείνητε· οἱ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦσιν αἰσχύνην τῇ πόλει περι-
άπτειν, ὡστ' ἀν τινα καὶ τῶν ξένων ὑπολαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ δια-
35 φέροντες Ἀθηναῖοι εἰς ἀρετήν, οὐς αὐτοὶ ἕαυτῶν ἐν τε 
ταῖς ἀρχαῖς καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τιμαῖς προκύνουσιν, οὕτω 
γυναικῶν οὐδὲν διαφέρουσι. ταῦτα γάρ, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθη-
ναίοι, οὐτὲ ὑμᾶς χρὴ ποιεῖν τοὺς δοκοῦντας καὶ ὑμῖν 
ἐναι, οὐτ' ἂν ἡμεῖς ποιῶμεν ὑμᾶς ἐπιπρέπειν, ἀλλὰ τούτο 
40 αὐτὸ ἐνδείκνυσθαι, ὅτι πολὺ μᾶλλον καταφημίζει 
τοῦ τὰ ἐλεεῖνα ταῦτα δράματα εἰσάγοντος καὶ καταγέλαστον 
τὴν πόλιν ποιῶντος ἢ τοῦ ἰσχυρὰν ἀγνοτος.

XXIV. Χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, ὃ ἄνδρες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον 
μοι δοκεῖ ἐναι δεῖσθαι τοῦ δικαστοῦ οὐδὲ δεόμενον ἀπο-
45 φεύγειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτῳ 
kάθηται ὁ δικαστής, ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι τὰ δίκαια, 
5 ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τῷ κρίνειν ταῦτα· καὶ ὁμοίωμεν οὐ χαριέσθαι

35 on the leading clause for its subj. Cf. 
a Xen. An. i. 4. 12, καὶ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἱναι, 
ἐὰν μὴ τις αὐτοῖς χρήματα διδόῃ, δοσκ 
καὶ τοῖς προτέροις μετὰ Κύρου ἀναβαί 
... καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἐπὶ μαχῇ ἱνα 
των. G. 183 and 278, 1, π.; H. 972 a d.
b 36. οὖν: a very pointed reiteration.
39. ήμεῖς, ὑμᾶς: the defendant and the 
dικασταί. Cf. e below.
40. τοῦ εἰσαγόντος: the one who, etc., 
or 'hin who,' here conveying the notion 
of quality, the man so shameless 
as to. G. 276, 2; H. 906. The phrase 
is borrowed from the stage. Cf. Legg. 
viii. 838 e, ἢ ταῖς ὑθέτας ἢ τινας ὁδοῖ-
νοσας εἰσάγοντες.

XXIV. 1. χωρὶς δὲ τῆς δόξης, οὐδὲ 
dίκαιον: after the unseemly practice 
has been condemned by reference 
to τὸ καλὸν (δόξα), it is found still 
more inconsistent with τὸ δίκαιον, and 
this is conclusive against it. The 
second οὐδὲ (with αἰσχροῦσιν) is merely 
the idiomatic correlative of the first

one. On the argument involved, see 35 
Introd. 71, fin.

3. διδάσκειν καὶ πείθειν: perhaps c 
the full idea would be, διδάσκειν καὶ 
διδάσκατα (or διδάκοντα) πείθειν. For, 
strictly speaking, πείθειν may be the 
result of mere entreaties, but this 
Socrates would probably have called 
διδάσκατα rather than πείθειν. Cf. d 
below.

4. ἐπὶ τῷ καταχαρίζεσθαι: this 
explains ἐπὶ τούτων καταχαρίζεσθαι τὸ 
dίκαιον, "make a present of justice." 
Notice the evil implication of κατα 
in composition.

5. ὁμοίωμεν: part of the oath taken 
by the δικασταί was, καὶ ἀκροδόμου 
tοῦ τοῦ κατηγόρου καὶ τοῦ ἀπολογουμένου 
ὁμοίας ἀμφοῖ. The orators were al-
ways referring to this oath. Cf. 
Aeschin. iii. 6 ff.; Dem. xviii. 3, 
etc. See Introd. p. 49, note 2. Cf. 
also the sentiment, grateful to Ath-
henian hearers, with which Iolaus be-
οἳς ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ, ἀλλὰ δικάσεως κατὰ τοὺς νόμους. οὖκον 35
χρὴ οὖτε ἦμᾶς ἐβίλευσώ ἦμᾶς ἐπιορκέων ὑπὲρ ἦμᾶς ἐθίζεσθαι:
οὐδέπεροι γὰρ ἄν ἦμῶν εὐσέβοις. μὴ οὖν ἁξιότευτε με, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τοιαῦτα δὲν πρὸς ἦμᾶς πράττειν, ἄ 10
μὴτε ἡγοῦμαι καλὰ εἶναι μὴτε δίκαια μὴτε ὅσα, ἀλλὰ
tε μέντοι νῦν Δία [πάντως] καὶ ἀσβεστίας φεύγοντα ὑπὸ Με. 35
α λῆτον τούτοι. σαφῶς γὰρ ἂν, εἰ πείθομεν ἦμᾶς καὶ τῷ
dίσαθαι βιαζόμεθα ὑμῶν ὑμᾶς καὶ τῷ
dόξαθαι καὶ τῇ
dιδάκται, ὑγεία ἢ ἄσθενες καὶ ἀσθενεῖς.
15 ῥοῆν ἀν ἐμαυτοῦ ὡς θεοῦ οὐ νομίζω. ἀλλὰ πολλοῦ δεῖ 35
οὕτως ἔχειν: νομίζω τε γάρ, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ὡς οὐδεὶς
τῶν ἐμῶν κατηγόρων, καὶ ὑμῖν ἐπιτρέπω καὶ τῷ θεῷ κρί-
ναι περὶ ἐμοῦ ὅτη μέλλει ἐμοὶ τε ἀρίστα εἶναι καὶ ὑμῖν.

XXV. Τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὃ ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναῖοι, ε
ἐπὶ τούτῳ τῷ γέγονότι, ὅτι μον κατεψηφίσασθε, ἄλλα τέ 36

15. πολλοῦ δεῖ κτ.: this is far from (lacks much of) being the case (so).
17. ἐπιτρέπω τῷ θεῷ: cf. 42 a, ἀνή-
λον παντὶ πλῆν ἣ τῷ θεῷ. Socrates
sees a divine providence in any de-
cision that may be rendered, and
concludes his plea with words of sub-
mission.
18. ἀριστα: what Socrates un-
derstood to be ἀριστὸν for every man may
be read in the Euthydemus (270 a-
281 e), where Socrates discusses hap-
piness with Clinias; and at the end
of the Phaedrus in his prayer: ᾧ φίλε
Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι δοῦν τῇ δε θεῷ, δοπέτε
μοι καὶ φιλεῖσθαί ἑαυτῷ ἐν (with-
in). ἐξουθεν (outward acts and fortunes)
ἓν δοσα ἐκ, τοὺς εἶν τοῖς μοι φίλαια.
πλοῦσιν δὲ νομίζωμι τῶν σο-
φόν. τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλῆθος εἰς μοι δοὺν
μήτε φέρουν μήτε ἄγουν δύνατ' ἄλλος ἢ
ὁ σώφρον. — καὶ ὑμῖν: he is loyal to
the δικαστή; since they represent
Athens, they are his friends. Cf. the
words of Phaedrus at the end of the
prayer, καὶ ἐμοὶ ταύτα συνεχόχου καὶ
γάρ τὰ τῶν φίλων.

XXV. Here ends Socrates's plea in
answer to Meletus, Anytus, and Lyco.
But much remained to be discussed
and decided before the case was dis-
posed of. The pleadings in a γραφὴ
ἀσεβείας, like those in a γραφὴ παραβό-
μον, were (1) a speech of the defenda-
ant in reply, (3) a vote on the de-
fendant's guilt or innocence. This
would end the matter if the defendant
were acquitted. But the judges found
a verdict of guilty against Socrates.
After such a verdict there remained
always (4) a speech from the prosecu-
tion urging the penalty already pro-
posed or a compromise, and (5) a
speech on behalf of the defendant
in which he actually proposed some
penalty to be inflicted (ἀντιτίμησις) in
place of his opponent's. Cf. Aeschin.
πι. 197 f. After c. xxiv. comes the ver-
dict of the δικαστή, which is followed
by the τίμησις of Meletus. Then with
c. xxv. begins the ἀντιτίμησις of So-
crates. Then comes the final vote
fixing the penalty. See Introd. 74.
1. τὸ μὴ ἀγανακτεῖν: the inf. with ἐ
the art. is placed at the beginning of
the clause, and depends upon a word
of prevention expected instead of ἐγκ
βαλλεῖται. "Many things contribute
toward my not grieving," i.e. prevent
me from grieving. G. 263, 2, and 160,
1; II. 901. The fact that I feel no
disposition to make an outcry, results
from many causes, etc. Cf. Rep. i.
331 b, τὸ μηδὲ ἀκοντὰ τινὰ ἔξω-
πατῆσαι... μέγα μέρος εἰς τούτο
ἡ τῶν χρημάτων κτῆσις αὐθαί
where the parallel is complete except
that, because of the long and intri-
cate specifications (omitted in quot.
μοι πολλὰ ἐξιμβάλλεται, καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον μοι γέγονε τὸ γεγονός τούτο, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον θαυμάζω ἐκατέρων τῶν ψήφων τὸν γεγονότα ἀριθμὸν. οὐ γὰρ ὕπομνη ἔγογγε ὡς ὅπως παρ' ὁλίγον ἔσεθαί, ἀλλὰ παρὰ πολὺ νῦν δὲ, ὡς ἔσεθα, εἰ τριάκοντα μόναι μετέπεσον τῶν ψήφων, ἀποπεφηγηθηκαί. Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἔμοι δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀποπεφηγηκαί, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀποπεφηγηκαί, ἀλλὰ παντὶ δήλον above), there is a repetition of the in eis τῶν.

2. ὅτι μοι κατεψήφισαθε: a definition of τῶν τῷ γεγονότα.

3. καλ...γέγονε: a departure from the beaten track. καλ ὅτι οὐκ κτέ, though regular, would have been cumbersome. The important fact detaches itself from any connective like ὅτι. This is often the case in clauses connected with τέ...καλ, ὡσπ...ὡσπ, μὲν...δὲ. See on ὡσοὶ δὲ ἐθοκεί, 21 ε, and διαθέματα, 25 δ. — οὐκ ἀνέλπιστον: no surprise, i.e. not unexpected. Compare ὑπομνη just below almost in the sense of ἔλπις. The use of ἔλπις and ἀνέλπις and the like to express expectation, without reference to the pleasure or pain involved in the event expected, is common enough in Greek; sometimes even the context makes the expectation one of pain or harm to come. In English, hope is rarely used in the sense of mere expectation, but cf. Rich. III. ii 4, I hope he is much grown since last I saw him; Mer. of Ven. ii 2, As my father, being I hope an old man, shall fructify unto you.

6. οὗτο παρ' ὁλίγον: so close. οὗτος is separated from ὁλίγον by παρά, a case of apparent hyperbaton. See on ἀλλος τε κτέ, 35 δ. The combination παρ' ὁλίγον is treated as inseparable, because the whole of it is required to express the idea "a little beyond," i.e.

7. εἰ τριάκοντα κτέ.: strictly speaking 31. Diog. L. ii. 5 41, says: κατεδικασθή, διακοσίαις ὁδηγηκοντα μιᾶ πλείοι τῶν ἀπολύοντων (sc. ψήφων). The total number of votes against him was therefore 281; so that 220 of the 501 δικασταῖ (see Introd. 66) must have voted in his favor. Socrates probably counted the numbers roughly, as he heard them, and said that thirty votes would have turned the scale. When Aeschines was acquitted of the charge of παραπρακτεία, betrayal of trust when on an embassy, brought by Demosthenes, his majority is said to have been also thirty votes. For Demosthenes, as here for Socrates, such defeat was, under the circumstances, victory. See Introd. 72.

8. ἀποπεφηγηκαί: i.e. alone, Meletus could not have got 100 votes, since with two helpers he failed to get 300.
10 τούτῳ γε, ὃτι, εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη Ἀντώνος καὶ Λύκων καταγγεία, στοντες ἔμοι, καὶ ὥσπερ χειλᾶς δραχμᾶς οὐ μεταλαβόν τὸ ἔρημον μέρος τῶν ψήφων.

XXVI. Τιμᾶται δ’ οὖν μοι ὁ ἀνήρ θανάτου. εἰς... ἐγὼ δὲ δὴ τίνος ὑμῖν ἀντιτιμήσομαι, δ’ ἀνδρές Ἀθηναῖοι; ἢ δηλον ὅτι τῆς ἀξίας; τί οὖν; τί ἁξίος εἰμι παθεῖν ἢ ἀποτίσαι, δ’ τι μαθὼν ἐν τῷ βίῳ οὐχ ἦσον ἦσον, ἀλλ’ ἥμελησας ἄντερ οἱ πολλοί, χρηματισμὸν τε καὶ οἰκονο-

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10. εἰ μὴ ἀνέβη: for the accusers and their respective importance, see Intro.; 30. Notice ἀνέβη... καταγγέλλων.
11. χειλᾶς δραχμᾶς: see Intro. 72.
36 b — τὸ ἔρημον μέρος: (cf. Dem. xviii. 103, τὸ μέρος τῶν ψήφων οὐκ ἔλαβεν) the indispensable fifth part, not a fifth part. The acc. is used because the whole fifth is meant. Cf. Prot. 329 ε, μεταλαμβάνων... τῶν τῆς ἀρετῆς μορίων οἱ μὲν ἔλλογοι οὐ δὲ ἔλλογο. Xen. An. iv. 5. 5, οὗ προσέλαβεν πρὸς τὸ τῶν ψήφων ὑπίσταται, εἰ μὴ μεταβολὴ αὐτοῖς τυροῦ... ἀνὰ δὴ μεταβιβάζων ἀλλήλοις οὐκ ἔλεγεν ἐκατόν.

XXVI. 1. τιμᾶται θανάτου: fixes my penalty at death. See Intro. 73. For the omission of the art. when θανάτος means the penalty of death, cf. 37 b, and see on τοῦ διδαξα. 28 c.
2. οὖν: ethical dat. G.184, 3; H. 770.
3. ἡ δὴν κτ.: with ἡ (an) is appended the interrogative answer to the first question, which is merely rhetorical. — τῆς ἁξίας: sc. τιμῆς. This ellipsis is so common that ἡ ἁξία is treated as a noun; here τιμῆς may easily be supplied from the verb. On παθέν τῇ ἀποτίσαι, see Intro. 74.
4. δ’ τι μαθών: strictly speaking, this is the indir. form of τι μαθὼν, which hardly differs from τι παθών. GMT. 100, n. 7 b; H. 988 c. Both idioms ask, with astonishment or dis-

approval, for the reason of an act. They resemble two English ways of asking ‘why?’ ‘what possessed (μαθών) you?’ ‘what came over (παθών) you?’ So δ’ τι μαθών = an emphatic because. The indir. question here is loosely connected with the leading clause. Such connexion as there is depends upon the notion of deciding a question implied in τί ἁξίος... ἀποτίσαι, “what sort of a penalty do I deserve to pay since the question involved is what possessed me,” etc. This is more striking than the regular phrase οὐχ ἦσον ἦσον ἦσον οἱ ἦσον. Cf. Euthyd. 200 b, δικαίωτον ἂν τὸν υμέρου πατέρα τόστοιμοι δ’ τι παθών σοφοὶ νυν οὖτος ἐφοσον. — ἀλλ’ ἀμελησάς: this is more fully explained below by ἐντεάδα οὐκ ἦν, for which see on 9 below.
5. ἄντερ οἱ πολλοί: sc. ἐπιμελεῖται, supplied from ἀμελησάς. Cf. Hdt. vii. 104, ἀνοίγει δὲ τῶτῳ αἰτεῖ, οὐκ οἷς φεύγειν οὔπως ἀνόφειρόν ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλ’ μάνιστοι εἴ τι τάξις ἐπικρατέσθη τῇ ἁπάλλυσθαι (sc. κελέον). ἐκατότοσον is often to be supplied from οὔτεῖς. For a similar ellipsis, see Hom. Od. vi. 193, οὐδ’ οὖν ἐσθῆτος δευμόρει οὔτε τεν ἄλλού | ὅπερ ἔπειθεν ικέτην ταλαιπωρόν ἀντίσαντα (sc. μη δευςοθα). Socrates’s specifications cover both public and private life.
μίας καὶ στρατηγικῶν καὶ δημηγοριῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων καὶ ξυνομοσίων καὶ στάσεων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει γιγαντιών, ἥγησάμενος ἐμαυτῷ τῷ οὖν ἐπιεικέστερον εἶναι ἢ ὥστε εἰς ταῦτ’ ἱόντα σφάζεσθαι, ἐνταύθα μὲν οὐκ 10 ἢ, οἱ ἐλθὼν μήτε ὡς μήτε ἐμαυτῷ ἐμελλὼν μηδὲν ἀφελός εἶναι, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ τίδι ἐκαστὸν [ἵον] εὑρεγετεῖν τὴν μεγίστην ἐνεργείαν, ὡς ἐν γῆς ἐνταύθα ἢ, ἐπιχειρῶν ἐκαστὸν ὑμῶν πείθειν μὴ πρότερον μητὶ τῶν ἐαυτοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, πρὸς ἐαυτοῦ ἐπιμεληθεῖσα ὡς ὀς βελτιστὸς 15 καὶ φρονιμώτατος ἔσοιτο, μήτε τῶν τῆς πόλεως πρὶν αὐτῆς τῆς πόλεως, τῶν τε ἄλλων οὕτω κατὰ τὸν αὐτοῦ τρόπον

6. καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἄρχων κτ.: and magistracies besides and plots and factions. ἄλλων is attrib. to ἄρχων ξυνομοσίων and στάσεων. Cf. Phaedo, 110 ε, καὶ λίθος καὶ γῆ καὶ τοῖς ἁλλοις ζῷοις (as well as in animals) τε καὶ φυτοῖς. Homer uses a similar idiom, Od. 1.132, πᾶρ δ' αὐτὸς κλισιῶν όθεν ποικίλων ἐκπολοῦν ἄλλων μυστήρων. Socrates means to include all performances which bring a citizen into public life; he talks of responsible public offices as on a par with irresponsible participation in public affairs. Of course στρατηγία is a public office, and among the most important; but δημηγορία is not so, even in the case of the ἄρτορες. For the facts, cf. 32 b.

7. ξυνομοσίων καὶ στάσεων: the former relates to political factions, the so-called ἐταρπία, instituted to overthrow the existing government, the latter to revolutions, whether from democracy to oligarchy, or from oligarchy to democracy. Such combinations and seditions were rife toward the end of the Peloponnesian war. See Grote, c. lxxv.

8. ἥγησάμενος ἐμαυτόν κτ.: freq. the pron. is not given, and then the const. is different. Cf. Xen. An. v. 4.20, ἰκανοὶ ἥγησάμενοι εἶναι . . . ταῦτ' ἐπέτεις κτ. Like the present case is Soph. 234 ε, οἷμαι δὲ καὶ ἐμὲ τῶν ἐπὶ πέρρωθεν ἀφετηρίζων εἶναι.

9. εἰς ταῦτ' ἱόντα: the reading ἵνα can hardly be defended. See App.

11. ἵππι δ' τὸ ἴδια κτ.: but toward privately benefiting individuals. This is strictly the completion of the thought introduced by ἄλλη ἀμέλησα, which, though ἐνταύθα μὲν οὐκ ἢ, furnishes its verb, still requires a positive expression to explain ὡς ἤσσυχαν ἢγον. ἐνταύθα, as is often the case with ὥστε is resumptive, and restates ἵππι τὸ ἴδια ἐκαστὸν κτ. The whole period is full of repetitions, but ἵππες comes in most unaccountably. See App. See on τούτων γὰρ ἐκαστὸς, 19 ε.

13. μὴ πρότερον κτ.: cf. 30 a-b.

14. πρὶν ἐπιμεληθεῖν: πρὶν takes the opt. on the principle of o r a t i o o b l i q u a, since the tense of the leading verb (ἡ) is secondary. GMT. 67,1; 66,2, κ. 1; H. 924.

15. ὡς ἔσοτο: GMT. 45; II. 885 a.

16. τῶν τε ἄλλων: not a third specification in line with μήτε . . . μήτε, but connected with the whole μὴ πρό·
ἐπιμελεῖσθαι: τί οὖν εἰμι ἄξιος παθεῖν τοιοῦτος ὁν; ἀγαθὸν τι, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, εἰ δεῖ γε κατὰ τὴν ἄξιαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ τιμᾶσθαι; καὶ ταύτα γε ἀγαθὸν τοιοῦτον, ὃ τι ἂν 20 πρέποι έμοι. τί οὖν πρέπει ἄνδρι πένητη εὐφρενήτη, δεο-μένῳ ἄγεν σχολήν ἐπὶ τῇ ὑμετέρᾳ παρακελεύσει; οὐκ ἔσθ' ὁ τι μάλλον, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, πρέπει οὕτως, ὡς τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνδρα ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνεισθαί, πολὺ γε μάλ-λον ἢ εἰ τις ὑμῶν ἵππῳ ἢ ἐνωρίδι ἢ ξυγήν. νενίκηκεν 25 ὀλυμπιάδες. ὃ μὲν γὰρ ὑμᾶς ποιεῖ εἴδαιμονος δοκεῖν εἶναι, ἐγὼ δὲ εἶναι, καὶ ὃ μὲν τροφῆς οὐδὲν δείται, ἐγὼ ἐ

36 ἐν πρυτανείῳ συνεισθαί: those entertained by the state (1) were invited once or (2) were maintained permanently. Socrates is speaking of (2), i.e. maintenance in the Pryta- 

TH501OS; the senatorial Prytanes dined in the θόλος, and in later times also those called ἀληθείᾳ, —certain Eleusinian priests, scribes, heralds, etc. See on eἰς τὴν θόλον, 32 c. The public guests sat at table in the Πρυτανείον, which was at the foot of the northwest corner of the Acropolis. Some of them earned the distinction by winning prizes in the national games, some received it on account of their forefathers' benefactions to the state, e.g. the oldest living descendants of Harmodius and of Aristogeiton respectively were thus honored. The most ancient Πρυτανείον on the Acro- 

polis was in historic times used only for certain religious ceremonies.

24. ἐπικά οἴτι: i.e. ἀληθείᾳ, race-horse; ξυγήν, a pair; ξυγήν, four horses abreast. Since a victory in the great panhellenic festivals was glorious for the country from which the victor came, he received on his return the greatest honors, and even substantial rewards. Cf. Rep. v. 465 d, where Plato speaks of the μακρυστός βίος τοῦ ὅλου ἀληθείᾳ. ζωῆς, the blissful life Olympic victors lead.

26. οὕτω δεῖται: only rich men could afford to compete.
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28. ἐν πρυτανεῖῳ σιτῆσεως: cf. above τοῦ τοιούτου ἐν πρυτανείῳ σιτῆσεως. The art. is omitted, since this is thrown in merely to explain τοιούτου.

XXVII. 3. ἀπαθαινοῦμενοι: in the spirit of stubbornness. This serves to explain παραπλησίως κτλ. For the facts, see on τῷ δεισάνθωμι διαζῴμην, 35 δ. — τό δὲ: refers to the act which has been only incidentally touched upon (ταῦτα λέγων = διὰ ταύτα λέγων). ὁ δὲ, οὐ δὲ, τῷ δὲ, are used without a preceding μν when they introduce some person or topic in contrast to what has just been dwelt upon, here περὶ τοῦ οὐκου κτλ. For a different use of τῷ δὲ, see on τῷ δὲ κυνοείδει, 23 α.

4. ἐκῶν ἦνα: an apparently superfluous inf. G. 208, n.; H. 950 a. For the facts, see on ἥ ἀκών, 25 e.

7. ὁσπέρ καὶ ἄλλοις: for instance the Lacedaemonians. Cf. Pseudo Plut. Apophth. Lac. s.v. Ἀναζωδρίδου or Ἀλεξανδρίδου, c. 6, ἐρωτώτοι τὸν αὐτόν, διὰ τὸ ταῦτα περὶ τοῦ θανάτου δίκαιον πλέοσιν ἦμεραι οἱ γέροντες κρίνουσι, πολλαίς, ἐφη, ἥμεραις κρίνουσιν, διὰ περὶ θανάτου τόις διαιμαρτάνουσιν (those who go completely wrong) οὐκ ἔστι μεταβουλεύσασθαι (to reconsider). Thucydides also says in his account of Pausanias, i. 132, δ. χρόμεναι τῷ τρόπῳ φηστε εἰώθασιν ἐς σφᾶς αὐτῶς (their own countrymen), μὴ ταχεῖς εἶναι περὶ ἄνδρος Σπαρτίτου ἄνευ ἀνα-ριστήτων τεκμηρίων βουλεύσασθαι τι ἀνίκεσθαι.

11. ἀκτητήσαν, ἔρειν, τιμηθησάθαι: the fut. is used to disclaim the fut. (GMT. 27, n. 2; H. 855) intention.

13. τί δεισάν: what fear is there to induce me? Supply verbs from the three insfs. above.

14. φημῆ: see above 28 e-30 b.
15 ἐστιν; ἀντὶ τοῦτον δὴ ἔλαμαί δὲν εὐθὺς δὲν κακῶν ὄντων, τοῦτον τιμητάμενος; πότερον δεσμὸν; καὶ τί με δεῖ σῆν ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ, δουλεύοντα τῇ ἀεὶ καθισταμένῃ ἁρχῇ, τοὺς ἐνδέκα; ἀλλὰ χρημάτων, καὶ διδέσθαι ἐως ἄν ἐκτίσω; ἀλλὰ ταύτων μοι ἐστὶν ὅπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον· οὐ γὰρ ἐστι μοι χρήματα ὅποθεν ἐκτίσω. ἀλλὰ δὴ φυγῆς τιμήσωμαι; ἵσως γὰρ ἂν μοι τοῦτον τιμήσωμε. πολλὴ μεν- τὰν μὲ φιλοφυλήξας ἔχω, εἰ οὕτως ἀλόγιστος εἰμὶ ὡστε μὴ δύνασθαι λογίζεσθαι, ὅτι ὑμεῖς μὲν ὄντες πολῖται μου οὐχ ὁδῷ τε ἐγένεσθε ἐνεγκείν τὰς ἐμᾶς διατριβὰς καὶ τοὺς ἰδίους ἐμαρτυρίας καὶ τοὺς.

15. ἔλαμαί δὲν ... ὄντων: a remarkable constr., arising from ἔλαμαῖ τι ἐκεῖνον ἐν οἶδα κακὰ ὄντα, by the assimilation of ἔκεινον ἐν τῷ ὄνῳ and of κακὰ ὄντα to κακῶν ὄντων, and the insertion of οἷς after οἶδα. εὖ τοῦτο οἷς and οἷς οἷς occur freq. (in parenthesis) where οἷς is superfluous. See on δῆλον οἷς, Crit. 53 a, and cf. Dem. xix. θ, μηνυμενεύοντα ὡμῶν οἷς οἷς τὸς τόπος πολλοὺς ὑπομνῆσαι, to remind you, although I know that most of you remember it. Cf. Gorg. 481 α, αἰσθάνομαι ὅτι σοῦ ἐκάκαστο ... οἷς ὅπως ἵν μὴ τὰ παθικά ... οἷς δυναμένους ἀντιλέγειν. So the acc. and inf. may follow οἷς and ὅς.

16. τοῦτον κτῆ.: a part (τί) of ὅς, by fixing my penalty at that. See App. c 17. δουλεύοντα: as a man in prison, who ceses to be his own master.

18. τοὺς ἔθεκα: see Intro. 75 and cf. οἱ ἄρχοντες, 30 e. — ἀλλὰ χρημάτων: a neg. answer to the preceding rhetorical question is here implied; otherwise ἔθεκα might equally well have been used. The second ἀλλὰ introduces an objection, which answers the question immediately preceding it.— καὶ διδέσθαι κτῆ.: to remain in prison. GMT. 18, 3, n. Cf. in Dem. xxiv. 68, the document which winds up with: ἔδω οἱ ἀρχιπρόντων τιμηθῇ δεδεσθαί τέως (ἔως) ἀν ἐκτίσῃ δὲ ἄν αὐτὸν καταγγειοθῇ. 19. νῦν δὲ: just now.

20. ἐκτίσω: for the fut. with rel. denoting purpose, see GMT. 65, 1; H. 911. — ἀλλὰ δὲ: but then. See on ἀλλὰ δὲ, Crit. 54 α. The ἀλλὰ points to the impossibility just asserted of Socrates's paying a fine himself, while δὲ introduces the one possible alternative.

22. φιλοφυλήξα: clinging to life, which is opposed to ἐνυψία (courage). Cf. Eur. Hec. 315, πότερα μαχομεθ', ἡ φιλοφυλήξασαι; ibid. 348, καθ' ἑαυτού καὶ φιλόψυχος γυνὴ; also the speech where Macaria chooses to die, Per alc. 516 ff., κοῦκα αἰσχροῦμαι δὴ, ἐν δή τις λέγειν | "τί δὲν χρῆσθαι ἔκεσθαι σὺν κλάδοις | αὐτὸι φιλόψυ- χοῦντες; ἢ ἔστε χθονοῖς:" with the admiring words of Iolaus, ibid. 597 ff., ἀλλ' ὧν μεγίστων ἐκπέμπειν' ἐνυψία | ταύτων γυναικῶν, ... — εἰ ... εἰμί: cf. 30 b, and see on diaphthetai, 25 b.

23. ἦτι ὲμαίς μὲν: that (if) you, my fellow-citizens, proved unable to bear my company. After this we look for something like this: "then others will prove still less able to bear it." But instead, we find a question with ἓρι, will others then, etc., answered by πολ-
25 λόγους, ἀλλ' ὑμῖν βαρύτεραι γεγόνατί καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦτεραι, 37 ὥστε ἐκεῖτε αὐτῶν νυν ἀπαλαγήναι. ἂλλοι δὲ ἁρα αὐτὰς θύσουσι βαδίσοις; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ, ὡ Ἀθηναίοι. καλὸς οὖν ἄν μοι ὁ βίος εἴη ἐξελθώντι τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπω ἀλλήν ἐξ ἀλλής πόλεως ἀμειβομένῳ καὶ ἐξελαυνομένῳ ζην. εὖ
30 γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτι, ἂν ἐλθὼν, λέγοντος ἐμοῦ ἀκραόστοναι οἱ νέοι ἀντέρ᾽ ἐνθάδε· κἂν μὲν τούτους ἀπελαύνω, οὗτοι ἐμὲ αὐτοῦ ἐξελώσι πείθοντες τοὺς προσβυντέρους· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀπελαύνω, οἱ τούτων πατέρες τε καὶ οἰκείοι δὲ αὐτῶν τούτως.

XXVIII. Ἰσος οὖν ἂν τις εἶποι· σιγών δὲ καὶ ἰσοπλη-
χίαις ἄγων, ὈΣώκρατε, ὅχι οἶος τ' ἐσεὶ ἦμῖν ἐξελθὼν
ζην; τούτι δὴ ἔστι πάντων χαλεπώτατον πείσαι τινας
ὑμῶν. ἐὰν τε γὰρ λέγω ὅτι τῷ θεῷ ἀπειθεῖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶ
5 καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' ἀδύνατον ἰσοχίαις ἄγων, οὐ πείσεσθε μοι.

37 λοῦ γε δεῖ. The dependence of the whole upon ὅτι is forgotten because of the intervening detailed statement.

d 25. βαρύτεραι, fem. because τὸς ἐμᾶς διατριβᾶς is the most important idea and τοὺς λόγους is incidentally added by way of explanation. For agreement with the most prominent noun, see G. 138, n. 2 b.

28. ὁ βίος: the art. as here used has something of its original demonstrative force; accordingly ἐξελόθων: ...ζην is appended as if to a dem. pron., that would be a glorious life for me, to be banished at my time of life. Notice that ἔφρασθαι means ὑο ἐντὸς ἐξελοθῶς ἐν ἐκατοντάρχῳ; ἐπικρᾶν, live in exile; κατείχαν, to come back from exile. Instead of τηλικῶδε ἀνθρώπω, the commoner idiom would be τηλικῶδες ἦν. But cf. τηλικῶδε ἄνδρες, Crit. 49 a; Euthyd. 293 b, πολλὰ γὰρ βέβαιοι τηλικῶδες ἄνδρες, and Legg. i. 634 d, οὗ γὰρ ἐν τηλικῶδες ἄνδραί τινος πρέπει τῷ τοιοῦτον.

— ἀλλὰς ἐξ ἀλλης κτῆ.: cf. Xen. An. v. 4. 31, ἀναβοῦσιν ἀλλήλων νυνήκουσιν εἰς τήν ἐτέραν ἐκ τῆς ἐτέρας πόλεως. Elsewhere we find the substantive repeated, e.g. τόπον ... τόπον, 40 c.

The whole expression suggests the restless life led by the so-called sophists. Cf. Soph. 224 b, where the typical sophist is described as τῶν μαθητῶν ἐξιπαθομένων πόλις ἐκ πόλεως νομίσματος ἀμείβοται, one who goes from town to town buying up and selling knowledge for coin. Cf. also Prot. 313 a—314 b.

33. δι' αὐτοῦ τούτου: to describe the involuntary cause in contrast to οὕτως αὐτοῦ.

XXVIII. 2. ἔλθων ἴδον: to live on in exile. This forms a unit to which σιγῶν and ἰσοπλη-χίαις ἄγων are added by way of indicating the manner of life he will lead. The meaning of ἰσο-
χίαις ἄγων is plain from 36 b.

3. τοῦτι δι': that is the thing of which, etc.; cognate acc. after πέσω. — τιμᾶ:.
ὡς εἰρωνευομένη· ἐὰν τ’ αὖ λέγω ὅτι καὶ τυγχάνει μέγι,
στὸν ἁγαθὸν δὲν ἀνθρώπῳ τούτῳ, ἐκάστης ἡμέρας περὶ ἀρε-
τῆς τοὺς λόγους—ποιεῖσθαι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων περὶ δὲν ὑμεῖς
ἐμοὶ ἀκούετε διαλεγομένου καὶ ἐμαυτῶν καὶ ἄλλους ἐξετά-
ζοντος, δ’ ἔνεξετάστος βίος οὗ βιωτός ἀνθρώπῳ, ταύτα
δ’ ἔτι ἦττον πείσεσθέ μοι λέγοντι. τὰ δὲ ἔχει μὲν οὔτως
ὡς ἐγὼ φημι, δ’ ἀνδρεῖς, πείθεω δὲ οὐ ράδιον. καὶ ἐγὼ
ἀμα οὐκ εἰθισμαί ἐμαυτῶν ἀξίων κακοῦ οὐδενός. εἰ μὲν
γὰρ ἦν μοι χρήματα, ἐτυμησάμην ἐν χρήματων ὅσα ἐμελ.

λοι ἐκτίσεων: οὐδέν γὰρ ἂν ἐξελάβην· νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ
ἐστιν, εἰ μὴ ἀρα ὅσον ἂν ἐγὼ δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι, τοσοῦτον

6. εἰρωνευομένη: see Introd. 26. —
καὶ τυγχάνει μέγιστον ἁγαθόν: it is not
duty only, it is the highest good
and gives the greatest pleasure.
8. τοὺς λόγους: his speeches.
10. ἀνεξετάστος: this may mean
unexamined, unscrutinized, or without
scrutiny, in which latter case a man
neither examines himself nor others,
that is, his life is unthinking. Verbal
adj. in τος, esp. with a privative,
occur with both an act. and a pass.
sense. Here the act. meaning sub-
stantially includes the pass. in so far
as it involves self-examination (καὶ
ἐμπέταν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐξετάζοντος).
—
βιωτός: worth living. Cf. ψεκτός, blame-
worthy, and ἐπαινετός, praiseworthy.
—
ταύτα δ’ ἔτι: δ’ introduces apod.
(GMT. 57) in order to bring it into
relation with the preceding οὐ πεί-
σεσθέ μοι. The two correspond very
much like the two introductory clauses
ἐὰν τε ... ὅτι τ’ αὖ. See on δεῦ τα ἐπὶ κτ., 25 d.
11. τὰ δὲ: see on τὸ δὲ, 37 a.
12. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀμ’ οὐκ εἰθισμαί: after
Socrates, in 28 e–30 c and here, has
shown that he neither can nor should
abandon his customary manner of
living, and has thus proved that he
neither can nor should live in exile; he
further adds (cf. the reasons given in
37 b) that he cannot propose banish-
ment as his penalty. Banishment he
has already (28 e ff.) rejected, though
here he rejects it in a somewhat al-
tered form.
13. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν κτ.: γὰρ is re-
lated to the thought which lies unut-
tered in the previous explanation:
not from love of money do I refuse to
make a proposition. The apod. in-
cludes δ’ ἐμελλον κτ. See on δ’
ἐμελλει, 20 a.
15. νῦν δὲ—οὐ γὰρ: but as it is, b
(I name no sum of money,) for money
I have none. The connexion is similar
to ἄλλα γὰρ (10 d, 20 c), where the un-
expressed thought alluded to by γὰρ
is easily supplied. νῦν δὲ expresses
forcibly the incompatibility of facts
with the preceding supposition. Cf.
Lach. 184 a, νῦν δὲ ἐδ’ ἕδ’ ἔχει ἀκούσα
καὶ σοῦ.
16. εἰ μὴ ἄρα: see on εἰ μὴ ἄρα, 17 b.
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βούλεσθέ μοι τιμήσαι. ἵσως δ' ἄν δυναίμην ἐκτίσαι ύμών μᾶν ἄργυρίου τοσοῦτον οὐν τιμῶμαι. Πλάτων δὲ οδε, ὧ άνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ Κρίτων καὶ Κριτόβουλος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος κελεύσατε με τριάκοντα μνῷ τιμήσασθαι, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυάσθαι τιμῶμαι οὐν τοσοῦτον, ἐγγυηταί δ' ύμῶν ἐσονται τοῦ ἄργυρίου οὗτοι αξίόχρεω.

XXIX. Οὐ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου, ὧ άνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὦνομα ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν ὑπὸ τῶν βουλομένων τὴν πόλιν λοιδορεῖν, ὡς Σωκράτη ἀπεκτόνατε. άνδρα σοφὸν φήσουσι γὰρ δὴ σοφὸν εἶναι, εἰ καὶ μὴ εἰμί, οἱ βουλόμενοι ύμῶν ὄνειδίζων, εἰ οὖν περιείμεντες ἄλῳν χρόνον, ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτόματον ἄν ύμῶν τότε ἐγένετο· ὅρατε γὰρ δὴ τὴν ἡλικίαν ὅτι πόρρω ἤδη ἐστὶ τοῦ βίου, θανάτῳ δὲ ἐγγύς. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο οὐ πρὸς πάντας ύμᾶς, ἀλλὰ πρὸς

18. μνάν ἄργυρίου: about seventeen dollars. This is certainly small compared with the fines imposed in other cases, e.g. upon Miltiades, Pericles, Timotheus.

21. αὐτοὶ δ' ἐγγυάσθαι: sc. ἔστε, to be supplied from κελεύσατε. Their surety would relieve Socrates from imprisonment.

22. ἀξίόχρεω: responsible, an assurance hardly needed in Crito’s case.

XXIX. Here ends Socrates’s ἀντίτιμος, and it was followed by the final vote of the court determining Socrates’s penalty. With this the case ends. Socrates has only to be led away to prison. See note on c. xxv. above, 35 d. See Introd. 35 and 36. In the address that follows, Socrates is out of order. He takes advantage of a slight delay to read a lesson to the court.

1. οὖ πολλοῦ γ' ἕνεκα χρόνου: a compressed expression. By condemning Socrates, his judges, in order to rid themselves of him, have hastened his death by the few years which remained to him; thus, to gain a short respite, they have done a great wrong.

2. ὄνομα ἔστε καὶ αἰτίαν: the name and the blame. See on τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τὴν διαβολὴν, 20 d, and ὄνομα δὲ τοῦτο κτῆ, 23 a. — ὑπὸ: as if with ὄνομασθήσετε and αἰτιασθήσετε. See on πεπώθατε, 17 a. Some periphrasis like ὄνομα ἔστε κτῆ was often preferred by the Greeks to their somewhat cumbersome fut. pass. (of which there are only two examples in Hom.).

7. πόρρω τοῦ βίου: far on in life. For the gen. with advs. of place, see G. 182, 2; H. 757. — θανάτου δ' ἐγγύς: and near unto death. The contrast introduced by δ' is often so slight that but overtranslates it. Cf. Xen. Cyr. i. 5, 2, δ Κυνάρης δ τοῦ Ἀστυάγους
παϊς, τῆς δὲ Κέρυν μητρὸς ἄδελφος κτὲ. Ἀν. i. 7. 9, εἰπερ Ὑπερέλου ἐστὶ παῖς, ἐμὸς δὲ ἄδελφος, οὐκ ἀμαχεῖ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λήψομαι.

12. ὡστε ἀποφυγεῖν: so as to escape, i.e. in order to escape. The Greek idiom expresses not so much purpose as result. There really seems very little difference between this ὡστε with the inf. and an obj. clause with ὡςας and the fut. ind. GMT. 98, 2, and 45; Ἡ. 953 and 886. Cf. Phaedr. 252 ε, πᾶν ποιούσιν ὡςας τοιοῦτος (sc. φιλόσοφος) ἦσαν, and Phaed. 114 ε, χρή πᾶν ποιεῖν ὡστε ἀρετῆς καὶ φρονήσεως ἐν τῷ βίῳ μετασχεῖν. Cf. also ὡστε διαφεύγειν, 39 a below.

14. τὸλμῃ: in its worst sense, like theLat. audacia. Cf. ἓλαν τὸλμῃς, 39 a below, and Crit. 53 ε.

16. ϑηνοῦντος κτ.: a development of the idea in τοιοῦτα, ὃ ἀν κτ. Here is a transition from the acc. of the thing (sound) heard to the gen. of

the person heard, unless ϑηνοῦντος...

φημι is looked upon as a gen. absolute thrown in as an afterthought for the sake of a more circumstantial and clearer statement. For the facts, cf. Gorg. 522 d, where (evidently with reference to the point here made) Plato puts the following words into Socrates's mouth: εἰ δὲ κολακικὴς ῥητορικὴς (rhetorical flattery) ἐνεδέι τελευτήθην ἔργας, εἰ οὖν ὑπὲρ ἔργος ὑπὸ ἐν μὲ φάρσα τῶν ἱάτων.

19. οὐδὲν: see on οὐδὲν, 34 ε.

21. ὡς ἀπολογησάμενος: in this way, etc., i.e. after such a defence. ὡςας above means as I have, and that idea is vividly repeated by ϑης. Thus its contrast with ἐκεῖνος (sc. ἀπολογησάμενος) is made all the more striking. — τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, 30 ε.

23. πᾶν ποιῶν: by doing anything and everything. Cf. πανούργος, a rascal. Cf. 38 d.
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39 θάνατον, καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις πολλάκις δῆλον γί-—
26 γενεται οτι τὸ γε ἀποθανεῖν ἀν τις ἐκφύγοι καὶ ὁπλα ἀφεῖς καὶ ἐφ’ ἱκετείαν τραπέζην ὅν τῶν διωκόντων. καὶ ἀλλαὶ μὴναὶ πολλαί εἰσίν ἐν ἐκάστοις τοῖς κωνδύνοις ὡστε διαφεύγειν θάνατον, εάν τις τολμᾶ τὰν ποιεῖν καὶ λέγειν. ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐ τούτο ἡ χαλεπόν, ὥν ἄνδρες, θάνατον ἑκφυγεῖν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ χαλεπῶτέρον πονηρίαν. θάττων γὰρ θανάτου θεί. καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂτε βραδὺς ὄν καὶ πρε-β
σβύτης ὑπὸ τοῦ βραδυτέρου εἰάλων, οἰ δ ’ ἔμοι κατήγοροι ἂτε δεινοὶ καὶ ὁξεῖς ὄντες ὑπὸ τοῦ θάττους, τῆς κακίας, καὶ νῦν ἐγὼ μὲν ἂπεμι ὑφ’ ὑμῶν θανάτου-δίκην ὁφλῶν, 35 οὗτοι δ’ ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ὀφληκτότες μοχθηρίων-καὶ ἀδι-
κίαν. καὶ ἐγὼ τε τὰ τῷ τιμήματι ἐμμένω καὶ οὗτοι. ταύτα μὲν
που ἰσως οὖν καὶ ἐδεί σχεῖν, καὶ οἷμαι αὐτὰ μετρίως ἐχεῖν.

XXX. Ὅτι δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτο ἐπιθυμῶ ὑμῖν χρησμοδή-

28. ἄστι: cf. μηκανάσθαι ὅποιος just above, and see on ἄστι ἄσφοργειν, 38 d.
29. μὴ ... ἡ: substituted rhetorically for a statement of fact. See on μὴ σκέμματα ἡ, Crit. 48 c. For the idea of fearing implied, see GMT. 46, n. 4.
30. ἀλλὰ πολὺ κτὲ.: fully expressed we should have ἀλλὰ μὴν πολὺ χαλεπῶ-
tέρον ἡ πονηρίαν ἐκφύγειν. — θάττων θανάτου θεί: flies faster than fate, to preserve the alliteration, which here, as often, is picturesque. For the thought, cf. Henry V. iv. 1, “Now if these men have defeated the law and outrun native punishment, though they can outstrip men, they have no wings to fly from God.” In the thought that wickedness flies faster than fate, we have perhaps a reminiscence of Homer’s description of Ἀτη, Il. ix. 505 ff., ἤ δ’ Ἀτη σθεναρὴ
te καὶ ἄρτιτος, οὔπερκα τάσαν ἡ πολλὸν ἐπεκροθεῖς, φθάνει δὲ τε τὰσαν ὑπ’ αὐλῶν
βλάπτοντος ἀνθρώπων.
34. θανάτου δίκην ὁφλῶν: with ἐφιλασκάνειν, whether used technically (as a law term) or colloquially, we find the crime or the penalty either (1) in the acc. or (2) in the gen. with or without δίκην. On the accent, see App.
36. καὶ ἐγὼ κτὲ.: i.e. they escape their punishment just as little as I escape mine. The καὶ before ἔδει makes a climax: “perhaps it was necessary for the matter actually to shape itself just as it really has.”
37. σχεῖν: on the meaning of σχεῖν and ἐχεῖν respectively, see on ἔσχετε, 19 a.
XXX. 1. τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτο: τὸ δὲ is used adverbially; see on τὸ δὲ, 37 a. χρησμοδήσα, declare a prophecy.
σαι, δ' καταφησάμενοι μοι. καὶ γὰρ εἰμὶ ἣδη ἐνταῦθα, ἐν δὲ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦν, ὅταν μελλὼσιν ἀποθανεῖσθαι. φημὶ γάρ, δ' ἄνδρες, δι' εἰμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε, 5 τιμωρίαν ἕμιν ἤσεω εἰρίθης μετὰ τὸν ἔμον βάναυσον πολὺ χαλεπωτέραν νὴ Δία ἢ οἰαν εἰμὲ ἀπεκτόνατε: νῦν γὰρ τοῦτο εἰργάσασθε οἴμοιν ἀπαλλάξεσθαι τοῦ διδόναι ἐλεγχον τοῦ βίου, τὸ δ' ἕμιν πολιτευντίαν ἀποβήσεσθαι, ὡς εἰ γάρ φημι. πλεῖον εσονται ύμᾶς οἱ ἐλέγχοντες, οὐς οὖν ἕγα 10 κατείχον, ύμεῖς δὲ οὐκ ἡσθάνεσθε· καὶ χαλεπάτεροι ἔσον- 11 ταί ὄσον νεώτεροι εἰσι, καὶ ύμεῖς μᾶλλον ἀγανακτήσετε. εἰ γὰρ ζησθεί ἀποκτείνοντες ἄνθρωποις επισχήσεων τοῦ ὅνειδειν τω ἕμιν ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἤσθε, οὐκ ὀρθῶς δια-

30 e 3. ἄνθρωποι χρησμῳδοῦν κτέ.: prob. Socrates has in mind such cases as Homer mentions, I. xvi. 851 ff., where Patroclus as he dies prophesies truly to Hector, οβ θην οὐδ' αὐτὸς δηρὰν βεὶ, ἀλλὰ των ἢδη ἡγεῖναι παράστηκεν βάναυσος καὶ μοίρα κρατάει, and xxii. 358 ff., where Hector's last words foretell the killing of Achilles by Paris and Phoebus Apollo. Cf. Verg. Aen. x. 738., —
Ille autem exprimatur: Non me, quicunque es, multo, Victor, nec longum laetabere; te quoque fata Prospectant paria, atque eadem mox atra tenebris.

Cf. also Xen. Cyr. viii. 7. 21, ἢ δὲ τοῦ ἄνθρωπου ψυχῆ τότε (at the hour of death) δῆσαι βειοτάτῃ καταφαίνεται καὶ τότε τι τῶν μελλόντων προφαί: τότε γὰρ, ὡς ἐοικε, μάλιστα ἔλυθενοντο. The same idea is found in many literatures. Cf. Brunhild in the song of Sigfried (Edda), —

I prithée, Gunther, sit thee here by me, For death is near and bids me prophecy.

See also John of Gaunt's dying speech, Rich. II. ii., —

Methinks I am a prophet new-inspired, And thus expiring do foretell of him: His rash fierce blaze of riot cannot last, For violent fires soon burn out themselves.

4. ἀπεκτόνατε: sc. by their verdict, and by the penalty which they voted after Socrates had made his counter-proposition (of a penalty), ἀντίτιμημα.

6. οὖν ἔμι ἀπεκτόνατε: this is after the analogy of τιμωρίαν τιμωρεῖσθαι τινα, without some reminiscence of which it would hardly occur to any one to say βάναυσον τα τιμωρίαν ἔμι ἀπεκτόνατε. ἀπεκτόνατε is substituted, as more vivid and concrete, for the expected τετιμώρησθε. Similarly we have μάχην μικῶν οὐκ ἢ τταὐσθαι as more specific equivalents of μάχην μάχασθαι. — νῦν: expresses reality. This use of νῦν is akin to its very frequent use in contrast to a supposition contrary to fact (cf. 38 b, Luch. 184 d and 200 e); but here it is connected with a false account of what will come to pass, in contrast with the true prophecy of Socrates.

8. τὸ δ' κτέ.: for a similar idiom, though more strongly put, cf. Soph.
νοείσθε. οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' αὕτη ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατή 39
15 οὔτε καὶ, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη καὶ καλλιστὴ καὶ ράστη, μῆ θ' τοὺς
ἀλλούς κολούειν, ἀλλ' ἔαντοι παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται
ὡς βέλτιστος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὦμω τοῖς καταψηφισματέ
νοις, μαντευσάμενος-ἀπαλλάττομαι.

XXXI. Τοὺς δὲ ἀποψηφισμένους ἠδείς ἃν διαλεγο-
χθείν ὑπ' τοῦ γεγονότος τουτοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ὦ δ' οἱ
ἀρχοντες ἀσχολίαν ἄγονοι καὶ οὕτω ἔρχομαι οἱ ἑκάστα
με δεῖ τεθάναιν. ἀλλὰ μοι, ὦ ἄνδρες, παραμεῖνε τοσοῦ-
τοῦ χρόνου· οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει διαμυθολογησά τρός ἀλλή-
λους ἐώς ἐξεστίν· ὦμω γὰρ ὃς φίλοις οὕσω ἐπιδείξαι 40
ἐθέλω τὸ νυνί μοι ἐξυμβεβηκός τι ποτε νοεί. ἐμὸ γὰρ, ὦ
ἄνδρες δικασταὶ—ὑμᾶς γὰρ-δικασταὶ καλῶν ὀρθῶν ἃν
καλοῖν—θαυμάσιον τι γέγονεν. ἡ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μοι

24. a, τὸ δὲ τοῦτο γίγνεται πάντων τοῦ-
εναντίαν.

14. ἐσθ' αὕτη: not οὐ γὰρ ἐσθ' κτέ.,
as Schanz has it. The position of ἐστι near οὐ at the beginning of the
clause justifies the accent. G. 28, 3,
x. 1, fin.; H. 490, 3.

15. μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν: to op-
pres no man, corresponding to the pre-
ceding ἀποκτείνοντες . . . ἐπισχῆσιν κτέ.

XXXI. 2. ὑπέρ: has just the same
meaning with περί. See L. and S. sv.
ὑπέρ, ἐπί. Socrates speaks about what
has befallen him, which he looks upon
as for the best since it is the will of
Divine Providence.—οἱ ἀρχοντες: see
Introd. 75, and cf. 37 e.

3. ἀσχολίαν ἄγονοι: are busy. They
were occupied with the arrangements
for conveying Socrates to prison. For
teθάναι, see on τεθαναίν, 30 e.

4. ἀλλ' : used freq., for the sake
of greater vivacity, before the inv.
or subjv. of command. See on ἀλλ'
ἔμωι κτέ., Crit. 45 a.

5. οὐδὲν γὰρ κολύει: indicates the
calm self-possession of Socrates, so
strongly contrasted with the ordinary
attitude of those under sentence of
death.—διαμυθολογήσαι: more friend-
ly and familiar than διαλέγεσθαι. Thus
Socrates prepares to open his heart
upon matters not strictly relevant,
which only those of whom he is fond
and who care for him need hear. Cf.
Phaed. 61 e, τοὺς καὶ μάλιστα πρέπει
μέλλοντα ἑκείνω ἀποδημεῖν διασκο-
πεῖν τε καὶ μυθολογεῖν περὶ τῆς
ἀποδημίας τῆς ἑκεί, πολαν τινὰ αὕτην
οἴσμεθα εἶναι.

8. ὑμᾶς γὰρ κτέ.: see on ἐν τί μὲν
ἀμέτοι, 17 a.

9. ἡ γὰρ ἐλευθερία κτέ.: notice how
many short statements of fact crowd
one upon the other. This serves to
arrest the attention. The θαυμάσιον
ti is that now, when Socrates has such
a jûte before him, the voice is silent,
while previously, etc. See on δεινὰ ἀν
ἐίναι (ἵν.), 28 e.
μαντική ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου ἐν μὲν τῷ πρόσθεν. χρόνῳ—παντὶ πάνυ τυχή ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ πάνυ ἐπὶ σμικροῖς ἐναντιομενή, εἰ τῷ μέλλομι μὴ ὄρθως πράξειν· νῦν δὲ ἐξυμβεβηκέ μοι, ἀπερ ὅρατε καὶ αὐτοὶ, ταύτη ἡ γε δὴ οἰηθεὶς ἂν τοῖς καὶ νομίζεται ἐσχάτα κακῶν εἶναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὔτε ἐξοντι ἐσθεν

οἰκοθεν ἡναντιώθη τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σμηνείον, οὕτε ἅνικα ἀνέ—βαλον ἐνταυθῷ ἐπὶ τὸ δικαστήριον, οὔτε ἐν τῷ λόγῳ οὐδαμοῦ μέλλοντι τι ἐρεῖν· καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε χε λέγοντα μεταξύ· νῦν δὲ οὐδαμοῦ περὶ ταύτη τήν πράξειν οὔτ' ἐν ἔργῳ οὐδείν οὔτ' ἐν λόγῳ ἡναντιώται μοι. τί οὖν αἰτιον εἴναι ὑπολαμβάνω; ἐγὼ υἱῶν ἔρω· κινδυνεύει γάρ μοι τὸ ἐξυμβεβηκός τούτο ἁγαθὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ οὐκ ἐσθ' ὅπως ἡμεῖς ὀρθῶς ὑπολαμβάνομεν ὅσοι οἰόμεθα κακὸν εἶναι τὸ τεθναί. μέγα μοι τεκμήριον τούτον γέγονεν· οὗ γάρ ἐσθ' ὅπως οὐκ ἡναντιώθη ἄν 25 μοι τὸ εἰσώδες σμηνείον, εἰ μή τι ἐμέλλων ἐγὼ ἁγαθὸν πράξειν.

10. ἡ τοῦ δαμονίου: see on δαμόν, 31 d. See App. 11. πάνυ τε ἐν σμικροῖς: see on οὕτω παρ' ὀλγών, 30 a. 12. ὀρθῶς πράξειν: I.e. so that all would be for the best, an expression which is closely allied to εἰ πράττειν. Cf. below c, ἁγαθὸν πράξειν. Cf. 45 d. 13. ἡ γε δή κτῆ: γέ emphasizes the idea expressed, and δὴ appeals to the patent fact. Cf. φάσκω τά γε δή, Crit. 45 d. — καλ... νομίζεται: a shift from act. to pass. Cf. Charm. 156 c, ταύτα οὕτω λέγοντι τε καὶ ξέρει. Perhaps as νομίζεται expresses the opinion actually in vogue, it should be strengthened in translation by some adv. 14. ἐσθεν: in the morning. Cf. Xen. An. iv. 4. 8; vi. 3. 28; and Hom. Od. 1. 572.

17. πολλαχοῦ δή: in many situations, and hence, often. 18. λέγοντα μεταξύ: for this and other advs. with the temporal partic., see G. 277, 6, n. 1; H. 970. Usually μεταξύ is prefixed, not appended. 19. περὶ ταύτη τήν πράξειν: in regard to this whole affair, referring to the whole trial, and including everything that led up to it. 20. ὑπολαμβάνω: not subjunct., since there is no question of doubt. The question is only a vivid fashion of speech, of which Plato is very fond. 22. ἡμεῖς: to be conected immediately with δην. This use of the pron. gives a genial color to the whole; in Eng. we should use a partitive expression, all those among us. 25. ἡμέρλλον: referring definitely to o
past time but still containing the idea of continued action. Cf. Xen. An. v. 8. 13, entifier tov toû tâs kathômâmen (had done), èpantos èn èpâkolwthta. For the facts, see Introd. 27, fin.

XXXII. 1. Leîtha: after an argument based upon the silence of his inner voice, Socrates considers the question upon its merits.

2. èînai: not ësthai. G. 203, n. 2; H. 948 a. Cf. Hom. II. ix. 40, daimoni, eûtîn tân mûlûn èleptei ëúsas 'Achiôv | èpantolêmîs tî èmenei kai ènplêkidas ës ëgorevês; Cf. also Il. xiii. 309, èkê tâ thî èpantos ènplêmuo kárho kómmastas 'Achiôv.

3. oîn còn, ìn ìnai: with a definitively expressed subj. (cf. oîn àpothe- mhîn in e below), to be dead is as to be nothing, i.e. its nature is such that a man when dead is nothing.

4. tîn têbnuota: the subj. of ëchein (not of ìnai), which is an after-thought.—kathê tâ leguména: Socrates associates his idea of the life hereafter with stories and traditions which are themselves a development of Homer's utterances about the 'Hâstovn pêbion and Hesiod's account of the makárôn vênov. The later poets, e.g. Pindar, continued what Homer and Hesiod began. And Pindar, furthermore, incorperates into his descriptions of life after death Orphic and Pythagorean accounts of metempsychosis. Here and in the Phaedo (70 e-72 a) Socrates appeals to a palaioi lógos.

5. tî ëphixê: a date of interest. G. 184, 3; H. 771. The gen. would express the subject of the action designated.—tô toû tópopou: governed by metâbolh kai metâkhrêsis. Of these two the latter repeats the former in more specific form. The gen. corresponds to the acc. with metâballemv and (rarely) metoukein. Cf. Theaet. 181 c, ëtvan tî òphn en òphn metâbalh.

6. tîn èndêva: see on toûs èk tâs nêmuçhias, 32 b. See also App. — kathê: the second member is introduced by èi ò dî in line 19.


8. kérdo: not ìgathôn, because Socrates does not consider such a condition as in itself a good.

9. òn òma: òn belongs to ìperein, and on account of the length of the prot. is repeated first with òma in 14, and again just before the int.; similarly ðâoi is twice used in the prot. See on òn òs tâx àv, 31 a. — èkplezûmen kal
νύκτα, ἐν ἡ ὕπτω κατεδαφθεὶς ὡστε μηδὲ ὅναρ ἰδεῖν, καὶ τάς ἄλλας νύκτας τε καὶ ἡμέρας τὰς τὸν βίον τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀντιπαραθέντα ταῦτη τῇ νυκτὶ δέοι σκεφάμενον εἰπεῖν, πότες ἀμεων καὶ ἡδιον ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας ταύτης τῆς νυκτὸς βεβίωσεν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτοῦ βίῳ, ὅμως ἄν ὁ μὴ ὁτι ἰδιώ.

τὴν τοιά, ἀλλὰ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα εὐαρίθμητον ἂν εὐρέως ὁ ἑαυτὸν ταύτας πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἡμέρας καὶ νύκτας. εἰ οὖν τοιοῦτον ὁ θάνατος ἔστι, κέρδος ἔγγυε λέγω καὶ γὰρ οὐδέν πλείων ὁ πᾶς χρόνος φαίνεται οὕτω δὴ εἰναι ἡ μία νύξ. εἰ δ' αὖ οὗτον ἀποδημηθεὶς ἔστω ὁ θάνατος ἐνθέωδε εἰς ἄλλον τόπον, καὶ ἄληθή ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα ὡς ἁρὰ ἐκεῖ εἰσών ἔπαντες οἱ τεθνεότες, τί μείζον ἀγαθὸν τούτου εἰς ἄν, ὁ ἄνδρες δικασταί; εἰ γὰρ τις ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἄιδον, ἀπαλλαγεὶς τούτων τῶν φασκάνων δικαστῶν ἐως, εὐρή. σει τοὺς ἄληθος δικαστάς, οἰπερ καὶ λέγονται ἐκεῖ δικά. ζεω, Μίνως τε καὶ Ῥαδαμάνθυς καὶ Αἰακὸς καὶ Τρυπόλεμος καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῶν ἡμιθέων δικαίων ἐγένοντο ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῶν

 ántraraθέντα σκεφάμενον: the first two particles coupled by καὶ are subordinated to σκεφάμενον, just as it is subordinated in turn to εἰπεῖν. See on ὅτι ἀπεκχαράνην, 21 ε. 14. μὴ ἄτρι, ἀλλὰ κτῆ.: not to speak of any one in private station, no, not the Great King, etc. ἀλλὰ is used here to introduce a climax. See II. 1035 a. 16. αὐτὸν: sc. this gives a final touch of emphasis to βασιλέα. Socrates talks of the king of Persia in the strain which was common among Greeks in his day. Polus, in the Gorgias (470 e), is startled because Socrates refuses to take it for granted that the king of Persia is happy. 17. κέρδος λέγω: sc. αὐτὸν. — καὶ γὰρ κτῆ.: for thus the whole of time appears no more than a single night, etc.
**AΠΟΛΟΓΙΑ ΣΩΚΡΑΤΟΥΣ.**

βίω, ἀρα φαύλη ἂν εἰη ἡ ἀποδημία; ᾠ ἂν ὦ Ὀρφεὶ οὐγγε-41
νέσθαι καὶ Μουσαίῳ καὶ Ἡσιόῳ καὶ Ὀμήρῳ ἐπὶ πόσῳ
ἀν τις ἰδέας ἂν ὑμῶν; ἕγω μὲν γὰρ πολλάκις ἐθέλω
30 τεθνάναι, εἰ ταῦτα ἐστὶν ἄληθῆ. ἐπεὶ ἐμοι γε καὶ αὐτῷ
θαμμαστῇ ἂν εἰη ἡ διατριβὴ αὐτοῦ, ὅπως ἐντύχομεν ἡ
Παλαμήδει καὶ Ἀιάντε τῷ Τελαμώνος καὶ εἰ τις ἄλλος τῶν
παλαιῶν διὰ κρίσιν ἁδικον τεθηκεν. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι

usu ally transformed into a demon with a
long tail, still fulfills the same duties,—
... When the spirit evil-born
Cometh before him, wholly it confesses;
And this discriminator of transgressions
Seeth what place in Hell is meet for it;
Girds himself with his tail as many times
As grades he wishes it should be thrust
down.

In Ar. Frogs, Aeacus is Pluto’s foot-41
man. For a painting representing the
judges of the underworld, see Gerhard’s
Vasenbilder, plate 239. — Τραπέζιος:
son of Eleusis, glorified in the trad-41
tions of Demeter θεσμοφόρα. He was
the disseminator of intelligent agri-
culture. Plato uses here the freedom
which characterizes all his mythical
digressions, and adapts the myth to
the point which he desires to make.
διάδοχος implies action in two capaci-
ties: (1) as judge, pronouncing upon
the deeds and misdeeds of every soul
that has lived and died (this is the
account of Minos in the Gorgias), and
(2) as king and legislator. Cf. Hom.
Od. xi. 568 ff., where Minos is shown
χρόσων σκῆντος ἐξόντα, ἡμιστειωτά
νέκυσσιν. Probably here the prevail-
ing idea is that of king and legislator.
Homer (Od. iv. 564 ff.) places Rhad-
amanthus among the blessed in the
Elysian fields.

27. Ὀρφεὶ κτὲ.: Orpheus and Mus-
sseus with Homer and Hesiod were
honored as the most ancient bards
and seers of Greece.

28. ἐπὶ πόσῳ: price stated in the
form of a condition. — The repetition
of ἂν has an effect comparable to the
repeated neg. The first ἂν is con-
nected with the most important word
of the clause, while the second takes
the place naturally belonging to ἂν in
the sent. GMT. 42, 2, fin. Cf. 31 a.

66, τεθνάναι δὲ μυράκις κρείττον κτέ.
Cf. 30 c.

30. ἐμοι γε καὶ αὐτῷ: for me myself
more particularly.

31. ὅπως: when (if at any time) I b
met.

32. Παλαμήδει: the son of Tau-
plius, a king in Euboea. The wisdom
of Palamedes provoked the jealousy
of Odysseus, Diomedes, and Aga-
memnon, and was his ruin. Acc. to
the post-homeric story Odysseus plotted
so successfully, by forging a mes-
sage to Palamedes from Priam, that
Palamedes was suspected of treason
and stoned by the Greeks. Cf. Verg.
Aen. 82 ff. and Ov. Met. xiii. 58 ff.
The title is preserved of a lost trag-
edy by Sophocles called Palamedes
and of one by Euripides. The fate
of Ajax is well known through Hom.
Od. xi. 541 ff. See also Met. xiii. and
the Ajax of Sophocles.

33. ἀντιπαραβάλλοντι: a case of
asyn denton (H. 1039), which occurs not
infrequently where as here a sent.
is thrown in by way of explanation.
τὰ ἐμαυτοῦ πάθη πρὸς τὰ ἐκεῖνων, ὡς ἔγὼ οἷμαι, οὐκ ἂν ἄν
35 ἄηδες εἰη. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον, τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἔξετάζουτα καὶ
ἔρευνοι τὸν ὅστερ τοὺς ἐνταῦθα διάγεω, τίς αὐτῶν σοφός
ἔστι, καὶ τίς οἰεται μέν, ἐστι δ’ οὖ. ἐπὶ πόσῳ δ’ ἂν τις, ὡ
ἀνδρεῖ δικασταί, δεξαίτο ἐξετάσαι τὸν ἐπὶ Τροίαν ἀγωνα
τὴν πολλήν στρατιάν ἢ Ὀδυσσέα ἢ Σίινθον, ἢ ἄλλους ὡ
μυρίων ἂν τις εἰποί καὶ ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας, οἷς ἐκεῖ
διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ἔστειλαι καὶ ἐξετάζειν ἀμήχανον ἂν εἰη
evδαμονιάς. πάντως οὐ δὴ τοῦτο ἐνέκει οἷς ἐκεῖ
ἀποκτείνουσι: τά τε γάρ ἄλλα εὐδαμονέστεροι εἰσών οἱ
ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνθαδε, καὶ ἣδη τὸν λουπὸν χρόνον ἀθανατοὶ εἰσώ,
45 εἰπερ γε τὰ λεγόμενα ἀληθῆ.

41 b μοί is easily supplied from the pre-
ceeding ἐμογέ. The partic. is used
as with ἢμισθαι, to which ous ἂν ἄηδες
εἰη is substantially equivalent. Cf.
also the partic. with impers. expres-
sions like ἀμεινόν ἔστι, μεταμέλει μοί, etc.
35. καὶ δὴ τὸ μέγιστον: and what
after all is the greatest thing. Then
follows, in the form of a clause in
apposition, explanation of the μέ-
γιστον. The whole is equivalent to
τὸ μέγιστον ἐστι τοῦτο, ἐξετάζουτα διά-
γειν (with an indef. personal subj.).
See on οἷς μηδὲν εἰποί, 40 e.
38. ἄγουσα: not ἄγαγοτα because
it represents ὤ ἢγε. GMT. 16, 2 ; Η.
860 a. Cf. Tim. 25 b c, where the
fabled might of prehistoric Athens is
described, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγουμένης ...
κρατήσας τῶν ἐπίστων τρόπων ἐκτητη.
This loose use of the impf. instead of
the aor. is not uncommon where ex-
treme accuracy is not aimed at.
Od. xi. 503 ff. — The most comprehen-
sive clause, ἢ ... γυναῖκας, escapes from
the grammatical const., a not uncom-
mon irregularity. Cf. Gorg. 483 δ ε,
XXXIII. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑμᾶς χρή, δὲ ἀνδρεῖς δικασταί, εὔσεβεῖς ἐνιαὶ πρὸς τὸν θάνατον, καὶ ἐν τῷ τούτῳ διανοεῖσθαι ἄλλησε, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ κακὸν οὐδὲν αὖτε ἦστε οὔτε τελευτήσατε, οὐδὲ ἀμελεῖται ὑπὸ θεῶν τὰ τοῦτον πράγματα· οὐδὲ τὰ ἔμα νῦν ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοματοῦ γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ μοι δῆλον ἔστι τοῦτο, ὅτι ἢδη τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάξθαι πραγμάτων βέλτιον ἦν μοι. διὰ τούτῳ καὶ ἐμὲ οὐδαμοῦ ἀπέτρεψε τὸ σημεῖον, καὶ ἔγωγε τοὺς καταψηφισμένους μοι καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῦσι οὐ πάντων χαλεπάων.

10 καίτοι οὐ ταύτη τῇ διανοιᾷ κατεψηφίζοντο μοι καὶ κατηγόρουν, ἀλλ' οἴμοις βλάπτειν· τοῦτο αὐτοῖς ἄξον μέμεθεν φεσθαι. τοσοῦτοι μέντοι δέομαι αὐτῶν· τοὺς νιεῖς μου

41 thing above all. The position of τοῦτο, coming as it does after instead of before ἐν τι, is very emphatic.

6. τεθνάναι καὶ ἀπηλλάξθαι: the pf. is used, because to speak of the completion of the change, i.e. to be dead, is the most forcible way of putting the idea. πράγματα applies to the trouble and the unrest of a busy life.

7. βέλτιον ἦν: Socrates considers the whole complication of circumstances in which he is already involved, or in which he must, if he lives, sooner or later be involved. Deliverance from this he welcomes as a boon. Cf. 30 b. — διὰ τούτο κτῆ.: cf. 40 a c. Socrates argued from the silence of τὸ διαμόνην that no evil was in store for him when he went before the court. This led him to conclude that his death could be no harm. On further consideration, he is confirmed in this, because death is never a harm. Applying this principle to his own actual circumstances, its truth becomes the more manifest, so that, finally, he can explain why the divine voice was silent. Contrast the opposite view expressed by Achilles (Hom. Od. xi. 489 ff.), and in Eur. I. A. 1249–1252, where Iphigenia, pleading for life, says, ἐν συντεθωράτῳ πάντα νικήσω λόγον. | τὸ φῶς τὸς ἀνδρόποιοις ἁδιστὸν βλέπειν, | τὰ νέρθε σὲ οὔδεν. μαλεῖται σὲ εἰκεῖται | ταῦτα. κακός | κακός κρισισιοῦ | κακῶς θεωρεῖ.

11. βλάπτειν: used abs. without acc. of the person or of the thing, because the abstract idea of doing harm is alone required.—τοῦτο . . . ἄξον μέμφευσα: so far it is fair to blame them. Contrast 17 b, τοῦτο μοι ἐθανεῖν αὖτι ἄν, this...about them; and cf. Symp. 220 c, τοῦτο γά μοι οὔτε μέμψει κτῆ. They deserve blame for their malicious intention and for the reason given in 20 b. — ἄξον: it is fair. Cf. Gorg. 405 e, ἄξον μὲν οὖν ἐμοὶ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ἑπτά.

12. τοσοῦτοι μέντοι: "although they certainly are far from wishing me well, yet I ask so much as a favor," i.e. so little that they can well afford to grant it. Then follows an explanation of τοσοῦτο.
ἔπειδήν ἦβησώσει τιμώρησασθε, ὦ ἁνδρεῖ, ταύτα ταῦτα 41
λυπόντες ἀπερ ἐγὼ ύμᾶς ἐλύσων, ἐάν ύμῖν δοκῶσιν ἢ
15 χρημάτων ἢ ἀλλοῦ του πρότερον ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἢ ἀρέτης,
καὶ εάν δοκῶσι τι εἶναι μηδὲν ὄντες, ὀνειδίζετε αὐτοῖς
ἀπέρ ἐγὼ ύμῖν, ὦτι οὐκ ἐπιμελοῦνται ὃν δὲ καὶ οἶονται
τι εἶναι ὄντες οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι. καὶ εάν ταύτα ποιήσε, δίκαια
πεπονθῶς ἐγὼ ἐσομαι υφ ύμῶν, αὐτός τε καὶ οἵ νεῖς. 42
20 ἄλλα γὰρ ἦδη ὄρα ἀπενέα, ἐμοὶ μὲν ἀποθανομένῳ, ύμῖν
dὲ βιωσόμενοι· ὁπότεροι δὲ ἡμῶν ἔρχονται ἐπὶ ἁμενῶν
πράγμα, ἀδηλον παντὶ πλὴν ἢ τῷ θεῷ.

41 13. ἦβησώσει: see on ἐρχετε, 19 a.
Cf. Hes. Op. 131, ἀλλ' ἄταν ἠθάνει καὶ
ἥβης μέτρον ἱκετο.
16. ὀνειδίζετε: see on ὀνειδίζων ἐκα-
στον, 30 e.
18. δίκαια πεπονθῶς: to be under-
stood in the light of cc. xviii. and
xxvi. Socrates looks upon what is
usually taken as the most grievous in-
jury as the greatest possible blessing.
42 19. αὐτός τε κτέ.: for ἐγὼ αὐτός
461, ἐπάξιος μὲν Ὀιδίπους κατουκτίσαι;
αὐτός τε παῖδες θ' αἰδε.
20. ἄλλα γὰρ κτέ.: serves to close the
speech, giving at the same time the
reason for coming to an end.
22. πλὴν ἢ: pleonastic like ἀλλ' ἢ
in 20 d. See App.—τῷ θεῷ: cf. the
subtly ironical way in which the same
thought is put in the Euthyphro
(3 d e), where, speaking of his accu-
sers, Socrates says, εἰ μὲν οὐν, δὲ
δειγμών, μέλλον μοι καταγελᾶν, ὅπερ σὺ
φῆς σαυτοῖ, οὐδὲν ἂν εἰς ἄνθες πάλεσοντας
καὶ γελῶντας ἐν τῷ δικαστήρῳ διαγα-
γείν: εἰ δὲ σπαυδάσονται, τούτ'
ζην δὴ ἢ προ ἀποβήσεται ἀδηλο
πλὴν ύμῖν τοῖς μάντεσιν. See
on ἄριστα, 35 d.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΤΑ ΤΟΤ ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

I. ΣΩ. Τι τηνικάδε ἀφιξαί, ὁ Κρίτων; ἢ οὐ πρὶν ἔτι ἔστων;
ΚΡ. Πάννυ μὲν οὖν.
ΣΩ. Πηνίκα μάλιστα;
5 ΚΡ. Ὀρθρὸς βαθὺς.
ΣΩ. Θαυμάζω ὡς ἡθέλησέ σοι ὁ τοῦ δεσμωτηρίου φύλαξ ὑπακούσαι.
ΚΡ. Ξυπνήθης ἢδη μοῖ ἔστων, ὃ Σώκρατες, διὰ τὸ πολλάκις δεύρῳ φοιτάν, καὶ τι καὶ εὐεργετήσῃ ὑπ’ ἐμοῦ.
10 ΣΩ. Ἀρτι δὲ ἥκεις ὅ πάλαι;

43 1. Κρίτων: see Intro. 62. See on Apol. 33 δ, fin., and cf. 38 b, fin.
4. πηνίκα μάλιστα, about what time is it? In Lat. maxime and admodum are so used, e.g. locus patens ducentos maxime pedos, Liv. x. 38. 5; locus in pedum mille admodum altitudinem abruptus, id. xxi. 36. 2.
5. Ὀρθρὸς βαθὺς: the adj. limits ὀρθρός, so that the whole expression means rather the end of night than the beginning of day. Cf. the time when the Protagoras begins (310 a), τῆς παρελθούσης νυκτὸς ταυτησί, ἔτι βαθὺς ὀρθρό. The description in the same dialogue of young Hippocrates feeling his way through the dark to Socrates’s bedside shows that ὀρθρός means, just before daybreak. Cf. Xen. An. iv. 3. 8 ff., where Xenophon dreams a dream, ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀρθρὸς ἦν . . . ἤκουσέ τε καὶ ἔστων ὃς ὑπεφαίνει ἠθέλησε. Here ὀρθρὸς means the dark before the dawn. Cf. also ἀμφιλόκη νύξ, Hom. II. vii. 433, ἡμος 5 ὅπερ ἄρ ἄρω ἢς ἢς ἢς, ἑτεί δ’ ἀμφιλόκη νύξ, ὃ τῆς ἄρρε πυρηνί κριτὸς ἔγγριτο λαβει Ἀχαιῶν.
9. καλ. . . . καλ. κτ.: and what is more, I’ve done a little something for him. τι is equiv. to εὐεργεσίαν τινα (a tip).
KR. Ἐπιεικὸς πάλαι.

ΣΩ. Εἶτα πῶς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἐπήγειράς με, ἄλλα συγὴ ταρακάθησαι;

KR. Οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὖδ’ ἄν αὐτὸς ἦθελον 15 ἐν τοσαῦτῃ τε ἀγρυπνία καὶ λύπῃ εἶναι. ἄλλα καὶ σοῦ πάλαι θαυμάζω αἰσθανόμενος ὡς ἦδεως καθεύθεις· καὶ ἐπίτηδες σε οὖκ ἱγευρον, ἵνα ὁς ἡδοτα διάγης. καὶ πολλάκις μὲν δὴ σε καὶ πρότερον ἐν παντὶ τῷ βίῳ εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ τρόπου, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῇ νῦν παρεστώσῃ 20 ἔμφορῷ ὡς ράδιοι αὐτὴν καὶ πρῶς φέρεις.

ΣΩ. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν, ὁ Κρίτων, πλημμελεῖς εἰ ἄγανακτεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὤντα, εἰ δὲ ἤδη τελευτᾶν.

KR. Καὶ ἄλλοι, ὁ Σώκρατες, τηλικοῦτοι ἐν τοιαῦταις ε ἔμφοραις ἀλίσκονται, ἄλλ’ οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἐπιλύει τῇ ἡλικίᾳ τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἀγανακτεῖν τῇ παρούσῃ τύχῃ.

ΣΩ. Ἑστὶ ταῦτα. ἄλλα τι δὴ οὕτω πρῶφρο ἄφιξαι;

KR. Ἄγγελιάν, ὁ Σώκρατες, φέρων χαλεπῆν, οὐ σοι, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, ἄλλ’ ἐμοὶ καὶ τοῖς σοῖς ἐπιτηδείως πᾶσιν καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρείαν, ἢν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ ἐν τοῖς 30 βαρύτατοι ἄν ἐνέγκαμι.

12. εἶτα: refers to ἐπιεικὸς πάλαι in a vein of wonder or perhaps of gentle reproof.
14. οὐ μᾶ τὸν Δία: the neg. belonging to the clause that follows is inserted by anticipation in the oath. The answer to Socrates’s question is implied clearly in the use of ὀδηγεί, and becomes categorical in καὶ ἐπίτηδες κτλ.
15. ἐν τοσαῦτῃ τε ἀγρυπνίᾳ κτλ.: τέ is introduced after τοσαῦτῃ, which belongs to both subsists. This position of τέ is very common after the art. or prep. —ἄλλα καὶ: but furthermore.
17. Ἰνα διάγης: for the subjv. after a secondary tense, see GMT. 44, 2; 43 H. 881 a.
18. εὐδαιμονίας τοῦ τρόπου: for the gen. of the cause, see G. 173, 1; H. 744. At the end of the sentence, a clause with ὡς (equiv. to δὲν ὁταν) is introduced in place of the gen. —For the facts, see Introd. 38 and note 6, p. 26.
21. πλημμελεῖς: cf. Apol. 22 d and see on ἐμμελως, Apol. 20 c.
25. τὸ μὴ οὐχὶ ἄγανακτεῖν: ἐπιλύεται c is here qualified by ὀδηγεῖ, and is used in the sense of preventing. Hence the doubled neg. GMT. 95, 2, x.1 b; H.1034.
29. καὶ χαλεπῆν καὶ βαρείαν: an effective and almost pathetic reitera-
ΣΩ. Τίνα ταύτην; ἢ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκται ἕκ Δήλου; οὗ δὲ ἀφικομένου τεθνάναι με; 43

ΚΡ. Οὔτω δὴ ἀφίκται, ἀλλὰ δοκεῖ μὲν μοι ἥξεων τῆμερον ἔξ ὧν ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ἥκοντες τινές ἀπὸ Σουνίου καὶ 35 καταλυτόντες ἑκεί αὐτό. δήλου οὖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἀγγελῶν ὧν ἥξει τῆμερον, καὶ ἀνάγκη δὴ εἰς αὐρων ἔστατ, ὥσκρατες, τὸν βίον σε τελευτάν.

Π. ΣΩ. 'Ἀλλ', ὁ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ. εἰ ταύτῃ τοῖς θεοῖς φίλον, ταύτῃ ἔστω. οὐ μέντοι οἴμαι ἥξεων αὐτὸ τῇ 30 τῆμερον.

In the citation of the first ἀληθῶς, made all the stronger by the doubled καί.

30. ἐν τοῖς βαρύταιρ ἐν ἑνίκαιμι: in Hdt., Thuc., Plato, and later writers, ἐν τοῖς, about, is idiomatically used to limit the superl. Thus ἐν τοῖς becomes an adverb, which describes not absolute precedence but an average and comparative superiority. Cf. Thuc. iii. 17, ἐν τοῖς πλείσται, among the most numerous (not 'the very most numerous,' since Thuc. adds that the number was exceeded once) where the gender of πλείσται is noticeable. Cf. also id. i. 6. 3, ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι τῶν τε ἐθνῶν κατέθεσαν κτέ. Here the position of the ἐν shows that ἐν τοῖς πρῶτοι is taken almost as one word, i.e. πρῶτοι limited so as to mean practically the first, or substantially the first of those who laid down, etc.

31. τίνα ταύτην: connect with φέρων above. For ἐν, see on ἐν ἰδίου. Ἀπολ. 30 c. 30 ὁ ἐν τοῖς πλοῖον κτ.: cf. Phaedo, 58 a: τοῦτο ἐστὶ τὸ πλοῖον, δὲ φασὶν Ἀθηναίοι, ἐν δὲ Ὑπατέων ποτὲ εἰς Κρήτην τοὺς δίς ἐπὶ ἐκεῖνου (the seven couples to be sacrificed to the Minotaur) τρίχατος ἕκαστο καὶ ἐσοφος τοι καὶ αὐτὸς ἐσώθθη. τῷ οὖν Ἀπάλλων ἐκείνῳ, ἃς λέγεται, τότε ἐς σωθεν, ἐκάστου θεοῦ θηραί (the solemn embassy) ἐπίειν εἰς Δήλον· ἣν δὴ ἀδι καὶ νῦν ἔτι ἐς ἐκείνου κατ᾽ ἐναυτῶν (every twelfthmonth) τῇ θεῷ πέμποντον. ἐνείδαν ὡς ἀρκονταί τῆς θεορίας, νόμος ἔστιν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτου καθαρεύει τὴν πάλιν καὶ δημοσία μηδένα ἀνακτώναι (to put no one to death by public execution), πολὺ ἐν εἰς Δήλον ἀφίκται τὸ πλοῖον καὶ πάλιν δεδομένο κτέ. Cf. Introd. 36.

32. τεθνάναι: see on τεθνάναι, Ἀπολ. 30 c. ἵνα.

33. δοκεῖ μὲν: with no following δέ. In such cases the original affinity of μὲν with μὴ is usually apparent. Its meaning is, indeed, surely.

35. τῶν ἀγγελῶν: can hardly have been written by Plato, since ἀγγέλον in the sense of ἀγγελία is not used except by later writers (Polybius), while ἐκ prevents us from taking ἀγγελῶν as referring to persons. See App.

Π. 1. ἀλλ', ὁ Κρίτων, τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ: it's all for the best, Crito. ἀλλ' introduces in vivid contrast to Crito's despondency the cheerful hope of Socrates. — τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ: a hopeful invocation often prefixed to a solemn statement. Cf. Symp. 177 e, ἀλλ' τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ καταρχέτω Φαῖδρος, let Phaedrus make a beginning and good luck to him. Used freq. like the
ΚΡ. Πόθεν τούτο τεκμαίρει;

5 ΣΩ. Ἡγώ σοι ἐρώτῃ γάρ πον ύστεραίᾳ δεί με ἀποθεοθήσκειν ἢ ἃν ἔλθῃ τὸ πλούς.

ΚΡ. Φασί γέ τοι δὴ οἱ τούτων κύριοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐ τοίνυν τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας οἶμαι αὐτὸ ἥξειν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ἐτέρας. τεκμαίρομαι δὲ ἐκ τυχὸς ἐνυπνίον ὅ
10 ἐώρακα ὀλύγον πρότερον ταῦτης τῆς νυκτῶς· καὶ κυδυνεύεις ἐν καιρῷ τινὶ οὐκ ἐγείρας με.

ΚΡ. Ἡν δὲ δὴ τί τὸ ἐνυπνίον;

ΣΩ. Ἐδόκει τίς μοι γυνὴ προσελθοῦσα καλὴ καὶ εὐείδης, λευκὰ ἰμάτια ἔχουσα, καλέσαι με καὶ εἰπεῖν· ὁ Σωκρ.
15 κρατεῖ, ἦματι κεν τριτάτῳ Φιλίνῃ ἐρίβωλον ἵκονοι.

ΚΡ. Ἀποτον τὸ ἐνυπνίον, ὁ Σωκρατεῖ.

43 Lat. quod bonum felix faustumque sit, or quod bene veritate. Cf. Dem. III. 18, ἔτερος λέγει τις βελτίων ταῦτα ποιεῖτε ἀγαθὴ τύχη. Cf. also the comic perversion of it in Ar. Ar. 436, πρεμάσατον τὸ ἄρα ἀθέρα | ἐς τὸν ἵππον ἔσσων πλησίον τοῦπιστάτου. For the most formal use of this word, see many inscriptions and the decree, Thuc. iv. 116. 11, Ἀδριάς εἰσε τύχη ἀγαθῇ τῷ Ἀθηναίων ποιεῖται τῇ ἐκχειρίᾳ (armistice). In Xen. Hell. iv. 1. 14, it is used of a betrothal: ἐμοὶ μὲν τοιῶν, ἕφι, δοκεῖ, δ Ἀγεσίλαος, σὺ μὲν, δ Ἡπειρίδαστα, τῇ τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ διδόναι ὅτι τῆν ὑπατερά. Cf. also Xen. Cyr. iv. 5. 51, ἀλλὰ δέχομαι τε, ἔφη, καὶ ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ ἡμεῖς τε ἱππεῖς γενομένθα καὶ ἕμεις διέλοιπε τὰ κοινά.

44 a 5. τῇ γαρ πον κτῆ.: this is the first premise that follows the conclusion stated above in οὐ μέντοι ἤξειν τήμερον, the second is contained in the account of the dream.
7. οἱ τούτων κύριοι: see Introdc. 75, and cf. Apol. 39 e.
8. τῆς ἐπιούσης ἡμέρας: means the same as τῆς ἡμέρας, for Socrates is now thinking of the fact that day has not yet dawned. See ἐρίβως βαθὺς, 43 a.

10. ταῦτας τῆς νυκτῶς: in the course of this night. The vision came after midnight, a circumstance of the greatest importance, according to Mosch. Idyll. ii. 2, νυκτὸς οὐ γε τριτάτον λάχος ἔτσιν, ἐγγοθή δ' ἡ ἡμέρα... ἐστε καὶ ἄρηκτων ποιομαιητας θνοὺς ἄνειροιν. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 10. 32 ff., —

Atque ego cum Graeco facerem, nutus mare citra, Versiculōs, vetuit me tolli voce Quirīnus.
Post medium noctem visus, cum somnia vera.

11. ἐν καιρῷ τῳ: usually expressed by the shorter ἐν καιρῷ, opportune. Cf. Legg. iv. 708 e, ἐὰν πρὸς καιρὸν τινα λέγομεν. The τὸς has the effect of a litotes, as e.g. in ἐκεῖ τινὰ λάγον, there is good and sufficient reason for it.

15. ἦματι κτῆ.: quoted from Hom. b. Il. i. 383, ἦματι κε πριτάτῳ Φιλίνῃ ἐρίβωλον ἵκονοι.

16. ἄτοπον κτῆ.: sc. ἐστί, an excl. which nearly approaches the form of a regular sent. Cf. Hom. II. i. 231,
ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ΣΩ. Ἐναργεῖς μὲν οὖν, ὥς γέ μοι δοκεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων.

III. KR. Λίαν γε, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἀλλ', ὃ δαμόνει Σώκρατες, ἐτὶ καὶ νῦν ἐμοὶ πείθου καὶ σώθητι. ὡς ἔμοι, ἕαν σὺ ἀποθάνης, οὐ μία ξυμφορά ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς μὲν τὸν ἐστερήσθαι τοιούτου ἐπιτρέπειν, οἶνον ἐγὼ οὖν ἐδένα μὴ ποτε εὑρήσω, ἐτὶ δὲ καὶ πολλοὺς δόξων, οἱ ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ μὴ σαφῶς ἴσασιν, ὡς οἶδο τε ὃν σε σφέξειν, εἰ θελευν ἀναλίσκειν ἐν χρήματα, ἀμελήσαι. καίτοι τίς ἄν αἰσχύνει εἰς ταύτης δόξα ἡ δοκεῖν χρήματα περὶ πλείονοι ποιεῖσθαι ἡ φίλους;

17. Ἐναργεῖς μὲν οὖν: it is surely plain enough, immo evidens. The full meaning can hardly be understood without reading the context. Cf. Homer. Π. ιξ., vv. 356–388. Plato thinks of dying as going home, and Phthia as the home of Achilles. —γέ μοι: not γ' ἐμοι. The emphasis falls on the verb rather than on the pron. See on δι γέ μοι δοκεῖ, Apol. 18a. ἐτι δὲ: this gives a hint as to what Crito has planned. It is developed later. See Introd. 62.

3. ξυμφορά ἐστιν: more vivid and natural than ἐστα. — χωρὶς μὲν. ἐτι δὲ: quite apart from my losing, etc. . . . I shall further, etc. See App.

4. ἐστερήσθαι: the pf. inf. with χωρὶς. — οὔδενα μὴ ποτε: equiv. to οὐ μὴ ποτὲ τινα, and so here with the fut. indic., I shall certainly never, etc.

5. ὁ δὲ οἶδες τω ἐν κτῆτι: I shall seem to many to have neglected you whereas I was able to save you. οἶδες τω ἐν σφέξειν. I might have saved you, if I had wished. GMT. 40, 2, κ. 2; H. 887.

8. ἡ δοκεῖν. . . . φίλους: explaining ταύτης, which covers an idea already contained in what precedes. Cf. Gorg. 500c, περὶ τοῦτον εἰδεν ἡμῖν οἱ λόγοι, οὐ τί ἐν μᾶλλον σπουδασεῖν τις (than which what would a man be more inclined to pursue with diligence). . . . τοῦτο, ὡντα χρή τρόπον τον κτῆτι. Where the gen. after a comp. is a dem. or
οὐ γὰρ πείσονται οἱ πολλοὶ ὦς σὺ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἡθέλησας 44
10 ἀπέναι ἐνθέντε ἡμῶν προδημομένων.

Σ.Ω. Ἀλλὰ τί ἦμιν, ὦ μακάρει Κρίτων, οὐτω τῆς τῶν
πολλῶν δόξης μέλει; οί γὰρ ἐπιεκέστατοι, ὥν μᾶλλον
ἀξίουν φρονίζειν, ἧγησονται αὐτὰ ὦτω πεπράξθαι ὥσπερ
ἀν πράσῃ.

15 ΚΡ. Ἀλλ’ ὅρας δὴ ὦτι ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ τῆς ἀ
τῶν πολλῶν δόξης μέλεων. αὐτὰ δὲ δήλα τὰ παρόντα
νῦν, ὀτι οἱ τε εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοὶ οὐ τὰ συμφράστα τῶν
κακῶν ἐξεργάζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέγιστα σχεδόν, εὰν τις ἐν
αὐτοῖς διαβεβλημένος ἦ.

Σ.Ω. Εἰ γὰρ ἄφελον, ὦ Κρίτων, οοὶ τε εἶναι οἱ πολλοὶ
τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐγράψεσθαι, ἵνα οἱ τε ἦγον καὶ ἀγαθὰ
τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ καλῶς ἂν εἴχεν· νῦν δὲ οὐδέτερα οοὶ τε·
οὔτε γὰρ φρόνιμον οὔτε ἄφρονα δυνατό ποιῆσαι, ποιοῦσι
δὲ τούτο δ’ τι ἂν τύχωσιν.

IV. ΚΡ. Ταῦτα μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχετω· τάδε δὲ, ὦ Σώκ- ε
κρατες, εἰπέ μοι ὃρα γε μη ἔμοι προμηθεῖ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

13. ὃσπερ ἀν πράξη: see on δν ἀν
λέγω, Apol. 20 e. The aor. subjv. has
the force of the fut. pf. GMT. 20,
κ. 1; H. 889 c.

15. ὅρας δὴ: Crito means to point
at the case in hand. “The fact is that
the many are really in a position, etc.”
Crito has profited but little by what
Socrates has said in the court-room.
Cf. Apol. 30 d, 34 c, 40 a, etc.

20. τί γὰρ ἄφελον κτλ.: a wish
the object of which is not attained.

να οἴδι τε ἦσαν expresses an unat-
tained purpose depending on the pre-
ceding unfulfilled wish. GMT. 44, 3;
H. 884. See on δ’ ἔμελλεν, Apol. 20 a.

21. ἐγράψεσθαι: serves as a repetition
of ἐξεργάζεσθαι above. Such repeti-
tion of the simple verb is common.
Cf. 49 c d and Lys. 209 c, τι πορ’ ἐν εἰ
τὸ αἰτίον, ὃτι ἐνταῦθα μὲν ὃποιοι
σωματίων, ἐν ὃς δὲ λέγετε εἰλέγομεν κωλύοντοι.

22. καλῶς κτλ.: indeed (i.e. if this
wish were granted) it would be delight-
ful. — νῦν δὲ: introduces the fact.
Supply ἐγράψεσθαι here, and ποιῆσαις
with δ’ τι ἂν τύχωσιν. In hypothetical
and rel. sents. τυχάνειν may be used
without the partic, which is always
suggested by the leading clause.

IV. 2. ὅρα γε μη: like μη alone e
(Apol. 25 a), ἃρα μη looks for a neg.
answer, but it may also (see on μη, 45 e)
convey an insinuation that in spite


"ΚΡΙΤΩΝ.

ἐπιθείς, μή, ἐὰν σὺ ἐνθέντε ἐξέλθης, οἱ συκοφάνται ἡμῶν πράγματα παρέχωσιν ὡς σὲ ἐνθέντε ἐκκλήσασιν, καὶ ἄναγκαιος ἦν καὶ πάσαν τὴν ουσίαν ἀποβαλείν ἢ συχνὰ χρήματα, ἢ καὶ ἀλλο τί πρὸς τούτοις παθεῖν; εἰ γάρ τι τοιοῦτον φοβεῖ, ἔσασιν αὐτὸ χαίρειν· ἤμεῖς γάρ που δίκαιος ἔσμεν σώσαντες σε κινδυνεύων τούν κίνδυνον καὶ ἐὰν δὲν ἔτι τούτῳ μεῖζον. ἄλλ᾽ ἐμοὶ πείθον 10 καὶ μὴ ἄλλως ποίει.

ΣΩ. Καὶ ταῦτα προμηθοῦμαι, ὃ Κρίτων, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά.

ΚΡ. Μήτε τοῖνυν ταῦτα φοβοῦ· καὶ γὰρ οὔδὲ πολὺ τάργυριόν ἔστω, δὲ θέλοις λαβόντες τινὲς σώσαι σε καὶ 15 ἐξαιγαγεῖν ἐνθέντε. ἔπειτα οὐχ ὅρις τούτους τοὺς συκοφάντας ὡς εὐτελεῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἄν δεοι ἐπὶ αὐτοὺς πολλοῦ of the expected denial the facts really would justify an affirmative answer; you surely don't, though I imagine you do, is Crito's meaning. The μή which follows προμηθεῖ is obviously connected with the notion of anxiety in that verb. The same idea is again presented in φοβεῖ (are fearful) below. The subjv. παρέχωσι conveys an idea of action indefinitely continued, whereas ἡμεῖς and ἀναγκαστάμεν denote simply the occurrence of the action. 45

8. δικαίως ἔσμεν κτλ.: see on δικαίως εἴμι, Ἀρ. 18 a. 9. ἄλλοι οἰκή. μη...ποίει: no, no! do as I say. ἅλλα with the inv. introduces a demand or a request made in opposition to an expressed refusal or to some unwillingness merely implied or feared. This vigorous request is reinforced by the neg. μή ποίει, do this and do not do that. Cf. 46 a. 13. μήτε: the second clause, which we miss here, appears below (b) in the resumptive statement ἐπερ λέγω, μήτε

κτλ.—φοβοῦ: reiterating φοβεῖ above, be fearful. It is a part of Crito's character to return again and again to his point. Cf. 43 d, and see Introd. 62. Further he had here a welcome opportunity for airing his grievances against the sycophants (blackmailers). Crito had been himself the victim of these rascals until he found a vigorous friend, Ἀρχιδήμον, πάνυ μὲν ἰκανὸν εἶ. πεῖν τε καὶ πράξα, πέντε δὲ, αὐτὸν Χειροφον puts it, who delivered him from them. This good riddance was due to the advice of Socrates. Cf. Xen. Mem. ii. 9. 4, οὐκ ἢ πΓ τερίας καὶ ἐνδρα (sc. just as you keep dogs to protect sheep from wolves), ἰδίῃς θέλοι τε καὶ δύνατό σου ἀπερείκειν τοὺς ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀδικεῖν σε. 15. τοῦτος: said with scorn. Cf. 48 e, τοῖνυν τῶν πολλῶν, and Dem. xviii. 140, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἅλλα καὶ φέρειν ἡδύνασθ, ὡς θεικεῖ, ἢ πόλις καὶ ποιῶν οὐδὲς λαυθάνειν (this fellow could do...undetected).
ἀργυρίου; σοι δὲ υπάρχει μὲν τὰ ἐμὰ χρήματα, ὡς ἐγὼ 45
οἶμαι, ἰκανόντες καὶ εἰ τί ἐμοῦ κηδόμενος οὐκ οἴει
dειν ἀναλίσκεις τὰ μᾶ, ξένου οὕτω ἐνθάδε έτομοι ἀναλί-
σκεις. εἰς δὲ καὶ κεκομίκευ επ' αὐτῷ τούτῳ ἀργύριον ἰκα-
νόν, Σμυμίας θαύμα. έτομοι δὲ καὶ Κέβης καὶ ἄλλοι
πολλοὶ πάνω. ἠστε, ὡπερ λέγω, µήτε ταύτα φοβούμενος
ἀποκάμη καὶ οὕτω σώσαι, µήτε δὲ έλεγχε εἰς τῷ δικαστήριῳ
дуσχέρες σοι γενέσθω, οὕτω σέ ἀν ξένος ἐξελθὼν δὲ τι χρῷο
πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοτε ὅποι ἂν ἄφικη
ἀγαπήσουσι σε. εἶν δὲ βούλῃ εἰς Θεταλίαν ἦναι, εἰσὶν
ὁμοί ἐκεί ξένοι, οἳ σε περὶ πολλοῦ πονησονται καὶ ἀσφα-
λείαν σοι παρέξωνται ἀστε σε µηδένα λυπεῖν τῶν κατὰ
Θεταλίαν.

V. Ἡτι δὲ, ὁ Σώκρατες, οὐδὲ δίκαιον μοι δοκεῖς ἐπι-
χειρεῖν πράγμα, σαυτόν προδοῦναι, εξὼν σωθήναι καὶ
τοιαῦτα σπεύδεις περὶ σαυτὸν γενέσθαι, ἀπερ ἀν καὶ οἵ
ἐχθροὶ σου σπεύσαιν τε καὶ εὔπεισαν σε διαφθείραι

45 17. σοι δὲ: the argument is as
a follows: the amount required to settle
with these sycophants, I should be
ready enough to expend for almost
any one, but for you, etc.—ὅπραχα: 
cf. Παρώνασις . . . ὑπερχετ ἐπ' ὦν ἄργυρος
φιλούσα αὐτῶν μᾶλλον ἡ κτῆ., Χεν. Ἀπ. 
i. 1. 4; καὶ ὑπάρξει δημοὶ ἡ ἴμη πόλις.
ἐκόντες γὰρ µὲν δεικτοῦν, ibid. ν. 6. 23.
—ὡς ἐγὼ οἴμαι: said with reference
to the appositive ἰκανόν.

b 18. οὐκ οἴλα: Crito recollects what
Socrates had said (45 a, in connexion
with 44 e). See on οὐ φήτε, Ἀπολ. 25 b.

19. ξένου οὕτω: cf. Ἀπολ. 33 ε, ἄλλοι
ταύτων οὕτω κτῆ. The pron. calls up
the ξένοι as present in Athens, and, for
rhetorical purposes, within sight. The
art. is omitted because ξένοι is a pred.,
these others who are ξένοι.

21. Κέβης: Cebes also was from
Thebes, and the two play a very
important part in the Phaedo.

23. ἀποκάμη σαυτὸν σώσαι: get
tired of trying, etc. Here is no impli-
cation that Socrates has already tried
to get away. Crito only hints that any
other course is nothing short of moral
cowardice. See App.—δὲ έλεγεν: cf.
Ἀπολ. 37 d e d.

24. χρόφο: the opt. representing
the subj. of doubt. GMT. 34, 3.

25. ἄλλοι: for ἄλλοι, which we
expect after πολλαχοῦ on account of
ἐκτ. This is attraction, or inverse
assimilation. Cf. Soph. Ο. C. 1228,
βῆμα κεῖνη ἐδιπτέρ ἑκεῖ.

V. 4. σὲ διαφθέραι: σὲ is accented c
for emphasis and to disconnect it
from ἤπειραν.
5 Boulómenoi. ἐμονεὶ δὲ τούτως καὶ τούς υἱὲς τοὺς σαντοῦ ἔμοι ἰδεῖς προδιδόναι, οὐς σοι ἔξων καὶ ἐκθέπαι καὶ ἐκπαιδεύσαι οἰκῆσαι καταληπτοῦν, καὶ τὸ σοῦ μέρος, ὦ τι ἀν τύχωσι, τοῦτο πράξουσιν: τεύξονται δὲ, ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς, τοιοῦτοι οὕτε ἐωθεὶ γίγνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ὀρφανίαις περὶ τοὺς
10 ὀρφανοὺς. η γὰρ οὐ χρῆ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας, ἢ ξυνιαταλαι-πωρεῖ καὶ τρέφοντα καὶ παιδεύοντα· οὐ δὲ μοι δοκεῖς τὰ βαθυμότατα αἵρεῖσαι. χρὴ δὲ, ἀπερ ἂν ἄηρ ἄγαθος καὶ ἀνδρεῖος ἔλουτο, ταῦτα αἵρεῖσαι, φάσκοντα γε δὴ ἄρετῆς διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐπιμελεῖσθαι· ὡς ἔγινε καὶ
15 ύπὲρ σοῦ καὶ ύπὲρ ἡμῶν τῶν σῶν ἐπιτηδείων αἰσχύνομαι, εἰ μὴ δόξῃ ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ ἀνανδρία τηλῇ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πεπράξαθαι, καὶ η ἐισόδος τῆς δίκης εἰς τὸ δικα- στήριον ὡς εἰσῆλθεν ἔξων μὴ εἰσέλθειν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ ἄγων

V. 7. τὸ σοῦ μέρος: pro tua parte or quod ad te attinet.—
8. τοῦτο πράξουσιν: cf. εὗρ, κακῶς, and even ἄγαθος (used adv.) with πράττειν (Apol. 40 e). See on μὴ ὀρθῶς πράξεσθαι, Apol. 40 a.
10. η γὰρ κτι.: the γάρ is connected with an unexpressed reproof.
13. φάσκοντα γε δὴ: sc. σε, at all events you who maintain, etc., or particularly when you maintain. See on ἀ γε δὴ, Apol. 40 a.
16. μὴ: see on ἔρα γε μὴ, 44 e. The notion of fear is remotely implied. For this const., very common in Plato, see GMT. 46, π. 4, fin.; H. 867.
—ἀνανδρία τειλ κτι.: a certain sort of cowardice on our part. Notice the emphasis given to τῇ ἡμετέρῳ, for which we are responsible. If Crito and the rest, by showing more energy, by using all possible influence against Meletus and his abettors, had carried the day, they would have been more
genuinely ἀνδρεῖς in the proper sense of the word. They failed ἀνανδρία τειλ. Cf. Euthyphro's boast, εὑρομεν ἂν διὰ σαθρός ἑστι, Euthph. 5 c.
17. καὶ η ἐισόδος...καὶ ο ἄγων: in apposition with ἀπαν τὸ πράγμα τὸ περὶ σὲ. On the meaning of the technical terms, see Introd. 70, with note 1, p. 52. Precisely how the trial of Socrates could have been avoided except by flight from Athens is not clear. There is a wholly untrustworthy tradition that Anytus offered him terms of compromise. Probably there were abundant means at hand for raising legal technicalities and for securing in this way an indefinite delay. All that Crito necessarily suggests is that flight was open to Socrates before proceedings began. At Athens, as at Rome, the law allowed a man to go into voluntary exile. See Introd. 72.
18. ο ἄγων: the management of the case. See on εἰς ἄγωνα καθιστάς, Apol. 24 c.
19. τὸ τελευταῖον σκοτειν: the scene of this act is laid in the prison.

20. κατάγελος: because, in Crito’s opinion, all who were involved made themselves a common laughing-stock by their weak-minded negligence and irresolution. Cf. Cymbeline, i., —

Howsoever ’tis strange,
Or that the negligence may well be laughed at,
Yet it is true, sir.

In the whole drift of Crito’s phraseology, the notion of acting a part on the stage before the Athenian public is prominent. — κακόν κτέ.: this is really in Crito’s eyes the culmination of disgrace (connect with τὸ τελευταῖον) in a matter that has been disgracefully mismanaged. Here is a return to the leading thought and a departure from the regular grammatical sequence. The anacoluthon is most obvious in the repetition of δοκεῖν after δέπι.

21. διαπεφυγέναι: people will think they allowed every advantage and every opportunity, especially the possibility of escape which now engrosses Crito’s thoughts, to pass unimproved. ἡμᾶς is the object. Cf. Charm. 150 e, τούτῳ άποιον τὸν διαφεύγειν τοῖς παρὰ τοῖς“Ελλησιν λατροὺς τὰ πολλὰ νοοῦμα, i.e. the reason why Greek doctors fail to cure most diseases.

22. οὐδὲ σύ σαυτόν: sc. ἑώσας. Crito hints at Socrates’ part, then recurs to his own. The interjection of such a clause in a relative sent. is irregular. — δέν τε ὅτι: like Ἁὲν above. For the fact, cf. 45 b-e.

24. ἡμᾶ τῷ κακῷ: ἡμῖν is used as πρὸς freq. is. Cf. Symp. 195 e, νέον μὲν οὖν ἔστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ, he is young and in addition to his youth he is tender. Cf. also Theaet. 185 e, καλὸς γὰρ εἰ...πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ (in addition to your beauty) εὐρήκησα με κτέ. —

25. ἀλλὰ: cf. line 28 below, and see on ἀλλ’ ἑμοὶ πείδου, 45 a. This speech has the dignity which genuine feeling alone can give. Cf. Rich. III. iv. 3,—

Come, I have learned that fearful commenting Is leaden servitor to dull delay; Delay leads impatient and snail-paced beggary;
Then fiery expedition be my wing.

On βεβουλεύσθαι, to have done with delibertation, cf. Dem. viii. 3, οἵμαι τὴν ταχιστὴν συμφέρειν βεβουλεύσθαι καὶ παρακευόμεθα, and iv. 19, ταῦτα...πάσι δεδοξάθαι φημι δεῖν. GMT. 18, 3 b; H. 851 a.


27. εἰ δὲ τι περιμένομεν: this adv. use of τι is developed out of the cognate acc. (kindred signification). Cf. the Eng. idiom, “to delay somewhat (a bit).” G. 159; H. 715.
καὶ οὐκέτι οὖν τε. ἀλλὰ παντὶ τρόπῳ, ὁ Σωκρατεσ, πεί-46
θον μοι καὶ μηδαμῶς ἄλλως ποιεῖ.

VI. Σ.Ω. Ἡ φίλη Κρίτων, ἡ προβυπία σου πολλοῦ μ
άξια, εἰ μετὰ τως ὁρθότητος εἶη. εἰ δὲ μή, ὡσφ μείζων,
tοσοῦτῳ χαλεπώτερα. σκοπεῦσθαι οὖν χρῆ ἦμᾶς εἰπε
tαὐτα πρακτέων εἰπε μή. ὡς ἐγὼ οὐ μόνον νῦν ἀλλὰ καὶ αἰ
5 τοιοῦτος οἶος τῶν ἔμων μηδεν ἄλλω μείθεσθαι ἤ τῇ λογῷ,
ὅς ἂν μοι, λογιζομένω βέλτιστος φαινήται. τοὺς δὲ λά
γους οἷς ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν ἔλεγον οὐ δύναμαι νῦν ἐκβα
λεῖν, ἐπειδή μοι ἦδη ἡ τύχη γέγονεν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν τι ὁμοι
φαίνονται μοι, καὶ τοὐς αὐτοὺς προσβεδώ καὶ τιμῶ σύστερον 10 καὶ πρότερον. ἢν εἰκὸς βελτίων ἐξείμεν λέγειν ἐν τῷ

VI. 2. ἀξία: sc. ἐστίν, in spite of
the opt. in the prot. GMT. 54, 2 b;
H. 901 b.—εἰ εἴη: not if it should be,
but if it should prove to be. Cf. δείκ
τω εἰν εἰργασμοῖς, Apol. 28 d. For
the present, Socrates does not decide
whether Crito's zeal is right or wrong.

4. οὗ μόνον κτ.: Socrates main-
tains that "truth is truth to th' end
of reckoning" (Measure for Measure,
v.1). νῦν and άει might almost change
places, since the important point is
that Socrates, after proclaiming the
supremacy of reason (cf. Apol. 38 a)
in prosperity, finds his belief still firm
in adversity. Cf. 53 c and e. Cf.
As You Like It, ii. 1,—

Sweet are the uses of adversity,
Which, like the toad, ugly and venomous,
Wears yet a precious jewel in his head.
Socrates meets in his trial and death-
sentence "the counsellors that feel-
ingly persuade him what he is." For
collocactions similar to this combina-
tion of νῦν and άει, cf. 49 e; Hom. H. ix.
106, οἶον ἐγὼ νοεῖ, ἥμιν πάλαι ἥττον ἔτι καὶ νῦν. Cf. also Eur. Med. 292, οὐ νῦν με
πρῶτον ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, Κρίτων, ἡθλαφε
κτ.], and Soph. Phil. 965, ἐμοὶ μὲν
οὐκότος δεῖ μοι ἔκπληττω τοι ἀν-
δρός, οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τάλαι.

5. τοιοῦτος οἶος: for the omission
(rare except with the third person) of
the copula, cf. Gorg. 487 d, καὶ μὴν
ὅτι ἐγὼ οἶος παρρησιάζομαι, equiv. to
ὅτι τοιοῦτος εἰ οἶος κτ. For οἶος πεί
θεσθαι, see on τοιοῦτος, Apol. 33 a.—
tων ἔμων κτ.: τὰ ἐμα includes all the
faculties and functions both of body
and of mind. Among these λόγος is
included, since it means man's reason
as well as his reasons and his reason-
ings, — his utterances and his prin-
ciples. Cf. below 47 e, εἰς τοῖς τοῦ
ἀπειθοῦντος καὶ 47 e, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστι τῶν
ἱμετέρων.

6. τοὺς δὲ λάγους κτ.: these words
imply a measure of reproof at least
when spoken to Crito, who had in
general approved of Socrates's prin-
ciples.

8. ὁμοιοι: not different in sense
from οἴοι, and to be understood in
the light of what immediately follows.
See on καὶ πρότερον, 48 b. "They
seem like what they formerly were."
παρόντι, εί ίσοι ὣτι οὐ μὴ σοι ξυνχωρήσω, οὔτε ἂν πλείω 46
tῶν νῦν παρόντων ἡ τῶν πολλῶν δύναμις ὀστερ παιδας
ἡμᾶς μορμολύττηται, δεσμοῦς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιτέμπουσα
καὶ χρημάτων ἀφαιρέσεις. πῶς οὖν ἂν μετριώτατα σκο-
15 ποίμεθα αὐτά; εἰ πρῶτον μὲν τούτον τὸν λόγον ἀναλάβο-
μεν, ὃν οὐ λέγεις περὶ τῶν δοξῶν, πότερον καλῶς ἐλέγετο
ἐκάστοτε ἡ οὖ, ὅτι ταῖς μὲν δὲ τῶν δοξῶν προσέχειν τὸν
νοῦν, ταῖς δὲ οὖ. ἡ πρὶν μὲν ἔμε δεῖν ἀποθνήσκειν καλῶς
αὐτὸν, νῦν δὲ κατάδηλος ἄρα ἐγένετο, ὃτι ἄλλος ἐνεκα
20 λόγου ἐλέγετο, ἣν δὲ παιδαὶ καὶ φλυαρία ὡς ἀληθῶς; ἐπι-

46 Supply καὶ πρότερον (from what follows) with ὄμοιον.

c 11. πλείω μορμολύττηται: uses more
hobgoblins to scare us. μορμολύττεσθαι
has the double acc. like βλάπτειν τινά
τι. Μορμά, like ἔμπουσα, was one
of the fictitious terrors of the Greek
nursery. Cf. Gorg. 473; At. Av.
1244, πότερα λοῦν ἡ | Φρύγα ταὐτί λε-
γοῦσα μορμολύττεσθαι δοκεῖς; The
Schol. there suggests that the alarm
began ἀνὰ τῶν προσωπῶν (masks) τῶν
ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ὑποκριτῶν, καὶ ἐκλάνον
μορμολυκεία. τοιούτοις δὲ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες
τὰ παιδία φοβοῦσιν. Cf. Phaed. 77 ε.

13. δεσμοῦς καὶ θανάτους ἐπιτέμπ-
πουσα κτ.λ.: by confronting us with bonds,
with death, with loss of worldly goods.
These are the usual punishments, to
the harshest of which Socrates has
been condemned. The plural is used
to put an abstract idea more vividly
and concretely, as it were, by a process
of multiplication. Cf. the use of
mortēs, necēs, and the common
poetical use of θάνατοι to describe a
violent and premature death, and in
general the free use of the plural by
the poets in phrases like πτοκῶν κλα-
μάκων προσαμβάδεις, Eur. Phoen. 488,
and Bacch. 1213, δωμάτων προσαμβά-
δεις, I. T. 07, εἰσβάδεις, ibid. 101, also
the common use of διαλαγαῖ both in
poetry (Eur. Phoen. 701) and in prose
(Lys. xii. 58; xiii. 80, etc.). That such
plurals were only a stronger way of
putting the singular is clearly shown
in Eur. Bacch. 1350, ἀλαὶ, δὲ δὲ κτ. αἴ,
πρόσμενες φυγαῖ. For θάνα-
tos, meaning the penalty of death, see
on Apol. 30 β.

15. εἰ ἀναλάβομαι: I think, if we
should begin by taking up your point, etc.
That is, such thorough consideration
(44 β, 45 ε) of Critios’s (ὁν σὺ λέγεις)
point involves considering the whole
question whether, etc.

18. ἡ πρὶν μὲν κτ.λ.: with ἡ (a n) a d
second question is superadded, which
substantially forestalls the answer to
the first. Cf. Apol. 26 β. Here the
answer suggested by ἄρα is to be taken
ironically. See on ἀλλὰ χρημάτων,
Apol. 37 ε, and cf. 47 ε below, and esp.
50 ε and 51 a, where we find ἡ πρὸς
μὲν ἄρα σοι τὸν πατέρα . . . πρὸς δὲ τὴν
πατρίδα ἄρα.

19. ἄλλως: not at all seriously, as a
mere joke, i.e. in a sense other than
its proper one; the expression is a
strong one. Cf. Phaedo, 76 ε, εἰ δὲ μὴ
ἐστὶν ταῦτα, ἄλλως ἂν ὁ λόγος οὗτος
θυμῶ δ’ ἐγὼ γ’ ἐπισκέψεσθαι, ὁ Κρίτων, κούῃ μετὰ σοῦ, 43 ἐι τί μοι ἄλλοιστερος φανεῖται, ἐπειδὴ ὦδε ἔχω, ἦ γὰρ αὐτός, καὶ εάνομεν χαίρεω ἢ πεισόμεθα αὐτῷ. ἐλέγετο δὲ πως, ὡς ἐγόμαι, ἐκάστοτε ὦδε ὑπὸ τῶν οἰομένων τι λέγειν, 25 ὃστερ νῦν δὴ ἔγω ἔλεγον, ὅτι τῶν δοξῶν ἂς οἱ ἄνθρωποι δοξάζουσι δέοι τάς μὲν περὶ πολλοῦ ποιεῖσθαι, τάς δὲ μή. εἰ τούτο πρὸς θεῶν, ὁ Κρίτων, οὐ δοκεῖ καλῶς σοι λέγεσθαι; σὺ γὰρ, σοι γε τάνθρωπεία, ἐκέκει ἐς τοῦ μέλλειν ἀποθνήσκειν αύριον, καὶ οὐκ ἂν σε παρακρούσῃ ἡ παρούσα ξυμ- 47 30 φορά: σκόπει δὴ, οὐχ ἰκανῶς δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι, ὅτι οὐ πάσας χρῆ τάς δόξας τῶν ἄνθρωπων τιμᾶν, ἀλλὰ τάς μὲν, τάς δ’ οὐ; τί φης; ταῦτα οὐχὶ καλῶς λέγεται;

KP. Καλῶς.

ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τάς μὲν χρηστάς τιμᾶν, τάς δὲ πονηρὰς 35 μή;

KP. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Χρησταί δὲ οὐχ αἱ τῶν φρονίμων, πονηραὶ δὲ αἱ τῶν ἀφρόνων;

KP. Πῶς δ’ οὖν;

46 εἰρημένος ἐπὶ. ἕνεκα λόγου, for the form’s sake (dicis causa)—quite different from λόγον χάριν (e. g. exempli causa)—is brought in ἐκ παραλλήλου. See on εἰκῇ κτ., Apol. 17 c.

24. τί λέγειν: the contradictory of ὄντιν λέγειν. Cf. Apol. 30 b. It means, “to say something that can be depended upon, that amounts to something.” Cf. Lach. 195 c, τί δοκεῖ Ἀλχίτης λέγειν, ὁ Νίκια; οὐκε μέντοι λέγειν τι, to which Nicias humorously responds, καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθὲς γε.

25. νῦν δὴ: just now.

28. ὅσα γε τάνθρωπεία: humanly speaking. Cf. Dem. xviii. 300, βοσὸν ἄνθρωπινος λογισμῷ δυσατόν, as far as human calculation could. For the adv. acc. δοσα, see G. 100, 2; H. 719.

One who is but a man can be sure of his life for no single moment, though he may have a reasonable confidence. Cf. Henry V. iv. 1, “I think the king is but a man, as I am; the violet smells to him as it doth to me; all his senses have but human conditions.” Notice the force of γε. Cf. 54 d, δοσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦμαι.

30. ἰκανῶς: sufficiently, satisfactorily, and hence rightly or truly. ἰκανῶς very commonly appears in conjunction with μετριός or καλῶς, to either one of which it is substantially equiv. Cf. Symp. 177 e and Phaed. 96 d.

32. For an omission here, see App.
VII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δη, πώς αὐ τά τα τουαίτα ἐλέγετο; γν- 47
μναζέμενος ἄνηρ καὶ τούτο πράττον πότερον παντὸς ἄνδρός
ἐπαίνυς καὶ ψόγυς καὶ δόξη τῶν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἐνὸς μόνον
ἐκείνου δὲ ἀν τυχχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἡ παιδοτρίβης ὁν;

ΚΡ. Ἡνὸς μόνον.

ΣΩ. Οὐκόν φοβείσθαι χρὴ τοὺς ψόγους καὶ ἀσπά-
ζονθαι τοὺς ἐπαίνους τοὺς τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐκείνου, ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς
tῶν πολλών.

ΚΡ. Δῆλα δή.

VII. 1. τοὺς αὐτά ἐλέγετο: the impf. because the new question (αὐ) involves
a matter which has already been discussed. GMT. 11, n. 6; H. 883. —
tά τοιαύτα: refers to what follows. The definite instance given is only
one of many possible illustrations of the kind. On the inductive method,
see Introd. 18, and for further examples, cf. Apol. 25 b. Cf. also Lach.
184 e–185 b, where the same example is elaborated to establish the same
principle that approval and instruction alike should, if we are to heed
them, come from the one man who has made himself an authority, δ μα-
θὼν καὶ ἐπιτεθεός, while the praise
and blame of the many is to be neglected. There also the importance of
deciding aright in regard to gymnastic training is strongly insisted upon,
as follows: ἢ περὶ σμικροῦ οἴδασθε μι
κινδυνεύοι καὶ σὺ καὶ Δυσίμαχος, ἀλλ’
οὗ περὶ τούτου τοῦ κτήματος, δ’ τῶν ὀρε-
tέρων μέγιστον ἐν τυχάνει, … ὁποῖοι
ἐν τινες οἱ παιδεῖς γένονται.

2. τοῦτο πράττον: a man who makes
this his work, and hence is an expert in
earnest about it. One whose opinion
professionally given is worth more than
any layman's would be. Cf. Menex. 244 e, ἦγαθσάμαν λακεδαιμόνιοι
… σφέτερον δὴ ἔργον ἐκατα-
δουλοῦσθαι τοὺς ἄλλους, ταύτ’ ἐ
ἔργατον. As this τάυτα refers to
καταδουλοῦσθαι, the τοῦτο in question
refers to the notion of gymnastics
implied in γυμναζέμενος; the whole
phrase means, a person who wishes to
v. 105, ἀποπέμπουσιν ἐς Σάρτην κήρυκα
Φειδιππίδην Ἀθηναίον μὲν ἄνδρα, ἄλλως
dὲ ἡμεροθρόμμον τε καὶ τοῦτο με-
λετῶντα.

4. ἰατρὸς ἡ παιδοτρίβης: often
tupled together as having special
charge of bodily vigor and health.
The ἰατρὸς was expected to cure and
to prevent disease by a prescribed
regimen (διαιτητική); the παιδοτρίβης
professed and was expected (Gorg.
452 b) καλοῖς τε καὶ ἱσχυροῖς ποιεῖν
touς ἄνθρώπους τὰ σώματα; he it was
who really gave instruction in gym-
nastics. For fuller details, see Schö-
mann, Antiquities of Greece, I. 505 f.
Iccus of Tarentum, glorified as a suc-
cessful gymnast, is reputed to have
been most strict in regard to a tem-
perate diet. Cf. the proverbial phrase
Τοικοῦ δεῖτον. Sometimes medicine
and gymnastics were both made the
business of the same man, as in the
case of Ierodias of Selymbria. Cf.
Prot. 310 d e, ἐνὸς δὲ τινας ᾖθεμα καὶ
γυμναστικήν (sc. professed teachers
10 Σ. Ταύτη ἕρα αὐτῷ πρακτέον καὶ γυμναστέον καὶ εἰς εἰσερχόν γε καὶ ποτέον, ἢ ἂν τῷ ἐνι δοκῇ τῷ ἑπιστάτῃ καὶ ἐπαίνεται, μάλλον ἢ ἢ ἐξήπται τοὺς ἄλλους; 
ΚΡ. Ἐστι ταῦτα.
Σ. Εἰς τὰ ἀπειθήσας δὲ τῷ ἐνὶ καὶ ἀτμάσας αὐτοῦ ἐν τῇ δόξῃ καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνεις, τιμήσας δὲ τοὺς τῶν πολλῶν λόγους καὶ μηδὲν ἐπαινότων, ἄρα οὐδὲν κακὸν πείσεται; 
ΚΡ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 
Σ. Τί δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ κακὸν τοῦτο καὶ ποῖ τείνει καὶ εἰς τί τῶν τοῦ ἀπειθοῦντος;
20 ΚΡ. Δὴλον ὅτι εἰς τὸ σῶμα. τοῦτο γὰρ διόλλωσιν.
Σ. Καλῶς λέγεις. οὐκοῦν καὶ τάλλα, ὁ Κρίτων, οὕτως, ἵνα μὴ πάντα διώμεν, καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδικῶν καὶ αἰχμάλωτων καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἁρπαγμῶν ἡ μὴ ἔστιν, πότερον τῇ τῶν πολλῶν δόξῃ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπεσταθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτῆς, ἢ τῇ τοῦ ἐνός, εἰ τέστιν ἐπαίνεσθαι, ἣν δεῖ καὶ αἰσχυνθῆσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι μάλλον ἡ ἐξήπτησις τοὺς ἄλλους; ὃ εἰ μὴ ἄκο-
λονθήσομεν, διαφθερούμεν ἐκεῖνο καὶ λωβησόμεθα, ὦ τῷ 47
μὲν δικαίω βέλτιον ἐγίγνετο, τῷ δὲ ἀδίκῳ ἀπώλευτο. ἦ
20 οὐδὲν ἐστὶ τούτῳ;

ΚΡ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

VIII. ΣΩ. Φέρε δή, εὰν τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑγιεωνοῦ μὲν βέλτιον
γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ νοσῶν δὲ διαφθειρόμενον
διωλέσωμεν, πειθόμενον μὴ τῇ τῶν ἐπαίόντων δόξῃ, ἅρα
βιωτόν ἢμῖν ἐστὶ διεφθαρμένον αὐτῷ; ἐστὶ δὲ ποιν τούτο τὸ
5 τὸ σώμα: ἦ οὖχι;

ΚΡ. Ναὶ.

ΣΩ. Ἄρ' οὖν βιωτόν ἢμῖν ἐστὶν μετὰ μοχθηροῦ καὶ
diεφθαρμένον σώματος;

ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

10 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνων ἅρα ἢμῖν βιωτόν διεφθαρμένον,
ὅτῳ ἄδικον μὲν λωβᾶται τὸ δὲ δίκαιον ὑπόθεν; ἦ
φαιλότερον ἡγούμεθα εἶναι τοῦ σώματος ἐκείνο, ὅ τι ποτ'
KRITON.

15  KR. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τιμωτέρον;

KR. Πολὺ γε.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἀρα, ὅ βέλτιστο, πάνυ ἡμῖν οὖτω φροντιστέοι, τί ἐροῦσιν οἱ πολλοί ἡμᾶς, ἂλλ' τὸ τὸ ἐστάτων περὶ 20 τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων, ὃ εἰς, καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ ἀλῆθεια. ὡστε πρώτον μὲν ταύτῃ οὐκ ὄρθως εἰσηγεῖται, εἰσηγούμενος τῆς τῶν πολλῶν δόξης δεῖν ἡμᾶς φροντίζειν περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἄγαθων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, φαίη γ' ἀν τις, ὅδι τε εἰσὶν ἡμᾶς οἱ πολλοὶ ἀποκτηνύναι.

25  KR. Δῆλα δὴ καὶ ταύτα· φαίη γὰρ ἂν, ὃ Σωκρατέως.  

ΣΩ. Ἀληθῆ λέγεις. ἂλλ', ὃθαυμάσσει, οὐτός τε ὁ λόγος ὅν διεληλύθαμεν ἠμοίην δοκεῖ ἐπὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι [τῷ] καὶ πρότερον· καὶ τόνδε αὖ σκόπηε εἰ ἐπὶ μένει ἡμῖν ἢ οὔ, ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζήν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εὖ ζήν.

for arguing about its name.(ψυχῆ)here.  

18. οὐκ ἀρα πάνυ οὖτω: then we must not ... at all ... so much as all that, etc. οὖτω refers back to the drift of Crito's argument. Here again Socrates takes the last step in a long induction.

19. τί ... δ' τα: a not unusual combination of the dir. and indr. forms of question. Cf. Gorg. 500 a, ἄρ' οὖν παύσως ἂν δοθήτο εἰς τινα ἐκλείσασθαι ποιά ἀγαθά τῶν ἡδῶν ἄντι καὶ διοίκα κακά, ἢ τεχνικοῦ (specialist) δει εἰς ἐκάστων; The double acc. as in κακά (κακῶς) λέγεις τινα.

20. αὐτή ἢ ἀλήθεια: i.e. Truth, speaking with the lips of ἐστάτων, or appearing as the result of strict and patient inquiry.

23. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ: again Socrates reproves Crito, this time for his appeal to the Athenian public (44 d).  

—μὲν δὴ: certainly, equiv. to μὲν or nearly so.

25. δῆλα δὴ κτέ.: Crito eagerly catches at this objection and strengthens it with καί. Thus he implies that there is more than meets the eye, i.e. that there are many other valid objections. Cf. 45 a. See App.

26. οὔτος τε ὁ λόγος κτέ.: τέ corresponds to καί ... αὖ following. For a similar καί ... καὶ αὖ, see Lach. 181 d, καὶ τούτων πέρι ἔγνων πειράσομαι συμβούλευεν ὅτι δύναι καὶ αὖ προκαλεῖ πάντα τοιοῦ. The connexion of thought would not hinder us from subordinating the first clause: “as our discussion just closed agrees with what we argued formerly (when dealing with the same matter), so, etc.”

29. ὅτι οὖτος ζήν κτέ.: cf. Apol. 28 b ff.
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

30 ΚΡ. Ἄλλα μένει.

ΣΩ. Τὸ δὲ εὖ καὶ καλῶς καὶ δικαίως ὅτι ταῦτον ἐστι, μένει ἣ οὐ μένει;

ΚΡ. Μένει.

IX. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογομένων τούτῳ σκεπτεόν, πότερον δίκαιον ἐμὲ ἐνθένδε πειράσθαι ἔξεναι μὴ ἀφιέντων Ἀθηναίων, ἣ οὐ δίκαιον· καὶ ἐὰν μὲν φαίνηται ὁ δίκαιον, πειρώμεθα, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἐξίμεν. ἄς δὲ σὺ λέγεις τὰς 5 σκέψεις περὶ τε ἀναλώσεως χρημάτων καὶ δόξης καὶ πάλιν τροφῆς, μὴ ὡς ἀληθῶς ταῦτα, ὦ Κρίτων, σκέμματα τῶν φαντάσματος καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἁν, εἰ οὐκ εὖ τ' ἤσαν, οὖδεὶν ἄν ὑπεξε, τούτων τῶν πολλῶν. ἡμῶν δ', ἐπειδὴ ὁ λόγος οὕτωι αἴρεται, μὴ οὖδέν ἄλλο σκέπτεσθαι ἡ ἦ 10 ὅπερ νῦν ὑδὲ ἔλεγομεν, πότερον δίκαια πράξεις καὶ χρήματα τελοῦντες τούτους τοῖς ἐμὲ ἐνθένει ἐξάζουσι καὶ ἄλλα

48 31. τὸ δὲ εὖ κτέ.: this is needed because of the confused ideas which many associate with εὖ ζήν, e.g. (1) plain living and high thinking, or (2) high living and no thinking. For the latter meaning, cf. Rep. i. 320 ν, οἷον πλείστοι (τῶν προσβολῶν) τὰς ἐν τῇ προτέρα ἡδονὰς ποιούστες ἄγανακτοις ὅσ μεγάλων τινῶν ἀπεστηρημένως, καὶ τότε μὲν εὖ ζῶντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ζώντες. On this whole subject consult the discussion in Prot. 351 B ff.

c IX. 4. τὰς σκέψεις: drawn into the const. of the rel. clause, to which precedence has been given. The art. is commonly not retained in such a case, e.g. οὐς ἡ πάλιν νομίζει θεῶς οὐ νομίζον. The corresponding demonstr. ταῦτα is attracted into the gender of the pred.

6. μὴ... ὡς ὀπὰ κτέ.: Look to it, Crito, lest all this, at bottom, may prove to be, etc. A milder way of saying ταῦτα σκέμματα εἰστα φαίνεται, strengthened by ὡς ἀληθῶς. See on μὴ οὗ τοῦτ' ἦ, Apol. 39 α.

7. καὶ ἀναβιωσκομένων γ' ἁν: and would bring them to life again too. The ἁν forms with this partic. the apod. ἀναβιωσκομένων is used here like ἀναβιωσκομένων in Phaed. 80 d. Usually it is intransitive, like ἀναβιωσκομένων.

9. ὁ λόγος οὕτωι αἴρεται: the argument has prevailed thus far. Cf. Hor. Sat. i. 3, 115, nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut pectet idemque | qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti | et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit. Ibid. ii. 3, 225, vincet enim stultos ratio insanire nopes, and 250, si puerilius his ratio esse evinceat amare. It is rare to find this idiom with an acc. of the persons discussing, as in Rep. x. 607 b, ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἔχει.—μὴ... ὡς: as in 6 above.
χάρτας καὶ αὐτὸι ἐξάγοντες τε καὶ ἐξαγόμενοι, ἦ τῇ ἀλήθεια ἀδικήσωμεν πάντα ταῦτα ποιοῦντες· κἂν φανώμεθα ἀδικα αὐτὰ ἐργαζόμενοι, μὴ οὐ δέ ήπωμηγηθαι οὔτε εἰ.

15 ἀποθνῄσκειν δὲ τι παραμένοντας καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας οὔτε ἀλλο ὅτιον πάσχειν πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Καλῶς μὲν μοι δοκεῖσι λέγειν, ὡς Σωκράτες· ὃρα δὲ τὰ δρῶμεν.

ΣΩ. Σκοπῶμεν, ὃ ἀγαθὲ, κοινῷ, καὶ εἰ τῇ ἔχεις ἀντιλέγειν·

20 γεν ἐμοὶ λέγοντος, ἀντίλεγε, καὶ σοι πείσομαι· εἰ δὲ μή, εἰ παύσαι ἢδι, ὃς μακάριε, πολλάκις μοι λέγων τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, ὡς ἠνθεύεται ἀκόντων Ἀθηναίων ἐμὲ ἀπίστευειν· ὡς ἐγώ περὶ πολλοῦ ποιοῦμαι πείσας σε ταῦτα πράττειν, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος. ὃρα δὲ δὴ τῆς σκέψεως τὴν ἀρχήν, ἐάν

12. καὶ αὐτὸι κτέ.: καὶ αὐτοῖς, we ourselves too, stands for Crito and Socrates. Crito is responsible, in the supposed case, not only for his expenditure of money (χρήματα τελοῦνται), but also for instigating the act of Socrates, or rather for persuading him to allow various things to be done for him.—ἐξαγόμενοι: the pass. is especially strong, "we ourselves are both rescuers and rescued."

15. οὕτω πάσχειν: sc. εἰ δὲ, to be supplied from the preceding clause.

16. πρὸ τοῦ ἀδικεῖν: cf. Apol. 28 b d. The sense is, "there must be no question about submitting to the uttermost (ὅτιον πάσχειν) rather than committing unrighteousness." See also 51 b, where, as in this case, a choice is involved, and πρὸ is used in the sense of in preference to or instead of.

23. ὃς: inasmuch as, equiv. to ἐπεὶ. Cf. quippe in Lat.

24. ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄκοντος: opposed distinctly to πείσας σε, with your approval. Cf. 40 e fin., and Xen. An. v. 6. 29, ἐξήνεγκε γὰρ τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἐγὼ πράττειν ταῦτα διανοομένη ἢ δὴ οὐ πείσας ὑμᾶς. The vivid contrast of these two clauses makes the omission of soû, the subj. of ἄκοντος, the easier. Indeed, cases are common where a personal or a dem. pron. or some vague general notion of persons or things is the subj. implied. For a somewhat similar case, cf. Hom. Od. iv. 645 ff., ὥσπερ εἰς εἰδω ἢ σε βή ἁκόντος ἀπαύγα μηδέλοιμην, ἢ ἐκῶν οἱ δῶκας. —δῶν λέγονταί: in case the statement shall satisfy you. ἐὰν does not like ei (cf. 48 b) mean whether. GMT. 71, n. 1. Cf. Phaedo, 64 c, αἰκέσαι δή, ἄγαθε, ἐὰν ὅρα καὶ σοι ξυνδόκη κτέ. The subj. of the dependent sent. is made by anticipation (prolepsis) the object of ὃρα. Cf. Milton, Sonnet to Sir Henry Vane, xvii., "Besides to know | Both spiritual power and civil, what each means, | What severs each, thou hast learned, which few have done." Cf. below (49 d). Socrates is earnestly enforcing a principle.
παλαιότερα τάσεων είτε καὶ πραξίτερα, ὅμως τὸ γε

26. ἢ σκότος: sc. κατὰ τὸ ἀληθῆς ἄν ἀποκρίνεσθαι τὸ ἐρωτώμενον. μᾶλλον as in the question τῆς μάλιστα; Cf. Rep. vii. 587 d, τὸ ἄγαθον ὅταν καλὸν, ὡς πολλάκις ἡμῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐμπροσθεν χρόνῳ ωμολογήθη; [ἄπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγεν.]

3. ἢ σκότος: sc. ἡμᾶς. The const. with the acc. corresponds to the equivalent δὲ with the acc. and inf. GMT. 114, 2; H. 611 a. For the facts, see Introd. 65.

2. ἢ σκότος κτέ.: here the first member of the disjunctive question is resumed, so that the questioner gives notice to the questioned, as it were, of his opinion. For the accent of τινὶ when (exceptionally) it begins its clause, see G. 28, x. 1 (I); H. 119 a.

4. ὅπερ καὶ ἄρτι ἔλεγεν: prob. not written by Plato. If genuine, it cannot refer to anything here, but relates to the drift of 46 b and 48 b. See App.

5. ἢ πάσας κτέ.: here and in the words ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. below, we see how hard Crito finds it to assert.

49 After each double question (1) ὅπερν ... ὁμολογήθη; (2) ἢ πάσας ... παντὶ τρόπῳ; Socrates has looked at Crito for an answer. Finally he extorts the briefest assent by the pointed φασίν ἢ ous; in line 13 below.

6. ἢ κεκεχυμέναι εἰσὶ. thrown away. Cf. Henry VIII. iii. 2, "Cromwell, I charge thee, fling away ambition," and Soph. Phil. 13, μὴ καὶ μάθη μὲ ἡκοντα κάκειον τὸ πάν σφυμα, τῷ μν ἀυτικαί αἰρόσεων δοκᾶ. Similar is the Lat. effundere grata, laborem.—καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: one of the two particis. forms the predicative complement of ἐλαθομεν, the other stands in opposition to the pred. By the added τηλικοῦδε ἄνδρες (see on τοσοῦτον ous, Apol. 25 d), this opposition is put still more strongly. άρα gives point to the irony. See on ἄρῃ ous, 47 ε.

11. ὅμως παντὶ τρόπῳ: a more distinct reiteration of what ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον κτέ. has already stated. Therefore one as much as the other belongs
KRITON.

15 ΣΩ. Οὐδαμῶς ἀρα δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

ΚΡ. Οὐ δήτα.

ΣΩ. Οὐδὲ ἀδικοῦμενον ἀρα ἀνταδικεῖν, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ

οἴονται, ἐπειδῆ γε οὐδαμῶς δεὶ ἀδικεῖν.

gέλας ἥδιστος εἰς ἐχθρὸς γελᾶν; Contrast Soph. Ant. 523 ff.; KR. οὕτως ποθ

οὐχήρος, οὐδ' ὅταν θάνη, φιλός. | AN. οὗ


says it is folly to spare the offspring of one's foes, ἀναλα μεγάλῃ λείπειν ἐχθρὸς

ἐχθρῶν, ἐξει κτεῖνει, and ibid. 1007, where Orestes says, ἐχθρῶν γὰρ ἄνδρῶν


1049 ff., the grim humor of Alcmena, who says of Eurystheus, ἐχθρὸς μὲν

ἀνήρ, ὕφελεὶ δὲ καταβαῖν. See also

Bacch. 1344–1348, where Agave admits her guilt but asks for mercy, and

Dionsysus refuses mercy because he has been offended. Agave an-

swers: ὅργα πρέπει θεοῖς οὖν διοι-

κουσθαί βροτοῖς. This shows an ideal

of moral conduct for the gods, such as Plato preaches for men. Compare

Soph. Aj. 670–682, ὅ τι ἐχθρὸς ἡμῖν

ἐς τοσόν ἐχθραίρειο, ὡς καὶ φίλοις

ἀδῖνις, ἐς τὸν φίλον | τοσαυτῷ ὑποψίνῳ

ὑφελείν θουλόσθεμαι | ὡς αὖ ὁ ἅρμα

νοῦν, with Henry VIII. iii. 2, “Love

thyself last, cherish those that hate thee; | still in thy right hand carry
gentle peace | to silence envious
tongues. Be just and fear not.”

Shakspere thus expresses the view of

the Platonic Socrates and of Plato in

contrast to that of the Greek public

at large. That the historical (in con-

trast to the Platonic) Socrates at least
ΚΡ. Οὐ φαίνεται.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; κακουργεῖν δεῖ, ὡς Κρίτων, ἢ οὐ;
ΚΡ. Οὐ δεῖ δήπου, ὡς Σώκρατες.
ΣΩ. Τί δὲ; ἀντικακουργεῖν κακῶς πάσχοντα, ὡς οἱ
πολλοὶ φασι, δίκαιον ἢ οὐ δίκαιον;
ΚΡ. Οὐδαμῶς.

ΣΩ. Τὸ γὰρ ποὺ κακῶς ποιεῖν ἀνθρώπους τοῦ ἄδικείν
οὐδὲν διαφέρει.
ΚΡ. Ἀλήθη λέγεις.

ΣΩ. Οὔτε ἄρα ἀνταδικεῖν δεῖ οὔτε κακῶς ποιεῖν οὐδένα
ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ ἃν ὅτιοιν πάσχῃ ὑπ’ αὐτῶν. καὶ ὅρα, ὡς
Κρίτων, ταῦτα καθομολογῶν ὅπως μὴ παρὰ δόξαιν ὁμολογ
γῆς. οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ὅλοις τοις ταύτα καὶ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει.
οἷς οὐν οὖτω δέδοκται καὶ οἷς μή, τοῦτοι οὐκ ἔστι κοινὴ
βουλή, ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκη τοῦτος ἀλλήλων καταφρονεῖν, ὀρῶν
τας τὰ ἀλλήλων βουλεύματα. ἓκοπει δὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ εὖ

19. οὐ φαίνεται: plainly not. As οὐ φημι means I deny rather than that I do not assert, so οὐ φαίνεται means it does not appear, but it does appear not.

20. κακουργεῖν: this word, like κακῶς ποιεῖ, covers more cases than ἄδικείν: it includes ἄδικείν and also cases of harm done where there is little or no question of right and wrong involved. Apparently, it was more commonly used in everyday matters than ἄδικείν. In Crito’s answer his uncertain certainty is indicated by ἐξεργάσατο; had he meant that he was perfectly certain, he would have used δὴ.

28. οὔτε ἄρα κτῆ.: the complete presentation of this precept must be sought in the teaching of Christ. Cf. Luke vi. 27, ἀλλὰ ὅμως ἄγαπατε τοὺς ἄχρος ὑμῶν, κα

30. καθομολογῶν, ὁμολογής: see on εἰ γὰρ ὄφελον, 41 d.

32. τοῦτοι οὐκ ἔστι κτῆ.: this is strongly set forth in the Gorgias, where the Sophist and the true Philosopher represent respectively these two clashing theories. See Intro. 65.

34. βουλεύματα: counsel, i.e. their manner of thinking and acting.
μάλα, τότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ σοι, καὶ ἀρχώμεθα 49 ἐντεῦθεν βουλεύομενοι, ὡς οὐδέποτε ὄρθως ἔχοντος οὔτε τοῦ ἀδικείν οὔτε τοῦ ἀνταδικείν οὔτε κακῶς πάσχοντα ἀμύνεσθαι ἀντιδρῶντα κακῶς. ἦ ἀφίστασαι καὶ οὐ κοινωνεῖς τῆς ἀρχῆς; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ πᾶλαι οὗτο καὶ νῦν εἰς δοκεῖ. σοὶ δὲ τῆς άλλης δέδοκται, λέγε καὶ δίδασκε. 

κρ. 'Ἀλλ' ἐμένω τε καὶ ξυνδοκεῖ μοι· ἀλλὰ λέγε.

σ. Λέγω δὴ αὐτῷ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, μᾶλλον δὲ ἐρωτῶ· πότερον ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τῷ δίκαιῳ οὔτε ποιητέων ἢ εξαπατητέων; 

κρ. Ποιητέων.

XI. σ. Ἐκ τούτων δὴ ἁθρεῖ. ἀπάντησε ἐνθένδε ἥμεισ μὴ πείσαντες τὴν πόλιν πότερον κακῶς τινας ποιοῦν μεν, καὶ ταῦτα οὖς ἥκιστα δεῖ ἢ οὔ; καὶ ἐμένομεν οἷς όμολογήσαμεν δικαίως οὐσιν ἢ οὐ;

36. ὡς οὐδέποτε κτέ.: a statement of what is involved in ἐντεῦθεν, which is equiv. to ἐκ τούτων τοῦ λόγου (taking this principle for granted). ὡς with the gen. abs. is used in this same way also after λέγων. Cf. Men. 95 ε, οἷσθα ὅτι ἐν τούτοις μὲν ὡς διδακτοῦ ὁδηγὸς τῆς ὁρετίας λέγει; 

39. τῆς ἀρχῆς: cf. καὶ ἀρχώμεθα ἐντεῦθεν above. ἀρχὴ is the starting-point of an investigation,—a principle, a conviction.—καὶ πάλαι κτέ.: see on ὁ πῦρ κτέ., 40 b. 

41. τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: not what results, but what comes next. It may be taken adv. (like τὸ ἀπὸ τούτῳ and the like) and translated further. What is referred to is expressed in πότερον κτέ. below.

43. μᾶλλον δε: or rather. Cf. Lach. 190 c, λέγε δε μοι δ Νικία, μᾶλλον δ' ἡμῖν. 

44. ἡ εξαπατητέων: Socrates says this rather than ἢ οὐ ποιητέων because of the preceding ἂν τις ὁμολογήσῃ τε. Such an admission pledges a man to put his principle in practice. εξαπατῶν is not only construed with an acc. of the person, here easily supplied from τε, but furthermore takes the acc. of the thing. Cf. Xen. An. v. 7, 11, εἰ δὲ τις ὑμῶν ἢ αὐτός εξαπατηθήσῃ ἄν ολοκληρωθῇ τὰ ἄλλα προφανεῖς ταῦτα, λέγων διδασκόντω. 

XI. 1. ἐκ τούτων: in the light of this. See on 48 e, ἐκ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων, and cf. Henry IV. i. 1, “For more is to be said and done | than out of anger can be uttered.” The particular plan of flight Socrates considers in the light of, or out of, the general conclusion just approved. 

3. οἷς οὖσιν: the dat. is assimilated regularly to the omitted obj. of ἔμεθα.
5. ΚΡ. Όν τέχνη, διί Σώκρατες, ἀποκρινασθαι πρὸς δὲ ἐρωτ. 50
tὰς. οὐ γὰρ ἐννοοῦ.

ΣΩ. 'Αλλ' δὲ σκόπει. εἰ μελλοντιν ἡμῖν ἐνθένδε
eίτε ἀποδιδράσκειν, εἰθ' ὅπως δέι ὄνομάσαι τούτο, ἐλθόν-
tες οἱ νόμοι καὶ τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως ἐπιστάντες ἔρουντο.

10 εἰπέ μοι, διί Σώκρατες, τί ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ποιεῖν; ἀλλὰ τῇ
tούτῳ τῷ ἠργῷ ὁ ἐπίχειρεῖς διὰνοι τοὺς τε νόμους ἡμᾶς δὲ
ἀπολέσαι καὶ ἐξίμπασαν τὴν πόλιν τὸ ὁδόν μέρος; ἡ δοκεῖ

50 νομεν. ὑμολογήσαμεν would require
the acc. as in 49 ε above.

5. οὐκ ἔχω κτῆ.: Crito seems afraid
of understanding what is meant; the in-
evitable consequences involved alarm
him. See on κακοπνεύς, 49 c. This
natural state of mind on his part

gives good and sufficient reason for
a reconsideration of the whole subject
from a new point of view.

7. μέλλοντιν ἡμῖν: for the dat., cf.
Symp. 192 δ, εἰ αὐτοῖς . . . ἐπιστὰς δὲ
ὁ Πραστᾶς . . . ἐρωτ. Prot. 321 c, ἀπο-
ρῶντι δὲ αὐτῷ ἔρχεται Προμηθεὺς. See
on δ, 47 ε. The statement there given
covers a very large number of cases
where a partic. and a finite verb are
combined like ἐλθότας ἔρωτο.

8. εἰθ' ὅπως κτῆ.: this softening
phrase is used purely out of considera-
tion for Crito. To use the word
applied to runaway slaves might give
offence. One of the annoying mis-
haps that befell a well-to-do Athenian
was to have to give chase when a
slave ran off to Megara or Oenoa.
Cf. Prot. 310 c, where Hippocrates
nearly lost his dinner, μᾶλα γε ὡς
ἀφικόμενοι ἐξ Οινόθης. οὐ γὰρ τοιοῦ
tοις με δύσταρο ἀπεθάνω. Of course such
conduct on the slave’s part was con-
sidered despicable. Cf. 52 δ, δοῦλος
fαυλότατος. The δοῦλος χρηστός, who
appears in tragedy more frequently
than in real life, would not run away,
because of his attachment to his mas-
ter. Cf. Eur. Med. lines 64 f., χρη-
στότατος δοῦλος ξυμφορὰ τὰ δεσποτῶν ἐκ
κακῶς πιθότατα καὶ φρενῶν ἄνθυπτεταί, the
first of which recurs in the Bacchae
(1029), Alc. 768–77; and cf. also Eur.
Andr. 60–59, where the slave says to
Andromache, εἴνοις δὲ καὶ σοὶ ζωνταί τῃ
tῷ σῷ πόλει. In Xen. Oec. 7. 37
and 38, and 9. 11–13, is an interesting
account of the position of slaves in
the household.

9. τὸ κοινὸν τῆς πόλεως: the com-
monwealth. Cf. Xen. An. v. 7. 18, and
Hdt. i. 67, Σπάρτητεσν τῷ κοινῷ δια-
pεμπτομένου, sent by the commonplace
of Sparta. So Cicero says commune

ciciliae. The personification of the
state and the laws which here follows
is greatly admired and has been abun-
dantly imitated, e.g. by Cicero in his
first Catilinarian Oration (7. 18).
The somewhat abrupt transition from ἡμῖν
above to δί Σώκρατες suggests the fact
that Socrates considered himself alone
responsible to the laws in this matter.

10. ἀλλὰ τῇ: see on ἀλλὰ τῇ ἢ,
Apol. 24 c.

11. τοὺς τε νόμους: notice the order
and cf. 53 a, ἡμεῖς οἱ νόμοι.

12. τὸ σὸν μέρος: see on τὸ σὸν δὲ
μέρος, 45 d. Here it is about the same
in sense with καθ’ ὧδεν δύνασθαι, 61 a.
σοι οἶνον τε ἐτι ἐκεῖνη τὴν πόλιν εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀνατε- 50
τράφθαι, ἐν ᾧ αἱ γενόμεναι θύκαι μηδὲν ἰσχύουσιν, ἀλλ' 15 ὑπὸ ἰδιώτων ἄκυροι τε γίγνονται καὶ διαφθείρονται; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Κρίτων, πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα; πολλὰ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἔχων ἄλλως τε καὶ βῆτωρ εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ τούτου τοῦ νόμου ἀπολλυμένου, ὅσ τὰς δίκας τὰς δικασθείσας προστάτει κυρίας εἶναι. ἦ ἐροῦμεν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ὅτι 20 ἡδίκει γὰρ ἡμᾶς ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ ὅρθος τὴν δίκην ἐκρίνε; εἰ ταῦτα ἦ τί ἐροῦμεν;

ΚΡ. Ταῦτα νῦν Δία, ὦ Σῶκρατες.

ΧΙ. Σ.Ω. Τί οὖν, ἂν εἴτεσσον οἱ νόμοι. ὦ Σῶκρατες, ἡ καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολόγητο ἡμῖν τε καὶ σοί, ἦ ἐμένειν ταῖς δίκαις ἄις ἂν ἡ πόλις δικαία; εἴ οὖν αὐτῶν θαυμάζομεν λεγόμενα, ἵσως ἂν εἴποιν ὅτι, ὦ Σῶκρατες, μὴ θαύμαζε τὰ 5 λεγόμενα, ἄλλα ἀποκρίνουν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ εἰσόθα χρήσθαι τῷ ἐρωτάν τε καὶ ἀποκρίνεσθαι. φέρε γὰρ, τι ἐγκαλῶν ἡμῶν καὶ τῇ πόλει ἐπιχειρεῖς ἡμᾶς ἀπολλυναί; οὐ πρῶτον μὲν ἂ σὲ ἐγεννήσαμεν ἡμεῖς καὶ δι' ἡμῶν ἐλάμβανεν τὴν μυτέρα σου ὁ πατὴρ καὶ ἐφύτευσέν σε; φράσον οὖν, τοῦτος ἡμῶν,
10 τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους, μέμφει τι ὃς ὦ καλῶς ἐχουσιν; οὗ μέμφομαι, φαίνει ἂν. ἀλλὰ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τοῦ γενομένου τροφῆν τε καὶ παιδείαν ἐν ἧ καὶ σὺ ἐπαιδεύθης; ἥ οὐ καλῶς προσέταττον ἡμῶν οἱ ἐπὶ τούτους τεταγμένοι νόμοι, παραγγέλλοντες τῷ πατρί τῷ σῷ σε ἐν μονοικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ παιδεύειν; καλῶς, φαίνει ἂν. εἶεν. ἐπειδὴ εἶ δὲ ἐγένον καὶ ἐξετάφρης καὶ ἐπαιδεύθης, ἔχους ἂν εἶπεῖν πρῶτον μὲν ὡς οὐχὶ ἡμέτερος ἦσθα καὶ ἐκγόνος καὶ δουλος, αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ σοὶ πρόγονοι; καὶ εἰ τοῦθ' οὕτως

50 10. τοῖς περὶ τοὺς γάμους: probably Socrates was thinking particularly of the laws governing marriage which established the legitimacy of children (γνησίωτης). See Schoemann, Antiquities of Greece, p. 357.

11. ἀλλὰ: instead of ἔσεθα δὲ, which would have been written here to correspond to πρῶτον μὲν if Socrates's answer had not intervened.

14. ἐν μονοικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ: these words cover the whole of education (παιδεία), as Plato, Rep. ii. 376 e, says, ἐπὶ τοῦ ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώματος γυμναστικῆ, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς μονοικῆ. "The education of the average Greek gentleman, like that of the average English gentleman, comprised a certain amount of mental cultivation and a certain amount of athletic exercise. The former, besides reading, writing, and some elementary mathematics, consisted mainly in the reciting and learning by heart of poetry, along with the elements of music, and sometimes of drawing. Perhaps because so much of the poetry was originally sung or accompanied, the word 'music' was sometimes applied to the education in literature as well as in music proper, and it is in this wider sense that Plato habitually uses it. Under the term 'gymnastic' was understood the whole system of diet and exercise which, varying with the customs of different states, had for its common object the production of bodily health and strength, and the preparation for military service." Hellenica, The Theory of Education in Plato's Republic, by R. L. Nettleship, M.A., p. 88. See on τοῦτο πρῶτον, 47 a. See also Schoemann, Greek Antiquities, pp. 359 ff.

17. δουλος: opposed to δεσπότης. Cf. Hdt. vii. 104, where Demaratus says to Xerxes that the Lacedaemonians ἔλεσαν ἄντες οὐ πάντα ἔλεσαν εἰς ἐπιστημονήν. Elsewhere Plato uses δουλεύειν of the obedience which the law requires, e.g. Legg. 762 c, οὐ μὴ δουλεύσας οὐδὲ ἐν δεσπότης γένοιτο ἐξις ἐπιστημονήν, καὶ καλλωπίζεσθαι (cf. ἐκαλλωπίς, Apol. 20 e) χρῆ τῷ καλῶς δουλεύσαι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καλῶς ἀρξαι, πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς νόμοις, ὡς ταυτήν τοῖς θεοῖς ἄδικαι δουλευῖν, ἐπείτα τοῖς πρεσβυτέροις κτ. Cf. Apol. 23 b, 30 a, and also Eur. Orest. 418, where Orestes says in a very different spirit, δουλεύσαμεν θεοῖς, δ' τι πος' εἶλον οἱ θεοί. Cf. 52 d. This high standard of obedience, unhesitating and unqualified, to the established law, was familiar to the Athenians before Plato wrote.
Among many passages in the trag-46 d. where ἄρα occurs only in the
dian, cf. Soph. Ant. 663 ff., ὠτίς δ’ ὑπερβᾶς ἢ νόμοις βιάζεσαι ἢ τοίχι-
πάσεσει τοῖς κρατύνονσι νοεῖ, ἢ ὄντ’ ἐστ’ ἔπαλον τοῦτον ἐξ ἐμοῦ τυχεῖν. Ὦ ἀλλ’ ἐν 
τοῖς στήσει, τοῦτε χρῆ κλάειν | καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ τα-

םענים, ut liberi esse possi-

mum, and cf. in Eur. Suppl. 420 ff., 
the speech of Theseus, beginning, 
οὐδὲν τυράννου δυσμενέστερον πόλει | 
ἔτου τὸ μὲν πρώτιστον ὦν εἰς ἐσὶν νό-

μοι | κοινόν, κατεί δ’ ἐν τοῖς νόμοις 
κεκτημένοις | αὐτὸς παρ’ αὐτῷ, καὶ 
τὸς ὁπέρ’ ἐστ’ ἤτοι ἴσον. Cf. also ibid. 
316–333, 403–408, and the words of 
Aethra, 312 f., τὸ γάρ τοι συνέχον (bond 
of union) ἀνθρώπων πόλεως | τοῦτ’ ἐσθ’, 
ἀκεραίως ἐν τοῖς νόμοις σάγχ κα-

Δάφνης. Many lines in the Heraclidae 
of Euripides show that ready and 
free obedience to law distinguished 
Athens, τὰν ἐν ἁρτοῦ ἡγούσαν πόλιν, 
(379 f.). Cf. 181–198, 306 f., 329–332, 
420–424.

18. αὐτὸς τ’ κτῆ.: see on αὐτὸς τ’ 
κτῆ., Apol. 42 a.

21. ἢ πρὸς μὲν ... πρὸς δὲ κτῆ.: the 
first clause is logically subordinate. 
See on δεῖλα ἢ ἐπέρα, Apol. 28 d. ἄρα 
is ironical. See on ἄλλα ... ἄρα, 47 e, 
and particularly on ἢ πρὸς μὲν κτῆ., 
46 d, where ἄρα occurs only in the 
second clause. For the repetition, 
see Prot. 325 b, διδακτοῦ δὲ δότος καὶ 
θεραπευτοῦ (sc. ἀρετῆς) τὰ μὲν ἀλλ’ ἐν 
ἀρα τοὺς νείς διδάκονται, ἐφ’ ὦς ὄν 
ἐστι βάθατος ἢ ἐμψαλίω, ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιστῶνται, 
ἐφ’ ὦ δὲ ... ταύτα δ’ ἄρα ὦ διδάκον-

ται, οὐδ’ ἐπιμελοῦνται πάσαν ἐπιμέλειαν; 
Notice the position of σοι, which is 
nevertheless not the emphatic word.

22. ἦν: “when you were under 
your father or perhaps your master.” 
The past (ἴσται). — καὶ πρὸς τὸν δεσποτήν: for 
the δυσλός χρηστός, see on δοῦλος in 
17 above.

23. ἀπερ πᾶσχοι: anything that was 
(at any time) done to you. GMT. 62; 
H. 914 B (2). Though subord. to 
ἀστε ... ἀντιποίειν, this clause is also 
limited by the neg. statement ὦν ἐξ 
τού ἴσον ἰπ’, which limits the clause ἀστε 
... πολλά.

24. οὔτε ... πολλά: an explana-
tion of ἀστε ... ἀντιποίειν, in which 
the neg. of ὦν ἐξ ἴσον ἰπ’ is repeated. 
κακῶς ἰκούσαντα ἀντιλέγειν: equiv. 
λοιπον ὀρθῶν ἀντιλυσομένων. 

27. ὠστε καὶ συ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσεις: a 
so that you in your own turn will, etc. 
ὅ, when expressed in Att., has em-
phatic position. καὶ indicates equality,
toús nómous kai tìn patrída kaiπ̄ ósoun dúnasai epíxeir̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄̄
KRITON,

πάσχειν, ἤὰν τὸ προστάττῃ παθεῖν, ἡσυχίαν ἅγιοντα, ἤὰν τὸ τῦπτεσθαι ἤὰν τὲ δεῖσθαι, ἤὰν τὸ εἰς πόλεμον ἄγνωστὸν ἡ ἀποθανοῦμεν, ποιητέον ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ δι-
καίου ὦτως ἔχει, καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον ὦτῳ ἂναχωρητέον ὦτῳ λευτέον τὴν τάξιν, ἄλλα καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ καὶ ἐν δικαστη-
ρίῳ καὶ παντικήποι ποιητέον ἄν κελεύῃ ἡ πόλις καὶ ἡ πατρίς, ἡ πείθεν ἄντην ἢ τὸ δίκαιον πέφυκε, βιάζεσθαι δὲ
οὐχ ὃσιον ὦτῳ μητέρᾳ ὦτῳ πατέρᾳ, πολὺ δὲ τοὺτων ἐπὶ
ἡττον τὴν πατρίδα; τί φήσομεν πρὸς ταῦτα, ὥς Κρίτων;
ἀληθὴ λέγειν τοὺς νόμους ἢ οὐ;

ΚΡ. Ἕμοιγε δοκεῖ.

XIII. ᾿Ο. Σκόπει τοῖν τοῖς ᾿Ωκράτης, φαίην ἂν ἵσως
οὐ νόμοι, εἴ ἡμεῖς ταῦτα ἀληθῆ λέγομεν, ὅτι οὐ δίκαια
ἡμᾶς ἐπιχειρεῖσι δρᾶν ἢ νῦν ἐπιχειρεῖσι. ἡμεῖς γὰρ σὲ γεν-

51 times to propitiate, as in Hom. II. i. 100, τόσε κὲν μιν ('Απίθανον) ἱλασÆ
σάμενοι πειθοίμεν. Cf. e below.

The first two ἄν ἢ clauses (like ἄντη... ἄντη, σίβε... σίβε), with προστάτη understood, are explanatory of ἅν τὸ προστάττῃ παθεῖν, while the third takes a new verb with a new
apodosis. The two former are specifications under πάσχειν, the third instances analogous cases where un-
qualified obedience to the state is necessary. The emergencies of war are taken as typical of a host of
others, and then with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ the argument is brought to a head.

This elaboration of the period leaves to its own devices ποιητέον ταῦτα
(which, grammatically, is subordinate to λέγεω σι). 40. καὶ οὐχὶ ὑπεικτέον: a neg.
iteration of ποιητέον ταῦτα. We must not draw back, we must not retreat,
we must not leave the ranks. Corre-

sponding to these three duties, there were three forms of indictment, ἀστρα-
tελαις, δειλια, λαπτασιού. On the last,
cf. Apol. 28 e–29 a. ἁτιμλα was the
penalty involved in all these cases.

43. ἡ πείθεν: the inf. coming after ὡς
an impersonal verbal often depends
on an implied ὡς even when no ὡς
precedes. GMT. 114, 2, ἃ.; H. 991 a.

Cf. Gorg. 492 a, τάς μὲν ἐπιθυμίας φης
οὐ κολαστέον, εἰ μέλλει τις οἷον ἰδιῶ
ἔτων ἐν αὐτὰς ὡς μεγάλης πλήρωσιν
αὐταῖς ἁμένην γέ ποθεν ἀτοιμάζειν.
— ἀ... πέργικα: quomodo ius-
tum comparatum sit, an explana-
tion of πείθεν, which implies διδα-
σκειν (cf. Apol. 35 c, διδάσκειν καὶ
πείθειν).

XIII. 1. σκόπει τοῖς τοῖς κτέ.: an
application of the universal truth to
a particular instance.

2. ... κτέ.: the relation of δικαια
to ἢ κτέ. is the same in which ἀλη-
θή of the clause preceding stands
to ταῦτα. Supply an inf. govern-
ing ἢ.
7. ἀπείδαν δοκιμασθῆ: there was strict examination (δοκιμασία) into every youth's claim to be declared an Athenian citizen when he had completed his eighteenth year. If he proved of Athenian parentage, and otherwise qualified, he was declared of age, and registered in the λησσαρχικὸν γραμματεῖον of his deme. See Schöemann, Antiq. of Greece, pp. 369 f.

9. λαβόντα: the dat. might stand here, but cf. Symp. 176 d, Rep. iii. 414 a, Euthyph. 5 a, Eur. Herac. 983, Soph. El. 479 ff., Aesch. Cho. 410 f., and Symp. 188 d, οὕτως ... πᾶσαν ἡμίν ἐνδαιμονίαν παρασκευάζει καὶ ἄλληλοις δυναμένους ὑμείς καὶ φίλους ἔλειν καὶ τοῖς κρέστησιν ἡμῶν θεῖοι, here is what makes ready for us all happiness, what makes us capable of being friends and familiar of our fellow-men and also of the gods, who are mightier than we. See G. 138, n. 8 a; H. 941.

11. ἢδ' ... βούληται ... εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν: ἢδ' βούληται, as well as ὅτι ἢδ' βούληται in line 9 is a future supposition and depends on the future force of ἢδ' in line 13 (cf. ἢδ' νῦν ἄρεσκομεν in 8 above). Then εἰ μὴ ἀρέσκομεν comes in naturally as a vaguer supposition subordinated to the others. If any of you wants (shall want) to go off to a colony, supposing we and the state should not satisfy him. The notion of a citizen's not being suited by the law is so monstrous that it is stated as remotely as possible.

12. ἢδ' τε μετοικεῖν: cf. 52 e, also the picturesque use of μετοικος, Aesch. Pers. 319, and by Eurystheus, in speaking of his own body buried in foreign soil, Eur. Herac. 1030 ff., θανάτον γὰρ μὲ φάσθεν οὐ τὸ μόρισμα, ... καὶ σοὶ μὲν εὖνοι καὶ τόλμης σωτηρίας μέτοικος ἐδε κελεύει κατὰ χθονός.
Φεῦς, καὶ οὗτα ὁμολογήσας ἡμῖν πείθεσθαι οὔτε πείθεται. 51

20 οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ καλῶς τι ποιοῦμεν, προτιθέντων ἡμῶν καὶ οὗτ ἄγριως ἐπιπαττάντων ποιεῖν ἢ ἂν κελεύωμεν, ἀλλὰ ἐφέντων δυὸν θάτερα, ἡ πείθεων ἡμᾶς ἢ ποιεῖν, τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ.

XIV. Ταύτας δὴ φαμεν καὶ σέ, Ζώκρατε, ταῖς αἰτίαις ἐνέξεσθαι, εἰτερ ποιήσεις ἢ ἐπινοεῖς, καὶ οὔχ ἤκιστα Ἀθηναίων σέ, ἀλλὰ εἴ τι τοῖς μάλιστα. εἰ οὖν ἐγὼ εἴπομι· διὰ τί δὴ; ἵσως ἂν μοι δικαίως καθάπτωτο λέγοντες, ὅτι ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα Ἀθηναίων ἐγὼ αὐτοῖς ὁμολογήκας τυγχάνω ταύτην τὴν ὁμολογίαν. φαίην γὰρ ἂν οὗτος, ὦ Ζώκρατε, μεγάλα ἡμῖν τούτων τεκμηρία ἐστιν, ὅτι σου καὶ ἡμεῖς ἡ ἡρέσκομεν καὶ ἡ πόλις· οὔ γὰρ ἂν ποτὲ τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἀπάντων διαφερόντως ἐν αὐτῇ ἐπεδήμιες, εἰ μὴ σοι διαφερόντων ἤρεσκε, καὶ οὔτε ἐπὶ θεωρίαν πώστερ ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐξῆλθες, [ὅτι μὴ ἀπαξ εἰς Ἰσθμόν,] οὔτε ἄλλοσον οὔδαμοσε, εἰ μὴ τοιον εὐφανεῖον, οὔτε ἄλλην ἀποδή.

19. ὁμολογήσας πείθεσθαι: not πείθεσθαι, although πείθεσθαι would mean about the same. GMT. 15, 2, ν. 2. Cf. 52 d below, where πολυτεθασθαι is twice used similarly, with 52 c in.

20. προτιθέντων ἡμῶν: ἡ πειθεῖν must be supplied from what precedes. The same idea is then expressed negatively and once again positively. αἱρεῖν προτιθείναι is also used, meaning to leave a man free to choose. Socrates can never repeat too often that the state is right, as against those who seek to evade the authority of its law. This fact accounts for the clause which follows: τούτων οὐδέτερα ποιεῖ, a mere repetition of οὔτε πείθεται οὔτε πείθει ἡμᾶς.

22. θάτερα: the notion of plurality has here practically disappeared, as is often true also in the case of ταύτα.

XIV. 2. ἐνέξεσθαι: cf. 54 a, ἥρεσουται καὶ παιδεύονται. These are cases of the anomalous use of the fut. mid. of these verbs for the fut. pass. — καὶ: and what is more.

4. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα: see on ἐν τοῖς βαρύτατα, 43 c.

10. καὶ οὔτε . . . οὔτε: the prominence of the hypothetical expression (обр γὰρ ἂν κτ.:) grows less here, and completely disappears with οὔδε, as the contradictory ἀλλά plainly shows. θεωρία means not only a state embassy to games and festivals (see the passage from the Phaedo quoted on τὸ πλοῖον, 43 c) but also attendance at religious festivals, particularly at the great national games, on the part of private individuals. See on ἐλάττως ἀπεδήμησας, 53 a.

12. εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτο εὐφανείον: οὐσ
μίαν ἐποίησεν πώποτε ὡσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνθρώποι, οὐδὲ ἐπὶ - 52
θυμία σε ἄλλης πόλεως οὖδὲ ἄλλων νόμων ἔλαβεν εἰδέναι,
15 ἄλλα ἡμεῖς σοι ἱκανοὶ ἦμεν καὶ ἡ ἡμετέρα πόλις· οὖτω
σφόδρα ἡμᾶς ἤροῦ καὶ ἡμολόγεις καθ’ ἡμᾶς πολιτεύσε- σθαι τά τε ἄλλα καὶ παῖδας ἐν αὐτῇ ἐποίησω ὡς ἀρεσκού-
σης σοι τῆς πόλεως. ἔτι τοίνυν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ δύκῃ ἐξῆν σοι
φυγής τιμήσασθαι, εἰ ἰβουλέω, καὶ ὅπερ νῦν ἀκούσθης τῆς
20 πόλεως ἐπιχειρεῖς, τότε ἐκουσθῆς ποιησάσθαι. σοὶ δὲ τότε μὲν
ἐκαλλωπίζον ὡς οὐκ ἀγανακτῶν εἰ δεότι τεθνάναι σε, ἄλλα
ἡμᾶς, ὡς ἐφησθαί, πρὸ τῆς φυγῆς θάνατον. νῦν δὲ οὔτ’
ἐκεῖνος τοὺς λόγους αἰσχύνει, οὔτε ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἐγκρέ-
πει, ἐπιχειρῶν διαφθείρα, πράττεις τε ἄπερ ἀν δοῦλος ἀ
25 φαινότατος πράξεων, ἀποδιδόσκειν ἐπιχειρῶν παρὰ τᾶς
ζυνθήκας τε καὶ τᾶς ὁμολογίας, καθ’ ἂς ἡμῖν ἔστηκεν πολι-
τεύσεως. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν τούτῳ αὐτῷ ἀπόκριμαι, εἰ
ἀλήθη λέγομεν φάσκοντες σε ὁμολογηκόντει πολιτεύνεσθαί
καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἔργῳ, ἀλλ’ οὔ λόγῳ, ἢ οὐκ ἀλήθη. τί φῶς
30 πρὸς ταῦτα, ἐν Κρίτων; ἀλλ’ ἐν ὧν ὁμολογῶμεν;

52 the campaigns of Socrates, see on ἐν Ποσιδάλα, Apol. 28 ε. Euphony, perhaps, prevented the addition of ὀδη-
μίαν after ἀποδημίαν. Cf. 52 ε and 54 β.
14. εἰδέναι: added for the sake of clearness and precision. The result
is that the preceding gen. seems to be a case of prolepsis. Cf. Hom. Il.
II. 720, τὸ ἔνε ἐπὶ ἐξ ἐκείνος ἑπει ἔχεσθαι.
Soph. El. 542 f., ἢ τῶν ἡμῶν Ἅδης των ἡμερῶν ἡμῶν εἰς ἑκεῖνης ἐκεῖ ἐνα
δοσθαι πλούς. The subj. or obj. of the inf. is often put by anticipation
as the obj. of its governing verb, noun, or adj.
17. καλ. . . . ἐποίησε: is freed from its connexion with ὁμολόγεις, to which,
however, τά τε ἄλλα is still attached. See on καὶ γέγονε, Apol. 36 α. This
irregularity was hardly avoidable, since a participle would have been
clumsy, and the idea does not suit a clause with ἐπί. Accordingly it was
hardly possible to subordinate it to πολιτεύσεως.
18. ἔτι τοῖνυν: transition to a new
point, which, however, remains closely connected
with the leading idea.
19. φυγής τιμήσασθαι: cf. Apol. 37 c
and see on τιμάται βανάτου, Apol. 36 b.
21. ἐκαλλωπίζων: cf. Apol. 20 c,
ἐκαλλυνόμεν τοῖς λόγοις ἀκοινός
22. ἐκεῖνος τοῖς λόγοις αἰσχύ-
νεί: not ashamed of those words, but,
ashamed to face those words. H. 712. The
words are personified and con-
front him with his disgrace. Cf. 46 δ.
KRITON.

ΚΡ. Ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλο τι οὖν ἂν φαίειν ἢ ξυνθήκας τὰς πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καὶ ὁμολογίας παραβαίνεις, οὐχ ὅπως ἄναγκης ὁμολογήσας οὐδὲ ἀπατηθείς οὐδὲ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ ἄναγκα-35 σθείς βουλεύσασθαι, ἄλλα ἐν ἔτεσιν ἐβδομήκοντα, ἐν οἷς ἐξῆν σοι ἀπίεναι, εἰ μὴ ἡρέσκομεν ἥμεις μηδὲ δίκαιαι ἐφαίνοντός σοι αὐτοῖς ὁμολογίαν εἶναι. οὐ δὲ οὔτε Δακεδαί-μονα προηροῦ οὔτε Κρήτην, ἣς δὴ ἐκάστοτε φῆς εἰνομεί-σθαι, οὔτε ἄλλοιν οὐδέμιαν τῶν Ἑλληνιδῶν πόλεων οὖδέ τῶν 40 βαρβαρικῶν, ἄλλα ἐλάττω ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀπεδήμησας ἢ οἱ χω-λοί τε καὶ τυφλοὶ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀνάπηροι οὔτω σοι διαφε-ρόντως τῶν ἄλλων Ἀθηναίων ἤρεσκεν ἡ πόλις τε καὶ ἥμεις οἱ νόμοι δὴλον ὅτι τῶν γὰρ ἂν πόλις ἀρέσκοι ἀνευ νόμων;

29. ἄλλο οὐ λάθε: not merely in your professions. That ὁμολογήσειν is the verb with which ἐγρήγορο is connected appears from the context. Cf. 51 e.
30. ἄλλο τι ή: see on ἄλλο τι ή, Apol. 24 e, and cf. Phaed. 79 e quoted below.
32. ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς: without any reflexive meaning. Cf. Phaed. 79 a, ἄλλο τι ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἢ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ψυχή. But cf. 54 e.
35. ἐν ἑτοιμισθομήκοντα: cf. Apol. 17 d. Socrates here speaks less accurately than in 51 d.
38. ὡς δὴ ἐκάστοτε κτ.: Plato, like many others, often praises these states, whose similar institutions were all of them based upon the common character due to their Dorian origin. In the Memorabilia, Xenophon, himself the ardent admirer of Sparta, reports various conversations where Socrates praises Dorian institutions. See (Mem. iii. 5. and iv. 4) his commendation of the strict obedience to law at Sparta and of the education which prepares men for it. The education of Spartan women was less admired and less admirable. Cf. Eur. Andr. 506 ff., οὐδ' ἂν ἐν βολλαίτω τις σώφρων γένοιτο Σπαρτιάταιδων κόρη... | δρόμους παλαίστρας τ' οὖν ἀνασχετούς ἐμοὶ | κοῦνας ἤχουσι. κάτα θαυμάζειν χρεών | εἰ μὴ γυναῖκας σώφρονες πα-δεύετε;
40. ἐλάττω ἀπεδήμησας: cf. Phaedr. 230 c, where Phaedrus says to Socrates as they are taking a walk in the country: οὐ δὲ γε, ὦ βαθμίας, ἀποκά-τατάς τις φαίειν. ἀνεκχύρωσε γὰρ ἐξογγυ-μένον (a stranger come to see the sights in town) τινὶ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιχυρώσας ὑπας ὡς τὸ τοῦ ἄστεος ὡς εἰς τὴν διερχάσαν (foreign parts) ἀποδημεῖς, ὡς εἰς τῆς ἐξο-θεν ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ πόρος ἐξίεναυ Socrates answers: συγγραφεῖκα μοι, δ' ἀριστε, φιλομαθῆς γὰρ εἰμί: τὰ μὲν ὅλων χωρία καὶ τὰ δένδρα οὐδὲν μ' ἐθέλει διδά-σκειν, οἱ δ' ἐν τῷ ἄστει ἀνθρωποί.
νῦν δὲ δὴ οὐκ ἐμμένεις τοῖς ὁμολογημένοις; ἐὰν ἦμιν γε 53
45 πείθῃ, δὲ Σώκρατες· καὶ οὐ καταγελαστός γε ἔσει ἐκ τῆς
πόλεως ἔξελθών.

XV. Σκόπει γὰρ δὴ, ταῦτα παραβᾶς καὶ ἐξαμαρτά-

νων τι τούτων τι ἄγαθον ἐργάσει σαυτὸν ἢ τοὺς ἐπιτηδεί-

ους τοὺς σαυτοῦ; οὔτε μὲν γὰρ κυδωνεύσουσί γε σου ὦ ἐπιτηδεῖοι
καὶ αὐτοὶ φεύγει καὶ στερηθήσηται τῆς πόλεως ἢ
τὴν οὐσίαν ἀπολέσαι, σχέδον τι δὴλον· αὐτὸς δὲ πρῶτον
μὲν ἐὰν εἰς τῶν ἐγγύτατα των πόλεων ἔλθῃ, ἢ Ὁμήρας ἢ
Μέγαράδε,—εἰνομοῦνται γὰρ ἀμφότεροι—πολέμοις ἢξεις,
δὲ Σώκρατες, τῇ τούτων πολιτείᾳ, καὶ ὀσοπερ κηδεῖται
τῶν αὐτῶν πόλεων, ὑποβλέψονταὶ σε διαφθερεὰ ἴγουμε-

53 See on ὅν ὄντων, Apol. 37 b. H. 1049,
1 a. Cf. Eur. Suppl. 396, καθεῖκός, ὡς
λουκείς, οὐ σὰφε ὀ ἐς δὲ γαρ, κήρυξ. Ar.
Clouds, ἄλκινον᾽ ἀλκιεῖοι καὶ κακοπο-
γοῦντ᾽, ὀ ἐς δὲ γαρ. Its stress is given
chiefly to καὶ ἵνεις οἱ νόμοι.

44. οὐκ ἐμμένεις: a more vivid form
of question than ἐμμενεῖς. The laws
give answer to their own question in
ἐὰν ἦμιν γε πείθῃ, which implies ἀλλ᾽
ἐμμενεῖς. Socrates might have said
ἀλλ᾽ ἐμμενεῖς.

45. καταγελαστός: with reference to
his preceding operations. Cf. 52 e
above, οὐ δὲ τότε μὲν κτῆ.

XV. 1. σκόπει: prefixed to an
independent sent. just as ὅφει often
is. Cf. 47 a and Prot. 330 b. — παρα-
βᾶς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνουν: this = ἐὰν παρα-
βῆς καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνης. The pres. marks
the continuance of the action.

b 5. σχέδον τι: this adv. use of τι
is common with πῶς, σχέδον, πόλοι,
μᾶλλον and τολ. — πρῶτον μὲν: the
corresponding clause follows below
(d) in a different form. See on ἀλλά,
60 d.

7. Μίγαράδε: see App. and also G.
61; H. 219.—εἰνομοῦνταί γὰρ: for the
facts, see on δὲ δὴ ἐκάστοτε, 55 b, and
cf. Soph. O. C. 91 ff., κατείς σε Θήβαν
γά οὐκ ἐπαθείοις κακόν: οὐ γὰρ φιλοῦ-
σιν ἀνδρας ἐκδίκους πρῖν. In Thebes,
before and during the Peloponnesian
war, there was a moderate oligarchy
(ἄλγαρχία ἀνομοίοσ, different from the
δυναστεία ἀλγῶς of the time of the
Persian wars) in political sympathy
with Sparta. Megara also had an
oligarchical form of government, and
had been, since the battle of Coroneia
(447 B.C.), on the Spartan side.

8. τούτων: referring either to the
cities (instead of ἐν τούτοις) or to
xxiii. 319, ἢδ᾽ ὡς Τηλέτου μακαρ-
γοῦντιν ἀφίκετο, | οι νῦνς τ᾽ ἔλεγαν καὶ
ἐκ νημιδᾶς ἐταῖρον.

9. ὑποβλέψοντα: suggestive of the
Homeríκ ὕπαρξι ἢ ὄν. "They will look
upon you with suspicion." The
implication of suspicion is conveyed by
the ὑπ᾽ in ὑφόροις, ὑποψία, as in Xen.
Ἀν. ii. 10, 10, οἱ δὲ Ἐλληνες ὑφοροῦν-
tes τούτους αὐτοὶ ἐφ᾽ ἵνατων ἔχων ἔχουν ἡγεμόνας ἔχουσι.
10 νοὶ τῶν νόμων, καὶ βεβαιώσεις τοῖς δικασταῖς τὴν δόξαν 53 ὥστε δοκεῖν ὅρθως τὴν δίκην δικάσαι· ὡστὶς γὰρ νόμων καὶ διαφθορεύς ἔστι, σφόδρα ποὺ δόξειν ἂν νέων γε καὶ ἀνωτέρων διαφθορεύς εἶναι. πότερον οὖν φεύξει τὸς τε εὐνομομένως πόλεις καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς κοσμιοτά-15 τοὺς; καὶ τὸτε ποιοῦντι ἁρα ἄξιον σοι ἡ ἡ ἡ ἐσται; ἥπλησι καὶ τοὺς τοὺς καὶ ἀνασχυντήσεις διαλεγόμενος—54 τίνας λόγους, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἢ ὡστίπερ ἐνθάδε, ὡς ἡ ἄρετη καὶ ἡ δικαιοσύνη πλείστου ἄξιον τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα καὶ οἱ νόμοι; καὶ οὐκ οἷοι ἄσχημοι ἄν φανείσθαι 20 τὸ τοῦ Σωκράτους πράγμα; οἰσθαί γε χρή. ἀλλ' ἐκ μὲν α55 τοὺς τῶν τῶν τόπων ἀπαρεῖς, ἥξεις δὲ εἰς Θεσσαλίαν παρὰ τοὺς ἄξιος τοὺς Κρίτωνας: ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ πλείστῃ ἁταξίᾳ καὶ ἀκολασίᾳ καὶ ἰσως ἂν ἠδέως σοι ἀκούσων ὅσ γελοῖς ἐκ τοῦ δεσμοτηρίου ἀπεδίδρασκες σκεύην τέ τινα περιθέ-25 μενος, ἡ διφθέραν λαβῶν ἡ ἀλλα σα δὴ εἰσώθασιν ἐνσευκα-

53. καὶ βεβαιώσεις κτῆ.: δόξα καὶ δοκεῖν in the same sense, as in 44 c. "Indiciibus opinionem confirmabimus ut recte videantur tulisse sententiam." Wolf.

17. ἢ: see App.

19. ἄν φανείσθαι: see on οὖν ἂν ποιθέοντος, Apol. 30 b.


22. ἐκεῖ γὰρ δὴ κτῆ.: Socrates speaks as if the fact were familiar to Crito. The nobles of Thessaly were rich and hospitable, and bore the reputation of being violent and licentious. Some light is thrown upon the whole subject by the character of Meno given by Xenophon, Ἀν. ii. 6. 21 ff. Cf. also Dem. i. 22, τὰ τῶν Θεσσαλῶν ἡπίστα ἂν δίπου φόβει καὶ διὰ πάσιν ἀνθρώποις. This chiefly relates to their political character. Cf. also the ironical words of Socrates on the Thessalians in Plato's Meno, 70 a b.

24. σκευὴν τέ τινα κτῆ.: to this first clause the disjunctive ἐδιφθέραν ἤ ἄλα is subordinated. The diaphé- rα, according to the Schol. on Ar. Nub. 73, a πομπηκὼν περιβάλλων, σκεῦες and ἐνσευκαθσθαι refer to change of costume, and are also used of the costumes of actors. Cf. Ar. Achar. 388 f., where Dicapeolis, before beginning his defence, says: νῦν οὖν μὲ πρώτον πρὶν λέγειν ἐδιστε ἐνσευκάσω.
ζεσθαι οἱ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, καὶ τὸ σχῆμα τὸ σαυτοῦ μεταλλάξας: ὃτι δὲ γέρων ἀνήρ, σμικροῦ χρόνου τῷ βίῳ λοιπὸν ὄντος ὃς τὸ εἰκός, ἔτολμησας ὑπὸ τοῦ καιροῦ ὑπομεῖν ζῆν, νόμον τοὺς μεγίστους παραβάσας, οὐδεὶς ὃς ἔρει: 30 ἵσως, ἃν μὴ τινα λυπῆς: εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀκούσει, ὃ Σώκρατες, πολλὰ καὶ ἄναξια σαυτοῦ. ὑπερχόμενος δὴ βιώσει πάντας ἀνθρώποις καὶ δουλεύων· τί ποιῶν ἡ εὐνοούμενος ἐν Θεταλίᾳ, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἀποδεξημέρως εἰς Θεταλίαν; λόγου δὲ ἐκείνου οἱ περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῆς ἁλλῆς ἀρετῆς 35 ποῦ ἦμιν ἔσονται; ἀλλὰ δὴ τῶν παίδων ἕνεκα βούλεις ζῆν, ὃν αὐτοὺς ἐκηρύξης καὶ παιδεύσης; τί δὲ; εἰς Θεταλίαν αὐτοὺς ἀγαγών θρέψεις τε καὶ παιδεύσεις, ἐξέσω ποιήσας, ἵνα καὶ τούτο ἀπολαύσωσιν; ἢ τούτο μὲν οὖ, 53 ὁ σαλμ. οἶνον ἀφλιτάτων. Cf. also ibid. 430. σχήμα, on the other hand, relates to the other disguises of face and figure necessary to complete the transformation.

28. ὃ τὸ εἰκός: that is according to the law of nature. — ἐτολμησας: see on τόλμης, Apol. 38 d, and App.

29. οὐδές ὃς: will there be nobody to say this? i.e. "absolutely every one," expressed interrogatively. Here, as in many common idioms, the verb "to be" is omitted.

30. ἐν δὲ μή: otherwise. GMT. 52, 1, n. 2; H. 906, 5. — ἀκούσα...ἀνάξια: like ἀκούσα κακά (ὑπὸ τινος) is the passive of λέγων κακά. Cf. 50 c. The καὶ between πολλά and ἄναξια should not be translated.

31. δὴ: accordingly. He must make up his mind to it, he has no choice.

32. καὶ δουλεύων: better understood absolutely than with an implied dat. Here we have a blunt statement of the fact which Socrates had in mind in saying ὑπερχόμενος. — τί ποιῶν ἢ κτῆ.: the partic. goes with the verb of the foregoing clause. This cannot be reproduced in Eng., "in fact how can you live there except in one continual round of revelry, as if you had come to 'Thessaly to eat and drink.'"

No ἀλλά is needed after τί.

35. ἀλλὰ δὴ: a new objection raised and answered by the laws themselves in respect of what Crito said, 45 a—46 a. — ἀλλὰ: relates to the preceding thought: of course these sayings are nowhere, "but are you actually willing?" etc. See on Apol. 37 c.

38. ἵνα καὶ τούτο κτῆ.: i.e. in addition to all other obligations. ἀπολάύσων is often used, as here, ironically. How a Greek looked upon exile is plain from passages like Eur. El. 1311 ff., οὖς ἤδη | οἰκτρὰ. Διπ. πένθος, κλήν ὧτι λείπει τόλμη 'Ἀργείου. OP. καὶ τίνες ἄλλαι στοναχαὶ μείζους | ἡ γῆς πατρίδας ἐρωτεύετο; and Phoen. 388 ff., where Polynices, answering Iocasta's question, τί τὸ στέρεσθαι πατρίδος; ἢ κακὸν μέγα; σαῦρ μέγατον. ἔρρη κέ στι μεῖζον ἢ λόγφ. Cf. Richard II. i. 3, —
κρίτων.

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αὐτοῦ δὲ τρεφόμενοι σοῦ ζῶντος βέλτιον θρέφονται καὶ 54 παιδεύονται, μὴ ξυνόντος σοῦ αὐτοῖς; οἱ γὰρ ἐπιτηδειοὶ οἱ σοὶ ἐπιμελήσονται αὐτῶν. πότερον εὰν εἰς Θεταλίαν ἀποδημήσῃς ἐπιμελήσονται, εὰν δὲ εἰς Ἄιδον ἀποδημήσῃς οὐχὶ ἐπιμελήσονται; εἴπερ γε τι ὀφελος αὐτῶν ἵστι τῶν σοι φασκόντων ἐπιτηδείων εἶναι, οἰσθαί γε χρή. 5

XVI. Ἄλλα, ὁ Σώκρατης, πειθόμενος ἢμῖν τοῖς σοῖς τροφεύσαι μῆτε παῖδας περὶ πλείονος ποιοῦ μῆτε τὸ ζῆν μῆτε ἄλλο μηδὲν πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, ὥστε εἰς Ἄιδον ἐλθὼν ἔχης πάντα ταῦτα ἀπολογήσασθαι τοὺς ἐκεῖ ἄρχοντις. 5 οὔτε γὰρ ἐνθάδε σοι φαίνεται ταῦτα πράττοντες ἄμεινον εἶναι οὐδὲ δικαιότερον οὐδὲ ἀσιάτερον, οὐδὲ ἄλλω τῶν σῶν οὐδείς, οὔτε ἐκεῖσε ἀφικομένω ἄμεινον ἐσται. ἀλλὰ νῦν μὲν ἡδικημένοις ἄπει, εὰν ἀπίης, οὔχ ὑπ’ ἡμῶν τῶν νόμων ἀλλὰ ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων: εὰν δὲ ἐξέλθησιν οὕτως αὐτχρώσοις ἀντα- 10 δικήσας τε καὶ ἀντικακουργήσας, τάς σαυτοῦ ὀμολογίας τε καὶ ἐνυθήκας τάς πρὸς ἡμᾶς παραβάς καὶ κακὰ ἐργα-

54 What is my sentence then but speechless death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?

and Dante, Paradiso, xvii., —
Thou shalt abandon everything beloved
Most tenderly, and this the arrow is
Which first the bow of banishment shoots forth.

Cf. also many well-known passages in the Odyssey, e.g. Od. i. 58, ἵμευς καὶ καπνὸν ἀποθράκοντα νοθασί ής γαῖς, ix. 27 1., οὗ τοί εὖ γά γε | ἃς γαῖς δύναμαι γλυκερότερον ἄλλα ιδέσθαι, xx. 99.

39. θρέψονται καὶ παιδεύονται: see on ἐπιζήσας, 52 a.

44. τῶν . . . ἐναί: explanation of αὐτῶν. σοι is not to be connected with φασκόντων. —οἰσθαί γε χρή: cf. 53 c.

54 3. πρὸ: after περὶ πλείονος. See on πρὸ τοῦ δικαίου, 48 d.
5. ἄμεινον . . . δικαιότερον: see on ἄμεινον, Apol. 19 a.
7. νῦν μὲν: assuming that Socrates has made up his mind not to take Crito's advice.
8. οὐχ υπ’ ἡμῶν κτὲ.: the laws add this in the vein of what has gone before.
11. παραβάς, ἐργασάμενος: subordinated to the foregoing participle.
σάμενος τούτους οὖς ἦκιστα ἔδει, σαντόν τε καὶ φίλοις 54 καὶ πατρίδα καὶ ἡμᾶς, ἡμεῖς τέ σοι χαλεπανοῦμεν ἵωτι, καὶ ἐκεῖ ὁ ἡμέτεροι ἁδελφοὶ οἱ ἐν ’Αιδοῦ νόμοι οὐκ εὑμε-15 νὸς σε ὑποδέξονται, εἰδότες ὅτι καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐπεχείρησας ἀπο-λέσαι τὸ σὸν μέρος. ἀλλὰ μὴ σε πείσῃ Κρίτων ποιεῖν ἃ λέγει μᾶλλον ἡ ἡμεῖς.

XVII. Ταῦτα, ὁ φίλε ἐταύρε Κρίτων, εἴ ισθι ὅτι ἐγὼ δοκῶ ἀκούειν, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντότες τῶν αὐλῶν δοκοῦ-σιν ἀκούειν, καὶ ἐν ἐμοὶ αὐτῇ ἡ ἥχη τοῦτων τῶν λόγων βομβεῖ καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ δύνασθαι τῶν ἄλλων ἀκούειν· ἀλλὰ εἴ ισθι, ὅσα γε τὰ νῦν ἐμοὶ δοκοῦντα, ἐὰν λέγησι παρὰ ταῦτα, μάτην ἑρεῖς. ὅμως μέντοι εἰ τι οὔει πλεον ποιήσεω, λέγε.

ΚΡ. ’Αλλ’, ὁ Ἑώκρατες, οὐκ ἔχω λέγεω.

54 456 ff., οὐ γὰρ τί μοι Ζεὺς ἢν ὁ κηρός ταῦτα, ὁ συνομόν τῶν κατὰ θεῶν Δίκη κτῆ.

d XVII. 1. ὁ φίλε ἐταῦρε Κρίτων: Socrates speaks with great tenderness in order to make his final refusal the less hard to bear. The exceptional feature in this form of address lies in the mention of Crito's name at the end.

2. οἱ κορυβαντότες: κορυβαντών means act like the Corybantes. These were priests of Phrygian Cybele, whose orgiastic rites were accompanied by dances and deafening music. Here a species of madness seems to be indicated, under the influence of which men imagined that they heard the flutes that were used in Corybantic revels. Cf. Ion, 534 a, ὡσπερ οἱ κορυβαντότες οὐκ ἑμφόραντος ἄντε ἁρ-χόντα, ὡς ταύτα καὶ οἱ μελοποιοὶ οὐκ ἑμ-φόραντος ἄντε τὰ καλὰ μὲλη ταῦτα ποιοῦ-σιν, and the song of the bacchants in Eur. Bacch. 114-129 and 155-161,—

Soon shall the country rejoice in the dance; Soon with his revellers Bacchus advance; Into the hills, the hills shall be bare, Joining the host of his women-folk there. Far from their homes and their weaving they came, Goaded by Bacchus and stung by his name.

O wild Curetes' vaulted lair! O hallowed haunts of Crete! Where new-born Zeus found faithful care, And kind protection meet In caverns safe from every snare.

Corybantes, wearing helms three-rimmed, Stretched skins to make my drum's full round; Then they, in hollowed caves, lithe-limbed, With drums, and, with the flute's shrill sound Full Phrygian, bacchic ditties hymned.

Sing Dionysus, and praised let him be; Beat ye the deep-sounding drums as of old; Sing to the Eivan god evoe! Greet him with Phrygian cries, and let flutes Trill in your revels and ripple shrill joy; Instrumenta holy the holy employ.

5. ὅσα γε κτί.: a limitation added to soften the assertion. See on ὅσα γε ταύροτεσία, 46 ε. No obj. is needed with λέγησ. λέγεω παρὰ κτί. comes
KRITO.N.

ΣΩ. "Εα τοίνυν, ὦ Κρίτων, καὶ πράττωμεν ταῦτη, ἐπει- 54 
δὴ ταῦτη ὁ θεὸς ύψηλεῖται.

54 very near the meaning of ἀντιλέγειν. 
Cf. 48 d. Cf. also the omission of 
the obj. ἐμεί with the preceding ποιεῖ 
μὴ δύνασθαι κτέ.

e 8. ία: used abs. with a following 
subjv. or inv. to dismiss a matter 
under discussion. Cf. Charm. 163 ε, 
ία, ἤν ὅ ἀνω · μὴ γὰρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δόκοι 
σκοτῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὅ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. Euthyd. 
302 ε, ία, ὃ Διονυσίωρε, εὐφήμει τε 
καὶ μὴ χαλεπῶς με προδιδασκε. —ταῦτη: 
the repetition of the same word is 
effective.

9. ὁ θεὸς: see on τῷ θεῷ, Apol. 
19 a. Here, as at the end of his de-
fence proper, Apol. 35 d, and at the 
end of his closing words in court, 
Apol. 42 a, Socrates mentions ὁ θεὸς. 
Dante closes each one of the three 
parts of his great poem with a refer-
ence to the stars. This is no accident 
in either case, though Plato had a 
philosopher's reason which Dante 
could not give, except for the closing 
line of the Paradiso, which is ὁ θεὸς 
translated into the language of the 
poet, "L' Amor che muove il Sole e 
l' altre stelle," The love which moves the 
sun and the other stars.
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

Since all the extant Mss. of Plato follow or attempt to follow Thrasyllus in his subdivision into nine tetralogies or groups consisting of four members each, and since Thrasyllus was instructor to the emperor Tiberius, it follows that the origin of no Ms. of Plato now known to exist can be assigned to a date much earlier than the middle of the first century A.D. The following is a table exhibiting Thrasyllus’s tetralogies, and also naming the best Ms. in which each tetralogy is preserved:

<table>
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<td>II.</td>
<td>Cratylus.</td>
<td>Theaetetus.</td>
<td>Sophist.</td>
<td>Statesman.</td>
<td>“”</td>
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<td>IV.</td>
<td>Alcibiades I.</td>
<td>Alcibiades II.</td>
<td>Hipparchus.</td>
<td>Anterastae.</td>
<td>“”</td>
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<td>V.</td>
<td>Theages.</td>
<td>Charmides.</td>
<td>Laches.</td>
<td>Lysis.</td>
<td>“”</td>
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<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Minos.</td>
<td>Laws.</td>
<td>Epinomis.</td>
<td>Letters.</td>
<td>“”</td>
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Of the three Mss., the most trustworthy is Clarkianus, and the least trustworthy is Venetus T. Schanz constructs the pedigree of the existing Mss. of Plato, and traces them all to an original or Archetypus. This parent Ms. consisted of two volumes: Vol. I. contained the first seven tetralogies; Vol. II. contained the last two tetralogies, together with a number of works attributed with more or less confidence to Plato. The copies made of Vol. I. were of two kinds, (1) incomplete, omitting the seventh tetralogy, and (2) complete. The best Ms. now preserved represents an incomplete copy of Vol. I. of the Archetypus; this is the codex Clarkianus, the capital authority for the first six tetralogies. The complete copy of Vol. I. is represented by the much less trustworthy codex Venetus T, the best authority for the seventh tetralogy.

The best representative of Vol. II. of the Archetypus is codex Parisinus A.
The leading facts about these three Mss. are as follows:—

I. Codex Clarkianus, referred to by the single letter B for brevity's sake and because the Ms. is called also Bodleianus. It is now in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and is "the fairest specimen of Grecian calligraphy which has descended to modern times." Daniel Clarke found this Ms., in October, 1801, in the library of a monastery on the island of Patmos. It was beautifully written on parchment, in the year 896 A.D., by a skilful scribe, one Joannes, for the use of Arethas, who afterwards became archbishop of Caesarea. See M. Schanz, Novae Commentationes Platonicae, pp. 105–118; and Daniel Clarke, Travels in Various Countries of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

II. Codex Venetus T, Bekker's t. This Ms. is now in the Library of St. Mark's in Venice, and is chiefly valuable where the Clarkianus entirely fails, i.e. for the seventh tetralogy. For a more detailed account, see M. Schanz, Ueber den Platocodex der Marcus-Bibliothek in Venedig; also the preface to Vol. IX. of the same author's critical edition of Plato's works. The date of this Ms. is very uncertain.

III. Parisinus A, No. 1807 (formerly 94 and 2087). This Ms. is now in the National Library at Paris; it was probably written early in the tenth century after Christ. It comprises the eighth and ninth tetralogies of Thrasyllus, together with seven spurious dialogues. The Clitophon, with which it begins, is numbered twenty-nine. See M. Schanz, Studien zur Geschichte des Platonischen Textes, and the general introduction to his critical edition of Plato's works. There are many other Mss. of Plato, for some account of which also see Schanz in his general introduction, and in Bursian's Jahresbericht (9, 5, 1, pp. 178–188), where he summarizes his results and defends them against Jordan and Wohlrab.

**Important Editions of Plato's Complete Works.**

In all modern editions of Plato, numbers and letters which refer to the pages of the edition of Stephanus are found in the margin. This is the most convenient mode of reference, and is now universally employed to the exclusion of the less well-established subdivision into chapters. The edition of Stephanus (Henri Estienne) is in three volumes, but to give the volume is superfluous, since the name of the dialogue is given in every reference. Each page is divided into five parts by the letters (a) b c d e placed down the margin.

MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

PLATONIS DIALOGI. (Gr. et Lat.) Ex recensione Imm. Bekker. 3 Partes. in 8 Voll. Commentaria crit. et scholia. 2 Voll. Berolini, 1816–1823. (This edition contains the first systematic collation of Mss., and the result is a great improvement upon the Stephanus text.)


PLATONIS OPERA OMNIA. Rec. prolegomenis et comment. illustr. Gdfr. Stallbaum. 10 Voll. Lipsiae, 1827–1877. (In the Bibliotheca Graeca of Jacobs and Rost.)


PLATONIS DIALOGI secundum Thraissyll tetralogias dispositi. Ex recognitione Caroli Friderici Hermanni. 6 Voll. Lipsiae (1851, 1853), 1873, 1874.


IMPORTANT OR CONVENIENT EDITIONS OF THE APOLOGY AND OF THE CRITO.


PLATONIS APOLLOGIA, CRITO ET PHAEDO. Accedit emendationis specimen in nonullis reliquorum dialogorum. Edidit R. B. Hirschig. Trajecti ad Rhen, 1853.

PLATONIS APOLLOGIA SOCRATIS ET CRITO. Ed. V. aliquanto auct. et. emendat. quam cur. M. Wohlrab. Lipsiae (1827), 1877. (This is Vol. I., Section 1, of Teubner's ten-volume publication of Stallbaum's complete Plato mentioned above.)
MANUSCRIPTS AND EDITIONS.

The APOLOGY OF PLATO, with a revised text and English notes, and a digest of Platonic idioms. By the Rev. James Riddell, M.A. Oxford, 1867.


PLATO'S APOLOGY OF SOCRATES AND CRITO, with notes. By W. Wagner. Cambridge, England, 1869. (Boston, 1877.)

PLATON'S Verteidigungsrede des Socrates und Kriton. Erklärt von Dr. Christian Cron. Achte Auflage. Leipzig, 1882. (This edition is the basis of the present work, and is the first part of an edition of the selected works of Plato, edited for the use of schools by Dr. Cron and Dr. Julius Deuschle.)
CRITICAL NOTES.

These notes are Dr. Cron's necessary explanation of the text which he has adopted. Where departures have been made from Dr. Cron's text, they are in turn discussed. The first reading is the one adopted in this edition. B denotes Codex Clarkianus (= Bodleianus). T denotes Codex Venetus T. S denotes the reading adopted by Schanz, W that adopted by Wohlrab. Bem. denotes Dr. Cron's "Kritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Platons Apologie, Criron, und Laches. Separat Abdr. aus dem fünften Supplement-band der Jahrb. für classische Philologie," pp. 64-132. Leipzig, 1864. Teubner.

APOLOGY.

17 a, p. 55 (1). δ τι: with S. Cron fails to give any reason for his eccentric preference, here and elsewhere, for δτι.
17 b, p. 56 (13). γονίν: with inferior Ms. and B (second hand). οὐν, B (first hand) and Cron following S.
17 b, p. 56 (14). οδι μοι: οδι ιμοι, SW with Heindorf.
17 c, p. 57 (17). όλλα: with Bessarion’s Ms. (Venetus E). ολλα, Cron and S following B.
17 c, p. 57 (18). ονόμασι: with B. ονόμασιν, Cron and S with Bessarion’s Ms. and Venetus 185 (Bekker’s π).
17 d, p. 58 (27). πλείω ἔβδομηκοντα: Cron with S following B omits the πλείω, which is found only in inferior Mss. Hermann adopted πλείω ἔβδομηκοντα.
18 a, p. 59 (31). ης γι μοι: with S. ης γ' ιμοι, W.
18 a, p. 59 (2). ψευδή κατηγορημάτα: [ψευδή] κατηγορημάτα, S with Hirschig.
18 a, p. 59 (4). γεγονασι: with the best Mss. γεγονασιν, Cron following S. There are marks of correction in B and other Mss., but no Mss. cited by S reads γεγονασιν.
18 b, p. 60 (9). ιμοι: the Mss. read ιμοι μάλλον οὐδὲν αὐθεσι. Hermann bracketed μάλλον...αὐθεσι as a gloss, while the Zürich edition lets the words stand. S writes ιμοι μα τον...οὐδὲν αὐθεσι. Bekker and Stallbaum, following Mss. of slight value, read ιμοι οὐδὲν αὐθεσι. The suggestion of Schanz is the best unless these words are simply to be cut out. Riddell says "the rhythm would be intolerable without the three words μάλλον οὐδὲν αὐθεσι."
18 b, p. 60 (10). φροντιστής: Albert von Bamberg (Fleckenstein's Jahrbücher,
113, 10) proposes to cut out φροντιστής, because no exact parallel to this acc. of the dir. obj. has been found in prose. So far he is right, even against Krüger’s citation of various adjs. joined with εἶναι, for such combinations are very closely akin to verbal forms. On the other hand, to make such a point of the distinction between the indir. (or remoter) obj. which Bamberg would allow, and the dir. obj. which he proposes to disallow, is to ignore the difference in this particular between Greek and Latin syntax. In the shifting of voice from act. to pass., for instance, the distinction between dir. and indir. obj. is far less scrupulously defined in Greek than in Latin. To be sure Xenophon twice uses the gen. with φροντιστής (cf. Symp. 6. 6, τῶν μετεώρων φροντιστής and Mem. iv. 7. 6, τῶν οὐρανιῶν φροντιστής). It should be remembered that consistency may be too much insisted upon. Furthermore ἔπει διῆµεν are not surprising in a speech, which, like the Apology, aims to give Socrates’s personal hobbies in language as in thought.

18 c, p. 61 (12). οἱ ταύτην: Heindorf. ταύτην, W following the Mss.
18 c, p. 61 (13). ἀκούοντες: ἀκούοντες, S following B (first hand).
18 d, p. 62 (21). κυμαθιούσις: with S following B. Elsewhere κυμαθιούσις (τραγῳδιούσις) is found in the best Mss.
18 e, p. 63 (32). Uhlig quotes (Rhein. Mus. 19, 1, and Fleckiesen’s Jahrb. 121, 10) the authority of several grammarians to prove that the exclamation εἶναι has no connexion with εἶναι. He maintains that it is and always was an interjection, and that there was originally an aspirate at the beginning of the second syllable, like εὔοि, εὔαν (bacchic interjections), and the Attic ταῦς.
19 c, p. 65 (13). σοφὸς ἑστι: μὴ φύγομαι: with Riddell. σοφὸς ἑστι, μὴ φύγομαι, Cron.
19 d, p. 66 (10). σμικρὸν: with inferior Mss. μικρὸν, Cron and S following B. Judging from other cases, cf. below (28 b) and in the Crito (46 a), σμικρὸν and μικρὸν have about equal claims in any given place.
19 d, p. 66 (1). οὐδὲν ἑστιν: with S. οὐδὲν [ἐστιν], Cron. οὐδὲν ἑστιν, W.
19 e, p. 67 (7). ὁλὸς τ’ ἑστιν: [ὁλὸς τ’ ἑστιν], S.
19 e, p. 67 (9). πείθομαι: πείθομαι, S.
20 a, p. 67 (10). σφίσι: with B (second hand) and other Mss. σφίσιν, Cron following S with B (first hand).
20 a, p. 67 (17). καλὸν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν: following B with S W. Venetus T reads καλὸν καγαθόν. In his preface to Vol. II., Schanz very emphatically rejects the reading of B and defends T, but he has not the courage of his convictions, and finally retains the reading of B.
20 c, p. 68 (26). ἔχει: B. ἔχει, S W.
20 e, p. 69 (5). εἰ μὴ τι ... πολλοί: [εἰ μὴ τι ... πολλοί], S and Cobet. Bobrik (Fleckiesen’s Jahrb. 113, 5) argues against bracketing the words, “that the meaning of πολλοίν is quantitative while that of ἄλλοιν is qualitative.” S (Bursian’s Jahresbericht, 9, 5, 1, p. 188) is not convinced.
20 d, p. 69 (8). ἵστη: ἰστιν, S W—"ἵστη (θ' erasa) B D," S.
20 d, p. 69 (8). πετατίκη: πετατίκεν, S W.
20 e, p. 70 (18). μηδὲ ἵνα: with Heusde (Spec. crit. p. 11). μηδὲ ὅν, Cron following S with B.
20 e, p. 73 (20). τὸν λέγοντα: τὰ λεγόντα, Liebhold.
20 e, p. 71 (21). ἵστη: ἰστιν, S W.
21 a, p. 71 (23). ἐταῖρος τε καὶ: [ἐταῖρος τε καὶ], S with Ludwig. Müller-Strübing gives at too great length (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 121, 2) his too ingenious account of Ar. Clouds, 1072 ff.; but in a note (pp. 90, 91) he very acutely suggests that Σφήντιος was a nickname bestowed by Aristophanes in the Clouds upon Chaerephon, "πικρὸν γὰρ οἱ Σφήντιοι καὶ σκυμφάντας," Schol. on Ar. Plut. 720. Cf. Laches, 170 e, fin., with Stallbaum's note.
21 e, p. 73 (11). σοφατέρος ἵστη: with S W. But the reading of B, as Gaisford specifically says, is ἰστη.
21 e, p. 73 (14). καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὖτε: [καὶ διαλεγόμενος αὖτε], S. Wex includes these words in the parenthesis and connects them with πρὸς ὅν κτι.
21 d, p. 74 (23). ἦσκα γ' ὀὖ: with Bäumlein. ἥσκα γοῦν, S W.
21 e, p. 74 (2). καὶ λυποῦμενος: [καὶ] λυποῦμενος, S with Cobet.
22 b, p. 77 (17). μᾶλλον: Schanz (Philol. 28, 3, p. 566) suggests καλλιότα without venturing to introduce it into the text. With this use of μᾶλλον might be compared Hor. Sat. i. 10, 58, Versiculòs magis factos et euntes mollius.
22 c, p. 78 (29). τῷ αὖτε: τῷ αὖτε αὐτῶν, S with Bekker following inferior Mss. See, however, Heindorf's Annotatio critica in Apologiam Socratis, p. IX. Berolini MDCCCV.
22 d, p. 78 (7). καὶ ... δημοοργῆ: [καὶ ... δημοοργῆ], S with Hirschig.
23 c, p. 82 (8). οὐχ αὖτές: οὐχ αὖτές, W following inferior Mss. with H. Stephanus and Engelhardt, who refers αὖτές, of course, to the young. But it is by no means natural that men who are found out should not be angry with their discoverers. Their natural anger is, however, turned against Socrates, the real instigator of their discouragement. Socrates is not saying that they should not be angry with him, but rather urges that they should be angry with themselves, i.e. with their own conceit of knowledge. This is the meaning demanded by the context, see d below, ad fin. Further, τοῦτος would give the sense required by W far more clearly than αὖτες.
23 d, p. 82 (11). ἀγνοοῦσιν: ἀμφιγνοοῦσιν, S. ἀποροοῦσιν, Ast. Cobet ex-
CRITICAL NOTES.

punges the words ἀλλ' ἄνυστιν. There is, however, no sound objection either to the way in which the words are introduced or to the words themselves.

23 c, p. 83 (15). ὀμαῖ: with Stallbaum. ὀμαῖ, Cron following S and all good Mss. In this chapter B has ὀμαῖ twice, see lines 5 and 17. It looks like superstitition to write ὀμαῖ here.

23 c, p. 83 (17). ἐνυπεραμένως: ἐνυπεραμένως, S with Hermann following Bessarion's Ms.

23 e, p. 83 (22). καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν: [καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν], S with Cobet.

24 a, p. 84 (30). ἱστι: Cron and S write ἱστιν because there are traces of erasure in B.

24 b, p. 84 (5). ἀπερί: ἀπε, Rieckher.

24 d, p. 86 (5). τοῦτοι: εἰς τοῦτοι, S with Cobet. See Kr. Spr. 48, 11, 4.

24 e, p. 86 (14). ποιοῦσι: Cron following S writes ποιοῦσιν because of traces of erasure in B; similar traces after ἵν in this line do not lead them to write εἶν.

25 a, p. 87 (19). οἱ ἱκλησιασταί: [οἱ ἱκλησιασταί], S with Hirschig and Cobet. See Rem. p. 93.

25 c, p. 88 (1). ποτέρον ἱστιν: with the Mss. ποτέρον ἱστιν, S W.

25 c, p. 88 (3). ἄ τῶ: with S, who deviates but little from ἄ τῶ, the reading of B. ἄ τῶ, Cron. W reads ἄ τῶ. Krause explains it as meaning ἄ Ζαύ.

25 d, p. 89 (7). ἄποκριμαν: ἄποκριμαν, W.


26 a, p. 89 (21). καὶ ἀκουστῶν: bracketed as a gloss by S with Cobet.


26 a, p. 90 (21). δηλον: with Cron's seventh edition following B. δηλον ηδη διετιν, Cron's eighth edition with Schanz, who, however, says of the two words (Novae Commentationes Platonicae, p. 163), "Verba minime necessaria velim deleantur."

26 c, p. 91 (10). τοῦτοι: with B (second hand) and Vaticanus 1029 (Bekker's r). Cron following S writes τοῦτοι with Venetus 185 (Bekker's π). τοῦτοι, B.

26 c, p. 91 (13). δᾶλα: with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes δᾶλα with B and other Mss.

26 d, p. 92 (20). Ἀναξαγόρου: [Ἀναξαγόρου], S. Baiter requires Σωκράτους.

26 e, p. 93 (26). ἐν τῇ ὁχύρστρας πριγών: Birt (Das antike Buchwesen, Berlin, 1882, p. 484, Rem. 4) says, "The notion that these writings were themselves sold ἐν τῇ ὁχύρστρας is not conveyed here, for, if so, why should ἐνὺθείνοι have been used? In fact, καὶ δη καὶ ἀπείνης to the βιβλία something else which is sold for a drachma and which, therefore, cannot have been the βιβλία."

26 e, p. 94 (28). σοι δοκῶ ... νομίζων: σοι [δοκῶ] ... νομίζω, S who follows B in respect of νομίζω.
CRITICAL NOTES.

27 b, p. 95 (10). ἵγῳ σοι: following B. ἵγῳ σοι, S W with Heindorf. As the emphasis is wholly on ἵγῳ, there seems to be no good reason for disregarding the reading of B.

27 c, p. 98 (30). [ἡ] καὶ ὄνων, τούτων ἴμμονος: with S. ἤ [καὶ] ὄνων [τούτων ἴμμονος], Cron. A change of some kind is unavoidable; the least possible change is to bracket ἤ with Forster, who is followed by Heindorf and Cobet. This yields perfectly good sense, better, in fact, than Cron obtains by bracketing καὶ and τούτων ἴμμονος.

27 c, p. 98 (32). ταῦτα . . . τὴν γραφήν ταύτην: with S. ταῦτα . . . [τὴν γραφήν ταύτην], Cron. S and Cron agree that both expressions cannot stand. S is probably right in saying that not τὴν γραφήν ταύτην but ταῦτα should be bracketed, as a gloss added to explain ἀποτελεμένοις.

27 c, p. 98 (35). [οὐ] τούτων: οὐ τούτων, S W. Wecklein says (Rhein. Mus. 38, 1, p. 145), “Any one who grasps the argument summarized at this point in the Apology ought to agree to the following completion of it: ἄρως δὲ σὺ τίνα πείθουσα . . . ἄρωτόιν, οὐ τούτων ἄρωτοι ἄρωτοι καὶ δαμόνια καὶ θεία [καὶ δαμόνια καὶ θεία] ἔγειρεν καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτον [μήτε δαμόνια μήτε θεία] μὴ δαμόνια μὴ θεία, σοφίμα μηχανή ἄρωτοι.” Goebel, in the Programm of the Gymnasium at Fulda, first rejects all the interpretations made with a view to retaining οὐ before τούτων, and then proceeds to defend it by arguing that πείθουσα is used in an absolute sense, while the clause beginning with οὐ he takes as a causal parenthesis. The chief objection to this explanation is that it explains the whole sentence away, leaving it not a leg to stand on. It is better, therefore, to reject οὐ and to consider that μήτε ἄρωτας was added along with the rest in Meletus’s anxiety to make his charge of irreligion a sweeping one. A religious-minded Athenian certainly believed in gods and in heroes. The term δαμόνια, since the precise meaning of the word was hard to fix, might—so far as Meletus’s immediate purpose went—have been omitted, but the preceding δαμόνια make its introduction here indispensable. On Meletus’s ascription to Socrates of belief in δαμόνια is based Socrates’s assertion that so far from being an atheist, he believes like any other Greek in gods and demi-gods, called δαμόνια or more commonly ἄρωτα.

27 c, p. 98 (36). αὖ τούτων: αὖ [τούτων], S with Hirschig.

28 a, p. 98 (7). καὶ ἄλλοις: καλοῦσι, S with Hirschig.


28 c, p. 100 (21). ὁ παῖ: S omits these words which are added in the margin of B.

28 d, p. 100 (31). τάξιν ἤ: with B and other best Mss. Cron following S writes τάξιν with Bessarion’s Ms., strengthened by various authors who quote τάξιν, omitting the ἤ.

29 a, p. 103 (9). διενόν τάν: διενόν τάν, S W.

29 b, p. 104 (22). ὁδικέα: Otto Erdmann proposes (Fleckeisen’s Jahrh. 119, 5, p. 412) to substitute ἀπιστεῖν.
CRITICAL NOTES.

29 c, p. 105 (31). διαφθαρήσονται: following B. διαφθαρήσοντο, Hirschig following Bessarion's Ms.

29 d, p. 105 (36). ἄνθροπος: following B. οἱ ἄνθρωπος, inferior Ms.

29 d, p. 106 (43). ἀλοχόνει: B. ἀλοχόνη, other Ms.


30 b, p. 107 (59). λέγων' οὖκ: λέγων, δὲι οὖκ, W.


30 c, p. 109 (6). οἴνῳ ἔγιν λέγω: Wecklein (Rhe. Mus. 33, 2, p. 307) requires οἴον ἄν ἔγιν λέγω, because these words are to be closely connected with the detailed statement that follows, προσκείμενον...μένωπος, 30 c. But Socrates plainly has this thought in mind already, as is proved by his postponing its amplification until after another thought introduced with ἐμι μὲν ἀφρι has been developed. The point is that ἐμι μὲν ἁρι κτλ is also in the closest connexion with the leading idea τοιοῦτον ὡντα.

30 d, p. 109 (11). ἐπιμέλεσων: with Hermann. ἐπιμάσσειν, W following Ms.

30 e, p. 110 (19). [ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ]: S with Hirschig. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, Riddell.

30 e, p. 110 (21). ὑπὸ μειωτὸς τινος: unless ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ above is bracketed, this comes in very awkwardly.

30 e, p. 110 (21). οἴνῳ is taken by Goebel as a neuter, and he does not connect ἄν with τοιοῦτον τινα, but with ἐμι. He does not urge that the other way is ungrammatical, but apparently he thinks that the sense is in favor of his explanation. His argument is hardly convincing.

31 a, p. 111 (20). διατελοντι ἄν: διατελοῦσα ἄν, Cron following S with the best Ms.

31 a, p. 111 (30). ἐπιτείμεσαι: with B and other Ms. Cron following S writes ἐπιτείμεσαν on the authority of Venetus 186 (Bekker's Π) and of an erasure in B.

31 b, p. 111 (37). μάντω: μέν, S with Cobet and Hermann.


31 c, p. 112 (2). πολυτραγμονω: πολυτραγμονων, S following inferior Ms.

31 d, p. 113 (6). [φωνη]: bracketed by Forster, whom F. A. Wolf followed. φωνη. B. Cron omits the word.

31 d, p. 113 (12). πόλει: bracketed by S with Cobet.

32 a, p. 113 (18). ἀλλα: with S and Bessarion's Ms. ἀλλα, Cron.

32 a, p. 114 (5). ἂμα ἀπολογίμα: with S, who now appeals to Venetus T. ἂμα καὶ ἂμα ἄν, Cron following B. S, previous to his collation of Venetus T, argued as follows: "Plato scripsit ἂμα, quo cum dittographia ἂμα ἄν conjuncta est; inde lectionum varietas nata; ἂν ex antecedentibus posse suppleri notum."

32 b, p. 115 (8). Ἀντικες: bracketed by Hirschig and S. The preceding ἡμῶν certainly makes it plausible that Ἀντικες may have been introduced as a marginal gloss. See Benn. p. 104.

32 b, p. 117 (12). ἡμῶν: ἡμῶν, ἡμῶν, W. Döring (Fleckensael).
Jahrb. 119, 1, p. 15) supposes that Horace had this passage (chap. xx.) in his mind when he wrote the third ode of the third book of his Odes.

32 b, p. 117 (13). [καὶ ἔναντία ἔνθασμένη]: Hermann brackets these words but W believes them to be genuine. If they are retained, it follows either (1) that Socrates was not (in spite of reasonable evidence that he was) the ἐπιστάτης τῶν πρυτάνεων, and therefore voted against the unlawful proposition when it came up in the assembly as any member might have done, or (2) that Socrates voted alone in a preliminary meeting of the prytanes against having the question put to the people in an unlawful form. (2) explains the context best. But when all is said and done, the whole wording is clumsy and repetitious, since ἔναντιωθήν would do quite as well alone, and the cumulative effect of καὶ is tiresome.

33 b, p. 120 (14). ἐρωτάω: Goebel prefers ἐρωτάω.
33 b, p. 120 (19). ἀλλαώ: following B. οἱ ἄλλοι, S W.
33 e, p. 123 (24). ἐὰν ἔσορτῇ: with Bessarion's Ms. ἔσορτῇ, Cron with S following B. Sauppe argues that the art. is not necessary here; it certainly is desirable.

34 a, p. 124 (32). τούτου: Goebel prefers τούτου.
34 c, p. 125 (3). ἀναμνησθήλα: ἀναμνησθήλα, Cron and S following B, where ἀναμνησθήλα is read.
34 c, p. 125 (6). αὐτοῦ: B. αὐτοῦ, W. Heller argues in favor of τὰ αὐτοῦ. He is right in so far that the ordinary idiom would give us the art.; but after all the art. would be indispensable only if τὰ παῖδια (meaning all his children) had preceded.

34 d, p. 120 (14). ἐλαύν μὲν ποῦ τίνες: with S and Stallbaum. ἐλαύν μὲν ποῦ τίνες, Cron.
34 d, p. 126 (17). ύστεροί: P. Foucart (Revue de Philologie, I, 35) bases upon Attic inscriptions the following remarks as to the orthography of this word: "une série d'exemples depuis le cinquième siècle jusqu'au deuxième avant notre ère montre que au moins en prose, les Athéniens employaient toujours la forme ύστεροι. . . . A partir de la conquête romaine, ύστεροι se rencontrent dans les inscriptions attiques, ainsi que ύστερος; la forme de la langue commune finit par l'emporter, et c'est la seule qu'emploient les copistes." The Attic form without τ is preserved only in Parisinus (A). See S, Vol. XII. pp. viii. and ix.
34 e, p. 127 (20). τῷ Σωκράτῃ: τῷ Σωκράτῃ, S W with Riddell. This dat. was preferred by Bernhardt. Nevertheless, the analogy of προσήκειν and ἀφέσκειν does not bear unqualified application to ἔμποροι. The reading η of B is τῷ σωκράτῃ, which suggests that the interlinear correction may be the right reading. If the dat. be adopted here, then appeal would have to be made to Hdt. iv. 59, ἔδιδοντα τοῖς πρώτοις τῶν μαντίσων αὐτοῖς ἀπολύσασθαι.

35 b, p. 128 (38). ψίμας: B. ψίμας, S W.
35 d, p. 129 (11). [πάντων]: with S W. Stallbaum brackets ὅλα πάντων. πάντων, Cron following B.
CRITICAL NOTES.

36 a, p. 131 (4). τὸ γεγονός τοῦτο: [τὸ γεγονός] τοῦτο, S with Cobet, who, indeed, rejects these three words because he thinks they have come into the text from the margin. There is certainly room for doubt.

36 c, p. 133 (9). ὅντα: with S W following E. ὅντα, Cron following B. Cron defends ὅντα in his Bem. p. 109 f. The example quoted from Tac. Ann. vi. 22 (where see Nipperdey's note) is not convincing.

36 c, p. 133 (11). [ἰὸν]: with S W. ἱὸν, Cron. S says (Studien, p. 35) of the whole passage: "Hermann was for doing away with ἵνα ἤδη. But certainly δὲ requires a finite verb. Simply bracket ἱὸν and the whole difficulty is solved. The word was apparently added by an interpolator who construed ἵνα ἤδη closely with ἐπιχειρῶν, after the analogy of Phaedo 200 b, ἵσταμαι γὰρ δι’ ἐπιχειρῶν τοῦ ἐπικύριαμα. Of course ἵνα ἤδη makes any such explanation absurd."

36 d, p. 134 (22). μᾶλλον: Liebhold proposes, not to bracket μᾶλλον, but to change it into γε ἴλα.

37 c, p. 136 (18). τοῖς ἐνδικα: [τοῖς ἐνδικα], S with Heindorf.
37 c, p. 136 (22). μεντάν: μέντ' ἂν, W.
37 e, p. 137 (4). ἵστι: Cron following S writes ἵστιν because of signs of erasure in B.

37 e, p. 137 (5). τοῦτ': with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes τοῦτο with B.

39 b, p. 141 (36). μὲν τοῦ: Heller proposes μὲν οὖν, which is added by a later (second) hand in the margin of B and is also the reading of some inferior Ms., which, however, also retain τοῦ.
39 c, p. 142 (7). ἐργασάμεθα οἶδομένῳ: ἐργασάμεθα με ὀλόμενοι, S with Winckelmann. ἐργασάμεθα οἶδομένῳ, W. Hermann added μὲν after ὀλόμενοι on the strength of signs of erasure in B, which were also detected by S.
39 d, p. 143 (14). οὐ γὰρ ἵστ': following B according to Gaisford. οὐ γὰρ ἵστ', S and W, who neither of them make any mention of Gaisford's report on the reading of B.

40 a, p. 144 (10). η τοῦ δαιμονίου: [ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου], S with Schleiermacher.
40 c, p. 145 (5). τοῦ τόπου τοῦ: bracketed as a gloss by S with Hirschig.
41 a, p. 147 (29). ἔθελο: with Bessarion's Ms. Cron following S writes ἔθελο with the best Ms. Here, and Phaedr. 249 b, we have the only two clear cases where the best Ms. credit Plato with using ἔθελο after a word ending in a consonant.

41 a, p. 147 (30). ταύτα ἵστιν: following S with Bessarion's Ms. ταύτ' ἵστιν, Cron with best Ms.
CRITICAL NOTES.

41 b, p. 147 (33). τίθηκεν. ἄντιπαραβαβλοποί: τίθηκεν, ἄντιπαραβαβλοποί, S.
41 b, p. 148 (34). ἐκεῖνον, ὦς: ἐκεῖνον. ὦς, S.
41 b, p. 148 (35). ἁθή: B. ἁθη, W with several Mss.
41 b, p. 148 (36). τές αὐτῶν: with W. The best Mss. read τές ἐν αὐτῶν. τές δή αὐτῶν, Cron with S, who adds the δή as his own conjecture.
41 b, p. 148 (37). ἐστί: with Mss. ἐστίν, Cron and S, because there are signs of erasure in B, and Venetus 185 (Bekker’s Π).
41 b, p. 148 (38). ἄγοντα: B. ἄγαγόντα, S W following other Mss.
42 a, p. 160 (22). πλὴν ὢ: πλὴν ἐλ, S following D. The reading of B cannot be made out, but Gaisford and S incline to think it is πλὴν ἐλ.

CRITO.

43 a, p. 151 (1). πρὸς ἐς ἐστίν: with B. πρὸς ἐστίν, S following inferior Mss. and the Zürich edition.
43 b, p. 152 (19). νῦν: νῦν, W.
43 b, p. 152 (20). πρᾶσος: πρᾶσι, S following the Mss. The ω subscript is an essential part of the word. See Curtius, Grundzüge, No. 379. The Mss. authorities leave the matter doubtful, though for Plato πρᾶσος is the prevailing orthography. πρᾶσος is always without ω. S has lately made up his mind to write πρᾶσιο even in Plato. See Vol. XII. p. 6.
43 d, p. 153 (33). δοκεὶ... ἡμῖν: δοκεῖ... ἡμῖν, S with Buttmann.
43 d, p. 153 (35). τοῦτον [τῶν ἄγιλιῶν]: τοῦτον τῶν ἄγιλιῶν, W.
44 b, p. 155 (3). ἡμεια: ἡμεια, S with Hirschg.
44 b, p. 155 (5). ἐς δὲ: ἐς δὲ, S. Rieckher strikes out ὄς before ὄς τε.
45 b, p. 158 (19). ἔδωκεν ὄτου ἐνδέλεξεν: ἔδωκεν [ὀτου] ἐνδέλεξεν, S. ἔδωκεν ἐν ἐνδέλεξε, W with the explanation præterea, præter me. See Fleckseisen’s Jahrb. 1877, pp. 222 ff. and Cron’s Bem. p. 117. It certainly seems far more natural to take ἐνδέλεξε as a gloss explaining ὄτου than to regard ὄτου as a gloss.
45 b, p. 158 (23). ἀποκάθαρσις: ἀποκαθάρσις, S with Jacobs. Here S, contrary to his usual practice, has not been able to resist a tempting but unnecessary emendation.
46 b, p. 101 (4). οὐ μόνον νῦν: οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, S with A. Nauck. See the preface to the third edition of Cron’s Apology and Crito (p. xiv. f.).
CRITICAL NOTES.


47 a, p. 163 (30). οἵκανος: οἷκα λαλῶς, S with Hirschig.

47 a, p. 163 (32). τῶν δ' οὖ: with S. τῶν δ' οὖ; [οὐδὲ πάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μόνον, τῶν δ' οὖ;], Cron with W. The words bracketed do not occur in B, and S rejects them as a confusing interpolation (Nov. Comm. p. 162). They occur in the margin of B and in inferior MSS.

47 c, p. 165 (15). τὴν δοξαν και τοῦς ἐπιάνους: τὴν δοξαν [καὶ τοῦς ἐπαινοῦσα], S. τὴν δοξαν και τοῦς ψύχους καὶ τοῦς ἐπιάνους, Stallbaum. τοῦς ψύχους καὶ τοῦς ἐπιάνους, Hirschig.

47 c, p. 165 (18). ἐστὶ: ἐστι, all editions. But the emphasis should be carefully kept on τι, on τοῖς, and on εἰς τι, and not put on the verbs.

47 c, p. 165 (20). διολλων: so it stands corrected in B. διολλών, S following inferior MSS.

47 c d, p. 165 (24 ff.). The simpler punctuation of Cron's seventh edition has been preferred to that of the eighth. In the latter Cron follows Goebel.

48 b, p. 167 (25). ἄλη η δι καὶ ταῦτα: given to Socrates by W with Buttman. S brackets φαίη γὰρ ἀν and makes Crito's speech include ἀλήθη λέγεις. Goebel proposes ἄλη γαρ δι και ταῦτα, φαίη γ' ἀν, σε Ἐκκρατεῖς. If anything is to be omitted, ἀλήθη λέγεις could best be spared.


48 e, p. 169 (23). πείθασι σε: with Buttman. πείθασι σε, W following the MSS. See Cron's preface to his first edition of the Apol. and Crito, p. xii., also Bem. p. 117 f. Meiser (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41) favors a change of order πείθασι σε, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκοντος ταῦτα πράττειν. Goebel urges πείθασι σε, which would, however, be intolerable after παύσαν ἦν.

49 a, p. 170 (4). [ἐκεῖ καὶ ἐρπτί ἰλέγετο]: Meiser proposes to find room for this between ἐκεῖ and πάσαι.

49 b, p. 170 (7). τηλυκοίδε γέροντες: with Jacobs. τηλυκοίδε γέροντες, W. Some authority for not bracketing would perhaps be found in Lach. 180 d.

50 c, p. 176 (2). ἔμενεν: ἔμενεν, S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (10). τοὺς νόμοις: [τοὺς νόμοις], S with Hirschig.

50 d, p. 176 (14). νόμοι: [νόμοι], S with Hirschig.

50 e, p. 177 (20). σολ: σε is preferred by Buttman, Stallbaum, Hirschig, Goebel.

51 a, p. 177 (26). ἑσταί: S. ἑσταῖ, W following the MSS. ἐς ίσου ἑσταί, Hirschig.

51 a, p. 178 (30). ἔ: ἔ, W following the MSS. S says the first hand in B wrote ἐ. See on 53 c.


52 a, p. 181 (1). σε, Σωκράτες, ταῖς: B. σε [Σωκράτες] ταῖς, S. σε, δ' Σωκράτες, ταῖς, W.

52 b, p. 181 (11). ἔξηλθες, [ὁτι... Ἰσθμόν], οὔτε: ἔξηλθες, οὔτε, S. S gives
reasons as follows: Verba δεί... Ἰνδικὸν, quae jam Athenaeus 5, 15, legisse videtur, in marg. add. bc, incluserunt Turicenses delevit MS [i.e. Schanz himself]. See his Nov. Comm. p. 162.

52 d, p. 182 (28). πολιτεύονται: B. πολιτεύονται, S with inferior Mss.

53 a, p. 183 (43). δῆλον... νόμοι: bracketed by S with H. Stephanus and Hirschig, who also both reject οἱ νόμοι.

53 a, p. 184 (44). ἐμμένεις: B. ἐμμένεις, S W following the second hand in B.

53 b, p. 184 (7). Μεγάρας: Μεγάρας, W. Gaisford remarks on Phaedr. 227 d: "μέγαρας Fuit μέγαρα δὲ p. m." Is this the reading of B in this passage also?

53 e, p. 185 (17). ἦ: B. ἦ, S W. As in 51 a, p. 178 (30), where the reading of B is harder to make out, so here also S writes ἦ. The more vigorous ἦ (really) is better suited to the context than ἦ, which simply makes affirmation a matter of course.

53 e, p. 185 (28). αἰσχρός: with S and W. Still γλυκρός, which is added on the margin of B, deserves attention, and perhaps should be preferred. Cf. in the preceding line (27) the undoubtedly correct μεταλλάξας, which is on the margin of B, while in the text we find καταλλάξας, which both S and W reject.

53 e, p. 186 (32). καὶ δουλεύων... τι: καὶ [δουλεύων·] τίς, S with Schleiermacher.


54 a, p. 187 (41). ἐγκαλοῦμαν αὐτῶν, πότερον: [ἐγκαλοῦμαν] αὐτῶν πότερον, S.

54 b, p. 187 (1). πειθόμενος ημῖν: Meiser inserts after these words τοὺς συνε γεννήτας καὶ (Fleckeisen's Jahrb. 109, 1, p. 41).

54 d, p. 188 (1). Κρίτων: [Κρίτων], S.
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